govinfo:USCOURTS-wvnd-1_24-cv-00014-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 
CLARKSBURG 
 
MASSINISSA BELKADI, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
 
v.       CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-14 
         (KLEEH) 
 
C.C. MAYLE, a police officer  
for the City of Morgantown, 
 
  Defendant. 
 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL [ECF NO. 3] 
 
 Pending before the Court is Defendant C.C. Mayle’s Motion 
[to] Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint In lieu of Answer [ECF No. 3]. 
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant C.C. Mayle’s Motion is 
GRANTED. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff Massinissa Belkadi 
(“Plaintiff” or “Belkadi”) against C.C. Mayle, a police officer 
for the City of Morgantown. Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, Counts 
One through Four are brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and allege (1) 
Excessive Force; (2) False Arrest; (3) Unlawful Search and Seizure; 
and (4) Unlawful Detainment. Counts Five and Six are brought under 
West Virginia common law and allege (5) Battery and (6) Assault. 
Id. 
On March 27, 2024, Defendant C.C. Mayle (“Defendant” or 
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“Mayle”) moved to dismiss Counts One through Four of the Complaint 
to the extent they are brought under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and also asserts 
Counts Three and Four should be dismissed as duplicative of Count 
Two. ECF No. 3. On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed his response in 
opposition to partial dismissal [ECF No. 5] and Defendant filed 
his reply in support of dismissal on April 17, 2025 [ECF No. 6]. 
The Court additionally convened for a hearing on the subject Motion 
on January 13, 2025, and heard arguments from the parties. The 
Motion for Partial Dismissal [ECF No. 3] is thus fully briefed and 
ripe for review.  
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of 
February 2, 2023, he was in downtown Morgantown, West Virginia and 
planned to meet up later in the night with his girlfriend. ECF No. 
1 at ¶¶ 4-5. When meeting up, Plaintiff’s girlfriend was 
intoxicated, and he attempted to help her get back to his apartment 
– as previously planned. Id. at ¶¶ 6-8. During this time, one of 
the girlfriend’s friends yelled at Plaintiff and a stranger then 
picked up Plaintiff’s girlfriend and carried her away. Id. at ¶¶ 
8-10.  
Soon after, Defendant Officer C.C. Mayle arrived and 
approached Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff claims that Mayle 
physically placed his hands on him and forced him to sit on steps 
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outside a restaurant – detaining him. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff 
alleges Mayle then started questioning and yelling at him. Id. at 
¶¶ 19-20. Mayle allegedly accused Plaintiff of pulling his 
girlfriend into a car and told Plaintiff he would arrest Plaintiff 
if Plaintiff did not stop yelling at him. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23. 
Plaintiff asserts that Mayle failed to de-escalate the situation. 
Id. at ¶ 24. 
Mayle asked Plaintiff for his name, and he initially refused, 
but then gave his full name and offered up his identification. Id. 
at ¶¶ 26-29. During this time, Mayle ordered Plaintiff to stand, 
and when he did not stand, Mayle allegedly grabbed Plaintiff and 
lifted him up to a standing position. Id. at ¶¶ 28-30. Plaintiff 
claims he repeatedly asked the officer “for what?” during the 
interaction. Id. at ¶ 31. Then, Mayle allegedly swung Plaintiff 
from a standing position and slammed his head on a concrete 
sidewalk. Id. at ¶ 32. 
At this time, Mayle and another officer handcuffed Plaintiff 
and told him to stop resisting. Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff told the 
officers he was not doing anything. Id. at ¶ 38. After handcuffing 
Plaintiff and walking him towards a police vehicle, Mayle told him 
he was under arrest for disorderly conduct and public intoxication. 
Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiff was not read his Miranda rights upon arrest. 
Id. at ¶ 40. After the arrest, the police did not conduct a 
breathalyzer test or a field sobriety test. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. 
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 Plaintiff alleges he suffered physical injuries to his head 
and a finger as a result of Mayle’s actions. Id. at ¶ 45.  He was 
treated at Mon Health Medical Center for the alleged injuries and 
was diagnosed with a concussion and facial abrasions. Id. at ¶¶ 
46-47. Though Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct, 
obstructing an officer; fleeing from officer, public intoxication, 
and underage possession/consumption of alcohol – all the charges 
were later dismissed. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
a defendant to move for dismissal upon the ground that a Complaint 
does not “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In 
ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of 
the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.” Anderson v. 
Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Erickson 
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). A court is “not bound to accept 
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).  
 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(6)(b) tests the “legal 
sufficiency of a Complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 
192 (4th Cir. 2009). A court should dismiss a Complaint if it does 
not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007). Plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads 
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The factual 
allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above a 
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. The facts must 
constitute more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action.” Id. at 555. A motion to dismiss “does not resolve 
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the 
applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 
980 F.2d 942, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).  
IV. DISCUSSION 
As an initial matter, Defendant does not dispute that Counts 
One through Four are adequately pled under a Fourth Amendment 
theory of liability. However, even under the Fourth Amendment, 
Defendant contends Counts Three and Four are duplicative or 
encompassed by Count Two of the Complaint. Defendant further does 
not challenge the adequacy of the pleadings for the assault and 
battery claims. Thus, the parties’ arguments and the Court’s 
analysis focuses on (1) the applicability of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments as a basis for Counts One through Four and 
(2) whether Counts Three and Four are viable separate claims. For 
the reasons elaborated upon below, Defendant’s Motion for Partial 
Dismissal [ECF No. 3] is GRANTED. 
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A. Counts One through Four are Dismissed to the Extent the 
Claims Rely Upon the Eighth Amendment.  
Defendant argues that the § 1983 claims cannot be based upon 
the Eighth Amendment because it’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment protects individuals post adjudication when 
incarcerated. ECF No. 4 at pp. 6-7. In his reply briefing, 
Plaintiff concedes this point and acknowledges that his claims 
“should not be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment since 
Defendant’s actions against Plaintiff detailed in the Complaint 
did not occur after any ‘conviction’. . .” ECF No. 5 at p. 6. Thus, 
Counts One through Four are DISMISSED to the extent they rely upon 
the Eighth Amendment. 
B. Counts One through Four are Dismissed to the Extent the 
Claims Rely Upon the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Defendant moves to dismiss Counts One through Four as they 
are alleged under the Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff did 
not specify whether the claims are substantive or procedural due 
process violations. ECF No. 4 at p. 3. Further, assuming the claims 
are substantive Fourteenth Amendment claims, Defendant asserts 
that they are duplicative of the more specific rights afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. In support of his Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, Plaintiff argues that the claims should survive 
to the extent Plaintiff was treated as a pretrial detainee at any 
point during the subject events. ECF No. 5 at p. 5 (arguing it 
remains unclear when an individual’s rights prior to the completion 
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of an arrest end under the Fourth Amendment, and the protection to 
pretrial detainees analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment begin). 
Defendant rebuts Plaintiff’s argument stating that Plaintiff was 
not a pretrial detainee during the subject conduct because 
Plaintiff had not yet been formally charged – rather the conduct 
was incident to arrest. ECF No. 6 at p. 3. 
The Supreme Court has held that “if a constitutional claim is 
covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth 
or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard 
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of 
substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 
272 n.7 (1997) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). 
“The Court may not entertain a due process claim where Plaintiffs 
allege a Fourth Amendment claim arising from the same abusive 
government conduct.” Spry v. W. Virginia, 2017 WL 440733, at *6 
(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 1, 2017) (dismissing Fourteenth Amendment claim 
“[b]ecause Plaintiffs' textually-specific Fourth Amendment claim 
affords her decedent ample protection”). See Zsigray v. Cnty. 
Comm'n of Lewis Cnty., 2017 WL 462011, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 2, 
2017), aff'd sub nom. Zsigray v. Cnty. Comm'n of Lewis Cnty., W. 
Virginia, 709 F. App'x 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (dismissing Fourteenth 
Amendment claim because “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of 
physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the 
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more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the 
guide for analyzing these claims.”). 
Here, Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One through Four are 
appropriately brought pursuant to the Fourth Amendment because 
they all relate to the alleged unlawful arrest on February 1, 2024. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Plaintiff’s argument that he could be 
considered a pretrial detainee is a distinction without a 
difference and is not relevant to determining if a viable 
Fourteenth Amendment claim exists because, here, the Fourth 
Amendment provides the specific constitutional protections 
Plaintiff alleges were infringed by Mayle before and during his 
arrest. The Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim is 
duplicative and arises from the same alleged abusive government 
conduct. Plaintiff’s claims are thus properly alleged under the 
Fourth Amendment. Thus, Counts One through Four are DISMISSED to 
the extent they rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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C. Counts Three and Four are Dismissed Because the Claims 
are Subsumed by Count Two.   
Defendant argues Count Three for Unlawful Seizure and Count 
Four for Unlawful Detainment should be dismissed because they are 
duplicative of Count Two for False Arrest. ECF No. 4 at p. 7. 
According to Defendant, the facts pled in support of Counts Three 
and Four are the same as Count T wo – one encounter, one set of 
facts, and one event. In contrast, Plaintiff argues he should be 
able to proceed on all three independent claims because he provided 
facts to support each claim. Alternatively, he argues he is 
entitled to plead alternative claims. ECF No. 5, at p. 8. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2).  
“Claims are duplicative if they ‘stem from identical 
allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and 
for which identical relief is available.’ Doe v. Cmty. Coll. of 
Balt. Cnty., 595 F. Supp. 3d 392, 417 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting Wultz 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)). 
Furthermore, a “district court ‘has discretion to dismiss 
duplicative claims where they allege the same facts and the same 
injury’” in the interest of judicial economy. Id. Additionally, 
the Court can read the duplicative claims as being subsumed by the 
overarching Fourth Amendment claim. See Williamson v. Mills, 65 
F.3d 155, 158–59 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding excessive force claim 
subsumed by the false arrest claim because the damages recoverable 
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on the false arrest claim included damages suffered because of use 
of force in affecting arrest); Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 
1180 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Unlike a genuine excessive force claim, an 
artificial excessive force claim – that force was excessive merely 
because another Fourth Amendment violation occurred – is subsumed 
in the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive 
force claim.”). 
Here, Counts Three and Four assert the same Fourth Amendment 
violations relating to Plaintiff’s arrest and the interactions 
leading up to the arrest. While Plaintiff is the master of his 
complaint, the Court finds little difference in facts or legal 
rights between Counts Two, Three, and Four. Thus, the facts alleged 
in support of unlawful detention and unlawful seizure can be used 
to support the false arrest claim in Count Two and Counts Three 
and Four are DISMISSED. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant C.C. Mayle’s Motion [to] 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint In lieu of Answer  [ECF No. 3] is 
GRANTED. Counts Three and Four of Plaintiff’s Complaint for 
Unlawful Search and Seizure and Unlawful Detainment are DISMISSED 
because the alleged unlawful conduct is duplicative and included 
within Count Two.1 Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One through Four 
 
1 The subject Order is amended to correct a clerical error regarding 
the appropriate counts of dismissal. 
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are further DISMISSED to the extent the claims are brought under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. Thus, Plaintiff’s remaining claims are Count One for 
Excessive Force and Count Two for False Arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment and Counts Five and Six for Battery and Assault under 
West Virginia common law. 
It is so ORDERED.  
 The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Amended 
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF 
system.  
DATED:  April 10, 2025 
 
      ____________________________                 
      THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE 
      NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 
 
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