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govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_24-cv-11001-0
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMBRIDGE PAVERS INC.,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-11001 (KSH) (SDA)
v.
ARMORTEC PAVING & PATIOS CORP.,
MIGUEL A. BATISTA DIAZ, AND JOHN
CONNORS A/K/A JOHNNY CONNORS,
OPINION
Defendants.
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Cambridge Pavers Inc. (“plaintiff”) has sued Armortec Paving & Patios Corp.
(“Armortec”) and Miguel Batista Diaz (“Diaz,” and with Armortec, “defendants”) for trademark
infringement and related claims.1 Defendants have not appeared in this action, and plaintiff has
now moved (D.E. 17) for default judgment against them.
II. Background
The operative amended complaint alleges the following. Plaintiff is a New Jersey
corporation based in Lyndhurst (D.E. 6, Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) Armortec is a New Jersey company
having “an address for service of process” in Somerset, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 2.) Diaz is an “agent
for service of process upon” Armortec and “is an officer, shareholder or other individual
otherwise having an interest in” Armortec; the address listed for him is the same as the “address
for service of process” for Armortec. (Id. ¶ 3.) Connors “is an officer, shareholder or individual
otherwise having an interest in” Armortec, with an address in Somerset that is different from that
1 Plaintiff also named a third defendant, John Connors a/k/a Johnny Connors (“Connors”), but as
discussed infra, did not serve him and has not pursued relief against him.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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alleged for Armortec and Diaz. (Id. ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff is “a leading manufacturer of paving stones in the United States” and has used
the mark ARMORTEC “since at least as early as 1995 to distinguish its goods, namely paving
stones with a hardfacing top surface.” (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) The company has used “its extensive sales
and advertising” to develop “extensive good will throughout the United States” for its mark. (Id.
¶ 8.) Plaintiff is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3,094,763, for ARMORTEC, and
that registration is “valid, subsisting, and incontestable.” (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) It is also the owner of
U.S. Trademark Registration No. 6,620,469 for the mark CAMBRIDGE PAVINGSTONES
WITH ARMORTEC & WALLSTONES and Design, which registration is “valid and
subsisting.” (Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants” (without differentiating between them) “market and
sell and offer for sale a variety of concrete and asphalt products and services, including,
pavingstones under the name ARMORTEC PAVING & PATIOS.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Defendants
assertedly “are purchasing Plaintiff’s products from Plaintiff’s authorized distributors and dealers
and reselling those products using” the ARMORTEC mark “without authorization,” so as to
“deceive and confuse customers that Defendants are associated with or sponsored by Plaintiff.”
(Id. ¶ 14.) Moreover, they “have been expressly representing to customers and potential
customers that Defendants are, in fact, associated with Plaintiff,” and have been “providing
services to customers, including installation of Plaintiff’s products, and using Plaintiff’s
trademarks without authorization to deceive any confuse customers into believing that
Defendants are representatives of, associated with, or their services are sponsored by Plaintiff.”
(Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) They are also purportedly “using marks confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s marks
without authorization, to trade on Plaintiff’s goodwill, to deceive customers and to cause damage
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to Plaintiff’s reputation . . . .” (Id. ¶ 17.)
On December 9, 2024, plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint in this action. (D.E. 1.)
On January 30, 2025, plaintiff filed a proof of service representing that it had served Armortec
“c/o NJ Dept. of Treasury” on December 24, 2025, via a person designated by law to accept
service of process on Armortec’s behalf. (D.E. 4.) On February 18, 2025, the Court issued an
order directing plaintiff to move this case (D.E. 5), and on the same day, plaintiff filed its
amended complaint (D.E 6), which added an eighth cause of action and changed the addresses
pleaded for each of the defendants.
The claims asserted are federal trademark infringement (Count 1); false designation of
origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count 2); dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Count 3);
common law unfair competition (Count 4); unfair competition under N.J.S.A. § 56:4-1 (Count
5); fraud (Count 6); false advertising under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count 7); and cyberpiracy
under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Count 8).
As with the original complaint, each of the claims is asserted against “defendants” without
differentiation.
Plaintiff represents that it served Armortec via the New Jersey Department of Treasury
on March 3, 2025 (D.E. 8) and Diaz at his home via a person representing herself to be a
cohabitant (D.E. 9). On April 29, 2025, the Court issued another order directing plaintiff to
move this case (D.E. 10), and shortly afterwards new counsel substituted in for plaintiff. (D.E.
11-13). On May 14, 2025, plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against Armortec and Diaz
(D.E. 14), which the Clerk of Court entered the following day, on May 15, 2025. Two weeks
later, the Court issued yet another order to move this case. (D.E. 15).
On June 12, 2025, plaintiff filed this motion for default judgment, seeking relief against
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Armortec and Diaz. (D.E. 17.)2 The motion is supported by a brief (D.E. 17-1, Moving Br.), a
declaration of counsel, with exhibits (D.E. 17-3, Sutton Decl.), and a proposed form of judgment
(D.E. 17-2).
III. Legal Standard
The Court may enter default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) against a properly
served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading. Trs. of Int’l Union of Painters v.
Leo Constructing, LLC, 718 F. Supp. 3d 436, 441 (D.N.J. 2024) (Bumb, J.). Whether to grant
default judgment is a matter of the Court’s discretion, recognizing that cases are to be decided on
the merits “whenever practicable.” Id. (quoting Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180-81
(3d Cir. 1984)).
To grant the requested relief, “a court must be satisfied that: (1) it has jurisdiction, both
subject matter and personal, over the case and defaulting party, and service of process was
proper, (2) the party seeking judgment presented ‘a legitimate cause of action,’ and (3) entering
default judgment would be ‘proper.’” Id. (quoting Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp.3d 678,
683-84 (D.N.J. 2015)). The last factor, in turn, assesses “(1) prejudice to the [moving party] if
default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether
defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct.” Id. (quoting Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d
154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000)).
The Court accepts the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true but “need
not accept the moving party’s legal conclusions or allegations relating to the amount of
damages,” and must “ascertain whether ‘the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of
2 Plaintiff also filed what it captioned as another request for entry of default (D.E. 16), but the
submission was identical to the motion for default judgment, with the exception of a missing
notice of motion.
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action, since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law.’” Chanel, Inc. v.
Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535-36 (D.N.J. 2008) (Kugler, J.).
IV. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction and Service
The analysis begins with the preliminary inquiries: whether the Court has subject matter
and personal jurisdiction and whether the defendants were properly served. Subject matter
jurisdiction exists, as plaintiff has asserted federal statutory claims. As a New Jersey
corporation, Armortec is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey, and as a New Jersey
citizen resident in this state, Diaz is as well. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Paul’s
Gasoline Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 3638244, at *2 (D.N.J. July 6, 2020) (Kugler, J.).
With respect to service of process, the record reflects service on Diaz at his residence via
an adult who represented that she lived there with him. (D.E. 9 (proof of service stating that
summons was left with a woman, identified by name, who stated that Diaz resides at that
address); D.E. 17-3, Sutton Decl. ¶ 20 (attesting that Diaz was served with summons and
amended complaint).) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(B) (individual may be served by leaving a
copy of the summons and complaint “at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there”).
As to Armortec, plaintiff represents that it was served “via personal service on March 3,
2025.” (D.E. 17-3, Sutton Decl. ¶ 2; id. ¶ 20 (“The records of the process server prove that
[Armortec] was duly served with a Summons and Amended Complaint on March 3, 2025.”).)
The support for this is Docket Entry 8, which is a form proof of service stating that Armortec
was served “c/o NJ Dept. of Treasury.” Attached to this form was a second form proof of
service, which the docket text titles an “Affidavit of Attempted Service on Last Known
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Registered Agent at Registered Office.” (See D.E. 8-1.) This document states that the summons
was received by the process server on December 12, 2024, and that the process server made three
unsuccessful attempts, on December 13, 2024, December 15, 2024, and December 17, 2024, to
serve Armortec at an address in Union, New Jersey. (Id.) On each occasion, the process server
apparently attempted to call the unit; only once does the form indicate that the server knocked on
the door. (Id.)
Whether Armortec was properly served is a central issue, because proper service of
process is a prerequisite to the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Lampe
v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Adams v. Grand Oasis Cancun,
2015 WL 6872483 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2015) (Martini, J.) (denying default judgment motion where
plaintiff failed to show proper service). And it is up to plaintiff, as the party asserting that
service was validly effectuated, to provide the appropriate support for that position. Grand
Entm’t Grp. v. Star Media Sales, 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993). The present record does not
offer that support.
Under Rule 4, a corporation is to be served by (1) “following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court
is located or where service is made,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A), (e)(1), which, here, means
following New Jersey law, or (2) “by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process and – if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so
requires – by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).
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The options under Rule 4(h)(1)(B) essentially overlap with the options under New Jersey
law for service on a corporation, although the latter is broader. New Jersey requires plaintiffs to
effectuate service on corporations by:
serving a copy of the summons and complaint . . . on any officer, director, trustee
or managing or general agent, or any person authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation, or on a person at the
registered office of the corporation in charge thereof, or, if service cannot be
made on any of those persons, then on a person at the principal place of business
of the corporation in this State in charge thereof, or if there is no place of business
in this State, then on any employee of the corporation within this State acting in
the discharge of his or her duties . . . .
N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(6). By producing a proof of service reflecting service on the New Jersey
Department of Treasury, plaintiff appears to be relying on the provision permitting service on
“any person authorized by . . . law to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation,” as
none of the other categories even arguably applies. The “law” that would allow service via the
Treasury is N.J.S.A. 2A:15-30.1, and plaintiff has not shown that the conditions of that statute
have been met. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-30.1 (permitting service on state agency if business has failed
to register or re-register, or has failed to maintain a registered address or agent in the state for
service); Kearny Fed. Sav. Bank v. 100 W. St., LLC, 2024 WL 2966560, at *3 (App. Div. June
13, 2024); Trs. of United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Union Org. for Soc. Servs., 2023 WL
3862039, at *3 (D.N.J. June 6, 2023) (Kugler, J.).
3
3 What plaintiff has submitted also does not suggest that its prior attempts opened an avenue to
substituted or constructive service. Those attempts apparently involved the original, not the
amended complaint, as they were made before the latter was filed; they were made to an address
for Armortec that plaintiff abandoned in its amended complaint, suggesting that this was not the
correct address for the company; and the server’s affidavit, while not clear, suggests that at least
two of the attempts were made by “calls,” which are not a valid method of attempting service.
(See D.E. 8-1.)
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Because plaintiff has not shown that it properly served process on Armortec, default
judgment cannot be granted against that defendant. Within 14 days, plaintiff may, if it has a
factual and legal basis to do so, file a supplemental submission explaining how its efforts to
serve Armortec were valid and complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1) and/or
N.J. Ct. R. 4:4.
As to defendant Connors, there is no indication that he was ever served with process, and
the time for doing so has long since passed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). It appears plaintiff is not
pursuing its claims against Connors, as the default judgment motion was filed against only
Armortec and Diaz. The claims against Connors are dismissed without prejudice.
B. Pleading of the Claims
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff can rectify the service issue with respect to Armortec,
the Court proceeds to the next step: “whether the undisputed facts of [p]laintiff’s complaint
allege legitimate claims” against Armortec and Diaz. Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d
678, 684 (D.N.J. 2015) (Simandle, J.). Plaintiff’s brief focuses almost entirely on the relief it
seeks—an injunction—without explaining how the facts alleged in its complaint make out
legitimate claims for relief. As best the Court can discern, plaintiff appears to be arguing that an
injunction is warranted based on Count 1, trademark infringement.4
4 There is a passing reference to false designation of origin under Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), as an available cause of action for common law marks (D.E. 17-1, Moving Br. 8), but
here plaintiff has brought suit on registered marks. In any event, the standards for such a claim
mirror those for trademark infringement under § 1114. Matos, 133 F. Supp. at 684 n.6. So
whether plaintiff is seeking relief on Count 1 or 2, the outcome is the same.
Plaintiff’s briefing and attorney certification fail to address the remaining claims: Count 3, for
dilution; Count 4, for unfair competition; Count 5, for statutory unfair competition; Count 6, for
fraud; Count 7, for false advertising; or Count 8, for cyberpiracy. Those claims are dismissed.
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A trademark infringement claim requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) the mark is valid
and legally protectable; (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant’s use of the
mark to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of the goods
or services.” Fisons Horticulture, Inc v. Vigoro Indus., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 2015).
Regarding the first two elements, plaintiff has pleaded its registration and ownership of the two
marks upon which it seeks relief and attaches copies of the registrations to its motion. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 9-12; D.E. 17-3, Sutton Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. A.) Kinsley Tech. Co. v. Exquisite Buys,
2023 WL 5218124, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2023) (Padin, J.) (trademark registration established
plaintiff’s ownership of valid and protectable mark). Plaintiff has also alleged that the
ARMORTEC mark is incontestable. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) The allegations, assumed as true as
required in this procedural posture, support the first two claim elements. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 472.
On the third element, a “likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark
would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a
different product or service identified by a similar mark,” and if both the trademark owner and
the alleged infringer “directly compete with the goods or services, the court need rarely look
beyond the mark itself” and the focus is “whether the marks are confusingly similar.” Kinsley,
2023 WL 5218124, at *2 (cleaned up). Here, plaintiff has alleged that “defendants” “market and
sell and offer for sale a variety of concrete and asphalt products and services” that include paving
stones (the same type of goods plaintiff uses its marks for) and that they do so in the same
geographical market that plaintiff operates in. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, 13.) Plaintiff further alleges
that defendants are buying plaintiff’s actual products from authorized distributors and reselling
them, and that they are representing to customers that they are associated with plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶
14-15.) The very name, Armortec Paving & Patios, uses the same term as the mark, Armortec,
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and pairs it with “Paving & Patios,” further linking it to paving stones that plaintiff uses its mark
with. (See id. ¶ 27.) As there is both direct competition in the type of goods and the mark is
identical, this element is established for purposes of default judgment. See Matos, 133 F. Supp
3d at 685 (“The identity of marks . . . creates a great likelihood of confusion, and indeed makes
such confusion inevitable.” (footnote omitted)).
Although the complaint makes out a legitimate trademark infringement claim against
Armortec (the company allegedly doing the marketing, selling, and buying of the problematic
goods and using the trademarked name to do business), it does not set forth a viable claim
against Diaz individually. Diaz is merely alleged to be an agent for service of process and “an
officer, shareholder or individual otherwise having an interest in [Armortec].” (Am. Compl.
¶ 3.) Although in some circumstances a corporate officer can be held liable for trademark
infringement alongside the company, the allegations here, taken as true, do not establish a basis
for imposing such liability here. Compare Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v. Singh Trading Co., 2025 WL
2104507, at *6 (D.N.J. July 28, 2025) (Chesler, J.) (conclusory and generic allegations against
individual defendants did not warrant imposing liability for trademark infringement) with Prime
Hookah Inc. v. FCM Online LLC, 2022 WL 1115361, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2022) (Martini, J.)
(determining that allegations of specific, personal involvement, and acts by and benefits accruing
to individual defendants sufficed to hold them liable for trademark infringement). As plaintiff
has not asserted a legitimate claim for relief against Diaz, default judgment is denied as to him.
C. Relief Sought
Although the complaint requested various forms of relief, plaintiff now seeks only
permanent injunctive relief. A permanent injunction restraining trademark infringement may
issue when the plaintiff shows (1) irreparable injury, (2) the inadequacy of remedies available at
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law, (3) the balance of hardships between the parties favors equitable relief, and (4) that the
injunction sought would not disserve the public interest. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (citing
eBay v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). On the first factor, because plaintiff’s
allegations, taken as true, establish a claim for trademark infringement, including a likelihood of
confusion, a presumption of irreparable harm, which has not been rebutted, arises. The same
showing supports the fourth factor. See Meenaxi, 2025 WL 2104507, at *10. On the second
factor, monetary remedies are effectively unavailable here based on Armortec’s failure to
respond to the lawsuit, thus precluding discovery. (See D.E. 17-3, Sutton Decl. ¶¶ 6, 18.)
Moreover, even if a dollar figure could be ascertained, “it would not adequately compensate
Plaintiff for the reputational and goodwill injury” of Armortec’s conduct. Matos, 133 F. Supp. at
689. The third factor warrants an injunction because Armortec’s “only harm is that [it must]
obey the law and refrain from infringing,” as compared to the continued harm to plaintiff’s
trademark rights if injunctive relief is denied. Meenaxi, 2025 WL 2104507, at *10. See Matos,
133 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (describing harm to defendant as “self-inflicted”).
D. Whether Default Judgment would be Proper
The last part of the default judgment analysis asks whether judgment would be proper,
based on “(1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to
have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant’s delay is due to culpable conduct.” Leo
Constructing, 718 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (quoting Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at164).
Plaintiff would suffer prejudice here absent default judgment because, in the face of
Armortec’s infringement, it would otherwise have no way of protecting its trademark rights.
Plaintiff has been hindered in pursuing monetary relief (D.E. 17-3, Sutton Decl. ¶¶ 6, 18),
leaving an injunction as its recourse to stop further harm. Armortec has not responded, and no
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meritorious defense is apparent from the record. And culpable conduct can be presumed from a
defendant’s failure to respond. Meenaxi Enter., 2025 WL 2104507, at *6.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed as to defendants Connors and Diaz,
and Counts 3 through 8 are dismissed. The motion for default judgment is denied in part and
administratively terminated in part. Within 14 days, plaintiff may file a supplemental
submission addressing the issue of service of process on defendant Armortec, as outlined supra.
That submission shall include an updated proposed form of judgment.
An appropriate order will follow.
s/ Katharine S. Hayden
Date: March 30, 2026 Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.
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