govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_24-cv-01497-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
 
 
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND 
ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , 
 
  Defendant. 
 
Civil Action No. 24 - 1497 (LLA) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION  AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”)  filed this suit 
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking records related to 
the now-closed criminal investigation of former Congressman Matt Gaetz (Count  I).  ECF No. 1.  
CREW also claims that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) violated FOIA by employing a policy 
or practice of refusing to confirm or deny the existence of records related to investigations of public 
officials (known as a Glomar response) (Count II).  Id.1  Before the court are CREW’s motion for 
summary judgment on Count I, ECF No. 22, and the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment 
on Count II, ECF Nos. 18, 23.  For the reasons explained below, the court denies CREW’s motion 
for summary judgment on Count I as moot and denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment 
on Count II. 
 
1 CREW also brought a claim that DOJ violated FOIA b y categorically withholding records 
without conduc ting a case -by-case analysis (Count  III), ECF No.  1 ¶¶ 46-51, which the court 
dismissed, ECF No. 12, at 21-24. 
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Gaetz Request (Count I) 
In February 2023, CREW submitted a FOIA request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) and DOJ seeking 
all records related to the now -closed investigation conducted by 
DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) of Rep. Matt 
Gaetz (R-FL) that are not covered by grand jury secrecy pursuant to 
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including but 
not limited to DOJ’s decision not to bring criminal charges against 
Rep. Gaetz. 
ECF No.  22-3, at  6.2  CREW sought the records because they would “help explain why 
Rep. Gaetz—a prominent member of Congress —was not charged with any crime despite public 
reporting suggesting an abundance of evidence that he likely violated sex-trafficking laws and the 
conviction of his close associate on similar charges.”  Id. at 8.  It further argued that “[t]he public 
has a vital interest in learning whether the decision not to prosecute Rep.  Gaetz was motivated, 
even in part, by considerations apart from the sufficiency of the evidence against him.”  Id. 
In November  2023, the FBI “categorically denied ” CREW’s request pursuant to FOIA 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 14; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).3  While the FBI acknowledged that it 
had completed a search for responsive records, it declined to reveal them because doing so “would 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  ECF No . 22-3, at  14.  CREW 
 
2 When citing ECF Nos.  18-3 to 18-6, 22-3, 23-2, 23-3, 29-1 to 29-3, and 32, the court refers to 
the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination. 
3 Exemption 6 carves out “personnel  . . . [,] medical . . . [,] and similar files[,] the disclosure of 
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).  
Meanwhile, Exemption  7(C) excuses disclosure of “records or information compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records 
or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”  Id. § 552(b)(7)(C). 
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administratively appealed the FBI’s decision , id. at 19-23, and that appeal was closed in 
September 2024 after CREW filed this suit , id. at 25 (“[A]n appeal ordinarily will not be acted 
upon by [DOJ] if the FOIA request becomes the subject of litigation.”); see 28 C.F.R. § 16.8(b)(2).  
In October 2024, the FBI notified CREW that it was reviewing responsive records “on an interim 
basis for segregability.”  ECF No. 22-3, at 27. 
B. CREW’S FOIA Requests Concerning Investigations of Public Officials (Count II) 
In recent years, CREW has filed more than a dozen FOIA requests  to various DOJ 
divisions, also known as components, seeking records related to investigations of public officials.  
In response to some of these requests, DOJ components have issued “Glomar” responses, neither 
confirming nor denying the existence of responsive records.  These responses have led CREW to 
believe that DOJ has a policy or practice of “issuing Glomar responses to CREW simply because 
a FOIA request seeks records relating to an investigation of a third party, even when that 
investigation has been publicly disclosed,” in violation of  FOIA.  ECF No. 1 ¶ 43.  Responses to 
these requests by five DOJ components—the FBI, Criminal Division, Executive Office of United 
States Attorneys (“EOUSA”), Office of Information Policy  (“OIP”), and Office of Professional 
Responsibility (“OPR”)—form the basis for CREW’s policy-or-practice claim. 
1. Morehead request 
In April 2024, CREW submitted a request to the EOUSA and OPR seeking records relating 
to former Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) Terra Morehead’s “proven or alleged violations” of 
the law, Constitution, DOJ’s U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Kansas’s disciplinary rules, or “any other 
professional misconduct.”  ECF No.  23-3, at  156-57.  The request also sought “[a]ll records 
relating to any DOJ investigations, actions  . . . , or decisions not to take action, in regard to 
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AUSA Morehead’s conduct as an AUSA or prosecutor for the State of Kansas.”  Id. at 157.  In the 
request, CREW cited examples of federal courts criticizing AUSA Morehead “for her serious 
misconduct as a federal prosecutor related to undue influence of witnesses,  failure to disclose 
material information, and unauthorized access to attorney-client communications.”  Id. at 158; see 
ECF No. 23-2, at 8 ¶ 33. 
The next day, the EOUSA issued a response stating that “[t]o the extent that non -public 
responsive records exist, without consent, proof of death, or an overriding public interest, 
disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual could reason ably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and citing FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  
ECF No. 23-3, at 163.  The EOUSA also wrote that “[b]ecause any non-public records responsive 
to [the] request would be categorically exempt  from disclosure, this Office is not required to 
conduct a search for the requested records.”  Id.  In November 2024, OPR issued its response, 
stating that it “refuse[d] to confirm or deny the existence of any records that are subject to the 
protection of Exemption 6” and “[t]o the extent that [the] request seeks law enforcement records, 
OPR refuse[d] to confirm or deny the existence of records responsive to [the] request pursuant to” 
Exemption 7(C).  Id. at 168. 
2. Kelsey request 
In April 2023, CREW submitted a request to the Criminal Division and two U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices seeking “all documents related to DOJ’s investigation of Tennessee State 
Senator Brian Kelsey for violating campaign finance laws and conspiring to defraud the Federal 
Election Commission (‘FEC’) as part of a scheme to benefit his 2016 campaign for U.S. Congress” 
that mention seven names, including, as relevant here, “Amanda Bunning Kelsey (formerly 
Amanda Bunning)” and “Josh Smith.”  Id. at 147.  In its request, CREW stated that DOJ had 
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“issued a press release announcing that Senator  Kelsey had pleaded guilty to violating campaign 
finance laws and conspiring to defraud the FEC.”  Id. at 148; see ECF No. 23-2, at 3 ¶ 8.  The 
request also cited a local news article reporting on Senator Kelsey’s guilty plea and his 
co-conspirators.  ECF No. 23-3, at 149. 
In response, the Criminal Division addressed  the part of  CREW’s request regarding 
Mr. Smith separately from the other six names.  Id. at 153.  With respect to Mr. Smith, the Criminal 
Division responded that “to the extent that non -public responsive records exist, without consent, 
proof of death, or an overriding public interest, disclosure of law enforcement records concerning 
an individual could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy” and 
cited Exemption 7(C).  Id.  And with respect to the rest of CREW’s request, including records 
mentioning Ms. Bunning, the Criminal Division “decided to neither confirm nor deny the existence 
of [responsive] records pursuant to Exemptions  6 and 7(C).”  Id.  CREW then administratively 
appealed, and OIP affirmed the Criminal Division’s determinations.  ECF No. 18-3, at 21-22. 
3. Fortenberry request 
In March 2025, CREW submitted a request to the EOUSA and Criminal Division seeking 
“[a]ll records relating to the investigation of former United States Representative Jeffrey 
Fortenberry [for] proven or alleged violations  . . . of any provisions of law or c onstitution, 
including but not  limited to those relating to his indictment by a federal grand jury ” in 
October 2021, as well as “[a]ll records relating to any DOJ investigations, actions, or decisions not 
to take action,  . . . including but not limited to records related to DOJ’s motion to dismiss” 
Representative Fortenberry’s indictment with prejudice.  ECF No.  23-3, at 191-92.  The request 
cited a DOJ press release announcing that Representative Fortenberry had been indicted by a grand 
jury.  Id. at 192. 
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In response, the EOUSA stated that “[t]o the extent that non -public responsive records 
exist, without consent, proof of death, or an overriding public interest, disclosure of law 
enforcement records concerning an individual could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”  and cited Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 196.  The 
Criminal Division responded that CREW’s request appeared to seek investigation records 
maintained by a U.S. Attorney’s Office, so  the EOUSA was the p roper recipient of the request.  
Id. at 201.  The Criminal Division further stated that “[t]o the extent [CREW was] seeking other 
investigation records on . . . Representative Jeffrey Fortenberry, . . . [it] decided to neither confirm 
nor deny the existence of such records” pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. 
4. Evans request 
In March 2023, CREW submitted a request to the EOUSA seeking the “full case file of the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia for United States v. Derrick Evans , 
21-cr-337 (D.D.C), including but not limited to any video evidence or other evidence documenting 
Evans’ actions on or around January  6, 2021.”  Id. at 204.  The request explained that then-West 
Virginia House Delegate Evans had “pled guilty to a felony charge in which, as part of his plea 
agreement, he admitted to joining the  mob, breaching the Capitol, obstructing law enforcement 
during a civil disorder, and disrupting the certification of the 2020 presidential election.”  Id. 
at 205. 
In response, the EOUSA stated that “[r]ecords pertaining to a third party generally cannot 
be released absent express authorization and consent of the third party, proof that the subject of 
[the] request is deceased, or a clear demonstration that the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
the personal privacy interest and that significant public benefit would result from the disclosure of 
the requested records.”  Id. at 209.  Because CREW had not made any such showing, the EOUSA 
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explained that “the release of records concerning a third party would result in an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy and would be in violation of the Privacy Act, 5  U.S.C.§ 552a” and 
that such records were “generally exempt from disclosure” pursuant  to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  
Id. 
5. Mastriano request 
In September 2022, CREW submitted a request to the FBI seeking “[a]ll interview notes, 
summaries, memoranda, video recordings, audio recordings, or other records  concerning 
Pennsylvania State Senator Douglas Mastriano,” “[a]ll records provided by Senator  Mastriano to 
the FBI,” and “[a]ll complaints, tips, referrals, allegations, or other submissions received by the 
FBI relating to Senator Mastriano.”  ECF No. 18-4, at 20; see ECF No. 23-2 at 4 ¶ 15.  The request 
stated that, according to a news article, “Senator  Mastriano’s attorney ha[d] publicly 
acknowledged Mastriano ‘sat for a voluntary interview with the FBI’ regarding [his involvement 
in the ‘Stop the Steal’ movement] and claim[ed] ‘the FBI cl eared him.’”  ECF No. 18-4, at 21 
(citation omitted); see ECF No. 23-2, at 4 ¶ 16. 
Later that month, the FBI advised that it would “neither confirm nor deny the existence of 
such records” pursuant to Exemptions  6 and 7(C).  ECF No.  18-4, at 27 (“The mere 
acknowledgement of the existence of FBI records on third[-]party individuals could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”).  CREW then 
administratively appealed, arguing that the FBI could not issue a Glomar response where, as here, 
the “subject of a law enforcement investigation ha[d] publicly disclosed the existence of the 
investigation.”  Id. at 34.  CREW also argued that there was a significant public interest in “shining 
a light on the FBI’s investigation of the unprecedented January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol 
[and] the FBI’s alleged decision to clear Mr.  Mastriano of any wrongdoing, ” which rendered 
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improper the FBI’s “categorical withholding” of records.  Id. at 34-35 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
OIP then partially remanded the request to the FBI for “further review of the first subpart 
of [the] request”—regarding interview records—and affirmed the FBI’s response as to the rest of 
the request.  Id. at 39.  On remand, the FBI determined that the first part of CREW’s request sought 
“records on a third[ -]party individual that is exempt from disclosure” pursuant to Exemptions  6 
and 7(C), and it closed CREW’s request.  Id. at 44. 
6. Egyptian President request 
In September 2024, CREW submitted to the FBI , OIP, and the EOUSA a request for “all 
records related to the now-closed investigation conducted by DOJ and the [FBI] concerning a $10 
million withdrawal from the National Bank of Egypt which aligned with classified U.S. 
intelligence indicating that Egyptian President Abdel F atah El-Sisi sought to give $10  million to 
support former President Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign.”  ECF No.  23-3, at 213.  
CREW’s request cited a news article reporting on DOJ’s investigation.  Id. at 214. 
In its response, the FBI stated that the request sought “records on one or more third[-]party 
individuals” and declined to confirm or deny the existence of such records pursuant to 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 218.  The FBI also refused to confirm or deny the existence of 
responsive records by invoking Exemption  1, which protects against disclosure of classified 
national security information, and Exemption  7(E), which protects law -enforcement records that 
would “disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.”  
Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (b)(7)(E). 
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7. Giuliani and Kallstrom requests 
In November  2016, CREW submitted a request to the FBI for “all communications 
between any agents or employees of the [FBI] and Rudy Giuliani from July 4, 2016 to the present.”  
ECF No.  23-3, at  223.  The request cited statements made by former New York City 
Mayor Giuliani to news outlet s referring to his conversations with FBI agents about the FBI’s 
investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  Id. at 224.  CREW submitted the same 
request for “communications between any agents or employees of the [FBI] and James Kallstrom 
from October 1, 2015 to the present.”  Id. at 227.  CREW’s request cited statements made by 
Mr. Kallstrom, a former FBI  official, about discussions with FBI agents  about the Clinton 
investigation.  Id. at 228.  In response to both requests, the FBI declined to confirm or deny the 
existence of responsive records  in the absence of “an authorization and consent from the 
individual(s),” “proof of death,” or “a justification that the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
personal privacy,” citing Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 231, 234. 
8. Kindred request 
In August 2024, CREW submitted a FOIA request to the EOUSA, OPR, and the Office of 
the Inspector General, seeking internal communications among employees of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the District of Alaska and Office of the Federal Defender for the District of Alaska 
relating to misconduct by former federal judge Joshua Kindred and relating to the AUSA “from 
whom Judge Kindred received nude photographs  (as found by the Judicial Council of the Ninth 
Circuit on May  23, 2024).”  Id. at 237-38.  The request also sought “[a]ll records of any DOJ 
investigations, actions  . . . , or decisions not to take action, in regard to any communication 
between Judge Kindred” and the AUSA.  Id. at 238.  CREW’s request cited a Judicial Council of 
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the Ninth Circuit order and certification finding that Judge Kindred had engaged in misconduct.  
Id. at 239-40. 
The EOUSA responded that CREW was requesting records concerning a “third party” and 
that “[t]o the extent that non -public responsive records exist, without consent, proof of death, or 
an overriding public interest, disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an  unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ,” and it cited  
Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 243.  Accordingly, the EOUSA stated that it was “not required to 
conduct a search” because “any non -public records responsive to [the] request would be 
categorically exempt from disclosure.”  Id.  The EOUSA also noted that the request sought 
“records concerning Joshua Kindred” and declined to confirm or deny the existence of such records 
pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. 
9. Zinke request 
In March 2022, CREW submitted a request to the Criminal Division seeking “[a]ll records 
relating to U.S. Department of Interior Office of Inspector General (‘Interior OIG’) referral to DOJ 
concerning its finding that former Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke” violated various ethical 
standards and “[a]ll records relating to DOJ’s summer  2021 decision to decline prosecution of 
Ryan Zinke following Interior OIG’s referral.”   ECF No.  18-3, at  24.  In its request, CREW 
indicated that , the previous month, the “Interior OIG [had] stated in a public report that DOJ 
declined to prosecute the former Secretary of the Interior following a referral by the Interior OIG.”  
Id. at 25; see ECF No. 23-2, at 2 ¶ 3. 
The following month, the Criminal Division responded that “[t]o the extent that non-public 
responsive records exist, without consent, proof of death, or an overriding public interest, 
disclosure of law enforcement records concerning an individual could reasonably be expected to 
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constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy ” and cited Exemption 7(C).  ECF No. 18-3, at 29.  
CREW administratively appealed the Criminal Division’s determination , and OIP remanded the 
request to the Criminal Division for further processing.   Id. at 32.  The Criminal Division 
acknowledged receipt of the request  and initiated a search, but it notified CREW that i ts request 
presented “unusual circumstances” warranting an extension of time for the agency to respond.  Id. 
at 35; see id. at 4-5 ¶ 9 (providing no further update on the Criminal Division’s response). 
10. Trump companies request 
In February 2017, CREW submitted a request to the Criminal Division seeking “all records 
related to investigations conducted by DOJ and the [FBI] of companies owned or associated with 
Donald J. Trump, including, but not limited to, investigations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act” that used various search terms.  ECF No. 23-3, at 139-40.  In response, the Criminal Division 
declined to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records, explaining that, “with respect to 
the named individual, lacking t heir consent, proof of death, an official acknowledgment of an  
investigation of them, or an overriding public interest, even to acknowledge the existence of such 
records pertaining to this individual would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal  
privacy and could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of their personal  
privacy” under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 144. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
CREW filed this action against DOJ in May 2024, raising three counts under FOIA.  ECF 
No. 1.  First, CREW alleged that DOJ had wrongfully withheld responsive records relating to the 
investigation of former Representative Gaetz (Count I).  Id. ¶¶ 36-41.  Next, it argued that DOJ 
and its components had improperly adopted a blanket policy of issuing Glomar responses to any 
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request for records relating to publicly disclosed investigations of public officials (Count II).  Id. 
¶¶ 42-45.  Finally, it alleged that DOJ and its components had also improperly adopted a policy of 
categorically denying such requests “without conducting any case-by-case balancing of the public 
and private interests at stake” (Count III).  Id. ¶¶ 46-51.  CREW sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief.  Id. at 11-12. 
In July  2024, DOJ moved to dismiss Counts  II and III under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  ECF No. 8.  The court denied the motion as to Count II, finding that CREW 
had plausibly alleged that DOJ “adopted, endorsed, or implemented ” a policy or practice that 
violates FOIA.  ECF No. 12, at 17-18 (quoting Muttitt v. Dep’t of State, 926 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293 
(D.D.C. 2013) (“ Muttitt II”)).  Specifically, CREW had shown that various DOJ components 
provided Glomar responses to six of its FOIA requests seeking records relating to a publicly 
disclosed investigation of a public official.  See id. at 9-20.  The court granted DOJ’s motion to 
dismiss Count  III, however, determining that CREW had not sufficiently alleged a 
policy-or-practice claim based on the FBI’s categorical denials.  Id. at 21-24. 
DOJ then filed an answer, ECF No. 15, and a motion for summary judgment on Count II, 
ECF No.  18.  CREW filed a motion for summary judgment on Count I, ECF No.  22, and a 
cross-motion for summary judgment on Count II, ECF No. 23.  In March 2026, DOJ filed a status 
report indicating that the FBI had made its first production of records in response to CREW’s 
request relating to the investigation of Representative Gaetz and that approximately 8,500 
potentially responsive pages remain to be processed.  ECF No.  32, at 4.  The parties’ motions for 
summary judgment are fully briefed.  ECF Nos. 18, 22 to 24, 29 to 31. 
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III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
The purpose of FOIA is “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency 
action to the light of public scrutiny.”  Am. C.L. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. , 655 F.3d 1, 5 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“ACLU I”) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).  
Congress nonetheless included nine exemptions from disclosure that “are intended to balance the 
public’s interest in governmental transparency against the legitimate governmental and private 
interests [that] could be harmed by release of certain types of information.”  Tipograph v. Dep’t of 
Just., 83 F. Supp. 3d 234, 238 (D.D.C.  2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); 
see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (a)(8)(A)(i), (b)(1)-(9). 
Unless the requested records fall under one of FOIA’s nine exemptions, an agency must 
generally search for and disclose any documents responsive to a request.  In some cases, however, 
“merely acknowledging the existence of responsive records would itself ‘cause harm cognizable 
under [a] FOIA exception.’”  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. , 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C.  Cir. 2014) (“ PETA”) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Wolf v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  In such cases, 
an agency may issue a Glomar response, “refus[ing] to confirm or deny the existence or 
nonexistence of responsive records.”  Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926, 931 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (“EPIC I”).4  A Glomar response is therefore “a n exception to the general rule 
that agencies must acknowledge the existence of information responsive to a FOIA request and 
 
4 The Glomar response takes its name from the ship involved in Phillippi v. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  In that case, the Central Intelligence Agency refused to 
confirm or deny the existence of records about a ship called the “Hughes Glomar Explorer,” which 
was used in a classified Cold-War-era project. 
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provide specific, non-conclusory justifications for withholding that information.”  Am. C.L. Union 
v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“ACLU II”) (quoting Roth v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).  An agency may issue a Glomar response only “if 
the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records falls within a FOIA exemption.”  PETA, 
745 F.3d at 540 (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374).   
As an alternative to a Glomar response, an agency may respond to a FOIA request with a 
“categorical denial,” which is a categorical withholding of the contents of records pursuant to a 
FOIA exception.  Jurdi v. United States , 485 F. Supp. 3d 83, 92 (D.D.C.  2020); see Citizens for 
Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep ’t of Just. , 746 F.3d 1082 , 1088 -89 (D.C. Cir. 2014)  
(“CREW I”) (explaining that categorical treatment is appropriate “only when the range of 
circumstances included in the category characteristically supports an inference that the statutory 
requirements for exemption are satisfied” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
While FOIA requests must generally be litigated individually, there is a narrow exception 
permitting a plaintiff to raise a “policy or practice” claim under FOIA when the plaintiff argues 
“that an agency policy or practice will impair [ the plaintiff’s] lawful access to information in the 
future.”  Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. v. U.S. Dep ’t of State , 249 F. Supp. 3d 275, 281 (D.D.C.  2017) 
(quoting Newport Aeronautical Sales v. Dep’t of Air Force, 684 F.3d 160, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).5  
A plaintiff can establish such a claim by showing that an agency “ has adopted, endorsed, or 
implemented some policy or practice that constitutes an ongoing ‘failure to abide by the terms of 
the FOIA.’”  Muttitt II, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (quoting Payne Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 
 
5 Courts in this Circuit use the terms “policy or practice” and “pattern or practice” interchangeably 
in addressing this type of FOIA claim .  This court will use “policy or practice,” which is the 
D.C. Circuit’s chosen terminology.  See Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 
770, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).  The policy can be “informal, rather than articulated in regulations 
or an official statement.”  Muttitt v. U.S. Cent. Command, 813 F. Supp. 2d 221, 231 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(“Muttitt I”) (quoting Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at  491).  “[I]solated” incidents of noncompliance 
do not suffice.  Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491. 
“[T]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.”  Brayton v. 
Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative , 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C.  Cir. 2011).  A court should grant 
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.  56(a).  Summary 
judgment is properly granted against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to tha t party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  The burden is on 
the moving party to show that there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact” in dispute.  
Id. at 323. 
When the propriety of a Glomar response or the applicability of an exemption is at issue, 
summary judgment may be awarded to the agency based solely on the agency’s affidavits or 
declarations.  See Larson v. Dep ’t of State , 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C.  Cir. 2009).  A court “may 
grant summary judgment on the basis of agency affidavits that contain ‘reasonable specificity of 
detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by 
contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’”  EPIC I, 678 F.3d at 931 
(quoting Gardels v. Cent. Intel. Agency , 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see SafeCard 
Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that agency 
affidavits and declarations are “accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted 
by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents’” 
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(quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981))).  
“Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears 
‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’”  EPIC I, 678 F.3d at 931 (quoting Larson, 565 F.3d at 862).  With respect 
to policy-or-practice claims, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged policy 
or practice exists and that it “will impair the [plaintiff’s] lawful access to information in the future.”  
Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. , 249 F. Supp. 3d at 281 (quoting Newport Aeronautical Sales , 684 F.3d 
at 164); see Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. Cent. Intel Agency, 960 F. Supp. 2d 101, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Count I 
The court begins by addressing Count I, which challenges DOJ’s categorical withholding 
of responsive records relating to its investigation of former Representative Gaetz.  After CREW 
moved for summary judgment on Count I, DOJ withdrew its categorical denial of CREW’s request 
for records relating to the investigation of Representative  Gaetz and agreed to “process CREW’s 
request and produce responsive, non -exempt records.”  ECF No. 29, at 18 (noting that DOJ had 
learned of Representative Gaetz’s “public ackno wledgement of the existence of a DOJ 
investigation implicating his official duties ”); see ECF No. 32, at 4 (stating that the FBI released 
thirty-nine pages to CREW on March  9, 2026 and “is making monthly interim releases” for the 
remaining 8,500 potentially responsive pages).  DOJ requests that the court deny as moot CREW’s 
motion for summary judgment on Count I, ECF No. 29, at 18, and CREW does not oppose the 
request, ECF No. 31, at 23.  The court accordingly denies CREW’s motion for summary judgment 
on Count I.  CREW may renew its motion in the event that  DOJ fails to effectively process its 
request. 
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B. Count II 
In Count II, CREW contends that DOJ has a policy or practice of issuing improper Glomar 
responses to FOIA requests seeking records related to public ly disclosed investigations of public 
officials.  ECF No.  1 ¶  43; see ECF No.  23-1, at  21 (criticizing DOJ’s “knee -jerk Glomar 
responses”).6  In CREW’s view, this policy or practice has two aspects: (1) DOJ’s failure to 
consider whether it has already disclosed the existence of responsive records, which would waive 
the agency’s right to invoke a Glomar response under the “official acknowledgment” doctrine, see 
ECF No.  23-1, at  23-29; and (2) DOJ’s misapplication of governing legal standards when 
determining whether  a non -Glomar response would  actually cause  harm under FOIA 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C), see id. at 12-19, 29-34.  As support, CREW points to ten FOIA requests 
for which it received Glomar responses.7  Id. at 20-34. 
DOJ disputes both aspects of this alleged policy, asserting that its components “process[] 
FOIA requests pertaining to third-party investigations by performing an individualized analysis ” 
 
6 CREW has standing to pursue its policy-or-practice claim because of its “clear intent,” Nat’l Sec. 
Couns. v. Cent. Intel. Agency , 931 F. Supp. 2d 77, 93 (D.D.C.  2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), to file further FOIA requests for records relating to publicly disclosed investigations, as 
evidenced by the slew of FOIA requests it has submitted in recent years, see generally  ECF 
No. 23-3, and its stated “inten[t] to submit similar requests in the future,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 35.  These 
future requests are “themselves likely to implicate the challenged policies in the future.”  Nat’l 
Sec. Couns., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 93. 
7 CREW relies on four requests cited in its complaint, see ECF No. 1 ¶ 31; ECF Nos. 1-9, 1-12 to 
1-15 (Morehead, Kelsey, Zinke, and Mastriano requests), and additional requests  raised for the 
first time  in its summary judgment briefing, see ECF No.  23-1, at  21, 27 -28, 31-34 ( Trump 
companies, Fortenberry, Evans, Egyptian President, Giuliani /Kallstrom, and Kindred requests).  
While DOJ notes that CREW “cites additional FOIA requests for the first time in its [cross-motion 
and] opposition,” DOJ does not object to the court’s consideration of all of CREW’s requests.  
ECF No. 29, at 6.  CREW’s complaint also cited requests it had submitted to the EOUSA and OIP 
for records relating to DOJ investigations of Mr. Giuliani.  See ECF Nos. 1-10, 1-11; see also ECF 
No. 18-5, at 18; ECF No. 18-6, at 8.  Since CREW does not rely on DOJ’s Glomar responses to 
these requests in its summary judgment briefing, see ECF No. 23-1, at 32 n.10, the court declines 
to address them. 
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in accordance with FOIA.  ECF No. 18-1, at 14.  As support, DOJ submitted seven declarations 
from officials who oversee FOIA requests for the relevant components: the Criminal Division, see 
ECF No. 18-3 (O’Keefe Decl aration); ECF No.  29-3 (Butler Decl aration); the FBI, see ECF 
No. 18-4 (Hammer Decl aration); the EOUSA, see ECF No.  18-6 (Jolly Decl aration); ECF 
No. 29-1 (Suppl emental Jolly Decl aration); OIP, see ECF No. 18-5 (O’Neill Decl aration); and 
OPR, see ECF No. 29-2 (McCarty Declaration). 
The court concludes that CREW has not carried its burden of showing that  DOJ has an 
across-the-board policy or practice of  issuing Glomar responses whenever a FOIA request for 
investigation-related records identifies a subject by name , and it will accordingly deny CREW’s 
motion for summary judgment on Count  II.  But that does not mean that DOJ is entitled to 
summary judgment, because CREW has identified ways in which individual DOJ components 
appear to be acting inconsistently with FOIA in a manner that could support component-specific 
policy-or-practice claims.   The court begins by  addressing the propriety of DOJ’s challenged 
Glomar responses before turning to whether the deficiencies identified by CREW —and further 
revealed in DOJ’s declarations—establish a policy or practice that violates FOIA. 
1. Official agency acknowledgment 
CREW argues that DOJ ignores evidence that the agency has officially acknowledged the 
existence of an investigation, pointing to four examples of FOIA requests  it submitted to DOJ 
components.  ECF No. 23-1, at 24-28.  Under the “official acknowledgment doctrine,” an agency’s 
official acknowledgment of the existence of a requested record waives the agency’s right to make 
a Glomar response.  Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 11 F.4th 
810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 427 (“[T]he plaintiff can overcome a Glomar 
response by showing that the agency has already disclosed the fact of the existence (or 
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nonexistence) of responsive records, since that is the purportedly exempt information that a 
Glomar response is designed to protect.”) .8  “To establish official acknowledgment, a plaintiff 
must identify information in the public domain that (1)  matches the information requested, (2)  is 
as specific, and (3) has ‘been made public through an official and documented disclosure.’”  Knight 
First Amend. Inst., 11 F.4th at 815 (quoting Fitzgibbon v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 911 F.2d 755, 765 
(D.C. Cir. 1990)).  The requester “must pinpoint an agency record that both matches the plaintiff’s 
request and has been publicly and officially acknowledged by the agency.”  Montgomery v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 356 F. Supp. 3d 74, 82 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting James Madison Project v. 
Dep’t of Just., 302 F. Supp. 3d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2018)).  In the Glomar context, an official disclosure 
need only establish the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to the FOIA request, even 
if the contents of the records themselves have not been disclosed.  ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 427.  The 
D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that courts must apply the official -acknowledgment test 
strictly, because “the fact that information exists in some form in the public domain does not 
necessarily mean that official disclosure will not cause harm cognizable under a FOIA exemption.”  
BuzzFeed, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., 344 F. Supp. 3d 396, 408 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d 
at 378).  “Disclosure by one federal agency does not waive another agency’s right to assert a FOIA 
exemption.”  Mobley v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 806 F.3d 568, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  Similarly, “[t]he 
press and oth er non -official sources cannot waive the government’s right to invoke a Glomar 
response.”  Buzzfeed, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 408. 
 
8 CREW refers to this rule as the “public domain exception ,” see, e.g., ECF No. 23-1, at 24, and 
the D.C. Circuit has used “public domain” and “official acknowledgment” interchangeably when 
referring to this doctrine , see Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 104 F.4th 267 , 274  
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (clarifying that the public domain doctrine is not “separate and distinct from the 
official acknowledgement doctrine”). 
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a. Morehead request 
CREW first objects to the EOUSA and OPR’s Glomar responses to its request for records 
relating to AUSA Morehead.  ECF No. 23-1, at 25-26; see ECF No. 23-3, at 156-69.  In another 
suit in this court, CREW challenged OPR’s Glomar response to this same request, arguing that 
DOJ had officially acknowledged the existence of AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct.  See 
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Just., No. 24-CV-2416, 2025 WL 2206945, at *2 
(D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2025) (“CREW II”).  Specifically, CREW’s request identified testimony in court 
by the acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Kansas—where AUSA Morehead worked—stating 
that he was aware of allegations that AUSA Morehead had violated her prosecutorial obligations  
and that no disciplinary consequences had been imposed for her misconduct.  See id.; see also ECF 
No. 23-3, at  158-60 (stating that the a cting U .S. Attorney had testified  in court that 
AUSA “Morehead’s reputation for veracity is poor ” and that “despite evidence of her conduct in 
both this and other criminal  cases, the government ha [d] confirmed that it ha [d] not imposed 
internal sanctions or discipline against AUSA Morehead on the basis of untruthfulness” (quoting 
CCA Recordings 2255 Litig. v. United States , No. 12-CR-20003-03, 2021 WL 5833911 , at *10, 
*24 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2021), aff’d sub. nom. , United States v. Hohn , 123 F.4th 1084 (10th  Cir. 
2024) (en banc))).  The court in CREW II agreed, finding that the acting U.S. Attorney’s testimony 
“publicly acknowledged Morehead’s alleged violations of legal and ethical duties, as well as the 
lack of discipline she faced,” such that DOJ could not “claim ‘it would reveal anything not already 
in the public domain’ to say the agency has records related to those alleged violations.”  2025 WL 
2206945, at  *2 (quoting ACLU II, 710 F.3d at  430); see id.  (concluding that the acting U.S. 
Attorney’s statement that “he was ‘aware that there have been allegations’ of Morehead refusing 
to provide Brady or Giglio evidence . . . ‘ma[de] it neither logical nor plausible to maintain that 
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the Agency d[id] not have any documents’ related to allegations of misconduct against Morehead” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) ).  The court further explained that the acting U.S. Attorney’s 
public acknowledgments could bind other DOJ components.  Id.; see Marino v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 
685 F.3d 1076, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that if a DOJ prosecutor introduces certain records 
as evidence in court, other DOJ components may not invoke a FOIA exemption as to those 
records). 
This court, however, takes a different view.  It is true that official disclosures by one 
component of an agency may bind other components of the same agency, and DOJ does not dispute 
that rule as it applies to the Morehead request.  But that is only one piece of the inquiry.  The prior 
disclosure must also “establish[] the existence (or not) of records responsive to the FOIA request.”  
Leopold v. Cent. Intel. Agency , 987 F.3d 163, 170 (D.C.  Cir. 2021)  (second emphasis added)  
(quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 379).  Here, to constitute an official acknowledgment, the acting U.S. 
Attorney’s testimony must have established  the existence of DOJ records relating to 
AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct as a p rosecutor and any DOJ investigation of such 
misconduct.  See ECF No. 23-3, at 167.  Applying the official -acknowledgment test “strictly,” 
Moore v. Cent. Intel. Agency , 666 F.3d 1330, 1333 (D.C.  Cir. 2011), as it must, the court cannot 
conclude that the acting U.S. Attorney’s testimony stretches that far.  The acting U.S. Attorney  
stated that he was aware of misconduct allegations against AUSA Morehead, but these statements 
were made in response to questions about  whether the U.S. Attorney’s Office had disciplined 
AUSA Morehead and judicial findings of AUSA Morehead’s misconduct as a federal prosecutor.  
See ECF No.  23-3, at 176-89.  And while the acting U.S. Attorney  testified about 
AUSA Morehead’s “poor [reputation] for veracity,” the attorney questioning him specifically 
asked him to opine on  AUSA Morehead’s reputation in the “legal community,” referring “not to 
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[the U.S. Attorney’s] [O]ffice but the larger legal community.”  Id. at 188.  The acting U.S. 
Attorney did not acknowledge any inquiry into AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct by his 
office, nor did he state that his office had independently received misconduct complaints or 
allegations.  Put differently, his disclosure of his own awareness of AUSA Morehead’s alleged 
misconduct did not confirm the existence of DOJ records about that alleged misconduct. 
CREW’s official-acknowledgment argument is even weaker with respect to its request for 
records of AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct as a Kansas prosecutor and records of any DOJ 
investigations of AUSA Morehead in that capacity .  See id. at 167.  The acting U.S. Attorney’s 
testimony was limited to AUSA Morehead’s tenure as a federal prosecutor, see id.  at 185 
(attorney’s statement “limiting this [questioning  of the acting U.S. Attorney ] to when 
[AUSA Morehead] was a federal prosecutor”) , so it did not match the requested information in 
CREW’s request.  As the court in CREW II observed, see 2025 WL 2206945, at *2, the acting U.S. 
Attorney stated that he was “not aware of any disciplinary action taken [against AUSA Morehead] 
at any time for untruthfulness,” ECF No. 23-3, at 186; see id. at 177-87.  But that disclosure does 
not confirm that his office —or any other DOJ component —ever investigated or c ontemplated 
sanctioning AUSA Morehead.  Accordingly, based on the acting U.S. Attorney’s testimony, it is 
entirely “‘logical’ [and] ‘plausible,’” ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 431 , for DOJ  to maintain that the 
EOUSA and OPR do not have documents about AUSA Morehead’s alleged misconduct  as a 
federal or state prosecutor or about any DOJ investigation of her. 
Finally, DOJ’s declarations further belie CREW’s assertion that the EOUSA and OPR —
the components that responded to the Morehead request —systematically ignore official 
acknowledgments.  DOJ offers two declarations from Vinay J. Jolly, an Attorney Advisor at the 
EOUSA, to explain the component’s approach to official acknowledgments.  ECF Nos. 18-6, 29-1.  
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Mr. Jolly avers that  in assessing  whether a Glomar response is appropriate, the “EOUSA 
determines whether there has been a public disclosure of the investigation.”  ECF No. 29-1, at 2 
¶ 5.  “In determining whether the investigation has been officially acknowledged, EOUSA 
searches DOJ public websites, official government press releases, and news articles referencing a 
verifiable acknowledgement from an official of the government authori zed to make such 
statements[,] and consults with the individual U.S. Attorney’s Office  . . . .”  Id. at 2 ¶ 6.  As for 
OPR, DOJ offers a declaration from OPR Senior Associate Counsel Margaret S. McCarty, who 
asserts that OPR “conducted open-source research and did not find any acknowledgment by DOJ 
of an investigation into Ms.  Morehead’s conduct.”  ECF No. 29-2, at 5 ¶ 22 (“[A] district court 
later disagreed with OPR’s reasoning and found that, although there was no reference to an OPR 
investigation specifically, there was evidence of pu blic acknowledgment by the acting United 
States Attorney of alleged legal and ethical wrongdoing by Ms.  Morehead.”).  CREW offers no 
evidence of bad faith to rebut the presumption of good faith afforded to these declarations.  See 
SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200.9 
 
9 DOJ argues that the EOUSA’s response to the Morehead request was a categorical denial, not a 
Glomar response.  ECF No. 29, at 7 n.1.  The court previously rejected this argument, concluding 
that the EOUSA’s  use of hypothetical language effectively functioned as a Glomar response 
because it neither confirmed nor denied the existence of responsive records.  See ECF No. 12, 
at 16-17 (explaining that while the response  “stops short of explicitly invoking the Glomar 
language, it all but refuse s to confirm or deny the existence of CREW’s requested records ”).  
CREW also points out that in the CREW II litigation, DOJ described both the EOUSA and OPR’s 
responses as Glomar responses in a joint status report.   ECF No. 23-1, at 23; see ECF No. 23-3, 
at 171 (“Defendant (both DOJ components EOUSA and OPR) did not confirm or deny the 
existence of responsive records or conduct searches for records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA 
request . . . .”); Joint Status Report ¶ 2, CREW II, No. 24-CV-2416 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2024), ECF 
No. 9.  The CREW II court, however, evaluated the EOUSA’s response  as a categorical denial.   
See 2025 WL 2206945, at *3-4.  The court adheres to its view that the EOUSA’s response was a 
Glomar response, but, for the reasons explained above, it finds that the EOUSA did not improperly 
ignore an official acknowledgment as CREW asserts. 
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b. Kelsey request 
Next, CREW challenges the Criminal Division’s Glomar response to its request for records 
relating to DOJ’s investigation of Tennessee State Senator Kelsey that mentioned, among others, 
Amanda Bunning and Josh Smith.  ECF No. 23-1, at 26-27; see ECF No. 23-3, at 147-54.  CREW 
asserts that its FOIA request alerted DOJ that “it was public knowledge that Bunning was ‘listed 
in the [Kelsey] indictment’ as someone who received and passed along information in the course 
of his criminal conspiracy.”  ECF No. 23-1, at 27 (alteration in original).  As for Mr. Smith, CREW 
claims that its request identified a DOJ press release that named Mr. Smith as a co-conspirator of 
Mr. Kelsey and discussed Mr.  Smith’s guilty plea. 10  ECF No.  23-1, at  26; see ECF No.  23-3, 
at 148.  CREW therefore argues that DOJ officially acknowledged the existence of records relating 
to both Ms. Bunning and Mr. Smith.  ECF No. 23-1, at 27. 
To begin , the court finds that DOJ did not officially acknowledge the existence of 
responsive records about Ms.  Bunning.  CREW’s request cited a news article about 
Senator Kelsey’s guilty plea in which the news outlet stated that it had obtained a copy of a 
subpoena in the case seeking documents related to Ms.  Bunning, among others.  ECF No.  18-3, 
at 14; see Sam Stockard, Ex-Sen. Brian Kelsey Pleads Guilty to Two Counts of Federal Campaign 
Finance Violations , Tenn . Lookout (Nov.  22, 2022). 11  But this news article falls far short of 
satisfying the official -acknowledgment test, which requires an official disclosure by the agency 
from which information is being sought .  See Knight First Amend. Inst. , 11 F.4th at  815-16.  An 
agency’s official acknowledgment cannot be established based on disclosures by other agencies, 
 
10 CREW asserts that its request identified “two DOJ press releases” relating to Mr. Smith, but its 
request cited only one press release.  ECF No. 23-1, at 26 (emphasis omitted); see ECF No. 23-3, 
at 148 n.1. 
11 Available at https://perma.cc/Q29A-M42Y. 
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see Frugone v. Cent. Intel. Agency , 169 F.3d 772, 774 -75 (D.C. Cir. 1999), or other branches of 
government, see Salisbury v. United States , 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C.  Cir. 1982) —let alone 
reporting in the news media, see EPIC I, 678 F.3d at 933 n.5 (“[T]he national media are not capable 
of waiving [an agency’s] statutory authority to protect information related to its functions and 
activities.”); see also Fitzgibbon , 911 F.2d at  765 ( “It is one thing for a reporter or author to 
speculate or guess that a thing may be so or even, quoting undisclosed sources, to say that it is so; 
it is quite another thing for one in a position to know of it officially to say that it is so.” (quoting 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby , 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th  Cir. 1975))).  Accordingly, a statement 
in a news article about an alleged subpoena referencing Ms.  Bunning cannot be considered 
“tantamount to an acknowledgment that the [ Criminal Division] has documents on the subject .”  
ACLU II, 710 F.3d at 431. 
The news article also contains the statement that Ms.  Bunning appeared in 
Senator Kelsey’s indictment “as an individual who received information from [Senator  Kelsey] 
and passed it on to . . . others.”  Stockard, supra.  But Ms. Bunning’s name does not appear in the 
public indictment against Mr.  Kelsey, see Indictment, United States v. Kelsey , No. 3:21-CR-264 
(M.D. Tenn. Oct.  22, 2021), ECF No.  1, or the DOJ press release  announcing Mr.  Kelsey’s 
indictment, see U.S. Dep’t of Just., Tennessee State Senator Pleads Guilty to Campaign Finance 
Scheme (Nov. 22, 2022) (“DOJ Kelsey Press Release”).12  While the media may have inferred that 
Ms. Bunning was an unnamed individual in the indictment, the indictment’s references to unnamed 
individuals cannot constitute an official disclosure of the existence of records about Ms. Bunning.  
See Moore, 666 F.3d at 1334 (stating that “[a]n agency’s official acknowledgement . . . cannot be 
 
12 Available at https://perma.cc/ZKA9-T5TW. 
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based on . . . speculation, no matter how widespread ” (alterations in original) (quoting Wolf, 473 
F.3d at 378)). 
As for the part of CREW’s request referring to Mr.  Smith, there can be no dispute that 
DOJ’s press release  announcing Mr. Smith’s guilty plea as one of Mr.  Kelsey’s co-conspirators 
constitutes an official acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records about Mr.  Smith.  
See DOJ Kelsey Press Release, supra.  The press release states that the Criminal Division’s Public 
Integrity Section was prosecuting the case against Mr. Smith and Mr. Kelsey, see id., making the 
existence of responsive Criminal Division records relating to Mr. Smith “plain on the face of the 
official statement,” James Madison Project, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 22.  Indeed, DOJ does not attempt 
to argue that a Glomar response would have been appropriate to the part of CREW’s request 
referring to Mr. Smith.  See generally ECF Nos. 18-1, 29.  DOJ instead maintains that it issued a 
categorical denial, not a Glomar response, which used “to the extent” language .  ECF No.  18-1, 
at 8 n.2; see ECF No. 18-3, at 3-4, 8-9 ¶¶ 8, 20.  DOJ emphasizes that the Criminal Division’s 
response used explicit Glomar language for the rest of  the request and different , “categorical” 
language for the part regarding Mr.  Smith, and the court must give eff ect to those different 
wordings.  See ECF No. 29-1, at 7 n.1.  But, as the court previously found, “to the extent” phrasing 
refers to records “hypothetically without confirming or denying their existence.”  ECF No.  12, 
at 16-17.  The Criminal Division’s response therefore declines to confirm or deny the existence of 
responsive records—or acknowledge whether it had conducted a search —as to records referring 
to Mr. Smith and is effectively a Glomar response.  See Cobar v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 953 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2013) (treating the same language from OIP as a Glomar response); see also 
Tower v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. , No.  23-CV-204, 2024 WL 3967322 , at  *4 
(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2024) (assuming that an agency’s response was a Glomar response where it was 
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“not a model of clarity” and could be construed as a Glomar or a categorical denial); Raw Story v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 23-CV-2514, 2024 WL 4346214, at *10 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2024) (“Indeed, 
the court does not understand how Defendants can claim a categorical exemption for records it has 
not yet searched for and identified. ”).  But see Carzoglio  v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys , 
No. 24-CV-2080, 2026 WL 295387, at  *2 (D.D.C.  Feb. 4, 2026) (treating same language as a 
categorical denial). 
The court agrees with CREW on one  additional point: the Criminal Division’s general 
approach to official acknowledgments appears to be too  narrow.  DOJ offers a declaration from 
Courtney O’Keefe, Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division’s FOIA/Privacy Act (“PA”) Unit, to 
explain the Criminal Division’s process for issuing Glomar responses.  See ECF No.  18-3.  
Ms. O’Keefe states that, as part of its Glomar analysis, the Criminal Division considers whether 
there has been an “official acknowledgment by the Criminal Division  of a law enforcement 
investigation of the subject of the request.”  Id. at 6 ¶ 11 (emphasis added).  This suggests that the 
Criminal Division considers only its own official acknowledgments, see ECF No. 23-1, at 15, and 
Defendants do not argue otherwise, see ECF No. 29, at 3.  But, as noted, a disclosure by any DOJ 
component may bind the Criminal Division , so long as the prior disclosure es tablishes the 
existence or nonexistence of responsive records.  See Knight First Amend. Inst. , 11 F.4th at  817 
(“[A] disclosure by one component of an executive department may bind ‘another component 
within’ the same department.” (quoting Marino, 685 F.3d at 1082)).  Put differently, if a disclosure 
is “‘made by an authorized representative of the agency’s parent,’ it is ‘official’ as to the 
subordinate agency.”  Id. at 816 (quoting ACLU II, 710 F.3d at  429 n.7).  Applied here, the 
Criminal Division cannot limit its consideration of official acknowledgments to only Criminal 
Division disclosures.  With respect to the Kelsey request, it is not clear whether this overly narrow 
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focus caused the Criminal Division to err in processing the request, since the Criminal Division’s 
parent, DOJ,  officially acknowledged Mr. Smith’s indictment and there was no official 
acknowledgment by any component regarding Ms. Bunning.  The court will nonetheless consider 
the Criminal Division’s narrow approach to official acknowledgments—along with its response to 
CREW’s request regarding Mr. Smith—in evaluating CREW’s policy-or-practice claim.  See infra 
Section IV.B.3. 
c. Fortenberry request 
CREW also objects to the Criminal Division ’s and EOUSA’s responses to its request for 
records relat ing to the investigation of former Representative  Fortenberry.  ECF No.  23-1, 
at 27-28; see ECF No. 23-3, at 191-202.  CREW argues that a U.S. Attorney’s Office press release 
announcing Representative Fortenberry’s indictment , which CREW cited in its FOIA request, 
constitutes an official acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records .  ECF No.  23-3, 
at 191; see U.S. Att’y’s Off., Cent. Dist. of Cal., U.S. Rep. Jeff Fortenberry Charged with Scheme 
to Deceive Federal Investigators Probing Illegal Campaign Contributions in 2016 (Oct. 19, 2021) 
(“USAO Fortenberry Press Release”).13 
Beginning with the Criminal Division’s Glomar response, ECF No. 23-3, at 201-02, DOJ 
argues that the press release “does not indicate any involvement by the Criminal Division ,” ECF 
No. 29, at 6.  The Criminal Division therefore “issued a partial Glomar to the extent CREW was 
requesting Criminal Division records beyond the scope of the investigation by EOUSA and 
maintained that any request for records associated with the press release were misdirected to the 
Criminal Division.”  ECF No. 29, at 6-7.  The court agrees.  If the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s press 
 
13 Available at https://perma.cc/JD4Z-T425. 
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release had confirmed the Criminal Division’s involvement in the DOJ investigation of 
Representative Fortenberry—as the press release for Mr. Smith did—then it would have officially 
acknowledged the existence of Criminal Division records responsive to CREW’s request.  But 
“[p]rior disclosure of similar information does not suffice; instead, the specific information sought 
by [CREW] must already be in the public domain by official disclosure .”  Morley v. Cent. Intel. 
Agency, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124 (D.C.  Cir. 2007) (quoting Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378).  For example, in 
Marino, a DOJ component  had made a specific reference to an investigation by another DOJ 
component, waiving both components’ right to invoke a Glomar response.  See 685 F.3d at 1082.  
Here, however, the U.S. Attorney’s  Office’s press release states that the FBI, Internal Revenue 
Service, and U.S. Attorney’s Office were investigating and prosecuting 
Representative Fortenberry, with no mention of the Criminal Division.  See USAO Fortenberry 
Press Release, supra.  While the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office “are both arms of the DOJ, ‘there 
is no basis to conclude  . . . that the [Criminal Division] conducts all government investigations 
mentioned by other components of DOJ. ’”  Webster v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation , 
No. 24-CV-387, 2025 WL 2144099 , at  *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2025)  (first alteration in original)  
(quoting Donato v. Exec. Off. U.S. Atty’s, No.  16-CV-632, 2021 WL 5161740 , at  *4 
(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2021)).  CREW therefore fails to establish that the Criminal Division investigated 
Representative Fortenberry, and the Criminal Division correctly declined to treat the U.S. 
Attorney’s press release as an official acknowledgment.  See id. (holding that the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the District of Columbia’s public disclosure of an investigation did not waive the FBI’s 
right to issue a Glomar response regarding any FBI inv estigation); Greenspan v. Exec. Off. for 
U.S. Att’ys, No. 23-CV-1816, 2025 WL 1040834, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2025) (concluding that an 
official disclosure confirming that the FBI  had investigated an individual did not constitute an 
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official acknowledgment that another DOJ component, the Drug Enforcement Administration, had 
investigated him); Donato, 2021 WL 5161740 , at *4 (finding that Bureau of Prisons documents 
describing an investigation did not constitute an official acknowledgment of an FBI investigation).  
To be sure, the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s press release may have diminished  
Representative Fortenberry’s privacy interest in the existence of Criminal Division records, but 
that is a separate issue from whether it ignored official acknowledgments, as CREW asserts. 
As for the EOUSA’s response to CREW’s request, DOJ maintains that the EOUSA issued 
a categorical denial, not a Glomar response.  ECF No. 29, at 7.  Again, DOJ does not attempt to 
argue that a Glomar response from the EOUSA would have been proper, and it does not  rely on 
Glomar in the alternative.  Nor could it, since the U.S. Attorney’s Office ’s prosecution of 
Representative Fortenberry is public.  See USAO Fortenberry Press Release, supra.  Mr. Jolly 
avers in his declaration  that the EOUSA “issued a categorical denial” in response to the 
Fortenberry request “after weighing the asserted public interest with Mr.  Fortenberry’s privacy 
interests.”  ECF No. 29-1, at 2 ¶ 8.  His declaration also restates that, before issuing a Glomar 
response, the EOUSA determines whether DOJ has officially acknowledged an investigation.  Id. 
at 2 ¶¶ 5-6.  The declaration does not explicitly state w hy the EOUSA opted for, in its view, a 
categorical denial, but it implies that the EOUSA did so after determining that DOJ had officially 
acknowledged the investigation of Representative Fortenberry, which is consistent with CREW’s 
view.  See id.  Accordingly, the court does not find that this example supports CREW’s claim that 
the EOUSA systematically ignores official acknowledgments.  The court notes, however, that DOJ 
may easily avoid similar disputes in the future by expressly recognizing the existence of responsive 
records when it wishes to issue a categorical denial , as many of its components already do .  See, 
e.g., ECF No . 22-3, at  14 (FBI’s initial response to CREW’s request for records relating to 
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Representative Gaetz, stating that the FBI “ha[d] completed its search ” and the records were 
“categorically denied”). 
d. Evans request 
Finally, CREW challenges the EOUSA’s Glomar response to its request for the case file 
from the criminal prosecution of former West Virginia House Delegate Derrick Evans.  ECF 
No. 23-1, at  28; see ECF No.  23-3, at  204-10.  CREW emphasizes that DOJ cannot refuse to 
confirm or deny the existence of a “completed public prosecution.”  ECF No. 23-1, at 28; see U.S. 
Att’y’s Off., D.C., West Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Felony Charge for Offenses Committed 
During Jan. 6 Capitol Breach (Mar. 18, 2022).14 
DOJ argues—and the court agrees—that the EOUSA’s response was a categorical denial, 
not a Glomar response.  ECF No. 29, at 7.  The EOUSA’s response stated that “[r]ecords pertaining 
to a third party generally cannot be released without the express authorization and consent of the 
third party, proof that the subject of [the] request is deceased , or a clear demonstration that the 
public interest in the disclosure outweighs the personal privacy interest and that significant public 
benefit would result from the disclosure of the requested records.”  ECF No. 23-3, at 209.  It further 
stated that without any of the required evidence for releasing records concerning a third party, the 
release of responsive records “would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and 
would be in violation of the Privacy Act, 5  U.S.C. §  552a” and tha t “[t]hese records are also 
generally exempt from disclosure” under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id.  The EOUSA also stated that 
it would conduct a search for responsive public records if requested.  Id. 
 
14 Available at https://perma.cc/J3BD-L7G9. 
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Like DOJ’s other contested categorical denials, the EOUSA’s response lacks any explicit 
acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records , admission that a search occurred, or 
statement that the records are “categorically denied.”  Cf. Jurdi, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 90, 92 (treating 
as a categorical denial an agency’s response that “ confirm[ed] that records exist ” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) ).  Nevertheless, the response lacks the hypothetical 
“to the extent that records exist” language contained in the other contested responses.  And DOJ 
components frequently use language similar to the EOUSA’s response to categorically deny FOIA 
requests for third-party records, which courts have consistently treated as categorical denials, not 
Glomar responses.  See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. , 840 F. 
Supp. 2d 226, 228, 230 (D.D.C. 2012) (“CREW III”) (treating an identical response from the FBI 
as a categorical denial); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. , 846 F. Supp. 
2d 63 , 68, 71  (D.D.C. 2012) (treating an identical response from the EOUSA as a categorical 
denial); Black v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. , 69 F. Supp. 3d 26 , 31 , 40  (D.D.C. 2014) (same), aff’d, 
No. 14-5256, 2015 WL 6128830 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 2015). 
2. Application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) 
CREW also contends that DOJ improperly invokes FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C)  when 
determining whether to issue a Glomar response.  Exemption 6 permits the government to 
withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).  Exemption 7(C) protects 
“records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” when disclosure “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  Id. 
§ 552(b)(7)(C).  Both exemptions require agencies and reviewing courts to “balance the privacy 
interests that would be compromised by disclosure against the public interest in the release of the 
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requested information.”  Beck v. Dep’t of Just. , 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C.  Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Davis v. U.S. Dep ’t of Just., 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C.  Cir. 1992)).  Exemption 7(C) “provides 
broader privacy protection than Exemption  6 and thus ‘establishes a lower bar for withholding 
material.’”  CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1091 n.2 (quoting ACLU I, 655 F.3d at 6).  Accordingly, “when 
both Exemptions 6 and 7(C) could apply to all of the requested records, courts will ‘confine [the] 
analysis to Exemption 7(C).’”  United for FBI Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. , No. 22-CV-2885, 
2024 WL 961001, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting PETA, 745 F.3d 
at 541).  Here, CREW agrees that the court may focus its analysis on Exemption  7(C) because 
DOJ invoked Glomar responses under both provisions.  See ECF No. 23-1, at 7. 
As a threshold matter, to  withhold records pursuant to Exemption  7(C), an agency must 
show “that the records were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.”  Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., 245 F.  Supp. 3d 225, 249 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Kay v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm., 976 F. 
Supp. 23, 37 (D.D.C. 1997)).  “To establish a law enforcement purpose, [an agency’s] declarations 
must establish (1)  ‘a rational nexus between the investigation and one of the agency ’s law 
enforcement duties; ’ and (2)  ‘a connection between an individual or incident and a possible 
security risk or violation of federal law.’”  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 331 F.3d 
918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Campbell v. Dep’t of Just., 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
Once an agency establishes that the requested records fall under Exemption  7(C), the 
agency must then show that disclosure of the requested information “would compromise a 
substantial, as opposed to a de minimis, privacy interest.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 
309 F.3d 26, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 
873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  Where “no significant privacy interest is implicated (and if no other 
Exemption applies), FOIA demands disclosure. ”  Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. , 879 F.2d 
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at 874.  If the court concludes that a substantial privacy interest is at stake, the court must then 
“balance the . . . privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure.”  Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 18 F.4th 712, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“EPIC II”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004)). 
The D.C. Circuit has recognized the “‘substantial’ privacy interest held by ‘the targets of 
law-enforcement investigations . . . in ensuring that their relationship to the investigations remains 
secret.’”  PETA, 745 F.3d at  541 (alteration in original) (quoting Roth, 642 F.3d at 1174); see 
CREW I, 746 F.3d  at 1091 (“ [I]ndividuals have an obvious privacy interest cognizable under 
Exemption 7(C) in keeping secret the fact that they were subjects of a law enforcement 
investigation.” (alteration in original) (quoting Nation Mag., Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 
71 F.3d 885, 8 94 (D.C. Cir. 1995 ))).  The mere “mention of an individual’s name in a law 
enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.”  
Roth, 642 F.3d at  1174 (quoting Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. , 349 F.3d 657,  666 (D.C. Cir. 
2003)).  Accordingly, w hen a FOIA request “is made for  . . . investigative records regarding a 
particular individual, the [agency’s] mere acknowledgment that it possesses responsive records 
associates the individual named in the request with suspected criminal activity  and therefore a 
Glomar response may be appropriate.”  CREW I, 746 F.3d at  1091.  This privacy interest exists 
“regardless of whether the person might be implicated as the target of a law -enforcement 
investigation or merely a witness.”  Prop. of People v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 310 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68 
(D.D.C. 2018); see Roth, 642 F.3d at  1174 ( explaining that  “not only the targets of 
law-enforcement investigations, but also ‘witnesses, informants, and  . . . investigating agents’ 
have a ‘substantial interest’ in ensuring that their relationship to the investigations ‘remains 
secret’” (alteration in original) (quoting Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 666)).  Accordingly, 
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“Exemption 7(C) allows agencies to conceal the existence of responsive documents if the presence 
of such records in the agency’s system would ‘associate the individual named in the request with 
criminal activity’ or otherwise compromise the person’s privacy.”  Prop. of People, 310 F. Supp. 
3d at 68 (quoting Nation Mag., 71 F.3d at 893).  As relevant here, “public officials ‘may have a 
somewhat diminished privacy interest’ in the Exemption 7(C) balancing analysis ,” EPIC II, 18 
F.4th at 719 (quoting CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1092), but they “do not surrender all rights to personal 
privacy when they accept a public appointment ,” CREW I, 746 F.3d at  1092 (quoting Quinon v. 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
On the other side of the balancing test, the “public interest to be weighed against the privacy 
interest . . . is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purposes of the FOIA by 
contribut[ing] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the 
government.”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 309 F.3d at 33 (first alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282 (“It is well established that the only public 
interest relevant for purposes of Exemption  7(C) is one that focuses on ‘ the citizens’ right to be 
informed about what their government is up to.’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989))).  The public interest includes an understanding 
of the manner in which the federal government “handle[s] the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes that undermine the very foundation of our government.”  CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1093. 
CREW cites six of its requests to support its assertion that DOJ fails to consider evidence 
showing a public official’s privacy interests have been diminished.  See ECF No. 23-1, at 29-34.15  
According to CREW, DOJ’s failure takes two forms: DOJ ignores (1) evidence that the subject of 
 
15 CREW relies on the Mastriano, Egyptian President, Giulian i/Kallstrom, Morehead, Kindred, 
and Zinke requests.  ECF No. 23-1, at 29-34. 
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an investigation has publicly disclosed that they were under investigation and (2) evidence in the 
“public record” acknowledging the existence of an investigation.   Id. at 11, 29-34.  CREW 
separately contends that DOJ improperly requires FOIA requesters to establish a “significant” or 
“overriding” public interest in disclosure to overcome Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id. at 16-19 (citing 
its own requests and other FOIA cases in this district where DOJ enforced this requirement).  The 
court agrees that several of CREW’s requests reveal potential deficiencies in DOJ’s processing of 
FOIA requests, although it understands the scope of those deficiencies differently. 
a. Subject’s acknowledgment 
The parties do not dispute that,  generally speaking , “an individual ’s ‘well-publicized 
announcement’ that he was the subject of an investigation diminishes his privacy interest in ‘that 
very fact.’”  Codrea v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives , No. 21-CV-2201, 
2022 WL 4182189, at *7 (D.D.C. Sep. 13, 2022) (quoting CREW I, 746 F.3d at 1092); see Tower, 
2024 WL 3967322, at *6 (collecting cases where an individual’s “affirmative public disclosures 
significantly diminish[ed]” the individual’s privacy interest).  For example, in CREW I, the 
D.C. Circuit considered a FOIA request for files related to an FBI investigation of Tom Delay, the 
former Majority Leader of the House of Representatives.  746 F.3d at 1087.  Mr. DeLay had made 
“public statements confirming the fact that he had been, but was no longer, under investigation.”  
Id. at 1091.  The Court concluded that a Glomar response was inappropriate because “the FBI’s 
acknowledgement that it had responsive records would not itself cause harm by confirming” a fact 
that Mr. DeLay had already made public.  Id. at 1092. 
CREW argues that, for the Mastriano, Egyptian President, and Giuliani/Kallstrom requests, 
the FBI ignored evidence showing that the subject of an investigation had publicly disclosed that 
he was under investigation , which eliminated the subject’s privacy interest .  ECF No.  23-1, 
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at 29-32.  The court agrees that, for the Mastriano and Egyptian President  requests, DOJ has not 
adequately explained whether the FBI  considered statements by the subject’s spokesperson 
disclosing the existence of an investigation.  With respect to the Giuliani/Kallstrom requests, DOJ 
has provided no justification  at all for the FBI’s Glomar response, leaving the court to question 
whether the FBI even evaluated the threshold requirements for Exemptions 6 and 7(C), let alone 
considered the subjects’ public statements disclosing the existence of responsive records. 
Mastriano request.  CREW first cites its request for records relating to Pennsylvania State 
Senator Mastriano’s interviews with the FBI and any DOJ investigation of Senator Mastriano.  Id. 
at 29-30; see ECF No.  18-4, at  20-22.  The FBI issued its “standard” Glomar response to the 
request, ECF No. 18-4, at 27, and CREW appealed, id. at 31-35.  OIP remanded the request “for 
further review” of the  first part of CREW’s request regarding interview records and upheld the 
Glomar response as to the remaining parts.  Id. at 39-40.  On remand of the first part, the FBI stated 
that CREW had “requested records on a third [-]party individual that is exempt from disclosure 
pursuant to” Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and closed the request.  Id. at 44. 
CREW contends that the FBI’s determinations were improper because Senator Mastriano’s 
attorney had “publicly acknowledged [that Senator Mastriano’s interview with the FBI] took 
place,” eliminating Senator Mastriano’s privacy interest in that fact.  Id. at 33; see ECF No. 23-1, 
at 30.  CREW’s request cited a news  article that quoted the attorney as stating, 
“[Senator Mastriano] previously was approached and sat for a voluntary interview with the FBI 
and told them the truth about everything that happened [on January 6]. . . .  The FBI cleared him.”  
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Farnoush Amiri & Marc Levy, Mastriano Willing to Talk to Jan. 6 Committee, Spoke to FBI , 
Associated Press (June 2, 2022).16 
DOJ does not meaningfully respond to CREW’s assertion that the agency failed to consider 
whether Senator Mastriano’s attorney’s statements materially diminished  Senator Mastriano’s 
privacy interest—at least with respect to the existence of records about his interview with the FBI.  
See ECF No.  18-4, at  10 ¶  16 (Acting Section Chief of the FBI’s Record/Information 
Dissemination Section Shannon R. Hammer’s declaration stating that CREW “did not provide 
sufficient evidence of an official disclosure of the requested information by Senator  Mastriano, 
DOJ, or FBI”).  Senator Mastriano’s attorney confirmed that the FBI had interviewed the senator, 
eliminating his privacy interest in the existence of those interview records.  See CREW I, 746 F.3d 
at 1092 (concluding that because the third -party subject’s “ public statements confirmed he had 
been under investigation, the FBI’s acknowledgment that it had responsive records would not itself 
cause harm by confirming that fact, rendering a Glomar response inappropriate ”).  While 
“individuals have substantial privacy interests in relation to being associated with law enforcement 
investigations because any such association can engender comme nt, speculation, or harassment 
which can be embarrassing or stigmatizing,” ECF No. 18-4, at 4 ¶ 6, an agency is still required to 
show that such substantial privacy interests exist based on the individual circumstances of the 
request and third-party subject, see Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 898 F.3d 51, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(explaining that an agency has an “obligation to specifically identify the privacy interest at stake, 
which can vary based on many factors, including frequency, nature, and severity of the 
allegations”).  Here, it is difficult to see how Senator Mastriano could have been harmed by the 
 
16 Available at https://perma.cc/KUB6-DTYV. 
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FBI’s disclosure of the existence of records of his FBI interview after his own attorney had 
confirmed that the interview had taken place , and Ms. Hammer’s declaration does not state if or 
how the FBI considered the effect of those statements on the privacy interests at stake.17 
In fact, Ms. Hammer’s declaration implies that the FBI only deemed Senator Mastriano’s 
attorney’s statements relevant after CREW had shown a strong public interest.  ECF No. 18-4, 
at 12-13 ¶ 22 (explaining that the FBI rescinded its Glomar response on remand because CREW 
had submitted additional statements about the public interest in disclosure in its appeal).  But the 
FBI was required to show a substantial privacy interest at the outset, before considering whether a 
public interest in disclosure might exi st.  See PETA, 745 F.3d at 542 (“In light of the substantial 
privacy interests at stake, Exemption 7(C) authorizes a Glomar response unless the public interest 
in disclosure is strong enough to justify the privacy invasion ”); Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834 , 
at *12 (“Here, defendants fail at the first step of the inquiry: establishing a cognizable privacy 
interest to support their Glomar responses.”).  Ms. Hammer never explains why the FBI concluded 
that Senator Mastriano had a substantial privacy interest in keeping secret the fact that he had been 
interviewed by the FBI.  Instead, the FBI concluded that Senator Mastriano had a “cognizable 
privacy interest in any investigatory records the FBI may or may not have concerning him.”  ECF 
No. 18-4, at  10 ¶ 16 (emphasis added) .  Ms. Hammer never acknowledges whether the FBI 
 
17 CREW also objects to the FBI’s requirement of an “official” disclosure by the third -party 
subject, arguing that “[n]othing in the legal standards regarding Glomar responses requires a 
subject’s acknowledgment of an investigation into him or her to be ‘official’ (whatever that means, 
and the DOJ does not say) .”  ECF No.  23-1, at  30.  But Ms.  Hammer explains  how the FBI 
determines whether a subject’s acknowledgment diminishes his privacy interest, stating  in her 
declaration that the FBI considers “verified statements from [elected officials] or their authorized 
spokesperson[s], in instances when the third[]party is an elected official” and “news articles 
referencing a verifiable acknowledgment  . . . made by the third[]party themselves.”   ECF 
No. 18-4, at 5 ¶ 7. 
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initially considered Senator Mastriano’s attorney’s statements  and how they might have 
diminished Senator Mastriano’s privacy interest in the existence of interview records specifically.  
See i d. at 13 ¶ 23.  Rather, she simply states that the FBI “reconsidered” Senator Mastriano’s 
attorney’s statements on remand, after CREW had appealed.  Id.  This suggests that in its first 
analysis, the FBI ignored indicia of Senator Mastriano’s diminished privacy interest at the outset.18 
That said, to the extent CREW argues that the attorney’s statements eliminated 
Senator Mastriano’s privacy interests in the existence of an FBI investigation, CREW is incorrect.  
The attorney’s disclosure was limited to the existence of Senator Mastriano’s voluntary interview 
with the FBI, and it did not, as CREW asserts, confirm that Senator Mastriano was the subject of 
an FBI investigation.  See ECF No.  23-1, at  30.  Because his attorney did not disclose that 
Senator Mastriano “was ever the target of an FBI investigation outside of his association with the 
[voluntary interview],” Senator Mastriano had “ more than a de minimis  privacy interest in the 
existence of any FBI investigative records outside of the [interview] [his lawyer]  publicly 
acknowledged.”  Prop. of the People, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., No. 17-CV-1728, 2021 WL 6105680, 
at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2021); see Codrea, 2022 WL 4182189 , at *7 (concluding that a subject’s 
public statements acknowledging a police investigation did not diminish his privacy interest 
regarding whether he was the subject of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives investigation); Lindsey v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation , 490 F. Supp. 3d 1 , 19 -20 
(D.D.C. 2020) (concluding that the subject retained his privacy interest  in not being associated 
 
18 Because the court agrees with CREW that the FBI’s initial Glomar response was flawed, it need 
not address the parties’  dispute over whether, on remand, the FBI  issued a “rephrased Glomar 
response,” ECF No. 23-1, at 30, or a categorical denial, ECF No.  18-1, at 12; see ECF No. 18-4, 
at 44 (stating on remand that CREW had “requested records on a third party individual that is 
exempt from disclosure pursuant to” Exemptions 6 and 7(C)). 
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with FBI investigative records when he had made statements about being detained and questioned 
by law enforcement officials but had not admitted that he was a subject of investigative interest to 
the FBI). 
Egyptian President request.  Second, CREW cites the FBI’s Glomar response to its request 
for records relat ing to an investigation into allegations that “Egyptian President Abdel Fatah 
El-Sisi sought to give $10 million to support former President Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential 
campaign.”  ECF No. 23-3, at 213-19; see ECF No. 23-1, at 31.  CREW’s request cited a news 
article reporting that DOJ had closed its investigation into whether then-candidate Trump accepted 
funds from Egypt; the article also quoted a spokesperson for Trump’s presidential campaign about 
the investigation.  ECF No. 23-3, at 214; see Aaron C. Davis & Carol D. Leo nnig, $10M Cash 
Withdrawal Drove Secret Probe into Whether Trump Took Money from Egypt, Wash. Post (Aug. 2, 
2024).19  CREW thus contends that the FBI improperly refused to confirm or deny the existence 
of responsive records about the investigation despite the Trump spokesperson’s public statement.  
ECF No. 23-1, at 31. 
In response, DOJ claims that the Glomar response was proper because the article “does not 
constitute any official or public acknowledgment as it merely references DOJ’s and 
President Trump’s spokesperson’s refusal to answer any questions regarding the purported 
investigation.”  ECF No.  29, at 8.  But DOJ mischaracterizes the article, as the spokesperson for 
President Trump’s campaign did not merely decline to comment or refuse to answer any questions.  
Rather, the spokesperson expressly acknowledged the inv estigation, stating, “The investigation 
referenced found no wrongdoing and was closed.”  Davis & Leonnig, supra.  And a spokesperson 
 
19 Available at https://perma.cc/BWX4-J83T. 
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for the Egyptian government told the news outlet that it was “‘inappropriate to comment or refer 
to rulings issued by the judiciary system or procedures and reports taken by Justice Departments’ 
in other countries . . . [and] emphasized that the Justice Department had closed the investigation 
without ch arges.”  Id.  While DOJ is correct that the article does not contain an official 
acknowledgment by DOJ, that “ does not mean that the  third-party’s acknowledgment of that 
information has no bearing on the priv ate-public interest balancing test underlying the FOIA 
exemptions at issue.”  Lindsey v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017); 
see Prop. of the People, 2021 WL 6105680, at *6 (considering a congressman’s spokesperson’s 
comments in the private-interest analysis).  DOJ does not explain whether the FBI considered these 
third-party acknowledgments in its determination of the privacy interests implicated by CREW’s 
request.  In fact, DOJ does not offer any declaration in support of the FBI’s response.  The FBI 
may well have had compelling reasons to issue a Glomar response notwithstanding the public 
acknowledgments by the subjects’ spokespersons .  Cf. In  re Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the 
Press, No. 24-CV-115, 2025 WL 92363, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2025) (concluding that the same 
news article did not contain “sustained or repeated disclosure by the relevant parties ” to justify 
unsealing of grand jury documents).  But since DOJ provides scant explanation for the FBI’s 
conclusion and appears to have misunderstood the meaning of the spokespersons’ statements, the 
court cannot conclude that the FBI considered whether those statements may have diminished the 
subjects’ privacy interests. 
Giuliani/Kallstrom requests.  Third, CREW asserts that the FBI improperly issued Glomar 
responses to its requests for records  of “all communications between any agents or employees of  
the [FBI]” and Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Kallstrom.  ECF No. 23-3, at 223, 227; see ECF No. 23-1, 
at 31.  CREW’s requests cited statements made by Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Kallstrom to news outlets 
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referring to their conversations with FBI agents about the FBI’s investigation of former Secretary 
of State Clinton.  ECF No.  23-3, at 224, 22 8; see, e.g. , Fox News, Giuliani: Case Is Clearer 
Against Clinton Foundation; Comey Advisor: His Silence Would’ve Had Ramifications  (Jan. 23, 
2017);20 Fox News, FBI Reportedly Upset with Obama over Clinton Server Scandal ; 
Krauthammer Calls POTUS’ Remarks on Israel ‘Shameful’ (Jan. 24, 2017).21 
The FBI’s responses  to these requests  highlight a threshold problem with the FBI’s 
approach to Glomar responses, which the parties allude to but  do not squarely address: the FBI 
does not explain why Exemptions 6 and 7(C) apply to the requested records in the first place .  
These requests do not obviously concern “personnel [or] medical files [or] similar files,” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(6), or “records compiled for law enforcement purposes,” id. § 552(b)(7)(C).  “Not every 
document compiled by a law enforcement agency, such as the FBI, is compiled for a law 
enforcement purpose,” Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 6, and DOJ makes no attempt to show that all 
communications between the FBI and these subjects were compiled for law enforcement purposes.  
Indeed, DOJ does not offer any declaration from the FBI justifying its Glomar responses for these 
requests, and its briefing emphasizes that CREW’s  requests did not relate to any investigations.  
ECF No. 29, at 8. 
Ms. Hammer’s declaration about the FBI’s general approach to issuing Glomar responses 
also omits any mention of this threshold determination.  Ms. Hammer avers that when the FBI 
receives a FOIA request concerning “third party individuals” —that is, anyone other than the 
requester—the agency requires the requester to provide proof of death or a written waiver from 
the third party because individuals have a “substantial privacy interest in not being associated with 
 
20 Available at https://perma.cc/4SQ2-LFY3. 
21 Available at https://perma.cc/GV6S-Y4QA. 
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an FBI investigation.”  ECF No. 18-4, at 3 ¶ 5.  But not all records in the FBI’s possession that 
name a third -party individual are law enforcement records , and Ms.  Hammer’s declaration 
conspicuously omits that inquiry from the FBI’s process.  While “ an agency whose ‘principal 
function is law enforcement ’ [like the FBI] is entitled to deference when it claims that records 
relating to an external investigation were compiled for law enforcement purposes,” United for FBI 
Integrity, 2024 WL 961001 at *6 (quotin g Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Section, Int’l 
Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S. -Mex., 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C.  Cir. 2014)), the FBI has not 
made such claims with respect to CREW’s requests or in general. 
DOJ argues that these requests cannot support CREW’s policy -or-practice claim because 
they do not seek records relating to investigations of public officials .  See ECF No.  29, at  8.  
CREW, too, admits that these requests did not seek “records relating to the investigation of a third 
party.”  ECF No. 23-1, at 31 (stating that the requests were for records “not of an investigation”).  
Nevertheless, the court  finds the FBI’s Glomar responses probative in assessing  CREW’s 
overarching claim that “the use of [a] public official’s name triggers a Glomar response” from 
DOJ components.  Id. at 21.  Here, CREW’s requests named two public officials, Mr. Giuliani and 
Mr. Kallstrom, and DOJ does not explain the basis for its Glomar responses.  Finally, e ven 
assuming that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) applied to the requested records, DOJ does not explain 
whether it considered Mr.  Giuliani and Mr.  Kallstrom’s public statements about their 
conversations with FBI agents when weighing the relevant privacy interests. 
b. Other governmental entities’ acknowledgments 
CREW next argues that DOJ ignored acknowledgments by other governmental entities, 
such as federal courts and other agencies, that significantly diminished a subject’s privacy interest 
in the existence of an investigation, making DOJ’s invocation of Glomar inappropriate.  Id. 
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at 32-34.  As support, CREW points to DOJ’s responses to three of its requests: (1) the Morehead 
request, ECF No. 23-3, at 156-69; the Kindred request, id. at 237-45; and the Zinke request, ECF 
No. 18-3, at 24-36.  The court concludes that CREW’s objections to these responses lack merit but 
that these requests reveal a separate problem with DOJ components’ processing of FOIA requests, 
which the court discusses in the next section.  See infra Section IV.B.2.c. 
CREW asserts  categorically that “[s]ubjects of investigations suffer no . . . harm 
when . . . their association with the investigation or conduct that is the subject of the request is 
already a matter of public record.”  ECF No. 23-1, at 29 (emphasis added).  The problem with this 
argument is two-fold: first, CREW assumes that public information about a subject’s alleged 
conduct is sufficient to extinguish that subject’s privacy interest  in the existence of a DOJ 
investigation, even where the existence of a DOJ investigation is not public knowledge; and 
second, CREW fails to recognize that even when information about a DOJ investigation is in the 
public domain, that only diminishes, but does not eliminate, the subject’s privacy interest. 
On the first point , CREW incorrectly asserts that public information about the conduct 
allegedly targeted by a DOJ investigation is sufficient to extinguish a subject’s privacy interest in 
the existence of a DOJ investigation .  Information in the public domain may certainly bear on a 
subject’s privacy interests, but that information must reduce the subject’s privacy interest in the 
existence of the specific records being sought.  See Codrea , 2022 WL 4182189 , at  *7 (“[A]n 
individual’s public disclosure of in formation that could be potentially incriminating in a general 
sense does not reduce his privacy interest in whether he was the subject of a particular federal 
criminal investigation by a particular agency .”).  As applied here , the existence of a DOJ 
investigation itself must be a matter of public record  to reduce the subject’s privacy interest, and 
even then, the subject’s privacy interest may remain intact  absent an acknowledgment by the 
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agency or subject.  See Martin v. Dep’t of Just. , 488 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C.  Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that under Supreme Court precedent “a person’s privacy interest in law enforcement records that 
name him is not diminished by the fact that the events they describe were once a matter of public 
record”).22 
This holds true even when the subject’s conduct enters the public domain through another 
governmental entity’s investigation.  Indeed, CREW appears to conflate official acknowledgments 
of DOJ investigations with acknowledgments by other governmental entities of their own 
investigations.23  But information about a non -DOJ investigation is insufficient on its own to 
eliminate a subject’s privacy interest  in a DOJ investigation.  That is because a subject has a 
distinct privacy interest in the existence of a criminal investigation into them.  See CREW I, 746 
F.3d at 1091 (explaining that “[i]f a FOIA request is made for FBI investigative records regarding 
a particular individual, the FBI ’s mere acknowledgment that it possesses responsive records 
associates the individual named in the request with suspected criminal activity”). 
 
22 CREW relies on Bartko for this point, see ECF No. 23-1, at 32-34; ECF No. 31, at 3-4, but that 
case cuts in the opposite direction.  In Bartko, the D.C. Circuit held that OPR improperly invoked 
Exemption 7(C) to withhold records relating to a prosecutor’s alleged misconduct in handling the 
requester’s criminal case.  898 F.3d at 68-70.  With respect to the balancing of privacy and public 
interests, the Court held that the prosecutor’s privacy interest was “substantially diminished” 
because “the allegations of misconduct during the [requester’s] trial [were] already a matter of 
public record, as [was] the referral to OPR published in [a judicial] decision, and the U .S. 
Attorney’s public announcement that it too was referring the allegations of misconduct to OPR.”   
Id. at 69.  The privacy interests were  therefore diminished because the fact of the OPR 
investigation itself, a s well as  the conduct at issue in the investigation, were matters of public 
record. 
23 CREW’s misunderstanding is understandable, as courts have used the term “public domain 
exception” as a way of referring to the official acknowledgment doctrine.  See supra note 8.  But 
the so-called public domain exception does not provide that any information in the public domain 
confirming the existence of any law enforcement investigation is sufficient to render a Glomar 
response inappropriate.  See Nat’l Sec. Archive , 104 F.4th at  274 (“[T]he mere public disclosure 
of information . . . cannot overcome an otherwise valid FOIA exemption.”). 
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The court therefore rejects CREW’s categorical rule that public acknowledgments by other 
governmental entities of a subject’s conduct or their own investigation of that conduct eliminate 
the subject’s privacy interest in the existence of a DOJ investigation.24  For example, CREW argues 
that federal courts’ acknowledgments of alleged misconduct by AUSA  Morehead eliminated her 
substantial privacy interest in the existence of a ny DOJ investigation  into alleged criminal 
wrongdoing.  See ECF No. 23-1, at 32-33.  AUSA Morehead’s privacy interests may be somewhat 
“lowered because it is public knowledge that [she] has been accused of wrongdoing .”  United for 
FBI Integrity , 2024 WL 961001 , at  *10.  But none of the court statements cited by CREW 
acknowledged the existence of a DOJ investigation of AUSA  Morehead, meaning she “plainly 
ha[d] a ‘strong privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of any  [EOUSA or OPR] investigation 
of misconduct .’”  Id. (quoting PETA, 745 F.3d at  541); see ECF No.  18-6, at  4 ¶  16 (Jolly 
declaration stating that CREW “merely identified federal court decisions that criticized 
Ms. Morehead for misconduct, which is not the same as DOJ investigat[ing] Ms.  Morehead for 
misconduct, officially acknowledging any such investigation of Ms.  Morehead, or finding that 
Ms. Morehead committed misconduct”); ECF No. 29-2, at 6 ¶ 24 (McCarty declaration stating that 
OPR considered “Ms. Morehead’s substantial private interest in nondisclosure of any association 
with a misconduct investigation, if there was one”). 
Likewise, CREW ’s assertion  that f ormer Judge  Kindred’s privacy interests evaporated 
when the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council publicly disclosed its investigation of him also fails.  ECF 
 
24 CREW does not argue that DOJ components improperly balanced the privacy and public 
interests implicated by the following three requests.  Instead, it argues categorically that no privacy 
interest existed based on other governmental entities’ public acknowledgments.  Accordingly, the 
court does not address whether DOJ properly weighed the asserted public interests against the 
privacy interests in nondisclosure. 
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No. 23-1, at  33-34; see In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct , No.  22-90121 
(9th Cir. Jud. Council May 23, 2024), aff’d, C.C.D. No.  24-02 (U.S. Jud. Conf. Aug. 22, 2024).  
But the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council acknowledged the existence of its own investigation into 
Judge Kindred, not the existence of a DOJ investigation.  Judge  Kindred has a distinct privacy 
interest in the existence of a criminal investigation, and the fact that “the full extent of his conduct 
had been authoritatively addressed in a public forum,” ECF No. 23-1, at 34, does not eliminate his 
privacy interest in the existence of a law enforcement investigation, see Martin, 488 F.3d at 457; 
see also Connell v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 110 F.4th 256, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“[C]onfirmation that 
an agency has responsive records (or not) by the agency itself is different from statements to that 
effect by other sources—even trusted government sources—because confirmation by the agency 
itself removes ‘any lingering doubts’ on the issue.” (emphasis added) (quoting Knight First Amend. 
Inst., 11 F.4th at 816)). 
On the second issue, CREW’s argument is based on the faulty legal premise that  any 
information in the public domain about a DOJ investigation is sufficient to eliminate a subject’s 
privacy interest.  The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “the fact that information about 
[an individual’s] case[] is a matter of public record simply makes their privacy interests ‘fade,’ not 
disappear altogether.”  Am. C.L. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 750 F.3d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(quoting ACLU I, 655 F.3d at  9); see Stein v. Cent. Intel. Agency , No.  17-CV-189, 2024 WL 
4298757, at  *3 (D.D.C.  Sep. 26, 2024)  (“It is true that a privacy interest may ‘fade when the 
information involved already appears on the public record  . . . ,’ but that ‘does not mean that  it 
should receive widespread publicity if it does not involve a matter of public concern. ’” (quoting 
Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 763 n.15)).  Assessing a subject’s privacy 
interest in the existence of investigatory records is a fact -specific inquiry that “can vary based on 
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many factors, including frequency, nature, and severity of the allegations.”  Bartko, 898 F.3d at 66.  
As relevant here, an external source’s acknowledgment of a DOJ  investigation may diminish a 
subject’s privacy interest  in the existence of a law enforcement investigation , but it generally 
cannot, on its own, extinguish that privacy interest .  See, e.g., Codrea, 2022 WL 4182189, at *8 
(concluding that “ second-hand media reports of [a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives] records inspection [did not] diminish Hunter Biden’s privacy interest” in the existence 
of an agency investigation); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 394 F. Supp. 3 d 111, 118 
(D.D.C. 2019) (concluding that a former British intelligence operative retained a privacy interest 
in whether the FBI suspected him of “some wrongdoing” even though his privacy interests were 
diminished by public reporting that had “thrust [him] into the spotlight”).25 
PETA is instructive on this point .  There, the D.C. Circuit rejected a FOIA requester’s 
argument that a university’s public acknowledg ments of an agency investigation into its 
researchers eliminated those researchers’ privacy interests.   745 F.3d at 542.  The Court 
emphasized that the agency’s “own official acknowledgement that it had investigated the named 
researchers would carry an added and material stigma,” so, notwithstanding the university’s 
statements, the researchers retained “substantial p rivacy interests.”  Id.; see Hawkins v. Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation , No.  20-CV-1483, 2022 WL 905577 , at  *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022) 
 
25 CREW also argues that DOJ’s own guidance states that Glomar responses are inappropriate 
“where the subject of a request has already been publicly associated with agency law enforcement 
matters that would otherwise justify a Glomar response.”  ECF No.  31, at 2 (citation omitted).  
From this, CREW suggests that any evidence in the “public record” associating the subject of a 
request with a law enforcement investigation is sufficient to render a Glomar response 
inappropriate.  But CREW ignores that in all the cases cited in the DOJ guidance for the quoted 
proposition, the agency or third-party subject themselves had publicly acknowledged the existence 
of responsive records.  ECF No. 31-1, at 41 n.121; see CREW I, 746 F.3d at  1091-92 (subject’s 
public statements); Kimberlin v. Dep’t of Just., 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (prosecutor’s 
public acknowledgments of his own disciplinary proceedings). 
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(“Exempt information only lose[s] [its] protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a 
permanent public record[] if the information has been officially acknowledg[ed], i.e., made public 
through an official and documented disclosure .” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Accordingly, CREW is also incorrect that the Interior OIG’s reference to a possible DOJ 
investigation extinguished former Secretary  Zinke’s privacy interest  in the existence of such an 
investigation.  ECF No. 23-1, at 34; see ECF No. 18-3, at 29.  The Interior OIG report stated that 
the agency had “referred [its] findings to [DOJ], which declined prosecution of this matter in the 
summer of 2021.”  Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 18-890, Former Secretary 
Did Not Comply with Ethical Obligations and Duty of Candor 3 (Feb. 16, 2022).26  CREW claims 
that the Criminal Division issued a Glomar response to its request, ECF No. 23-1, at 34, while 
DOJ maintains that it categorically denied the request, ECF No. 18-1, at 10; ECF No. 29, at 7 n.1.  
The Criminal Division’s initial response did not use explicit Glomar language, but, again, 
hypothetical “to the extent” language does not confirm or deny the existence of responsive records 
and has the same effect as a Glomar response.  See ECF No. 12, at 17.  Even treating the Criminal 
Division’s response as a Glomar response, it is unlikely that  the Interior OIG’s report fully 
diminished Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in the existence of Criminal Division records about 
DOJ’s decision not to prosecute him.  The report states only that the Interior OIG referred its 
findings to “DOJ ,” and CREW points to no acknowledgments by DOJ components or 
Secretary Zinke confirming the existence of that referral or DOJ’s decision not to prosecute. 
 
26 Available at https://perma.cc/78NB-W8JP. 
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c. Scope of privacy interests 
While the court rejects CREW’s sweeping rule  about information in the public record  
eliminating a subject’s privacy interest  in the existence of a DOJ investigation , it concludes that 
DOJ’s responses to the Morehead, Kindred, and Zinke requests—as well as CREW’s request for 
records relating to investigations of companies owned by President  Trump, see ECF No. 23-3, 
at 139-45—reveal a different problem .  Specifically, DOJ has failed to satisfy its obligation to 
“specifically identify the privacy interest at stake ,” Bartko, 898 F.3d at 66, for each requested 
category of records. 
First, the EOUSA’s and OPR’s responses to the Morehead request do not explain why “the 
disclosure of any record regarding any allegation of misconduct,” id., would implicate a substantial 
privacy interest of AUSA Morehead.  CREW’s request did not only seek records relating to DOJ 
investigations of AUSA  Morehead but also records pertaining to “alleged violations by 
AUSA Morehead of  . . . the United States Attorney’s Manual  . . . , any ethical duties imposed 
upon [her] . . . , or any other professional misconduct.”  ECF No.  23-3, at  156-57.  But DOJ’s 
justifications focus solely on her privacy interest in the existence of an investigation.  See ECF 
No. 18-6, at 4 ¶ 15 (stating that the EOUSA concluded that AUSA  Morehead “had a substantial 
privacy interest in the requested information because [she is] mentioned in the requested files”); 
ECF No. 29-2, at 6 ¶ 25 (stating that AUSA Morehead “had strong privacy interests in not being 
associated with an OPR misconduct investigation, if one existed”); see also CREW II, 2025 WL 
2206945, at *3 (“Given that this information [about misconduct allegations] is already public, it 
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would not further harm Morehead’s privacy for DOJ to confirm or deny the existence of records 
concerning allegations of misconduct.”).27 
Next, the EOUSA’s response to the Kindred request  fails to account for the different 
privacy interests at stake for all the requested records.  Only one part of CREW’s request sought 
records of “any DOJ investigations, actions  . . . , or decisions not to take action, in regard to any 
communication between Judge Kindred and the AUSA from whom Judge Kindred received nude 
photographs.”  ECF No.  23-3, at  238.  As noted,  the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council did not 
acknowledge the existence of any DOJ investigation of Judge Kindred, so it did not meaningfully 
diminish Judge Kindred’s privacy interests with respect to a DOJ investigation.  But other parts of 
CREW’s request sought communications among employees of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Alaska concerning Judge  Kindred’s alleged conflicts of interest.  See id. at 237-38.  
DOJ’s proffered declaration does not explain what privacy interest the EOUSA identified in the 
existence of such communications, stating only that the agency “conduct[ed] a step -by-step 
consideration[] [and] issued a Glomar response because the disclosure of [the] requested 
information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of Mr.  Kindred’s personal privacy under 
FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C).”  ECF No. 29-1, at 3 ¶ 11.  Accordingly, DOJ has not shown why 
a blanket Glomar was appropriate.  See PETA, 745 F.3d at 545 (explaining that when there is “a 
category of responsive documents for which a Glomar response would be unwarranted, [an 
agency’s] assertion of a blanket Glomar response to [that part of the] request cannot be sustained”). 
 
27 The CREW II court did not parse the different parts of CREW’s request  and instead found that 
OPR’s blanket Glomar response was not appropriate because of the information in the public 
record.  See 2025 WL 2206945, at *3-4. 
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Third, while the court agrees with DOJ that the Interior OIG report did not fully eliminate 
Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in the existence of a DOJ investigation, CREW’s request did 
not only seek records relating to an investigation —it also sought records relating to the Interior 
OIG’s referral to DOJ concerning Secretary Zinke.  ECF No. 18-3, at 29.  And Secretary Zinke’s 
privacy interest in the existence of records concerning the Interior OIG’s referral was substantially 
diminished when the Interior OIG confirmed that it had referred its findings to DOJ.  But DOJ 
offers no meaningful explanation  for whether and how  the Criminal Division “specificall y 
identif[ied] the privacy interest at stake” for that and other parts of the Zinke request.  Bartko, 898 
F.3d at 66.  Ms. O’Keefe states in her declaration that “the Criminal Division followed the analysis 
described above [about a different FOIA request] and balanced the public interest in disclosure 
against the third-party individual’s privacy interests,” and “[b]ased on information available at the 
time of the request, the Criminal Division issued a categorical denial.”  ECF No. 18-3, at 9 ¶ 21.  
This explanation falls short of identifying Secretary Zinke’s privacy interest in  the existence of  
records related to the Interior OIG’s referral.  Even if Secretary Zinke retained a substantial privacy 
interest in the existence of records relating to DOJ’s decision not to prosecute (the second part of 
CREW’s request), the court is doubtful that such a privacy interest existed for the first part. 
Finally, CREW points to a n additional FOIA  request to support its claim that DOJ 
“essentially rubber stamps Glomar responses whenever it receives a request for investigative files 
relating to a named public official,” even when no privacy interest exists.  ECF No. 23-1, at 20; 
see id.  at 22.  CREW requested records from the Criminal Division related to DOJ and FBI 
investigations of “companies owned or associated with Donald J. Trump.”  ECF No. 23-3, at 139.  
The Criminal Division issued a Glomar response, id. at 144, which CREW argues was improper 
because Exemptions 6 and 7(C)’s protection against unwarranted invasions of “personal privacy” 
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does not extend to corporations, ECF No. 23-1, at 22.  The court agrees.  President Trump has “no 
privacy interest in his mere affiliation with [his companies], even were the compan[ies] under 
scrutiny,” and any companies owned or associated with President  Trump have “no cognizable 
privacy interest under FOIA.”  Prop. of People , 310 F. Supp. 3d at 71-72; see Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n v. AT & T Inc. , 562 U.S. 397, 408 -10 (2011).  DOJ does not meaningfully dispute this, 
instead asserting that the Criminal Division later conducted a search after CREW appealed its 
determination and OIP remanded the request.  See ECF No. 29-3, at 16.  DOJ thus argues that the 
initial Glomar response “is not indicative of any improper DOJ-wide policy or practice because it 
was reasonably based on the conclusion that the entities that were the subject of the FOIA request 
never publicly acknowledged any DOJ investigation.”  ECF No.  29, at  7.  B ut DOJ does not 
explain why those entities would have been protected by Exemptions 6 and 7(C) in the first place.  
See generally  ECF No.  29-3.  Instead, DOJ’s explanation suggests that the Criminal Division 
treated President Trump, not his companies, as “the subject of the FOIA request,” even though 
CREW did not seek records relating to an investigation into President Trump and, as noted, 
President Trump likely lacked a cognizable privacy interest in the existence of responsive records.  
Because DOJ does not provide any declarations explaining its basis for issuing an initial Glomar 
response or for remanding the matter, the court cannot conclude that the Criminal Division made 
the threshold determination that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) applied. 
Beyond the specific issues with the Criminal Division’s response to the Zinke and Trump 
companies requests, it appears that, like the FBI, see supra pp. 42-44, the Criminal Division does 
not consider at the outset whether Exemptions  6 and 7(C) apply to the requested records.  
Ms. O’Keefe avers that, upon receipt of a request, the Criminal Division first “assess[es] the 
subject of the request, including whether the request is a targeted third -party request.”  ECF 
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No. 18-3, at 5 ¶ 10.  “If the request seeks records pertaining to a third -party individual and the 
records sought could be of a particularly sensitive nature ( i.e., a law enforcement investigation),” 
the Criminal Division considers a Glomar response pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  Id.  But 
according to Christina Butler, Chief of the Criminal Division’s FOIA/PA Unit, the Criminal 
Division issued a Glomar response to CREW’s request “by following the analysis described in 
[Ms. O’Keefe’s declaration], which included noting no official acknowledgment by the Criminal 
Division of a law enforcement investigation of the subject of the request or an admission by the 
subject of the request, including companies owned or associated with the subject.”  ECF No. 29-3, 
at 3 ¶ 9.  Notably absent from Ms.  Butler’s declaration is any justification for treating CREW’s 
request as a “targeted third-party request.”  ECF No. 18-3, at 5 ¶ 10; see generally ECF No. 29-3.  
Accordingly, the Criminal Division’s declaration does not sh ow that it makes a threshold 
determination that Exemptions 6 and 7(C) apply when issuing Glomar responses.28 
 
28 CREW cites one additional FOIA request it submitted to OPR for investigation-related records 
that did not reference any public official by name and did not receive a Glomar response.  ECF 
No. 23-1, at  20-22.  CREW sought records from OPR relating to complaints of professional 
misconduct by members of the federal judiciary “as acknowledged by the 2023 OPR Annual 
Report.”  ECF No.  23-3, at  19.  In response, the EOUSA —to which OPR had referred the 
request—released 108 responsive pages in full and three pages in part.  Id. at 23.  CREW asserts 
that the EOUSA’s production “implicated [a federal judge] in misconduct by name,” thereby 
reflecting the same privacy interests as its other requests about publicly disclosed investigations 
but resulting in disclosure rather than a Glomar response.  ECF No. 23-1, at 21; see ECF No. 23-3, 
at 27-137 (production of court transcripts and filings related to a U.S. District Judge in the Southern 
District of Texas and three pages of redacted emails between federal prosecutors).  According to 
CREW, DOJ’s differential treatment of th is request reflects its policy or practice of issuing 
“knee-jerk Glomar responses” whenever a request references an official by name.  ECF No. 23-1, 
at 21-22.  But, as CREW acknowledges, its request did not refer to any third party by name, so 
confirming the existence of responsive documents would not have confirmed that OPR 
investigated any specific individuals.  See PETA, 745 F.3d at 545 (holding that a Glomar response 
was unwarranted for a request seeking documents showing that, in response to complaints filed 
against three named individuals, the agency conducted an investigation that did not target those 
(continued on next page) 
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d. Public-interest analysis 
Finally, CREW argues that, across the board, DOJ components require FOIA requesters to 
establish a “significant” or “overriding” public interest in disclosure to overcome Exemptions  6 
and 7(C).”  ECF No. 23-1, at 16-19.  According to CREW, this standard “is a work of fiction with 
respect to Exemptions 6 and 7(C)” and applies only to cases where the requester is attempting to 
overcome Exemption 2 or to recover attorney’s fees.  Id. at 17.  CREW thus argues that DOJ begins 
its balancing of interests “with an artificially high standard for acceptable public interests,” when 
it should be considering the specific public and privacy interests at stake for each request.  Id. 
at 19. 
The court disagrees .  It is well established that when  an agency invokes Exemption  6 or 
7(C) and privacy interests protected by those exemptions exist, the requester must demonstrate a 
“significant” public interest.  Favish, 541 U.S. at 172; see, e.g., Roth, 642 F.3d at 1175; Lindsey, 
490 F. Supp. 3d at  18; Marin v. Driscoll , No.  24-CV-1508, 2025 WL 3152310 , at  *5 
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2025).  This rule comes from the FOIA statute itself, which provides that records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes are pres umptively exempt from disclosure if their 
production “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see id. § 552(b)(6) (requiring a “clearly unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy” for personnel, medical, and similar files).  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
the term “unwarranted” to require courts to “balance the competing interests in privacy and 
 
individuals).  Indeed, CREW does not appear to argue that a Glomar response would have been 
appropriate.  See ECF No. 23-1, at 21.  Because a Glomar response likely would not have been 
warranted—and because neither party addresses that question —the court cannot conclude that 
DOJ declined to issue a Glomar response to CREW’s request simply because the request did not 
refer to an official by name.  This example therefore offers little insight into whether DOJ’s other 
Glomar responses resulted from an unlawful policy or practice. 
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disclosure.”  Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.  And, in doing such balancing, “[w]here the privacy concerns 
addressed by Exemption  7(C) are present, the exemption requires the person requesting the 
information to establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure”—that is, “the citizen must show that 
the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having 
the information for its own sake. ”  Id. (emphasis added).  Contrary to CREW’s assertions, this 
requirement is not limited to Exemption  2 or requests for attorney’s fees.  Indeed, in one of the 
cases CREW cites about Exemption 2, the court went on to apply the “significant” public-interest 
standard when considering Exemption 7(C).  Kishore v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 575 F. Supp. 2d 243, 
257 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The public interest ‘sought to be advanced [must be] a significant one more 
specific than having the information for [one ’s] own sake, ’ however.” (alterations in original) 
(quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172)); see ECF No. 23-1, at 17.29 
CREW appears to argue that no D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court precedent supports DOJ’s 
approach, but Favish—a Supreme Court decision —clearly sets forth the  relevant standard for 
weighing public and privacy interests under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).  CREW claims that Favish is 
inapposite because the case “address[ed] standards for evaluating the use of [those exemptions] in 
response to requests based on the need to discover misconduct in the course of investigations.”  
ECF No. 23-1, at 18 n.6.  It is true that Favish imposed the additional requirement that a requester 
“establish more than a bare suspicion” of government impropriety when the public interest being 
 
29 Additionally, in many of the cases CREW cites as examples of this allegedly improper practice, 
see ECF No. 23-1, at 16-17, the court looked for a  “significant” public interest asserted by the 
requester, see, e.g., CREW III, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (“The second step of the balancing test under 
Exemptions 6 and 7(C) is to determine whether there is a substantial public interest in releasing 
the requested documents.”); Garcia v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys , 302 F. Supp. 3d 79, 91 
(D.D.C. 2018) (applying Favish); Black, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 37 (same); Graff v. Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, 822 F. Supp. 2d 23, 36 (D.D.C. 2011) (same). 
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asserted is to show government misconduct, 541 U.S. at 174, and that additional requirement does 
not apply when CREW is asserting  a different public interest , see, e.g. , CREW I, 746 F.3d 
at 1094-96.  But CREW misses the fact that the basic standard for evaluating Exemptions  6 and 
7(C) set forth in Favish is equally applicable here.  Regardless of  whether a request seeks to 
uncover government misconduct or has some other purpose, the requester must identify a 
“significant” public interest wherever there is a privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 or 7(C).  
See Favish, 541 U.S. at 172; Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 287 F. Supp. 3d 50 , 
71-72 (D.D.C. 2018) (considering whether the requester showed a significant public interest where 
the asserted public interest was , as here,  “understanding how the agency conducted its 
investigation”). 
While the court disagrees with CREW’s objections to the “significant public interest” 
standard, it notes that DOJ’s declarations reveal potential errors in how two components —the 
Criminal Division and FBI—conduct the public-interest analysis.  First, as CREW points out, the 
Criminal Division has a policy that “[w]ithout an official acknowledgment of an investigation, or 
a public announcement by the subject regarding the existence of any investigation, the requester 
cannot demonstrate that the requested info rmation is likely to shed light on how the Criminal 
Division operates and thus, will not articulate a substantial public interest .”  ECF No. 18-3, at 8 
¶ 17 (emphases added) ; see ECF No. 23-1, at 15-16.  This categorical rule is inconsistent with 
FOIA.  The absence of an agency’s official acknowledgment does not directly bear on the public 
interest in disclosure—rather, it simply means that the agency has not waived its right to invoke a 
Glomar response by disclosing the existence of responsive records.  See Knight First Amend. Inst., 
11 F.4th at  815.  Moreover, the absence of a public  announcement by the subject bears on the 
subject’s privacy interests, not the public interest in disclosure.  When substantial privacy interests 
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exist, an agency has an “obligation to ‘measure’ the public interest in disclosure and ‘weigh’ it 
against the privacy interests at stake.”  Cabezas v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 20-CV-2484, 2023 
WL 6312349, at *2 (D.D.C. Sep. 28, 2023) (quoting Bartko, 898 F.3d at 66).  But the Criminal 
Division’s categorical rule that a requester cannot show a substantial public interest without 
establishing an official acknowledgment or disclosure by the subject conflates the public and 
privacy interests at stake. 
Second, when balancing privacy interests against the public interest, the Criminal Division 
and FBI  appear to consider the public interest only i n confirming the existence of responsive 
records.  ECF No. 18-3, at 8-9 ¶ 20; ECF No. 18-4, at 6 ¶ 9.  But when weighing the public interest, 
an agency must consider not only “the benefits of acknowledging the existence or non -existence 
of responsive records,” but also “the potential contents of such records.”  Heritage Found. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Just. , No.  23-CV-1148, 2024 WL 18 56418, at  *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2024) (emphasis 
added) (“Even in Glomar cases where public interests other than revealing government misconduct 
are asserted, the D.C. Circuit and other courts in this district have considered how the possible 
contents of responsive records might weigh in favor of disclosure. ”).  For example, in PETA, the 
D.C. Circuit observed that  responsive records “would directly implicate the cognizable public 
interest in shedding light on [the agency’s] investigatory processes.”  745 F.3d at  545.  When 
considering privacy interests, the agency must limit its consideration to the existence of responsive 
records, but that is not the case for considerations of the public interest.  See id. at 541-43.  This 
approach makes sense, because the “public may have an interest in confirming whether responsive 
records exist precisely because of the information such records might contain.”  Heritage Found., 
2024 WL 1856418 , at *7.  But Ms. O’Keefe avers in her declaration that the  Criminal Division 
considers “the public interest in confirming the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to 
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[the] FOIA request ,” ECF No.  18-3, at 9 ¶ 20 (emphasis added); she does not state whether the  
Criminal Division also considers  the public interest in the contents of those records.  The FBI’s 
approach is similarly flawed.  Ms. Hammer states that, in conducting the public-interest analysis, 
the FBI “analyzes any alleged public interest in disclosure of the existence of records concerning 
the third party.”  ECF No. 18-4, at 6 ¶ 9.  This narrow conception of the public interest does not 
comport with the agency’s obligations under FOIA.30 
3. Whether DOJ maintains an unlawful policy or practice 
As explained, CREW has provided substantial evidence that DOJ issued improper Glomar 
responses for: the Kelsey request with respect to records mentioning Mr.  Smith (Criminal 
Division, failure to recognize an official acknowledgment), the Mastriano request (FBI, failure to 
consider his lawyer’s acknowledg ment), the Egyptian President request (FBI , failure to consider 
spokespersons’ ackno wledgments), the Giuliani/Kallstrom requests (FBI, failure to consider 
threshold exemption requirements and subjects’ acknowledgments), the Kindred request (EOUSA, 
failure to consider privacy interest in the existence of each category of requested records ), the 
Morehead request (EOUSA and OPR, failure to consider privacy interest in the existence of each 
category of requested records), the Zinke request (Criminal Division , failure to consider privacy 
interest in the existence of each category of requested records), and the Trump companies request 
(Criminal Division , failure to consider threshold exemption requiremen ts).  CREW has also 
 
30 Because CREW is bringing a policy-or-practice claim and does not seek disclosure of the records 
at issue in these requests, the court does not address whether CREW established a sufficient public 
interest in the disclosure of its requested records for each of its requests.  The court  simply 
concludes that DOJ components were required to consider both the public interest in disclosure of 
the existence of responsive records  and the public interest in disclosure of the contents of those 
records. 
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identified—and the court has further discerned —problems with the Criminal Division’s 
constricted approach to official acknowledgments and the FBI and Criminal Division’s approach 
to the public-interest analysis.  But to prevail on Count II, CREW must show that DOJ “adopted, 
endorsed, or implemented [a] policy or practice that constitutes an ongoing ‘failure to abide by the 
terms of the FOIA.’”  Muttitt II, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (quoting Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491).  
“[I]solated mistakes by agency officials” are not enough.  Payne Enters., 837 F.2d at 491. 
In seeking summary judgment, CREW asserted that DOJ had a pattern or practice of 
issuing Glomar responses “simply because a FOIA request [sought] records relating to an 
investigation of a third party.”  ECF No. 1 ¶ 43.  The summary judgment record shows that CREW 
cannot prevail on that claim.  To begin, DOJ’s declarations establish that each component engages 
in an individualized analysis and does not issue Glomar responses automatically whenever a 
request refers to an individual by name.  See ECF No. 18-3, at 5 ¶ 10 (“The [Criminal Division’s] 
FOIA/PA Unit reviews each request received and assesses the merits of every request . . . prior to 
issuing a determination on the request.”); ECF No. 18-4, at 15 ¶ 27 (“[T]he FBI conducts a detailed 
case[-]by[-]case analysis to determine an appropriate response.  The FBI  . . . only withholds 
information, including by issuing Glomars . . . , if it determines there is a reasonably foreseeable 
harm to an interest protected by an exemption.”); ECF No. 18-5, at 7 ¶ 14 (“[E]ach FOIA request 
to OIP seeking investigatory records about a named individual and each potential Glomar response 
is analyzed on a case-by-case basis and all reasonable efforts are made to ensure compliance with 
the FOIA, DOJ’s regulations, and OIP’s Guidance.  OIP has consistently advised all federal 
agencies to consider whether there exists third -party con sent, proof of death, or official 
acknowledgment of the existence of the investigation and to consider on [a] case -by-case basis 
whether the public interest outweighs the privacy interest.”); ECF No. 18-6, at 5 ¶ 21 (explaining 
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that, in determining whether Exemption  7(C) applied to CREW’s requests, the “EOUSA 
considered: (1)  whether the requested records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, 
(2) whether there was a significant privacy interest in the requested information, (3) Plaintiff’s 
asserted public interest in the requested information, and (4) whether the disclosure of information 
would reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy”); ECF No.  29-2, 
at 5 ¶ 19 (“When a requester seeks OPR recor ds about a specific individual, OPR conducts an 
individualized balancing of the interests to decide whether a Glomar response is appropriate.”).  
While CREW has pointed to probative examples where DOJ may have fallen short of what FOIA 
requires, those examples fail to overcome the presumption of good faith afforded to DOJ’s 
declarations.  See SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200; see also Am. Oversight  v. U.S. Env’t Prot. 
Agency, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2019) (rejecting a policy-or-practice claim based in part 
on the agency’s declaration that “all FOIA requests are reviewed individually”). 
Additionally, the fact that DOJ may have erred in issuing Glomar responses for some of 
CREW’s requests does not lead to the conclusion that DOJ issued blanket Glomar responses 
simply because the requests sought records relating to investigations of third parties.  With respect 
to official acknowledgments, CREW presents at most one instance of a DOJ component ignoring 
an official acknowledgment of the existence of responsive records : the Criminal Division’s 
Glomar response to the part of the Kelsey request regarding Mr. Smith.  It is unclear whether that 
official acknowledgment—a DOJ press release stating that the Criminal Division was prosecuting 
Mr. Smith, see DOJ Kelsey Press Release, supra—should be attributed to the Criminal Division 
or DOJ itself.  If the Criminal Division ignored an official acknowledgment by DOJ, then this error 
may constitute an example of the Criminal Division’s overly narrow approach to official 
acknowledgments, which the court discusses below.   But t o the extent the Criminal Division 
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ignored its own official acknowledgment, its error appears to be an isolated mistake and is 
insufficient to support the existence of a policy or practice of ignoring official acknowledgments.  
See Am. Oversight , 386 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (granting summary judgment to the agency on the 
plaintiff’s policy-or-practice claim based on one instance of the agency denying a FOIA request 
solely for failure to provide a keyword or subject matter).   And for the  other components, DOJ 
offers declarations stating that its components consider Department -wide official 
acknowledgments in determining whether to issue a Glomar response.  See supra pp. 22-23 (OPR 
and EOUSA declarations).  According to OIP Chief of Staff Sean O’Neill, DOJ’s Guide to the 
FOIA instructs components that: 
An agency may not be able to utilize a Glomar response where the 
subject of a request has already been publicly associated with 
agency law enforcement matters that would otherwise justify a 
Glomar response.  For example, where there is a public 
acknowledgment of a law enforcement investigation by an agency 
official authorized to speak on behalf of the government, a Glomar 
response would be improper. 
ECF No. 18-5, at 6 ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).  CREW presents no evidence to the 
contrary suggesting that components (other than the Criminal Division) deviate from this official 
guidance.31 
DOJ’s other problematic Glomar responses also appear to be the product of 
request-specific judgment calls by DOJ components.   For example, the issues the court has 
identified with the EOUSA and OPR’s responses to the Morehead request, the EOUSA’s response 
to the Kindred request, and the Criminal Division’s response to the Zinke request are examples of 
 
31 CREW does not allege that the FBI and OIP ignored official acknowledgments, and DOJ’s 
declarations about those components demonstrate that those components properly consider official 
acknowledgments when determining whether to issue Glomar responses.  See ECF No.  18-4, 
at 3-5 ¶¶ 5-8 (FBI’s approach); ECF No. 18-5, at 6-7 ¶ 13 (OIP’s approach). 
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individual components failing to parse the privacy interests implicated by each part of a FOIA 
request, not a blanket policy of issuing Glomar responses whenever a request refers to an official 
by name.  And while CREW presents four examples of the FBI’s and the Criminal Division’s 
failures to consider disclosures by the subject or their spokespersons and failure s to consider the 
threshold requirements of Exemptions  6 and 7(C) , see supra  pp. 37-44, 53-55 (Mastriano, 
Egyptian President, Giuliani/Kallstrom, and Trump companies requests), it provides little evidence 
that those components’ Glomar responses were the product of an unlawful policy or practice. 
The court i n American Oversight  addressed a similarly deficient summary judgment  
record.  386 F. Supp. 3d at 8-14.  There, the plaintiff asserted  that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) had a policy of refusing to process FOIA requests for communications records 
that did not provide specific keywords of subject matters.  Id. at 8.  As support, the plaintiff pointed 
to six FOIA requests for which the agency had refused to conduct a search because the responses 
failed to provide a keyword or a search term that could narrow the scope of the request, even 
though the requests “reasonably described” the requested records.  Id.  For one of those requests, 
the EPA argued that it could not process the request without specific domain names for the 
potential authors or recipients of records.  Id. at 10.  The court found that the plaintiff’s dispute 
was “not with some unspoken policy of refusing to process the request until the requestor provides 
a keyword or subject matter for the email records sought, but with the EPA’s specific determination 
that it could not search for the records without specifying non -[governmental] domain names for 
the potential authors or recipients.”  Id.  Here, too, CREW’s dispute is not with some unspoken 
policy of issuing “knee-jerk Glomar responses” whenever the request includes the name of a public 
official, ECF No.  23-1, at  21, but rather with errors in the agency’s consideration of specific 
interests for specific requests. 
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The court agrees with CREW, however, that  the above examples and DOJ’s declarations 
reveal potentially erroneous practices in the Criminal Division ’s and the FBI’s approaches to 
determining whether a Glomar response is appropriate .  First, the Criminal Division appears to 
limit its consideration of official acknowledgments to disclosures made by that component alone, 
even though other DOJ components may bind it .  See supra pp. 27-28.  Second, the FBI’s  
declarations do not state whether it considers statements by a subject  or their spokesperson in 
determining whether a subject’s privacy interests have been diminished.   See supra  
Section IV.B.2.a (Mastriano, Egyptian President, and Giuliani/Kallstrom requests).  Third, it is not 
clear from the Criminal Division’s and the FBI’s declarations whether the components make the 
initial determination that responsive documents meet Exemption s 6 and  7(C)’s threshold 
requirements.  See supra pp. 42-44, 53-55 (Giuliani/Kallstrom and Trump companies requests).  
Fourth and finally , the Criminal Division  appears to follow an improper categorical rule that a 
requester can never establish a public interest in disclosure without an official acknowledgment or 
a public disclosure by the subject, and the Criminal Division’s and the FBI’s declarations suggest 
that both components apply an overly narrow conception of the public interest in disclosure .  See 
supra pp. 58-60.  These practices may suppor t narrower policy -or-practice claims against the 
Criminal Division and/or the FBI because individual DOJ components, like the agency writ large, 
can engage in an unlawful policy or practice of asserting Glomar responses.  See ECF No. 12, 
at 13-14. 
Of course, it may very well be that CREW, having learned that DOJ does not have a broad 
policy of “issuing Glomar responses to CREW simply because a FOIA request seeks records 
relating to an investigation of a third party,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 43, does not wish to proceed on narrower 
policy-or-practice claims.  And if CREW wishes to proceed, supplemental declarations from DOJ 
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could reveal that some of these apparent policies or practices—such as the FBI’s failure to consider 
disclosures by subjects’ spokespersons—are “merely isolated mistakes.”  Payne Enters., 837 F.2d 
at 491.  Supplemental declarations might also demonstrate that the Criminal Division’s and the 
FBI’s consideration of official acknowledgments, the threshold requirements of Exemptions 6 and 
7(C), and the public interest all comport with FOIA. 32  Rather than make any of those 
determinations without the benefit of the parties’ insights, the court denies both parties’ motions 
for summary judgment on Count II and directs the parties to meet and confer regarding CREW’s 
individual policy-or-practice claims.33 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that CREW’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Count I, ECF No.  22, is DENIED as moot, and DOJ’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Count  II, ECF No.  18, and CREW’s Cross -Motion for Summary Judgment on 
 
32 For example, DOJ does not expressly contest CREW’s interpretation of the O’Keefe declaration 
that the Criminal Division only considers its own official acknowledgments.  See ECF No. 29, 
at 3.  But at the same time, DOJ  argues that the Criminal Division, like every other component, 
“consider[s] . . . any official disclosure by DO J.”  Id.; see ECF No. 18-3, at 8-9 ¶ 20 (stating that 
the “Criminal Division was not aware of any evidence indicating that the Department publicly 
acknowledged the existence of an investigation involving the individuals referenced in parts” of 
the Kelsey request (emphasis added)).   It is therefore possible that the Criminal Division does 
consider official acknowledgments by other DOJ components and its declaration did not state that 
explicitly because CREW had not raised that specific argument. 
33 CREW also seeks discovery pursuant to Rule  56(d) to uncover “evidence of the existence of a 
policy and the extent of DOJ components’ noncompliance with FOIA by issuing even more 
Glomar responses to requests for investigative files that identify subjects by name.”  ECF 
No. 23-1, at 37.  The court concludes that discovery would be premature before the parties confer 
regarding the scope of CREW’s policy-or-practice claims. 
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Count II, ECF No. 23, are DENIED.  It is further ORDERED that the parties shall meet, confer, 
and file a joint status report on or before April 13, 2026, proposing next steps in this litigation. 
SO ORDERED. 
  
LOREN L. ALIKHAN  
United States District Judge 
Date: March 30, 2026 
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