govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_19-cv-00593-4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
ZION WILLIAMSON, 
 
   P l a i n t i f f ,  
 
                      v. 
 
PRIME SPORTS MARKETING, LLC, 
and GINA FORD, 
 
   D e f e n d a n t s .  
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1:19CV593 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
LORETTA C. BIGGS, Senior District Judge. 
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for A ttorney’s Fees made pursuant to (1) N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5; (2) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-1 54(d); and (3) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1 against 
Defendants.  (ECF No. 194 at 1. )  For the reasons stated here in, Plaintiff’s motion will be 
granted in part and denied in part. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Zion Williamson, was a student an d basketball player at Duke University 
during the 2018-2019 school year.  (ECF Nos. 14 ¶ 15; 32, Answer  ¶ 15.)  As recognized by 
the Fourth Circuit “[w]hen he enrolled at Duke  University, Zion Williamson was one of the 
most prominent young stars in basketball.  As a freshman on the Duke men’s basketball team, 
Williamson was named Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) Player of the Year and led Duke to 
the ACC Championship.  At the end of his firs t season, Williamson entered the NBA draft, 
where he was selected by the New Orleans Pelicans as the number one overall pick.”  
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Williamson v. Prim e Sports Marketing , 101 F.4th 302, 306 (4th Cir. 2024).  Williamson’s talent 
generated interest from agents wanting to represent him as well as fans. 
Defendant Prime Sports Marketing LLC, is a Florida sports marketing agency formed 
on April 1, 2018.  (ECF Nos. 14 ¶ 16; 32, Answer ¶ 16.)  Defendant Ford is the President and 
CEO of Prime Sports and appears to be its sole or primary employee.  (ECF No. 150-2 ¶¶ 1, 
7.) 
On April 20, 2019, Defendants entered into an agreement to represent Plaintiff, while 
he was still a freshman student at Duke, (ECF No. 150-3 at 9, (the “Agreement”).)  According 
to the terms of the Agreement, Defendants would “identify[ ] branding and endorsement 
opportunities” and “exclusively oversee all marketing opportunities brought before” Plaintiff.  
(Id. ¶¶ 1, 1.1.)  Also, in April and May of 2019 , Plaintiff was contacted by representatives of 
Creative Artists Agency, LLC (“CAA”), a comp eting agency.  (ECF Nos. 32, Counterclaims 
¶ 73; 33 ¶ 73.)  On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff emailed Defendan ts to terminate the Agreement 
the parties had previously signed.  (ECF No. 104 -2.)  Plaintiff then signed a representation 
agreement with CAA the same day.  (ECF No. 104-12.) 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff initiated this action on June 13, 2 0 1 9 .   ( E C F  N o .  1 . )   A s  a m e n d e d ,  h i s  
Complaint alleged that: (1) the Agreement is unenforceable under North Carolina’s Uniform 
Athlete Agent Act (“UAAA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78C-85, et seq.; (2) Defendants violated North 
Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, et 
seq.; and (3) Defendants fraudule ntly induced him to sign the Agreement.  (ECF No. 14 ¶¶ 
54–77.)  Plaintiff’s Complaint sought declarat ory and injunctive relief as well as monetary 
damages and attorney’s fees.  ( Id. at 22–24.)  Specifically, Plai ntiff requested that the Court 
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declare that the Agreement was void and unenforceable and that Defendants be enjoined from 
holding themselves out as his representative, among other things.  (Id. at 22–24.) 
On September 12, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, 
and on April 24, 2020, this Court denied Defendants’ motion, ( see ECF No. 31).  After their 
Motion to Dismiss was denied, on May 8, 2020, Defendants filed their Answer alleging an 
assortment of counterclaims, in contract and tort, seeking to recoup  payment for the work 
they performed on Plaintiff’s behalf.  (ECF No . 32.)  Defendants’ counterclaims included 
breach of contract (Count I), fraud (Count II), civil conspiracy (Count III), unjust enrichment 
(Count IV), misappropriation of trade secrets in  violation of North Ca rolina’s Trade Secrets 
Protection Act (“TSPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152, et. seq. (Count V), conversion (Count VI), 
breach of implied duty of good faith and fair  dealing, (Count VII), violation of the UDTPA 
(Count X); and Defendants additionally sought declaratory relief (Count VIII), injunctive relief 
(Count IX), and punitive damages in exce ss of 100 million dollars (Count XI).  ( Id. ¶¶ 101–
296.) 
Thereafter, on May 20, 2020, Plaintiff moved for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings on 
his declaratory judgment claim.  (ECF No. 34 .)  On January 20, 2021, this Court granted 
Plaintiff’s motion.  (ECF No. 49 at 20.)  Th is Court concluded and declared, among other 
things, that the Agreement was void as a matte r of law because Plaintiff was a “Student 
Athlete” under the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”), and neither Defendants nor the 
Agreement complied with the UAAA’s requirements for student athletic agents and agency 
agreements.  (Id. at 13–20.) 
After this Court entered Judgement for Plaint iff, Defendants then filed four related 
motions seeking to amend, reconsider or vacate this Court’s judgment which this Court found 
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“all appear[ed] to seek the same or related relief.”  (ECF No. 83 at 1.)  Specifically, Defendants 
filed: (1) a Motion to Alter or Amend the Court’s Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial 
Judgment on the Pleadings, on February 17, 2021, (ECF No. 51); (2) a Motion for Leave to 
Amend Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Coun terclaims, on February 17, 2021, (ECF No. 
53); (3) a Motion to Substitute Proposed Am ended Answer, Amended Affirmative Defenses 
and Amended Counterclaims in Pending Motion for Leave to Amend, on May 11, 2021, (ECF 
No. 65); and (4) a Notice of Motion to Vacate the Courts Order Granting Partial Judgment 
on the Pleadings, on May 20, 2021, (ECF No. 69).  On September 15, 2021, the Court denied 
all four motions.  (ECF No. 83.) 
Following the Court’s Order denying all four of Defendants’ motions, on October 15, 
2021, Defendants filed another Motion entitled  “Notice of Motion to Certify Judgment on 
the Pleadings, Order for Appeal, and to Stay Pr oceedings.”  (ECF No. 86.)  In this motion, 
Defendants were seeking to certify two of this  Court’s Orders for an  interlocutory appeal, 
(ECF Nos. 49; 83), and seeking to stay the proceedings pending Appeal.  (Id. at 1.)  Before this 
motion was addressed, the parties proceeded to discovery on Defendants counterclaims after 
which the parties, on February  11, 2022, each filed motions  for summary judgment on the 
counterclaims.  (ECF Nos. 102, 119.)1 
On July 18, 2022, the Court denied Defend ants’ Motion to Certify Judgment on the 
Pleadings, Order for Appeal, and to Stay Pro ceedings,” (ECF No. 177 at 25.)  The Court on 
that same date ruled on the parties cross motions for summary judgment related to 
Defendants’ counterclaims.  (E CF Nos. 102; 119; 177.)  Sp ecifically, the Court granted 
 
1 A Joint Stipulation of Dismissal was filed related to Plaintiff’s claims for the North Carolina Unfair and 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim and Plaintiff’s claim of fraudulent inducement, (ECF No. 188). 
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment an d denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  (ECF No. 177 at 24–25.) 
Following the Court’s entry of Final Judgment, (ECF No. 190), on September 7, 2022, 
Defendants appealed this case to the Fourth Ci rcuit Court of Appeals.  (ECF No. 191.)  On 
May 6, 2024, the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court’s Order voiding the contract and granting 
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on each of Defendants’ contract and tort 
counterclaims.  Williamson, 101 F.4th at 316.  On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant 
Motion for Attorney’s Fees.  (ECF No. 194.) 
III. STATUTORY BASIS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
The Plaintiff is seeking attorney fees pursuant to three separate North Carolina statutes; 
therefore, this Court will address each statute se parately to determine its applicability to this 
case. 
A. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5 
The first statute Plaintiff seeks his attorney’ s fees under is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5 
which awards attorney fees in nonjusticiable cases.  (ECF No. 196 at 7.)  “Under North 
Carolina law, a successful litigant may not rec over attorney’s fees, whether as costs or as an 
item of damages, unless such recovery is expressly authorized by statute.”  Silicon Knights, Inc. 
v. Epic Games, Inc. , 917 F. Supp.2d 503, 516 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2012) (internal quotations 
omitted) (citation omitted), aff’d 551 F. App’x 646 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curium) (unpublished).  
The statute Plaintiff requests attorney fees under provides in relevant part: 
In any civil action, special proceeding, or estate or trust proceeding, the court, 
upon motion of the prevailing party, ma y award a reasonable attorney’s fee to 
the prevailing party if the court finds that there was a complete absence of a 
justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party in any pleading.  
 
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5.  “Sect ion 6-21.5 was enacted to discou rage frivolous legal action.”  
Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Clancy & Theys Const. Co. , 5:12-CV-636-BR, 2015 WL 
7015725, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2015) (citations omitte d) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Whether to award attorney’s fees under this statute rests in the trial courts discretion.  
Lashchkewitsch v. Am. Nat’l Life Inc. Co., 5:15-CV-21-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185321, at * 3 
(E.D.N.C. July 27, 2017) (quoting McLennan v. C.K. Josey, Jr. , 785 S.E.2d 144, 148 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016)).  Because Section 6-21.5 provides for an award of attorney’s fees in derogation of 
the state’s common law, the statute must be strictly construed.  Sunamerica Fin. Corp. v. Bonham, 
400 S.E.2d 435, 438, (N.C. 1991). 
Awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5, requires that the court 
find (1) that the party seeking fees is a “prevailing party” and (2) “that there was a complete 
absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact  raised by the losing party in any pleading.”  
Lashchkewitsch, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185321, at *3–4. 
Regarding the first element, this Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party on 
each of the claims and counterclaims prosecuted in this action as this Court found in favor of 
Plaintiff on his Partial Motion for Judgment on  the Pleadings, and again on his Motion for 
Summary Judgment and against Defendant on its cross Motion for Summary Judgment on 
each of Defendants’ affirmative defenses and counter-claims, with each of these rulings being 
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.  (ECF Nos. 49, 177); Williamson, 101 F.4th at 316; see also Persis 
Nova Constr., Inc. v. Edwards, 671 S.E.2d 23, 30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“a prevailing party . . . is 
a party who prevails on a claim or issue in an action, not a party who prevails in the action.”) 
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
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Regarding the second element, a complete ab sence of a justiciable issue, “[i]n North 
Carolina, a justiciable issue is one that is ‘real and present as opposed to imagined or fanciful’.”  
Credigy Receivables, Inc. v. Whittington , 689 S.E.2d 889, 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting In re 
Williamson, 373 S.E.2d 317, 325 (N.C. App. 1988)).  “In order to find a complete absence of a 
justiciable issue it must conclusively appear that such issues are absent even giving the 
pleadings the indulgent treatment they receive on motions for summary judgment or motions 
to dismiss.”  Sunamerica Fin. Corp. v. Bonham , 400 S.E.2d 435, 437 (N .C. 1991) (citations 
omitted). 
In analyzing this element, th e trial court must determine whether: “(1) the pleadings 
contain a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact, . . . or (2) whether the 
losing party persisted in litigating the case after a point where he should reasonably have 
become aware that the pleading he filed no  longer contained a justiciable issue.”  Front Row 
Motorsports, Inc. v. DiSeveria, 3:22-CV-00138-SCR, 2024 WL 3258828, at *5 (W.D.N.C June 28, 
2024) (citations omitted).  The presence or absen ce of justiciable issues is a question of law.  
Id. at *3 (quoting Burleson, COA23-187, 2024 WL 1163348, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024). 
Plaintiff argues that there is a complete abse nce of justiciable issue because once the Court 
declared the Agreement void th ere was an “utter absence of legal or factual support for 
[Defendants’] counterclaims.”  (ECF No. 196 at 15.)  Defendants counter that their 
counterclaims “were separate from and indepe ndent of whether the parties’ Agreement was 
void and whether Plaintiff was or was not a ‘student athlete.’” (ECF No. 201 at 8.) 
First, this Court finds that at the time De fendants filed their Answer on May 8, 2020, 
(ECF No. 32), asserting their coun terclaims, there may have been justiciable issues of law or 
fact related to its counterclaims and affirmative defenses, or at the very least Defendants would 
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not have been on notice that their affirmativ e defenses and/or counterclaims were without 
merit.  Moreover, the Answer was filed prior to the Court’s Order declaring the Agreement 
between the parties void as a matter of law.  See Sunamerica, 400 S.E.2d at 438 (“it is [] possible 
that a pleading which, when re ad alone sets forth a justiciabl e controversy, may, when read 
with a responsive pleading, no longer present a justiciable controversy.”).  However, in 
determining whether to grant attorney’s fees unde r this statute, a “trial court may consider 
evidence developed after the pleadings have been filed.”  Sunamerica, 400 S.E.2d at 438. 
Therefore, the question before the court is whether Defendants, here the losing party, 
persisted in litigating their case after a point where they should reasonably have become aware 
that the pleading filed, here the Answer, no longer contained a “justiciable issue.”  The Court 
finds that Defendants did so under the facts of this case. 
Defendants should have first become aware that their claims, or at least certain of their 
claims, those specifically related to their brea ch of contract claim,  no longer contained a 
justiciable issue once this Court ruled upon Plaintiff’s motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
and concluded that the Agreement between the parties was void as a matter of law.  (ECF No. 
49 at 20.)  In its Order granting Plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment, this Court analyzed 
Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff was not a student athlete.  (See id.)  As a result, this Court 
held that “Defendants’ affirmative defenses and counter claims that Plaintiff was not a 
student-athlete “do not rely on material allegations of fact, rather the counterclaims are based 
on conclusions of law that fly in the face of their own pleadings as well as attachments to their 
pleadings.”  ( Id. a t  1 5 . )   F u r t h e r ,  t h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  t h a t  D e f e n d a n t s  themselves submitted 
pleadings and attachments that made repeated  references to Plaintiff’s engagement in 
collegiate athletics to such a degree that the Co urt concluded that Plaintiff engaging in an 
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intercollegiate sport “appears uncontested.”  ( Id. at 14.)  Therefore, at the very least, 
Defendants were put on notice that this Court found serious deficiencies in both the factual 
and legal bases for its claims.  Nevertheless, it does not appear that Defendants reconsidered 
their litigation strategy or initiated a change of course despite having been placed on notice of 
the deficiencies in their claims. 
Rather, Defendants filed four motions that  sought to, among other things, alter or 
amend the Court’s Order ruling the Agreement void, causing this Court to take a second look 
at Defendants’ pleadings and additional argume nts to support their claims.  However, the 
Court nevertheless found that “Defendants pleaded only conclusory allegations, not 
supported by factual allegations specific to Plaintiff from which this Court could conclude that 
a genuine issue was raised.”  (ECF No. 83 at 9.)  Additionally, the Court found that “[d]espite 
Defendants’ many arguments, they still have not provided any relevant case law” to support 
their counter claims.  (Id. at 12.) 
After several months of discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.  This Court analyzed  Defendants’ counter claims and affirmative defenses and 
found that “each of Defendants’ claims plead in their Answer fail as a matter of law.”  (ECF 
No.  177 at 18.)  While the awarding of summary judgment alone does not provide a basis for 
awarding attorney’s fees, it may be a factor.  See Sunamerica, 400 S.E. 2d at 438 (“N.C. Gen. 
Stat. §6-21.5 provides in part th at the entry of judgment purs uant to Rule 56 may be some 
evidence that an attorney’s fee may be warranted.”). 
In ruling on summary judgment, this Court found that Defendants counter claims of 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of  implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
declaratory judgment, and civil conspiracy failed as a matter of law.  (See ECF No. 31 ¶¶ 101–
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139, 187–203, 241–50, 251–62.)  The Court found that thes e claims failed as a matter of law 
because they all were dependent on the presence of a valid contract between the parties, and 
further that Defendants failed to provide any facts or law to support that the Agreement was 
valid.  (ECF No. 177 at 5–7, 17–18.)  As to their claims of conversion, and violation of unfair 
and deceptive trade secrets the Court found that Defendants provided no evidence to support 
those claims.  (Id. at 16, 17.)  In fact, the Court found that Defendants “do not offer . . . any 
specific evidence in the record to support such [claims], offering instead a single string citation 
to thirty-seven exhibits in their entirety withou t pin citations or explanatory parentheticals.”  
(Id. at 17.) 
Defendants counter claim of fraud, (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 140–170), was also found by this 
Court to fail as a matter of law.  (ECF No. 177 at 9.)  To support this claim, Defendants argued 
at summary judgment that Plaintiff falsely omi tted his discussions with the Creative Artists 
Agency and his plan to end his relationship with Defendants, inducing Defendants to provide 
him with their Plan and other benefits.  (ECF Nos. 142 at 18; 172 at  8.)  However, these 
arguments failed as a matter of law, becaus e Plaintiff had no duty to disclose his 
communications with a third party.  Further, as recognized by this Court and later affirmed by 
the Fourth Circuit on appeal, “[t]hough parties negotiating at arm’s length may have a duty to 
disclose some things, a party has no duty to disclose that he’s negotiating with a third party in 
a commercial transaction.”  Williamson, 101 F.4th at 315. 
Lastly, Defendants’ counter claim of misappr opriation of trade secrets, (ECF No. 32 
¶¶ 204–221,) failed as a matter of law because “Defendants’ allegations of trade secrets in their 
Answer are general and sweeping.”  (ECF No. 177 at 11.)  At summary judgment Defendants 
attempted to narrow their allegations; however, this Court found that Defendants alleged trade 
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secrets did not qualify as such unde r the statutory definition.  ( Id.)  Additionally, the Fourth 
Circuit in affirming this Court’ s Order stated that Defendants  “compilation of endorsement 
offers, is too nebulous to qualify for trade secret protection.”  Williamson, 101 F.4th at 315 
(internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
Therefore, it is clear to this Court that Defendants failed in their continuing obligation 
to evaluate the appropriateness of persisting in litigating their claims “after a point where [they] 
should reasonably have become aware that the pleading [Defendants] filed no longer 
contained a justiciable issue.”  See Laschkewitsch, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185321, at 7 (finding 
that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment and filing their own motion for 
summary judgment “on [their] own baseless claim s” is the party persisting in litigating after 
the point they should reasonably have become aw are that their claims no longer presented a 
justiciable issue). 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff may be aw arded reasonable attorney’s fees 
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5. 
B. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-154(d) 
The second statute that Plaintiff’s seek a ttorney’s fees under is, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-
154(d) which states “[i]f a claim of misappropriat ion is made in bad fa ith or if willful and 
malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party.”  § 66-154(d).  “‘Bad faith ca nnot be defined with mathematical precision,’ 
but ‘[c]ertainly it implies a false motive or a false purpose.’”  RLM Commc’ns, Inc. v. Tuschen , 
No. 5:14-CV-250-FL, 2015 WL 1268283, at * 4 (E.D.N.C.  Mar. 19, 2015) (quoting Bundy v. 
Com. Credit Co., 202 S.E. 676 (N.C. 1932). 
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Plaintiff asserts that Defendants misappropria tion of trade secrets claim was made in 
bad faith because it was “an effort to circumvent  this Court’s ruling invalidating the contract 
by nonetheless recovering their alleged earnings under that void contract.”  (ECF No. 196 at 
21.)  This Court declines to find that Defendants made this claim in “bad faith” without more 
than broad assertions by Plaintiff about Defendant’s motives.  Therefore, this Court concludes 
that attorney’s fees under §66-154(d) are not warranted. 
C. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1 
Lastly, Plaintiff seeks attorney fees under N. C. Gen. Stat. §75-16.1.  (ECF No. 196 at 
22.)  North Carolina’s Unfair an d Deceptive Trade Practices Act,  N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-1.1 et 
seq., permits a court, in its discretion, to a llow a reasonable attorney’s fee when a “party 
instituting a [§75-1.1] action knew, or should have known,  the action was frivolous and 
malicious.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.1(2).  “To prevail on a motion for attorney’s fees under § 
75-16.1, the moving party must (1) be the prevailing party and (2) prove that the non-moving 
party knew or should have known the §75-1.1 action was frivolous and malicious.”  MB Realty 
Grp., Inc. v. Gaston Cnty Brd. Of Educ., No. 3:17-cv-00427-FDW-DCK, 2019 WL 2724554, at * 
2 (W.D.N.C. June 28, 2019) (quoting Lincoln v. Bueche , 601 S.E.2d 237, 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004). 
“A claim is malicious if it is wrongful an d done intentionally wi thout just cause or 
excuse or as a result of ill will.”  Tuschen, 2015 WL 1268283, at *3 (quoting McKinnon v. CV 
Indus., 745 S.E.2d 343, 350 (N.C. Ct . App. 2016) (internal quota tions omitted).  Plaintiff 
provides this Court with no argument or evidence that Defendants’ unfair and deceptive trade 
practices act claim was malicious.  (See ECF Nos. 196 at 22; 202 at 7–8.)  Therefore, this Court 
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declines to find that Defendants “knew or sh ould have known that the [claim] was frivolous 
and malicious.”  MB Realty Grp., Inc., 2019 WL 2724554, at * 2 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, attorney’s fees are not warranted under this statute. 
IV. REASONABLENESS OF PLAINTIF F’S REQUESTED ATTORNEY’S 
FEES 
This Court having determined that Plainti ff can pursue his claim for attorney’s fees 
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5 , the Court will now determine whether Plaintiff’s requested 
fees are reasonable. 
To calculate attorney’s fees, a district court “must first determine a lodestar figure by 
multiplying the number of reasonable hours  expended times a reasonable rate.”  Robinson v. 
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC , 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Grissom v. The Mills Corp. , 
549 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 20 08).  “The fee applicant bear s the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the hours expended and the requested hourly rates, which generally requires 
submission of the attorney’s own affidavit an d timesheets as well as ‘satisfactory specific 
evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for 
which [the attorney] seeks an award.’” Prison Legal News v. Stolle, 129 F. Supp.3d 390, 396 (E.D. 
Va. 2017) (quoting Grison v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008). 
To determine what constitutes a reasonable nu mber of hours and rate, district courts 
should be guided by the following twelve factors: 
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) 
the attorney's opportunity costs in pre ssing the instant litigation; (5) the 
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the 
litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the 
amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation 
and ability of the attorney; (10) the unde sirability of the case within the legal 
community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the 
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professional relationship between attorn ey and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees 
awards in similar cases. 
 
Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243–44 (citing Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n. 28 (4th Cir. 
1978) (additional citations omitted).  A cour t then “subtract[s] fees for hours spent on 
unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones.”  Id.  Finally, the Court “awards some 
percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success.”  Id. 
As earlier stated, Plaintiff is seeking $1,490,946.75 in attorney’s fees.  (ECF Nos. 194; 
196 at 28.)  In support of this motion, Plaintiff submitted a declaration and 146 pages of time 
records totaling 2,996.4 hours spent on the case generated by four of the attorneys working 
on this litigation.  (ECF No. 195-2 at 146.)  The declaration states the fees they are requesting 
were generated over a 15-month period from February 3, 2021, to May 4, 2022.  (Id. ¶ 5.)  The 
declaration further states that the declarant and several other attorneys at Robinson Bradshaw, 
CGR, and Weil, also assisted with Plaintiff’s re presentation in this case, but Plaintiff is not 
seeking attorney’s fees for these additional attorneys.  (ECF No. 195 ¶ 12.)   
In examining this request, this Court must consider only the factors that are applicable 
“is under no obligation to go through the inquiry of those factors that do not fit.”  In re A.H. 
Robins Co., Inc., 86 F.3d 364, 376 (4th Cir. 1996).  Given the size of the attorney’s fees requested 
here, the Court will analyze the applicable factors to aid its determination of a reasonable fee 
in this case.  
1. Time and Labor Expended 
Plaintiff in his declaration states that duri ng the relevant period, Plaintiff’s attorneys 
responded to twelve motions filed by Defend ants.  The motions are as follows: Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Court’s Order granting Pl aintiff’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the 
Pleadings, (ECF No. 51); Mo tion for Leave to Amend Answ er, Affirmative Defenses and 
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Counterclaims, (ECF No. 53); Motion to Su bstitute Proposed Amended Answer, Amended 
Affirmative Defenses and Amended Counterclaims in Pending Motion for Leave to Amend, 
(ECF No. 65); Notice of Motion to Vacate the Courts Order Granting Partial Judgment on 
the Pleadings, (ECF No. 69); Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal and Request to 
Stay, (ECF No. 86); Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 119); and six Motions to Seal, 
(ECF Nos. 113; 139; 147; 157; 168; 171). 
In addition to responding to those motions, Plaintiff’s attorneys also filed their own 
motions including: a Motion to Strike, (ECF No. 129); Motion to Expedite Consideration of 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, (ECF No. 130); and a Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 
102). 
Further, Plaintiff’s attorney states that th ey expended considerable hours responding 
to Defendants written discovery requests (inc luding discovery demanded from Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff’s mother, Plaintiff’s stepfather, the Creative Artists Agency, and three members of 
Plaintiff’s team at the Creative Artists Agency), 21 interrogatories, 54 requests for documents, 
“numerous” third party subpoenas, and five depositions taken by Defendants.  (ECF No. 196 
at 26.) 
First, the Court concludes that period of time for which Plaintiff seeks reimbursement 
of attorney fees is consistent with this Cour t’s determination of the time period in which 
Defendant were, or should have  been reasonably aware, that their claims were seriously 
deficient and lacked justiciabi lity; specifically, that Defend ants’ affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims were not supported the facts or the law.  Notwithstanding, the Court also finds 
that while a considerable number of motions were filed by Defendants, a number of the 
motions were exceedingly redundant and involv ed many of the same issues not requiring 
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substantial additional research or analysis.  Therefore, while the docket contains numerous 
motions, the Court does find the amount of ti me and labor expended by Plaintiff’s counsel 
appears to be excessive, even given the statements that certain work performed was not billed. 
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions raised 
This Court finds that this case did not invo lve novel or particularly complex issues of 
facts or law.  The central issue before the Court was whether Williamson was a student athlete 
under the North Carolina Uniform Athlete Agents Act.  While this specific issue had not been 
addressed by the courts prior to the action, its resolution involved only statutory interpretation 
which is a fairly common issue.  In addition, the state and tort law claims defendant asserts as 
its counterclaims or affirmative defenses likewise are neither complex or difficult nor are they 
novel. 
3. The skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered 
The Court finds that the claims outlined above do not require special skill to perform 
the legal services rendered. 
4. Attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation 
The declaration submitted along with Plaintiff’s motion reflects that cases like these are 
common for the attorneys who worked on the case.  ( See ECF 195 at 4 (stating that one of 
Plaintiff’s attorneys, Jeffrey S. Klein, “has repr esented many prominent athletes and coaches 
from across the United States, as well as professional players associations in multiple sports.”).)  
While these statements regarding Mr. Klein may be true, it does not speak to whether Mr. 
Klein’s significant experience, expertise, and knowledge are required, necessary, or reasonable 
for the type of action before the Court which the Court has found to be neither complex nor 
novel. 
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5. Customary fee for like work 
A fee applicant is obligated to show that the requested hourly rates are consistent with 
the prevailing market rate in a particular community for the type of work that is being sought.  
The applicant bears the burden of establishing  the reasonableness of the hourly rates being 
requested.  Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather  Industries of America , 2016 WL 5477611, at *9 
(M.D.N.C.)  The only attestation this Court has that Plaintiff’ s attorney’s fees are reasonable 
is the declaration of one of th e attorneys on Plaintiff’s case, John Wester.  Mr. Wester is a 
partner of 40 years at Robinson, Bradshaw, & Hinson, P.A. (“Robinson Bradshaw”).  (ECF 
No. 195 ¶ 1.)  Mr. Wester has worked on this case since the beginning; however, the hours he 
spent on the case are not being requested in this motion.  (Id. ¶ 4–5.) 
Plaintiff’s counsel provides no affidavits of “other” local lawyers who can attest to the 
reasonableness of their rates.  See Design Res., Inc. , No. 2016 WL 5477611,  at *13 (explaining 
that the correct manner of proving reasonable hours and rates is with affidavits of local lawyers 
who are familiar with the skill of the fee applican ts and with the type of work in the relevant 
community). 
In his declaration, Mr. Wester states that based on his experience and personal 
knowledge of the “market rates in the Charlotte and Winston-Salem communities for lawyers 
of comparable skill, experience,  and reputation as the . . . atto rneys involved in this matter, 
[his] opinion is that the hourly rates sought in this case are comfortably within the range of 
reasonable hourly rates in the Charlotte and Winston-Salem markets.”  ( Id. ¶ 17.)  However, 
this is not the question to be answered.  Th e question is whether the requested hourly rates 
are consistent with the market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which 
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the award is sought.  See McAfee, 738 F.3d at 91.  The Court will now determine whether the 
rates offered by Plaintiff in his motion are reasonable. 
a. The Attorneys, their Experience and Hourly Rate Requested 
In his declaration, Mr. Wester gives a brief description of the background of each of 
the attorneys for which fees are being sought, the number of hours each of the attorneys have 
worked, as well as the hourly rates that are being sought in this motion.  Mr. Wester includes 
the following chart: 
Attorney Hours Hourly Rate 
Fitz E. Barringer 419.2 $475 
Jeffrey S. Klein 717.9 $800 
Lauren E. Richards 868.6 $475 
Zachary A. Schreiber 990.7 $475 
 
(ECF No. 195 ¶ 13.)  Fitz E. Barringer is a partner at Robinson Bradshaw and is a partner of 
Mr. Wester the declarant.  ( Id. ¶ 7.)  Mr. Barringer has practiced law at Robinson Bradshaw 
since September of 2012 and had only recently became a partner in January of 2020 when this 
case was ongoing.  ( Id.)  Mr. Barringer was “involved in virtually all aspects of this action 
including developing [Plaintiff’s] legal strategy , pleadings, and motions; communicating with 
opposing counsel regarding discovery disputes; and taking the lead on procedural and local 
practice issues in this case.”  (Id.) 
Jeffrey S. Klein, is described as “one of the nation’s leading sports and employment 
lawyers.”  (Id. ¶ 8.)  Mr. Klein practiced at the law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (“Weil”) 
in New York City, at the outs et of this litigation.  ( Id. ¶ 2.)  For over 40 years Mr. Klein has 
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represented many prominent athletes and coaches.  ( Id. ¶ 8.)  Plaintiff’ s attorneys do not 
summarize the work Mr. Klein performed.  (See id.) 
Lauren E. Richards is an associate at Loeb & Loeb LLP in New York City.2  (Id. ¶¶ 2, 
10.)  She has worked closely with Mr. Klein for the past 5 years on sports representation and 
contract disputes.  ( Id. at 10.)  Ms. Richards was the lead  associate on this case and worked 
closely with Mr. Klein, Mr. Barri nger, and Mr. Wester from the outset of the litigation.  ( Id.)  
Ms. Richards was the “principal author of the init ial drafts of many of [Plaintiff’s] pleadings, 
motions, and briefs; actively participated with Mr. Klein in taking and defending each of the 
depositions in this case; and was instrumental in developing [Plaintiff’s] legal strategy in this 
case.”  (Id.) 
Lastly, Zachary A. Schreiber is an associate at Weil.3  (Id. ¶ 11.)  Mr. Schreiber played a 
leading role in the review and production of Mr. Williamson’s do cuments, third-party 
discovery, and motions practice, including the summary judgment motions.  (Id.) 
In calculating their attorney’s fees, Mr. West er states that they excluded fees charged 
for his work and various other attorneys and paralegals.  ( Id. ¶ 14.)  He also states that the 
figures are “reduced hourly rates.”  (Id. ¶ 15.)  Wester states that Mr. Klein’s actual hourly rate 
for this matter averaged $1,115.98, Mr. Barringer’s averaged between $475–$500, Ms. Richards 
averaged $825.15, and Mr. Schreiber averaged $800.66.  (Id.) 
b. The Requested Rates are Not Reasonable 
This Court does not find that the hourly rates offered by Plaintiff for the above 
attorneys are reasonable for a case such as the one before the Court.  In the Fourth Circuit, to 
verify prevailing market rates courts should look for evidence such as “affidavits of other local 
 
2 Plaintiff provides no information to this Court on how long Ms. Richards has been practicing law.  (See id.)   
3 Plaintiff provides no information to this Court on how long Mr. Schreiber has been practicing law.  (See id.) 
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lawyers who are familiar both with the skills of the fee applicants and more generally with the 
type of work in the relevant community.”  Equifax Info. Servs., 560 F.3d at 245 (finding that 
Plaintiff submitting affidavits of her own attorney’s rates, did not meet the burden required to 
prove the prevailing market rates of attorneys in the Eastern District of Virginia).  Mr. Wester’s 
declaration is the only attorn ey affidavit that Plaintiff has provided to this Court to 
demonstrate that the requested fees are reasona ble.  While the court acknowledges that Mr. 
Wester is a distinguished member of the legal community, because of his involvement in this 
case as well as the involvement of his partner and the firm, the court is unable to rely 
exclusively on his opinion in de termining a reasonable market rate for the attorneys in this 
case. 
Further, this Court finds that it is not reasonable for associates, though they are from 
New York, to request attorney’s f ees at the same rate as a partne r.  Mr. Wester’s declaration 
did not provide enough information for this Co urt to “meaningfully evaluate the experience 
of the associates,” and determine whether the rate was reasonable here in North Carolina.  In 
re Hatteras Fin., Inc., S’holder Litig. , 286 F. Supp. 3d 727, 737 (M.D .N.C. Dec. 19, 2017).  The 
Court has no information on how long the asso ciates on the case, Ms. Richards and Mr. 
Schrieber, have been associates, and have little information on how long they have worked in 
this field for this Court to even begin to eval uate why they should be granted an hourly rate 
equal to the partner on the case.  The court does not find that these fees are reasonable. 
Lastly, Mr. Klein’s hourly rate far exceeds this Court’s expectation of a reasonable rate 
in this district, and for the type of case before the Court.  While the Court does acknowledge 
Mr. Klein’s level of expertise in sports and employment law, and while Mr. Klein’s rates may 
be reasonable elsewhere, it is not reasonable in this community for the nature of this case.  
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“Rates charged by attorneys in other cities, []  may be considered wh en the complexity and 
specialized nature of a case ma y mean that no attorn ey, with the required skills, is available 
locally, and the party choosing the attorney from  elsewhere acted reasonable in making the 
choice.”  Rum Creek Coal Sales,  I n c .  v .  C a p e r t o n, 31 F.3d 169, 179 (4th  Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
As this Court has stated, this case is not complex, and North Carolina has a wealth of 
attorneys that would have been able to litigate a case such as this one that is based primarily 
on the interpretation of a North Carolina statute.   Plaintiff’s choice in  choosing an attorney 
from another city does not lead this Court to fi nd the rate requested is reasonable, especially 
given the lack of complexity of the issues involv ed in the case.  Further, Plaintiff’s failure to 
provide any affidavits from local attorneys independent of this litigation to support Mr. Klein’s 
requested rate while offering the North Carolina partner the rate of $475 appears inconsistent.  
It appears that Mr. Klein was chosen not for the type of work that is required in this case, but 
rather for his prominence in the sports and legal community.  That is not to say that Mr. Klein 
did not provide valuable service to his client as reflected in the positive outcome of the case.  
While Plaintiff has the right to choose his own attorney to represent him, this court does not 
deem it reasonable that all of the costs associ ated with Mr. Klein’s representation choice 
should be borne by the losing party.  Theref ore, the Court will find that a more reasonable 
rate for Mr. Klein for work of this type in the Winston Charlotte market would be $525 per 
hour. 
While Plaintiff provides no independent affidavits, Plaintiff does cite two cases that he 
argues demonstrate that the hourly rate request ed is reasonable.  (ECF No. 195 at 27–28.)  
However, neither of the cases are similar to the claims in the instant case, both were resolved 
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in settlement agreements, unlike in this case, and neither detail the experience of the attorneys.  
See Binotti v. Duke Univ., 1:20-CV-470, 2021 WL 5366877, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2021); Ford 
v. Cardinal Innovations Healthcare Sols., 1:20-cv-736, 2022 WL 558376, at * 5 (M.D.N.C Jan. 21, 
2022). 
In addition, as earlier stated, nor does the Court find that the rates requested for the 
associates working on this case to be reasonabl e.  For each of the associates, Plaintiff is 
requesting an hourly rate of $475 an hour.  Based on this Court’s experience, a reasonable rate 
for associates is the range of $250-$275 an hour. 
Therefore, this Court finds that the hourly rates in this case are not reasonable for 
North Carolina, and an hourly rate of $250-$2 75 for each associate and $475-$525 for each 
partner is more in line with a reasonable fee for this case, which is at its core, a contract dispute. 
6. Attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation  
Plaintiff provided no informatio n regarding this factor, and the Court finds that this 
factor is not applicable in this case. 
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances  
Plaintiff provided no informatio n regarding this factor, and the Court finds that this 
factor is not applicable in this case. 
8. Amount in controversy and the results obtained 
Mr. Wester in his declaration states that “the attorney time spent on this case was 
reasonable and appropriate . . . in light of the substantial da mages sought, wh ich totaled in 
excess of $100 million, plus punitive damages and injunctive relief.”  (ECF No. 195 ¶ 19.)  
However, this Court disagrees.  While it is true that Defendants requested treble damages and 
punitive damages in the amount of $100 million dollars each, it was clear from the early stages 
of this litigation that Defendants were not able to provide any basis for their claims that would 
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generate such amounts.  In fact, it was Plaintiff that argued th at there was no factual or legal 
basis for any of Defendant counterclaims.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s attorneys knew early on that 
Defendants’ claims were meritless as they sent Defendants a letter immediately after this Court 
found the Agreement to be void.  (ECF No. 195 ¶ 21.)  Defendants provided no evidence at 
any point in this case that their claimed recove ry could conceivably rise  to the level of the 
damage requested, and therefore Plaintiff’s staffing and allocating time toward this case based 
on Defendants’ damages figure is not persuasive to this Court. 
Nevertheless, the Court does find that Plaintiff’s attorneys obtained a favorable result 
for Plaintiff.  The Supreme Court has stated that the degree of success obtained is the most 
important factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee.  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 
114 (1992).  This Court found that the contested Agreement was void and found in favor of 
Plaintiff on all of Defendants counterclaims. 
9. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney  
The Court addressed this factor in its analysis of the fifth factor.   
10. Undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit 
arose 
Plaintiff provided no evidence of this factor .  However, the Court does not find that 
this factor impacts its determination of a reasonable fee under the circumstances of this case.  
11. The nature and length of the professional relationship between 
attorney and client 
Mr. Wester stated in his decl aration that Plaintiff retained Mr. Klein to represent him 
in this matter.  (ECF No. 195 ¶ 9.)  Mr. Klein then contacted Mr. Wester and they both 
assembled the legal team that worked on the case.  ( Id.)  Beyond this, the Court has no 
information on the nature and length of Plaintiff’s relationship with his attorneys. 
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12. Attorney’s fee hours awarded in similar cases 
While Plaintiff has cited a number of cases with large attorney fee awards, none of the 
cases appear to come close to the facts of this case. 
Having now analyzed the twelve factors, the Court finds that factors 1, 2, 3 and 5 are 
most relevant to a determination of whether the number of hours and the hourly rates for 
which Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees are reasonabl e.  In addition, the Court has reviewed the 
146 pages of time records submitted to the court.  The Court as a result finds that a significant 
number of the hours billed are not reasonable and must be reduced as duplicative entries, 
block billing, and the substantial amount of time billed for attorney’s communications 
amongst each other. 
First, many of Plaintiff’s time entries are duplicative and certain tasks were overstaffed. 
District courts “should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not reasonably 
expended.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (citations omitted) (internal citations 
omitted).  The entries reflect that for each of the documents prepared in this case, each of the 
four attorneys has billed time for its drafting or editing. 
For example, in drafting Plaintiff’s Resp onses in Opposition to Defendants’ four 
similar motions to alter or amend, Plaintiff’s attorneys billed around 235-hours collectively 
and each of the four attorney’s billed hours towa rd the drafting or editing of the responses.  
(See ECF No. 195-2 at 3–11.)  Th e issues Defendants raised in those four motions were 
repetitive and the Court finds that the number of hours spent is substantial due to duplicative 
billing and having each attorney work on each document.  See Spell v. McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762, 
(4th Cir. 1988) (“[W]e have also been sensitiv e to the need to avoid use of multiple counsel 
for tasks where such use is not justified by the contributions of each attorney.”)) 
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Further, for work done on the cross mo tions for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s 
attorneys billed in excess of 762.2 hours collectively.  ( See ECF No. 195-2.)  Similar to the 
other briefs in the case, a substantial number of hours were billed for drafting on the motions 
for summary judgment, and each of the attorney’s worked on the briefs.  The Court does not 
find that these hours are reasonable given th at the motions were regarding Defendants 
counterclaims, most of which failed as a ma tter of law based on this Court ruling the 
Agreement void. 
Therefore, for the reasons outlined above, this Court finds that it is necessary to reduce 
Plaintiff’s hours to account for the duplicative nature of the time entries and the overstaffing 
of attorneys on tasks.  See Trimper v. City of Norfolk, Va. , 58 F.3d 68, 76–77 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(“Properly reducing allowable hours because of over staffing of attorneys . . . falls soundly 
within the district court’s proper discretion in determining an attorney’s fee award.”).  As the 
Court finds that a significant number of duplicative entries occur in the time entries of the two 
associates, the Court will reduce each of their hours by thirty percent each.  See Doe v. Kidd , 
656 F. App’x 643, 656 (4th Cir. 2016); Crump v. United States Dept. of Navy by and through Mabus, 
2:13cv707, 2017 WL 1158 244, at * 14 (E.D.Va. Mar. 27, 2017); Wyatt v. Owens, 7:14-cv-492, 
2018 WL 10613184, at *10 (W.D. Va. Jan 23, 2018). 
Additionally, this Court finds that a reducti on is necessary in this case to account for 
block billing.  “Inadequate docu mentation includes the practice of grouping, or ‘lumping,’ 
several tasks together under a single entry, without specifying the amount of time spent on 
each particular task.”  Guidry v. Clare, 442 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (E.D. Va. 2006).  “Courts in 
this circuit have routinely held that “block billing” does not provide the court with a sufficient 
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breakdown to support an attorneys’ fee request.”  Wyatt v. Owens , 7:14-cv-492, 2018 WL 
10613184, at *10 (W.D. Va. 2018). 
For example, on January 25, 2022, Mr. Barring er billed 4.4 hours for the time entry: 
“[r]espond to Mr. Schreiber’s inquiry re conf idential documents; reviewing Mr. Brown’s 
deposition; confer with JR Wester re Defendants’ video compilation concept; research video 
compilation concept; respond to  Mr. Klein’s inquiry re video compilation concept.”  (ECF 
No. 195-2 at 115.)  On Januar y 27, 2022, Mr. Barringer billed  6 hours for the time entry, 
“[r]espond to Z. Schreiber’s inquiry re attorney affidavit; draft motion to increase word limits; 
draft proposed order re motion to increase word limits; correspond with Z. Schreiber and L. 
Richards re motion to increase word limits; draft correspondence to J. Klein re motion to 
increase word limits; review draft of Summa ry Judgment brief; correspond with opposing 
counsel re motion to extend word limits.”  (Id. at 116.) 
This method of lumping together of time en tries is a proper basis for reducing a fee 
award as it “prevent[s] an accurate determination of the reasonableness of the time expended 
in a case.”  Guidry, 422 F.Supp.2d at 294.  While the Court is not obligated to sift through 146 
pages of time entries, the Court does find that the bulk of bl ock billing appears to occur on 
Mr. Barringer’s time entries.  (See e.g., id. at 16, 18, 75, 88, 118, 121, 123,125, 127.)  Therefore, 
the Court will reduce Mr. Barringer’s hours by thirty percent to account for the block billing.  
See Wyatt, 2018 WL 10613184, at *11 (collecting cases). 
Lastly, the Court finds that a reduction is  necessary to account for the substantial 
amount of time billed for th e attorney’s communications amon gst each other.  The Court 
notes that a substantial number of hours billed for this occur under Mr. Klein.  (See ECF No. 
195-2 at 30, 39, 42, 60, 125, 126.); see Spell, 852 F.2d at 768 (finding it necessary to reduce hours 
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attorney’s hours by 70% to account for, among other things, duplicatio n, overstaffing, and 
overkill that appeared in a fee petition where six attorneys who represented Plaintiff on appeal, 
billed hours the attorney’s spen t discussing the issues amon gst themselves and extensive 
conferences regarding these issues). 
Additionally, Mr. Klein is the only attorney that Plaintiff’s counsel did not provide this 
Court with a summary of what he  worked on in the case.  Plaint iff’s counsel states that Mr. 
Klein is “one of the nation’s leading sports and employment lawyers,” but the time entries 
reflect Mr. Klein billing close to the amount of time an associate on the case billed, and almost 
twice the amount of time that the other partner involved billed.  (ECF No. 195 ¶¶ 8, 13.)  
Therefore, due to his entries reflecting subs tantial hours communicating with the other 
attorneys, and the lack of information before the Court on his role in the case, the Court does 
not find his hours to be reasonable and will reduce Mr. Klein’s time by fifty percent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above discussion, this Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney 
fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.5.  However, because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 
not established that the requested rates and hours are reasonable, the Court declines to grant 
Plaintiff’s request of $1,490,946.75.  Rather the Court concludes that reasonable rates in this 
case are $525 per hour for Mr. Klein, $475 an  hour for Mr. Barringer and $275 an hour for 
Ms. Richards and Mr. Schreiber, respectively.   In addition, the Court concludes that a 
reduction in hours are necessary as follows: Mr. Barringer’s hours  will be reduced by thirty 
percent to account for block bi lling; Ms. Richards and Mr. Sc hreiber’s hours will be reduced 
by thirty percent to account for duplicative time entries; and, Mr. Klein’s hours will be reduced 
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by fifty percent to account for his time entries largely reflecting communications amongst the 
attorneys.  These reductions are reflected in the chart below: 
Attorney Hours Hourly Rate Total 
Fitz E. Barringer 293.44 $475 $139,384.00 
Jeffrey S. Klein 358.95 $525 $188,448.75 
Lauren E. Richards 608.02 $275 $167,205.50 
Zachary A. Schreiber 693.49 $275 $190,709.75 
   $685,748.00 
 
Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff atto rney’s fees in the amount of $685,748.00 
for the time covered by this motion.  While this reduction is far less than that requested, it is 
based on what the Court deems as reasonable in terms of the hours spent and the hourly rates 
that are reasonable. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, 
(ECF No. 194), is GRANTED, in part, in that Defendants shall pay attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff’s 
counsel in the amount of $685,748.00.  Plaintiff’s counsel shall submit to the Court within 14 days 
of the entry of this Order a stipulation by Plaintiffs’ counsel outlining to whom and in what 
amounts these funds shall be distributed. 
This, the 30th day of March 2026. 
 
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs      
Senior United States District Judge 
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