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govinfo:USCOURTS-vtd-2_26-cv-00069-2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT
CRISTIAN HUMBERTO JEREZ ANDRADE,
Petitioner,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; PATRICIA HYDE, IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING
BOSTON FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS; DAVID W.
JOHNSTON IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS VERMONT SUB-OFFICE DIRECTOR OF
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS; TODD M.
LYONS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; RODNEY SCOTT, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ACTING
COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTIONS; KRISTI NOEM,
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
MARCO RUBIO, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE;
PAMELA BONDI, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL; AND GREG HALE,
SUPERINTENDENT, NORTHWEST STATE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY—SAINT
ALBANS,
Respondents.
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2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 1 of 24
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OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Cristian Humberto Jerez
Andrade’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. He seeks immediate release “on
conditions this Court deems just and proper,” or, in the
alternative, a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within seven days. Id. at 15. The Federal Respondents contend
that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and that his petition lacks merit and
should be denied. ECF No. 7. The Federal Respondents, while
“reserving all rights, including the right to appeal,” have
submitted an abbreviated response “in light of this Court’s
prior decisions in, for example, De Luis v. Trump et al., No.
2:25-cv-921, 2025 WL 3763397 (D. Vt. Dec. 30, 2025) and
Piedrahita-Sanchez v. Turek et al., No. 25-cv-875-wks, ECF No.
13 (D. Vt. Nov. 14, 2025).” ECF No. 7 at 2.
The Court held a status conference on March 16, 2026, and
held a hearing on March 17, 2026. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court ORDERS a bond hearing.
I. Factual Background
In his Petition, Petitioner states that he is thirty-one
years old, born and raised in Honduras but forced to flee in
2015 “after fearing for his life.” ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 7 at
2.
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 2 of 24
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Petitioner alleges that he arrived in the United States in
or around January 2015. ECF No. 1 at 6. He states that he met
his longtime girlfriend in 2019, and the couple had a child
together on March 16, 2020. Id. “After several years living in
Louisiana, in November 2025,” his family made the difficult
decision “to have Mr. Jerez Andrade move to Vermont where he was
offered a more stable job.” Id. Petitioner states that:
On March 11, 2026, while at his residence in South
Burlington, Vermont, officers from DHS including ICE
surrounded Mr. Jerez Andrade’s home while attempting
to locate a different individual whom they believed
resided at the property. For approximately nine
hours, ICE officers remained outside the residence
before eventually obtaining a signed warrant for that
other individual. That individual was not present in
the home and does not reside there. Although the
warrant did not name Mr. Jerez Andrade and there was
no arrest warrant issued for him, DHS officers
ultimately arrested Mr. Jerez Andrade at the
residence.
Id. at 6-7. Petitioner was brought to the Northwest
Correctional Facility in Saint Albans, Vermont, and is currently
detained there. Id. at 7.
Petitioner states that he has “strong family ties in the
United States and poses no danger to his community.” ECF No. 2
at 3.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in
this Court on March 12, 2026. ECF No. 1. That same day, the
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show
Cause which, among other things, ordered that “Petitioner shall
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 3 of 24
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not be removed from the District of Vermont pending further
order of this court.” The Federal Respondents filed their
abbreviated response on March 13, 2026. ECF No. 7.
The Court held a status conference on March 16, 2026, and
then a full hearing on March 17, 2026. Before the hearing on
March 17, Petitioner submitted a “Memorandum in Support of
Petitioner’s Request for Immediate Release on Bond” that argued
for the Petitioner’s immediate release and attached exhibits,
including many letters from Petitioner’s family and members of
the community, and photos of petitioner. ECF No. 12.
At the March 17 hearing, the Court heard testimony from the
Petitioner himself, as well as from José Jerez, the Petitioner’s
nephew. The Court heard from them testimony about the
Petitioner’s fatherly bond with both his nephew and his son, and
about his relationship with his longtime partner. Both also
spoke about his work ethic. Both described the Petitioner’s
dedication to providing for his family. Both Petitioner and his
nephew also spoke about the day that Petitioner was detained,
and his nephew described scene of ICE agents entering the house,
picking him up off of the floor, slamming him and his uncle
against the wall, throwing him back to the floor, handcuffing
him while on the floor, taking his identification, pointing a
gun at him, and then one ICE agent going into the attic before
his leg fell through the roof and his weapon discharged maybe
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 4 of 24
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five feet away from the nephew. The Federal Respondents also
submitted a record of criminal history instances for the
Petitioner—which, as the Petitioner pointed out, were
uncorroborated. The Petitioner did admit to having one
conviction that stemmed from an argument he had in 2020 with his
longtime partner, and to which he pled guilty. The conviction
may have been for domestic abuse / battery. The Petitioner did
not remember the exact charge to which he pled. Though there
were some indications of warrants having been issued, perhaps
one for stalking/intimidation and another for a traffic
violation nonappearance, neither party knew whether the warrants
were active.
II. Jurisdiction and Legal Standard
District courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
hear claims that an immigration detainee is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Petitioners have the burden to
demonstrate that their detention violates the Constitution or
federal law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Skaftouros v.
United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).
1
1 In this case, Respondents do not argue that Petitioner failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. Other district courts
have addressed, and excused, exhaustion in similar
circumstances. See, e.g., Lopez Benitez v. Francis et al., No.
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 5 of 24
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III. Discussion
Petitioner requests immediate release “on conditions this
Court deems just and proper,” or, in the alternative, a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days. ECF
No. 1 at 15. The Federal Respondents contend that Petitioner is
subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2), and that his petition lacks merit and should be
denied. The Federal Respondents agree that the issues raised
with regard to Section 1225 are similar to those this Court
decided in Piedrahita-Sanchez v. Turek et al, No. 2:25-cv-875,
(D. Vt. Nov. 14, 2025), ECF No. 13, and De Luis v. Trump et al.,
No. 2:25-cv-921, 2025 WL 3763397 (D. Vt. Dec. 30, 2025). The
Federal Respondents reserve their right to disagree with the
Court’s holding in those cases, and state that they are
reserving their right to appeal. ECF No. 7 at 2 (“While
respectfully disagreeing with the Court’s prior decisions,
Federal Respondents acknowledge that, should the Court adhere to
its reasoning in those decisions, the Court would likely reach
the same outcome in this case. Thus, in the interest of
judicial economy, and to expedite the Court’s consideration of
this matter, Federal Respondents hereby rely upon and
incorporate by reference the legal arguments they presented in
1:25-CV-05937-DEH, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, 2025 WL
2371588, *37-41 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 6 of 24
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Piedrahita-Sanchez and submit that the Court can decide this
matter without further briefing and without oral argument.”).
Accordingly, the Court adopts the same analysis regarding
the Section 1225 issues in this case as in those cases,
reproduced below.
A. Basis for Detention
As is relevant here, two statutes principally govern the
detention of noncitizens who do not have an order of removal:
8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225 provides for inspection
of “[a]ll aliens . . . who are applicants for admission or
otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through
the United States[,]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3), where an “applicant
for admission” is defined as “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and
including an alien who is brought to the United States after
having been interdicted in international or United States
Waters).” Id. § 1225(a)(1). Subject to certain exclusions the
parties do not argue are applicable here, detention is mandatory
under Section 1225:
In the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.
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Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(c) governs the detention of noncitizens
apprehended within the United States on criminal grounds.
Section 1226(a) is a catchall provision that governs the
detention of any other noncitizen apprehended by immigration
enforcement and is generally understood to apply to noncitizens
“already present in the United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018).
2 Section 1226(a) creates a statutory
right to a bond hearing before an immigration judge, but
§ 1225(b) and § 1226(c) call for mandatory detention. Id. at
302, 305-06.
This July, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
adopted a new interpretation of Section 1225 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), one that Federal Respondents advance
2 The Court notes that the Government has argued that Jennings
supports its interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226, because
it states that 1226 applies to “certain aliens already in the
country[,]” and the word “certain” means that it is not the
exclusive source of detention authority for certain aliens who
are already in the country. Rather, the Court considers the
Jennings opinion to lend support to Petitioner’s reading of the
statutes: at most, the opinion is ambiguous. See Jennings, 583
U.S. at 288 (“Even once inside the United States, aliens do not
have an absolute right to remain here. For example, an alien
present in the country may still be removed if he or she falls
‘within one of more…classes of deportable aliens.’ § 1227(a).
That includes aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry
or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since
admission. See §§ 1227(a)(1), (2). Section 1226 generally
governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of
aliens pending their removal.”).
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 8 of 24
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in this case. See Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-11613-BEM, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 141724, 2025 WL 2084238, at *12 (D. Mass. July 24,
2025) (describing “novel interpretation”). In September, the
BIA issued a ruling in a case called Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which held that all noncitizens who
enter the United States without inspection are “applicants for
admission” who are “seeking admission” within the meaning of
§ 1225(b), no matter how long they have lived in the United
States.
In this case, Petitioner has been detained pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). It is the Federal Respondents’ position
that, notwithstanding his roughly 10-year presence in this
country, Petitioner remains an “applicant for admission” who is
“seeking admission” and is subject to detention under Section
1225(b)(2). As an initial matter, the Court notes that other
district courts in this Circuit have consistently rejected the
Federal Respondents’ proposed, broad interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See, e.g., Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937
(DEH), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, 2025 WL 2371588, at *25
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Samb v. Joyce, No. 25-cv-6373, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161109, 2025 WL 2398831, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
19, 2025); Gonzalez v. Joyce, No. 25-cv-8250, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 208578, 2025 WL 2961626, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2025);
Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4304, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197628,
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 9 of 24
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2025 WL 2829511, at *8-12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025); J.U. v.
Maldonado, No. 25-cv-04836 (OEM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630,
2025 WL 2772765, at *5-9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025); Perez v.
Francis, No. 25-cv-8112 (JGK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219356, at
*5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2025); Ortiz v. Freden, No. 25-cv-960-
LJV, __ F. Supp. 3d__, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217654, 2025 WL
3085032, at *36-37 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025). Moreover, the vast
majority of cases across the country have held similarly, with a
few exceptions that the Federal Respondents have previously
cited.
3
The Court begins its analysis with the statutory text and
plain meaning. See United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100, 108
(2d Cir. 2016). First, the title of Section 1225 is:
“Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225 (emphasis added). The word “arriving” in the
title indicates that it does not refer to noncitizens present
already. See Pizarro Reyes, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 175767, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025)
3 The Court has read and considered Chavez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
2325, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); Vargas Lopez
v. Trump, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192557, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb.
Sept. 30, 2025); Oliveira v. Patterson, No. 6:25-cv-01463, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218128 (W.D. La. Nov. 4, 2025); and Pena v.
Hyde, No. 25-cv-11983, 2025 WL 2108913 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025)
and does not find them persuasive in this context.
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 10 of 24
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(“the use of ‘arriving’ to describe noncitizens strongly
indicates that the statute governs the entrance of noncitizens
to the United States. This reading is bolstered by the fact
that 1225 clearly establishes an inspection scheme for when to
let noncitizens into the country.”).
Section 1225(b)(2) provides that “in the case of an alien
who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Under section 1225(a)(1), an
“applicant for admission” is defined as “[a]n alien present in
the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in
the United States (whether or not at a designated port of
arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United
States after having been interdicted in international or United
States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an
applicant for admission.” See also Ascencio-Rodriguez v.
Holder, 595 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Aliens not
admitted are treated as ‘applicants for admission.’” (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1225(A)(1)). Elsewhere, the INA defines “admission”
and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
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As for the meaning of “seeking admission,” this Court finds
that the likely meaning is those noncitizens presenting
themselves at the border, or who were recently apprehended just
after entering.
4 However, to the extent the statute may be
considered ambiguous as to whether it means either seeking the
legal right to enter (Federal Respondents) or the act of
entering the country at the border or otherwise (Petitioner),
the Court turns to the canons of statutory construction. Once
again, this Court agrees with many other courts that: if all
“applicant[s] for admission” also are “seeking admission,” then
the words “seeking admission” would be surplusage. Ortiz v.
4 As the district court in Benitez v. Francis analogized:
This understanding accords with the plain, ordinary
meaning of the words "seeking" and "admission." For
example, someone who enters a movie theater without
purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through
the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily
then be described as "seeking admission" to the
theater. Rather, that person would be described as
already present there. Even if that person, after
being detected, offered to pay for a ticket, one would
not ordinarily describe them as "seeking admission"
(or "seeking" "lawful entry") at that point—one would
say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a
lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively
"seeking admission" to the United States, it cannot,
according to its ordinary meaning, apply to Mr. Lopez
Benitez, because he has already been residing in the
United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157214, 2025 WL 2371588, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 12 of 24
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Freden, No. 25-cv-960-LJV, __ F. Supp. 3d__, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 217654, 2025 WL 3085032, at *15-16 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025)
(“After all, Congress simply could have said ‘if the examining
immigration officer determines that an applicant for admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained.’” (emphasis in original)).
This Court also agrees with other district courts who have
observed that this reading is supported by the other
subparagraphs in Section 1225(b)(2). Subparagraph (B) provides
that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “shall not apply to an alien…who is a
crewman” or “who is a stowaway” and subparagraph C specifies a
return procedure in the case of an alien described in
subparagraph (A) who is “arriving on land.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(B),
(C). The carve-outs for various means of initial arrivals into
the United States suggests that those covered by Section
1225(b)(2) who are “seeking admission” refer to those
individuals presenting themselves at the border (or those who
have not yet effected entry, such as the noncitizen who
succeeded in making it 25 yards into U.S. territory in Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020)).
Similarly—and, again, following the analysis of other
courts—the Court observes that the Federal Respondents’
interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2) would render the 2025 Laken
Riley Act—which amended 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)—without meaning.
2:26-cv-00069-wks Document 14 Filed 03/17/26 Page 13 of 24
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See, e.g., Ortiz v. Freden, No. 25-cv-960-LJV, __ F. Supp. 3d__,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217654, 2025 WL 3085032, at *17-18
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025). It is unlikely that Congress passed
the Laken Riley Act to add Subsection (c)(1)(E) to the mandatory
detention scheme under Section 1226(c) if those individuals were
already covered by mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2).
In support of its position, the Federal Respondents point
to the legislative history of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which streamlined the
distinct deportation and exclusion proceedings into “removal
proceeding.” The Federal Respondents argue that Congress sought
to discard the former regime and eradicate detention
discrepancies. However, this Court shares the skepticism of
other district courts faced with the argument that Congress was
seeking to completely overhaul the systems of detention as well.
See Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
179594, 2025 WL 2637503, at *30-32 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025);
see also Zumba v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-14626 (KSH), 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 190052, 2025 WL 2753496, *30 n.5 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025)
(“The Court need not consider the legislative history because it
finds the statute is clear and simply notes that Congress'
stated goal was to put certain noncitizens seeking entry on more
equal footing with noncitizens who were present in the United
States with respect to their removal proceedings. The cited
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legislative history does not suggest that Congress also intended
to subject all noncitizens who entered the United States without
inspection to mandatory detention during their removal
proceedings.” (emphasis in original)); see also Romero v. Hyde,
No. 25-11631-BEM, __ F. Supp. 3d__, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
160622, 2025 WL 2403827, at *29 (D. Mass. Aug. 19,
2025)(Congressional intent was not expressed as to detention
pending the outcome of the immigration proceedings, and
“[r]ealistically speaking, if Congress’s intention was so clear,
why did it take thirty years to notice?”).
B. Constitutional Deprivation
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), sets out a
three-part test that the Second Circuit has applied when
determining the adequacy of process in the context of civil
immigration confinement. Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842,
851 (2d Cir. 2020). Under Mathews, the three factors are:
“[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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On the first prong, Petitioner’s private interest in
“freedom from imprisonment” is strong. See Velasco Lopez, 978
F.3d at 851 (“the most significant liberty interest there is—the
interest in being free from imprisonment.” (citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). Petitioner “was detained
without any pre-detention, individualized determination as to
whether he posed a flight risk or any risk of dangerousness” nor
is there any indication that “there was any material change in
circumstances that triggered [Petitioner’s] sudden arrest and
detention”; rather, “it appears [Petitioner] was detained simply
because” he was residing at a house that ICE officers believed
another individual, for whom they had a warrant, resided at.
Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4304, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197628,
2025 WL 2829511, at *34-35 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (case in
which the petitioner was detained when he appeared for a
previously calendared conference in immigration court).
On the second prong, the Court weighs the risk as high
because “[t]he purpose of the bond hearing employed when the
government seeks to exercise its discretion in detaining a
noncitizen under § 1226(a) is to provide procedures which will
better ensure that people who are, in fact, a risk of flight or
a danger to the community are the people [who] are ultimately
detained.” Id. Here, there were no procedural safeguards in
the form of a bond hearing, and there are no planned procedural
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safeguards.5 Zumba v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-14626 (KSH), 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 190052, 2025 WL 2753496, *29-30 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,
2025) (“the first and second Mathews factors weight heavily in
petitioner’s favor, as she has been deprived of her liberty,
erroneously subjected to mandatory detention under § 1225 during
her removal proceedings, and denied due process protections,
including the right to seek bond.”). As there has been no bond
hearing, apparently no one has assessed Petitioner’s risk of
flight and dangerousness. The lack of procedure contributes to
an increased risk of erroneous deprivation. See, e.g., Black v.
Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 152, (2d Cir. 2024) reh’g en banc denied,
2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 27912, 2025 WL 2989687 (2d Cir. Oct. 24,
2025) (in considering the category of people subject to
mandatory detention under the former version of Section 1226(c),
the Second Circuit held that “the almost nonexistent procedural
protections in place for section 1226(c)” contribute to a
“markedly increased…risk of an erroneous deprivation of
[p]etitioners’ private liberty interest” where the only
procedural protection available was a hearing to contest whether
5 The Federal Respondents have previously observed that the
detention under Section 1225 is not indefinite: the Petitioner
could be granted temporary parole under §§ 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2)
for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”
or the Petitioner’s detention could end once removal proceedings
have concluded. Regardless, erroneous deprivation in the
meantime will have no procedural protections.
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the petitioners in fact committed a crime that makes them
subject to mandatory detention under that statute).
On the third prong, on the record currently before the
Court, the Federal Respondents do not have a significant
interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. It is not
authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and it serves no legitimate
purpose. See Lopez Benitez v. Francis et al., No. 1:25-CV-
05937-DEH, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, 2025 WL 2371588, *36
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (“The Attorney General’s discretion to
detain individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid where it
advances a legitimate governmental purpose such as ensuring the
appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings and
preventing danger to the community.” (cleaned up)). On the
other hand, the Court recognizes that there is a governmental
interest in ensuring persons “do not commit crimes or evade law
enforcement”—as such, a bond hearing will “permit the
Immigration Court to consider those interests while also
safeguarding Petitioner’s significant private interests in
personal liberty and due process.” Adonay E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-3975, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222247 at *26 (D. Minn. Nov. 12,
2025).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioners’ due process
rights were violated. See Gonzalez v. Joyce, No. 25-cv-8250,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208578, 2025 WL 2961626, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
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Oct. 19, 2025) (“Because Respondents’ ongoing detention of
[Petitioner] with no process at all, much less prior notice, no
showing of changes circumstances, or an opportunity to respond,
violates his due process rights,[] the Petition must be
granted.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
IV. Remedy
Generally, writs of habeas corpus are used to request
release from custody. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78
(2005). A habeas court has “the power to order the conditional
release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release need
not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in
every case in which the writ is granted.” Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 779-80 (2008) (noting that at “common-law habeas
corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy.”). When faced with
similar habeas petitions, some courts in this Circuit and
outside have ordered a bond hearing or, alternatively, immediate
release. See, e.g., Perez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-8112 (JGK),
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219356, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2025)
(“The Government shall ensure that the petitioner receives a
bond hearing before an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within seven (7) days of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order; if no hearing is held by that deadline, the Government
shall immediately release the petitioner.”); Ortiz v. Freden,
No. 25-cv-960-LJV, __ F.Supp.3d__, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217654,
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2025 WL 3085032, at *36-37 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (“[T]he
[c]ourt ORDERS the respondents to provide Alvarez Ortiz with an
individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge within
seven calendar days of the date of this decision and order at
which the government shall bear the burden to demonstrate, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he is a danger to the
community or a flight risk. . . . If the respondents fail to
provide such a hearing within seven calendar days, they shall
immediately release Alvarez Ortiz.”). Some other district
courts have simply ordered immediate release. See, e.g.,
Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4304, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197628,
2025 WL 2829511, at *44 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (“Hyppolite’s
Amended Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 is GRANTED. At the hearing on September 29, 2025, the
Court ordered Respondents to immediately release Hyppolite from
custody, and was later informed by Respondents’ counsel that he
was released that same day.”); Gonzalez v. Joyce, No. 25-cv-
8250, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208578, 2025 WL 2961626, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2025) (habeas petition granted and
respondents ordered to immediately release petitioner from
custody and certify compliance with a filing the next day);
Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937 (DEH), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157214, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); J.U. v.
Maldonado, No. 25-cv-04836 (OEM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191630,
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2025 WL 2772765, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025) (“Respondent
is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.”).
That has also been the approach taken by this Court. See, e.g.,
Reynoso De Luis v. Trump, et al., No. 25-CV-921, 2025 WL
3763397, at *2 (D. Vt. Dec. 30, 2025); Acosta Yupangui v. Hale,
et al., No. 25-CV-884, 2025 WL 3207070 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025);
Opinion and Order, Piedrahita-Sanchez v. Turek, et al., No. 25-
CV-875 (D. Vt. Nov. 14, 2025) (ECF Doc. No. 13).
The Court notes that, as the Federal Respondents
acknowledged in their pleadings and as the Petitioner asserts in
his petition, some other district courts have simply ordered
immediate release. See, e.g., Order, Lopez-Niz v. Hale, et al.,
No. 25-CV-912 (D. Vt. Dec. 30, 2025); Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-4304, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197628, 2025 WL 2829511, at *44
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (“Hyppolite’s Amended Petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is GRANTED. At the
hearing on September 29, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to
immediately release Hyppolite from custody, and was later
informed by Respondents’ counsel that he was released that same
day.”); Gonzalez v. Joyce, No. 25-cv-8250, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
208578, 2025 WL 2961626, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2025) (habeas
petition granted and respondents ordered to immediately release
petitioner from custody and certify compliance with a filing the
next day); Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937 (DEH), 2025 U.S.
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Dist. LEXIS 157214, 2025 WL 2371588 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025);
J.U. v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-04836 (OEM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
191630, 2025 WL 2772765, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)
(“Respondent is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from
custody.”).
Here, the Federal Respondents ask the Court to, if it
follows its previous cases, order the same relief it ordered in
Piedrahita-Sanchez: a bond hearing. ECF No. 7 at 2.
Petitioner, on the other hand, seeks immediate release “on
conditions this Court deems just and proper,” or, in the
alternative, a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within seven days. ECF No. 1 at 15. For the reasons set forth
above, the Court orders a bond hearing.
The Court considered Petitioner’s position that he should
be immediately released, and considered whether it would make
sense to order release of the Petitioner pending the bond
hearing. However, based upon the information that was provided
at the hearing held on March 17, 2026, the Court could not make
a determination that this case presented considerations that are
“extraordinary circumstances” that make immediate release
“necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.” Mapp v. Reno,
241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001).
6
6 Mapp concerned the standards for granting bail (even in cases
challenging detention by the Immigration and Naturalization
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Accordingly, the Court orders a bond hearing. However, the
Court is not separately ordering release pending the bond
hearing.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Respondents are
ORDERED to hold an individualized bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for Petitioner,
within five (5) business days. The hearing will be held by
March 24, 2026.
This Court also ORDERS a hearing for seven business days
from this date, March 26, 2026, to be held in this Court, at
which time it will inquire as to whether a hearing has been held
pursuant to Section 1226(a), and whether Petitioner has been
released. At that hearing, the parties shall be prepared to
address the remaining substantial constitutional issues
Service) pending a final decision on a habeas petition. Here,
the Court is in the position of deciding the habeas petition
upon its merits as to the 1226 issue—and having already rejected
the Federal Respondents’ identical legal position in other
cases—but also, having fashioned relief particular to the
circumstances of this case (ordering a bond hearing), having the
chance to address Petitioner’s circumstances in the meantime.
Here, based on the unique considerations at issue in this case,
and the abbreviated timeline that the Federal Respondents have
to hold a bond hearing, the Court does not find that immediate
release, whether or not pursuant to bail, would be appropriate.
It may be that the Petitioner may renew his request for release
depending upon further developments in the case.
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implicated in this case. This hearing will be on the full
habeas petition.
In addition, this Court ORDERS that Paragraph 3 of its TRO
remains in effect. ECF No. 5. This Court continues to ORDER
that Petitioner shall remain detained at the Northwest
Correctional Facility, and shall not be moved out of state, to
the extent that he remains detained at all. Should the Federal
Respondents release petitioner after the bond hearing, that
would not violate the TRO. Finally, because the parties have
informed the Court that the master calendar hearing is to be in
Massachusetts and Petitioner’s attorney has stated that he will
be present at that hearing, the Court excepts any transportation
to and from that hearing (and the bond hearing, should it be
combined with the other hearing) from the requirements of the
TRO.
Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 17th
day of March 2026.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
Hon. William K. Sessions III
United States District Court
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