govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_26-cv-00164-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
 
BRANDON M. HENRY, 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
WARDEN GUADAMAMA, et al., 
 Defendants. 
 
 
No. 3:26-cv-164 (SRU)  
  
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
 
Pro se plaintiff Brandon M. Henry (“Henry”)1 is currently in Connecticut Department of 
Correction (“DOC”) custody at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (“MacDougall-
Walker CI”).  Construing Henry’s complaint liberally, he brings Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claims against Warden Guadarrama,2 Lieutenant Milner, and two unnamed 
correctional officers (collectively, the “Defendants”).  See Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 4. 
For the following reasons, Henry may pursue his Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claims against Lieutenant Milner and John Doe 1.  All other claims are dismissed, 
and all other defendants are terminated.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Below is a summary of the basic factual allegations in Henry’s complaint. 
 
1 See Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Locator (“DOC Inmate locator”), 
https://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=316893 (last accessed Mar. 31, 2026).  I take 
judicial notice of that public record.  See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelley v. 
Quiros, 2023 WL 1818545, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2023) (taking judicial notice of state prison website inmate 
locator information). 
2 Although Henry lists “Warden Guadamama” as a defendant, the warden of McDougall-Walker CI is Jesus 
Guadarrama.  See Conn. Dep’t of Corr., MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution, 
https://portal.ct.gov/doc/facility/macdougall-walker-ci (last accessed Mar. 31, 2026).  I also take judicial notice of 
the publicly listed warden of McDougall-Walker CI and refer to him as “Warden Guadarrama.”  See Mangiafico, 
471 F.3d at 398. 
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On November 3, 2025, while Henry was housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit 
(“RHU”), he stepped out of the shower with his hands handcuffed behind his back.  See Compl., 
Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2.  Henry slipped and fell, and he sustained a nondescript injury.  Id. ¶ 3.  He 
alleges his injury would not have happened if the correctional officer who escorted him out of 
the shower did a “hands on escort” pursuant to DOC policy.  Id. ¶ 4.  Henry also alleges that 
“slip strips” outside of the showers may have prevented his injury.  Id. ¶ 5.  
Henry states that no one came to his aid as he lay on the ground in pain with his hands 
cuffed behind his back.  Id. ¶ 6.  Instead, Lieutenant Milner and a correctional officer (“John Doe 
1”) stood over him laughing and making derogatory comments.  Id. ¶ 7.  He alleges that neither 
of them called a code despite his injury.  Id.  Henry also claims that a second correctional officer 
(“John Doe 2”) who was in the “bubble” (ostensibly the officer’s station), did not call a code.  Id. 
¶ 8.  
Henry asserts that Warden Guadarrama tours the facility and is aware of the lack of slip 
strips.  Id. ¶ 9.  He states that he is not the first to fall due to a lack of slip strips.  Id.  
As relief, Henry requests monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of 
installation of slip strips and discipline of the involved officers for their failure to help him.  Doc. 
No. 1 at 5.  He also requests that all correctional officers be issued written orders to escort 
inmates “hands on” when they are removed from the showers.  Id.  Henry does not specify in 
what capacity he sues the Defendants, but, because he seeks both monetary damages and 
injunctive relief, I assume he sues them in both their individual and official capacities. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under section 1915A of Title 28 of the United States Code, I must review any “complaint 
in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 
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employee of a governmental entity.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).  I then must “dismiss the complaint, 
or any portion of the complaint,” if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 
relief.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).  Dismissal under this provision may be with or without prejudice.  
See Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004). 
In reviewing complaints under section 1915A, I must construe them “liberally and 
interpret[] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”  Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 
F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)).  A civil complaint must include sufficient 
facts to afford defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based 
and to demonstrate a plausible right to relief.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555-56 (2007).  Further, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  Conclusory allegations are not sufficient.  See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   
III. DISCUSSION 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”  U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).  
The ban on cruel and unusual punishment “does not mandate comfortable prisons, . . . but neither 
does it permit inhumane ones.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  An Eighth Amendment claim related to the conditions of 
an inmate’s confinement, often referred to as a “deliberate indifference” claim, is comprised of 
objective and subjective elements.  Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998).  
Objectively, an inmate must be deprived of a “basic human need[ ],” or be subjected to a 
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“substantial risk of serious harm” to health or safety.  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 
(1981); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  Subjectively, a prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] 
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 
Allegations of “mere negligence” are insufficient to plead a deliberate indifference claim. 
Id. at 835.  Moreover, “[t]he Second Circuit has recognized that ‘slip-and-fall claims are seldom 
viewed as rising to constitutional dimension,’ but could if ‘exceptional circumstances’ elevated 
the danger of a condition beyond that typically ‘presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet 
floor.’”  Branch v. Guadarrama, 2024 WL 3342991, at *3 (D. Conn. July 9, 2024) (quoting 
McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2020)). 
I assume for initial review purposes that Henry satisfies the objective prong.  With 
respect to Defendants Guadarrama and John Doe 2, Henry does not allege facts to suggest that 
they had the requisite knowledge of an excessive risk to Henry’s safety.  I therefore dismiss 
Henry’s claims against Defendants Guadarrama and John Doe 2.  I will, however, allow Henry’s 
deliberate indifference claims to proceed against Defendants Milner and John Doe 1 for further 
development, particularly because Henry alleges Defendants Milner and John Doe 1 failed to aid 
him (as was customary) while he was handcuffed behind his back, which may constitute an 
exceptional circumstance.  Henry’s deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Milner and 
John Doe 1 in their individual and official capacities therefore may proceed for further 
development.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is hereby ordered that: 
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(1) The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Milner and 
John Doe 1 in their individual and official capacities will proceed for further 
development of the record. 
(2) The Clerk is directed to correct the name of Warden Guadarrama on the docket, 
changing “Warden Guadamama” to “Warden Guadarrama.” 
(3) All other claims are dismissed. 
(4) All other defendants are terminated. 
(5) Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the Clerk shall verify the current work 
addresses of Lieutenant Milner, and mail a copy of the Complaint, this Order, and a 
waiver of service of process request packet to Lieutenant Milner in his individual 
capacity at his confirmed address.  On the thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing, the 
Clerk shall report to the Court on the status of each request.  If Lieutenant Milner fails 
to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for in-person service 
by the U.S. Marshals Service and Lieutenant Milner shall be required to pay the costs 
of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). 
(6) Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the U.S. Marshals Service shall serve the 
summons, a copy of the complaint and this Order on Lieutenant Milner in 
his official capacity by delivering the necessary documents in person to the Office of 
the Attorney General, 165 Capitol Ave., Hartford, CT 06106. 
(7) The Clerk cannot effect service on a Doe defendant without that defendant’s full 
name and current work address.  Henry is directed to obtain this information during 
discovery and to file a notice containing that information about the Doe Defendant 
with the court within 90 days of this Order.  Once a Doe defendant is identified, the 
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court will order that he or she be served with a copy of the complaint.  Failure to 
identify a Doe defendant within this time frame will result in the dismissal of all 
claims against that defendant. 
(8) Lieutenant Milner shall file a response to the Complaint, either an answer or motion 
to dismiss, within thirty (30) days from the date the Notice of Lawsuit and Waivers 
of Service of Summons forms are mailed to him or her.  If Lieutenant Milner chooses 
to file an answer, Lieutenant Milner shall admit or deny the allegations and respond 
to the cognizable claims recited above. Lieutenant Milner may also include all 
additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules. 
(9) Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, shall be 
completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this order.  Discovery 
requests need not be filed with the Court. 
(10) All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months (240 days) 
from the date of this order. 
(11) If Henry changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local 
Court Rule 83.1(c)(2) provides that Henry MUST notify the Court. Failure to do so 
may result in the dismissal of the case.  Henry must give notice of a new address even 
if he is incarcerated.  Henry should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on 
the notice.  It is not enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating 
that it is a new address.  If Henry has more than one pending case, he should indicate 
all case numbers in the notification of change of address.  Henry should also notify 
Defendants or the attorney for Defendants of his new address. 
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(12) Henry shall utilize the Prisoner E-filing Program when filing documents with the 
Court.  Henry is advised that the Program may be used only to file documents with 
the Court.  Local Court Rule 5(f) provides that discovery requests are not to be filed 
with the Court.  Therefore, discovery requests must be served on Defendants’ 
attorney by regular mail. 
(13) The Clerk shall immediately enter the District of Connecticut Standing Order Re: 
Initial Discovery Disclosures concerning cases initiated by self-represented inmates 
and shall send a copy of the Standing Order to the parties. 
(14) The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the complaint and this order to the 
Connecticut Attorney General and the DOC Legal Affairs Unit. 
So ordered. 
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 31st day of March 2026. 
 
 
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL 
Stefan R. Underhill  
United States District Judge 
 
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