govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-00521-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
CENTER CITY PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOL  
 
Plaintiff,  
   
v. 
  
 
TAMIKA ARCHER,  
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 25-521 (EGS) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION  
 
 
Plaintiff Center City Charter School (“Center City”) seeks 
relief from an adverse Hearing Officer Determination under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. Pending before the Court are 
the parties’ Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. Upon careful 
consideration of the motions, oppositions, and replies thereto, 
the applicable law, the Administrative Record, and for the 
reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Center City’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment and DENIES Ms. Archer’s Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
  
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I. Background 
A. Factual 1 
T.A. is a child with a primary disability of Developmental 
Delay. Administrative Record (“AR”), ECF No. 6-1 at 224. On May 
1, 2024, an Initial Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) 
meeting was held at his school at the time, AppleTree Learning 
Center (“AppleTree”). Id. The IEP stated that  
T[A] demonstrates challenges in several areas 
of social-emotional development and requires 
frequent support from adults to 
follow/participate in classroom routines 
safely and successfully. In particular, he 
demonstrates significant difficulty 
attending/concentrating during lessons and 
academic tasks and often responds impulsively 
when he can’t have/do something he wants, for 
example, screaming, pushing/throwing 
furniture, and/or other signs of significant 
distress. T[A]’s behavior can cause him to 
miss instructional time or not be able to 
participate in learning opportunities.  
 
Id. at 225. The IEP set forth various special education and 
related services to address T.A.’s developmental delays. Id. at 
 
1 Neither party submitted a Statement of Material Facts as to 
which there is no genuine issue pursuant to Local Civil Rule 
7(h). Since in an IDEA case, “[f]actual findings from the 
administrative proceeding are to be considered prima facie 
correct,” D.R. ex rel. Robinson v. District of Columbia, 637 F. 
Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2009); and since cross motions for 
summary judgment in IDEA cases do not follow the normal summary 
judgment procedure but rather are based on the Court’s review of 
the Administrative Record, the Court’s factual background is 
drawn from the Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact, see AR, ECF 
No. 6-1 at 404-409; and the Court’s review of the Administrative 
Record. 
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241. In particular, the IEP provided that T.A. would be provided 
specialized instruction in the general education setting for 
three hours per week, and specialized instruction outside of the 
general education setting for one hour per week. Id. at 241. The 
time frame for these services were beginning May 1, 2024, and 
ending April 30, 2025. Id. at 241.  
Ms. Archer enrolled T.A. in Center City for the 2024-25 
school year, and Center City reviewed T.A.’s IEP and behavior 
improvement plan (“BIP”) for implementation at Center City. Id. 
at 544. The first day of the 2024-25 school year was August 26, 
2024. Id. at 516. Beginning the second day of classes, the 
Special Education Director had safety concerns based on T.A.’s 
leaving the classroom and disrupting the classroom environment. 
Id. at 406. Classroom staff reported that it was difficult for 
T.A. to remain in his seat and assigned areas, that he screamed 
and rolled on the floor in the classroom, and that he got in 
other children’s faces and interfered with their work. Id. at 
406. Although an additional teacher was provided to provide one 
to one support for T.A., he could not keep himself under 
physical control in the classroom. Id. at 406. When T.A. left 
the classroom, he would run away from adults, run up and down 
the hallways and stairs, climb bannisters, and run into other 
classrooms. It would take three to four adults to find T.A. and 
take him to a safe place. Id. at 407.  
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By September 12, 2024, school administrators—the principal, 
Special Education Coordinator and Special Education Director 
were in contact with Ms. Archer about possible alternative 
educational settings for T.A., including D.C. Public Schools, 
nonpublic schools, and other charter schools. Id. at 407. 
Ultimately, however, Center City decided that it would create a 
self-contained classroom for T.A. and one other child. Id. at 
407. The self-contained classroom would be staffed by a special 
education teacher and an instructional teaching assistant. Id. 
at 407.  
The Special Education Coordinator discussed the self-
contained classroom with Ms. Archer on Friday, September 20, 
2024, and explained that T.A.’s hours in specialized instruction 
outside of the general education setting in the IEP would need 
to be amended to reflect an increase in those hours. Id. at 529. 
When Ms. Archer brought T.A. to Center City the morning of 
September 23, 2024, the Special Education Coordinator explained 
to her that T.A. could not be moved to the self-contained 
classroom unless the amendment to the IEP increasing T.A.’s 
hours of specialized instruction outside of the general 
education setting was signed. Id. Ms. Archer wanted T.A. to 
start in the self-contained classroom that morning, and so she 
signed the document. Id. Ms. Archer later testified that she 
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felt “kind of pressured” into signing the amendment, id. at 444; 
and that she “didn’t understand the IEP,” id. at 440. 
T.A.’s IEP Team, including Ms. Archer, met that afternoon. 
Id. at 413. The Special Education Coordinator testified that the 
meeting was held to review T.A.’s BIP, to talk about T.A.’s 
behaviors and how Center City was addressing them, and to 
explain the amendment to the IEP. Id. at 552. Staff from 
AppleTree attended the meeting at the request of Ms. Archer and 
provided information about strategies they had used with T.A. 
Id. at 552. The meeting also included discussion of T.A.’s 
placement in the self-contained classroom. Id. 
On September 24, 2024, Ms. Archer sent an email to the 
Special Education Coordinator requesting another IEP meeting. 
Id. at 408. She stated that she felt rushed and pressured to 
sign documents before the IEP meeting and that she would like to 
review the whole IEP. Id. On September 25, 2024, Ms. Archer 
filed a request for a Due Process Hearing. Id. at 4-12. Ms. 
Archer stated that she disagreed with T.A.’s placement outside 
of the general education setting. Id. at 9.  
 The Due Process hearing was held on November 21 and 22, 
2024, and the Hearing Officer’s Determination was issued on 
November 26, 2024. Id. at 402. 
  
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B. Procedural 
 The Complaint was filed on February 21, 2025, see Compl., 
ECF No. 1; and the Administrative Record on June 16, 2025, see 
AR, ECF No. 6. Center City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment 
(“MSJ”) on July 18, 2025. See MSJ, ECF No. 7. Ms. Archer filed 
her Opposition and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“XMSJ”) on 
August 8, 2025. See XMSJ, ECF No. 8. Center City filed its 
Opposition and Reply on August 29, 2025, see Opp’n, ECF No. 10; 
and Ms. Archer filed her Reply on September 11, 2025, see Reply, 
ECF No. 12. The cross motions are ripe and ready for the Court’s 
adjudication. 
II. Statutory Framework and Legal Standard  
A. The IDEA 
The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate education 
[“FAPE”] that emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further 
education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 
1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA seeks to guarantee children with 
disabilities a FAPE by requiring states and the District of 
Columbia to institute a variety of detailed procedures. “‘[T]he 
primary vehicle for implementing’” the goals of the statute “‘is 
the [IEP], which the [IDEA] mandates for each child.’” Harris v. 
District of Columbia, 561 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 
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2008) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311–12, 108 (1988)). 
An IEP is a written statement that includes, among other things: 
(i) a statement of the child's present levels of academic 
achievement and functional performance; (ii) a statement of 
measurable annual goals, including academic and functional 
goals; (iii) a description of the child's progress in meeting 
those goals; (iv) a statement of the special education and 
related services and supplementary aids and services to be 
provided to the child; and (v) an explanation of the extent, if 
any, to which the child will not participate with nondisabled 
children in any regular classes. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). An 
“IEP Team”—which consists of the parents of the child with 
disability, not less than one regular education teacher of the 
child (if applicable), not less than one special education 
teacher or provider of the child, and a representative of the 
local education agency—is charged with developing, reviewing, 
and revising a child's IEP. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (defining 
an IEP Team). Because the IEP must be “tailored to the unique 
needs” of each child, Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181,  
690 (1982), it must be regularly revised in response to new 
information regarding the child's performance, behavior, and 
disabilities, and must be amended if its objectives are not 
met. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)-(d). The IDEA requires an IEP to 
be “in effect” for each child with a disability in the agency's 
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jurisdiction “[a]t the beginning of each school year.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(d)(2)(A).  
B. Standard of Review 
Pursuant to the IDEA, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision” rendered during administrative 
proceedings may “bring a civil action” in state or federal court 
without regard to the amount in controversy. 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2), (i)(3)(A). “The Court's approach toward IDEA 
administrative decisions diverges somewhat from its role in the 
typical lawsuit.” Davis v. District of Columbia, 244 F. Supp. 3d 
27, 37 (D.D.C. 2017). “Although the [cross motions] bear the 
familiar placard of ‘summary judgment,’ judicial review of 
hearing-officer decisions [HOD] does not follow ‘a true summary 
judgment procedure.’” 
Id. (quoting L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. 
District of Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(citation omitted)). Under IDEA, the reviewing court “(i) shall 
receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) 
shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and 
(iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, 
shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 
D.R. ex rel. Robinson v. District of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 
11, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)).  
“On review of an HOD, the burden of proof falls upon the 
party challenging the administrative determination, who must ‘at 
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least take on the burden of persuading the court that the 
hearing officer was wrong.’” D.R. ex rel. Robinson v. District 
of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Reid 
ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)). 
“The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of review, the 
Supreme Court has held, does not authorize unfettered de novo 
review.” D.R. ex rel. Robinson, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (citing 
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 206, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982). 
“Rather, consideration of the record impliedly requires courts 
to give ‘due weight’ to the administrative proceedings, 
[citation omitted], and ‘[f]actual findings from the 
administrative proceeding are to be considered prima facie 
correct.’” Id. (quoting S.H. v. State–Operated Sch. Dist. Of 
Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). “Therefore, courts may 
not substitute their own views for those of the hearing 
officer,” Id. (citing see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S. Ct. 
3034; Shaw v. District of Columbia, 238 F. Supp. 2d 127, 136 
(D.D.C. 2002)), “and a court upsetting a hearing officer's 
decision ‘must at least explain its basis for doing so,’” Id. 
(quoting Kerkam, 862 F.2d at 887). The deference to the HOD “is 
at its apex when the court is reviewing matters of ‘educational 
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policy’  . . . and at its nadir when a decision lacks thorough 
reasoned findings or opines on a purely legal question.” Davis, 
44 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (citations omitted). 
III. Analysis 
A. There Was No Procedural Violation of the IDEA  
The Hearing Officer found “that [Center City] did not 
comply with the IDEA’s procedural requirements in changing 
[T.A.’s] educational placement and that this resulted in a 
denial of FAPE to the student.” AR, ECF No. 6-1 at 410. For the 
reasons explained below, the Hearing Officer’s legal conclusion 
was in error. 
The procedural safeguards set forth in the IDEA require 
placement decisions to be “made by a group of persons, including 
the parents, and other persons knowledgeable about the child, 
the meaning of the evaluation data, and the placement options.” 
34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a). The Hearing Officer found that Center 
City failed to comply with the this procedure when it changed 
T.A’s special education hours to take place mostly in the self-
contained classroom because it did not convene T.A.’s IEP team 
before the September 23, 2024 placement decision. AR, ECF No. 6-
1 at 411. 
According to Center City, it was not obligated to convene 
T.A.’s IEP team because Ms. Archer agreed to the placement 
decision without convening an IEP team meeting. Id. at 411-412. 
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Therefore, Center City and Ms. Archer could agree to amend 
T.A.’s IEP pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4): 
[i]n making changes to a child's IEP after the 
annual IEP Team meeting for a school year, 
the parent of a child with a disability and 
the public agency may agree not to convene an 
IEP Team meeting for the purposes of making 
those changes, and instead may develop a 
written document to amend or modify the 
child's current IEP. 
 
The regulations further provide that pursuant to this 
regulation, “[c]hanges to the IEP may be made . . . by amending 
the IEP rather than by redrafting the entire IEP.” 34 C.F.R. § 
300.324(a)(6). 
The Hearing Officer agreed that Center City received Ms. 
Acher’s signature on the IEP Amendment Form the morning of 
September 23, 2024, and in doing so intended to amend the IEP 
without convening an IEP team meeting based on Ms. Archer’s 
agreement. Id. at 412. But the Hearing Officer determined that 
the procedure for changing an IEP without convening an IEP team 
meeting did not apply because the IEP from T.A.’s prior school 
was an “initial” IEP developed by that school “at the end of the 
2023-2024 school year” and no annual IEP team meeting had been 
held for the 2024-2025 school year. Id. at 412.  
 The Court concludes that the Hearing Officer’s 
determination that the IEP could not be amended because no 
annual IEP team meeting had been held for the 2024-2025 school 
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year was in error. Here, the annual IEP Team meeting took place 
at AppleTree on May 1, 2024. AR, ECF No. 6-1 at 225. The time 
frame for T.A.’s IEP was May 1, 2024, through April 30, 2025. 
Id. at 241. Since the IEP did not expire until April 30, 2025, 
changes could be made by amendment to the IEP in September 2024. 
See K.A. ex rel. F.A. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 741 F.3d 1195, 
1202 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “[i]f changes are needed 
before the IEP expires, amendments may be made either by a 
reconvened team, or by a written agreement between the parents 
and the school district.”).  
The Hearing Officer read into the regulation a requirement 
for Center City to hold the annual IEP team meeting for the 
2024-2025 school year sometime after the start of the 2024-2025 
school year even though T.A.’s IEP did not expire until April 
30, 2025. Such a requirement does not exist. Other than citing 
the applicable regulation, the Hearing Officer cited no legal 
authority to support his legal conclusion. See AR, ECF No. 6-1 
at 411-413. There is no indication in the record that when T.A. 
enrolled in Center City, it did not consider the May 1, 2024, 
through April 30, 2025 IEP to be the IEP in effect. The IDEA 
requires an IEP to be in “effect” “[a]t the beginning of each 
school year.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). This is exactly the 
situation with T.A.’s IEP–it was in effect at the beginning of 
the 2024-2025 school year because it did not expire until April 
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30, 2025. Accordingly, changes to T.A.’s IEP could be made by 
amendment pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4). 
Ms. Archer urges the Court to adopt the Hearing Officer’s 
interpretation of the regulation, arguing that the Hearing 
Officer’s interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of 
term “school year” in the regulation. See XMSJ, ECF No. 8 at 9-
10. Ms. Archer also argues that under Center City’s 
interpretation, the language “for a school year” is rendered 
superfluous. Id. at 10. Ms. Archer cites no authority in support 
of her arguments other than citing caselaw that supports the use 
of a dictionary to ascertain the ordinary meaning of a term, and 
the applicable statute and regulations. See id. at 9-11.   
As an initial matter, there is no dispute over the meaning 
of the term “school year.” The question is whether the IEP could 
be amended with Ms. Archer’s agreement without an IEP team 
meeting. The Court rejects Ms. Archer’s arguments. She ignores 
the fact that the IEP itself states that its time frame was May 
1, 2024, through April 30, 2025. AR, ECF No. 6-1 at 241. 
Furthermore, she provides no legal authority for the proposition 
that the IDEA required Center City to hold the annual IEP team 
meeting for the 2024-2025 school year sometime after the start 
of that school year even though T.A.’s current IEP did not 
expire until April 30, 2025. The IDEA requires there to be 
an IEP in effect for each child with a disability in the 
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agency's jurisdiction at the beginning of each school year. 20 
U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). This is exactly what happened here—
T.A.’s IEP was in effect at the beginning of the 2024-2025 
school year because it did not expire until April 30, 2025. 
T.A.’s IEP Team met after the amendment was signed, during 
the afternoon of September 23, 2024. AR, ECF No. 6-1 at 413. The 
Special Education Coordinator testified that that the meeting 
was held to review T.A.’s BIP, to talk about T.A.’s behaviors 
and how Center City was addressing them, and to explain the 
amendment to the IEP. Id. at 552. Staff from AppleTree attended 
the meeting at the request of Ms. Archer, 
id. at 655; and 
provided information about strategies they had used with T.A. 
when he was at AppleTree. Id. at 552. The meeting also included 
discussion of T.A.’s placement in the self-contained classroom. 
Id.  
The Hearing Officer found that “[t]he IEP team did not 
agree that [T.A.] needed to be in a full-time self-contained 
program.” Id. at 408. In support, he cited the testimony of the 
Special Education Coordinator at Center City generally. Id. The 
Special Education Coordinator was asked whether “the team 
agree[d] at this meeting that [T.A.] needed to be in self-
contained or non-public.” Id. at 532. The Special Education 
Coordinator responded “no”; but it is not clear whether she is 
responding “no” to whether there was agreement about T.A. being 
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in a self-contained classroom, whether there was agreement about 
him being moved to a nonpublic school, or both.  
The Administrative Record indicates that there was 
agreement among the IEP team that T.A. needed to be in the self-
contained classroom. First, and as background, the Special 
Education Coordinator and Ms. Archer discussed the placement on 
Friday, September 20, 2024, and the Special Education 
Coordinator explained that the IEP would need to be amended. Id. 
at 529. Second, Ms. Archer requested and agreed to T.A.’s 
placement in the self-contained classroom. Id. Even though Ms. 
Archer subsequently had second thoughts about the placement and 
later testified that she felt “kind of pressured”; she did 
request the placement and she did sign the amendment. See id. at 
444, 529. Third, the Special Education Coordinator testified 
that the placement “decision was made between the teachers, 
myself—it was discussed between the teachers, myself, with mom, 
with the principal.” Id. at 529. Fourth, T.A.’s Special 
Education teacher at Center City testified that he was in 
agreement with moving T.A. to the self-contained classroom. Id. 
at 623. Fifth, the Director of Special Education at Center City 
testified that the placement was appropriate. Id. at 641.  
T.A.’s Special Education teacher from AppleTree did 
testify, based on her attendance at the September 23, 2024 
meeting, that there was disagreement about moving T.A. to the 
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self-contained classroom, but she was not specific about whether 
the disagreement was among T.A.’s IEP team at AppleTree, or the 
IEP team at Center City. Id. at 459.  
For these reasons, and because the amendment to T.A.’s IEP 
was consistent with 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4), the Hearing 
Officer’s legal conclusion that “the evidence does not establish 
that [T.A.’s] IEP team made the placement decision as required 
by 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a),” id. at 413; was in error. 
B. The Evidence Does Not Indicate That the Purported 
Violation Resulted in a Denial of FAPE 
 
When a procedural violation is established, “the hearing 
officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the 
procedural inadequacies— 
 
(i) Impeded the child's right to a FAPE; 
 
(ii) Significantly impeded the parent's 
opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process regarding the 
provision of a FAPE to the parent's 
child; or 
 
(iii) Caused a deprivation of educational 
benefit. 
 
34 C.F.R. § 300.513(1)(2). 
 
 The Hearing Officer found that T.A. did not receive a FAPE 
because “[i]n bypassing IEP team decision making, [Center City] 
significantly impeded [Ms. Archer’s] opportunity to participate 
in the decision making process.” AR, ECF No. 6-1 at 413. The 
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Court has concluded above that the IEP was properly amended and 
that 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(a) was not violated. Therefore, the IEP 
team decision making process was not bypassed. Moreover, the 
evidence demonstrates that Ms. Archer requested and agreed to 
the self-contained classroom setting. Ms. Archer argues that her 
“earlier decision, made under pressure and without full 
understanding controlled the outcome” and so her decision making 
rights were denied. XMSJ, ECF No. 8 at 14. The Court 
acknowledges that Ms. Archer later testified that she felt “kind 
of pressured” into signing the Amendment; AR, ECF No. 6-1 at 
444; and that she “didn’t understand the IEP,” id. at 440. 
However, the evidence that Ms. Archer requested the placement 
and signed the amendment is uncontroverted. For these reasons, 
T.A. was not denied a FAPE.  
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons explained above, Center City’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED; and Ms. Archer’s Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 8, is DENIED. 
 An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 
  United States District Judge  
  March 30, 2026 
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