govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-3_25-cv-00226-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
AT LOUISVILLE 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00226-CRS 
 
CELESTINA FRANCIS PLAINTIFF 
 
v. 
 
OMNI HOTELS MANAGEMENT CORP. DEFENDANT 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff, Celestina Francis, worked for 
defendant, Omni Hotels. She alleges that she was forced to resign due to Omni’s discriminatory 
conduct and  retaliation against her  for reporting that conduct . Pending before this Court are 
Francis’ Motion to Remand and Omni’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. Both 
motions are ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Francis’ Motion 
to Remand and grant Omni’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
Francis filed the instant action in the Jefferson Circuit Court. She has asserted the following 
claims: (1) Omni discriminated against her based on her race; (2) it discriminated against her based 
on her national origin; (3) it retaliated against her because she reported that discrimination; and (4) 
it constructively discharged her. Compl., DN 1-3. Francis has brought these claims pursuant to the 
Kentucky Civil Rights Act and under the common law of Kentucky. On April 21, 2025, Omni 
properly removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, DN 
1. Even though this Court has jurisdiction, Francis has moved to remand. Motion, DN 9. Francis 
argues that the Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to the Burford and 
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Thibodaux abstention doctrines. Id. at PageID# 59–61. Abstention under these doctrines is not 
warranted, however. Thus, the Court will deny Francis’ Motion to Remand. 
Also before the Court is Omni’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (DN 12). When Omni hired 
Francis, she agreed to resolve by arbitration “all claims or controversies involving or in any way 
concerning [her] application with, employment with, or termination from the Company. ” 
Agreement, DN 12-1 at PageID# 102. The agreement also made it clear that discrimination claims 
fall within its scope:  
The claims covered by this Program include claims for 
discrimination, harassment or retaliation of any kind - including 
without limitation harassment or discrimination based on . . . , race, 
nationality. . . and claims for violation of any federal or state statute 
or common law or regulation. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Francis does not dispute that she signed the agreement, nor does she contend 
that her claims are not within the scope of the agreement. See Response, DN 14. Francis challenges 
the enforceability of the agreement.  Id. She contends that the agreement is contrary to Kentucky 
law and public policy because Kentucky law guarantees her a right to have her employment 
discrimination claims heard in a state circuit court. Id. at PageID# 123–24 (citing KRS 344.450). 
According to Francis, the arbitration agreement she signed violates that right, rendering it illegal 
and against Kentucky’s public policy for that reason. Thus, she contends that the agreement is void 
ab initio. Id. at PageID# 117–25. Contrary to Francis’ argument, Kentucky law expressly permits 
employers to require employees to sign arbitration agreements as a precondition to employment.  
KRS 336.700. Thus, the arbitration agreement she signed is neither illegal nor unenforceable as 
against public policy.  
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ANALYSIS 
 
A. Francis’ Motion to Remand 
It is well established that abstention doctrines represent a narrow exception to a federal 
district court’s duty to adjudicate cases before them. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). Thus, “only the clearest of justifications” warrant remand 
of a case for abstention purposes. Id. at 819. No such justifications exist here. Francis relies on the 
abstention doctrines announced in Burford and Thibodaux, but her case does not present 
circumstances that justify abstention under either doctrine.  
1.  The Burford Abstention Doctrine 
 
The Burford abstention doctrine arose from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
The case involved a dispute over the issuance of an oil drilling permit  in the East Texas oil field. 
Id. at 317. It also concerned the complexities regarding the distribution of those oil drilling permits. 
Id. at 319. Distributing such permits carried significant economic implications not only for permit 
holders but also for future applicants and for  the environment. Id. The East Texas oil field was 
enormous. Id. at 318.  It required consistent administration over thousands of wells and nine 
hundred operators who were all drawing oil from the same underground reservoir. Id. at 319. 
Because of the way the oil move s underground in a giant pool, its pressure must be maintained 
and carefully controlled to p revent unnecessary waste  and permanent loss . Id. These concerns 
implicated how many permits could be responsibly i ssued and where applicants would be 
permitted to drill. Id. One operator’s drilling had the potential to drain oil in a way that could 
disrupt the entire field. Id. Because of these geological complexities, the regulation of each field 
as a unit was necessary. Id. In short, granting permits required assessing several factors including 
oil supply, market demand, protection of individual operators, and public interest. Id. at 321. 
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As a result, the Texas Legislature enacted a regulatory scheme with a centralized process 
for judicial review of administrative decisions made under that scheme, including granting drilling 
permits. Pursuant to the regulatory scheme, the Texas Legislature vested the Texas Railroad 
Commission with the power to grant oil  drilling permits. Id. at 320.  The district court in Travis 
County was designated as the exclusive forum for judicial review of the Commission’s decisions. 
Id. at 325. This designation enabled the district court to gain extensive experience and expertise in 
adjudicating the complex disputes often arising from permit distribution. Id. at 327. 
Sun Oil sidestepped this process . Id. at 316. The Commission had granted an oil drilling 
permit to Burford that allowed it to drill four wells in the East Texas oil field. Id. at 317. Sun Oil 
contended that this decision was unreasonable and violated its due process rights. Id. It filed these 
claims in federal district court. The district court abstained. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals , holding that abstention was 
appropriate. Id. at 334. In so holding, the Supreme Court established two categories of cases that 
can warrant abstention: (1) when there are “difficult questions of state law” that bear on substantial 
policy problems and which “transcend[] the result in the case then at bar” or (2) when “adjudication 
in a federal forum ‘would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect 
to a matter of substantial public concern. ’” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 517 U.S. 706, 7 07 
(1996) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814). 
Francis argues that her case falls squarely within the first category. Motion, DN 9 at 
PageID# 59. It does not. Francis’ case consists of routine, employment discrimination claims  
brought pursuant to Kentucky law: (1) race discrimination, (2) national origin discrimination, (3) 
retaliation, and ( 4) constructive discharge. None of these claims present s difficult questions of 
state law. Each is governed by well -settled precedent. Indeed, Francis has failed to identify any 
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issues that present difficult or complex questions of law. Nor does her case require the Court to 
render a decision that would affect or interfere with a state regulatory system. Nor does her case 
present issues that transcend this particular dispute. The adjudication of Francis’ claims will be 
remedial in nature and limited to the two parties involved. She seeks damages for Omni’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct. Compl., CN 1 -3 at PageID# 32 -33. A damages judgment will not bind other 
potential plaintiffs with claims like Francis’.  
Finally, while Francis contends that her claims involve “intensely local questions of law 
and public importance,” simply advancing this assertion does not make it so. Francis has not 
explained what she means by this phrase and has not otherwise developed an argument to support 
it. She certainly has not explained how this contention is consistent with the first category of cases 
Burford described as warranting abstention. This Court has no obligation to guess at what Francis 
means and then rule on the merits  of that guess. Rice v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F. App’x 452, 
454 (6th Cir. 2006) (“It is well -established that ‘issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.’”) (cit ations 
omitted). Having been presented with no circumstances that warrant abstention under Burford, and 
seeing none, the Court declines to abstain pursuant to that doctrine. 
2.  The Thibodaux Abstention Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court established an additional abstention doctrine in La. Power & Light Co. 
v. City of Thibodaux , 360 U.S. 25  (1959). Thibodaux concerned whether the city possessed 
expropriation authority, specifically the prerogative to take real property owned by a public utility. 
Id. The city contended that a Louisiana statute gave it that prerogative. Id. at 25, 30. No binding 
precedent interpreting the statute existed. Id. at 30. However, the Louisiana Attorney General had 
opined that the statute did not give a city the power to take utility-owned, private property. Thus, 
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when presented with the issue, the district court found that Louisiana law was unsettled. Id. That 
factor contributed to its decision to abstain. 
Additionally, because the statute at issue expressly gave only the State of Louisiana 
expropriation power and because the city was  not the state itself , the case “intimately involved” 
Louisiana’s “sovereign prerogative.” Id. at 28. That is, a decision would potentially determine 
whether the state statute could be read to include a delegation of Louisiana’s takings power to one 
of its cities. In this way, a decision risked “serious disruption . . . of state government .” Id. at 28. 
This factor also informed th e district court’s decision to abstain. Th e Supreme Court determined 
that the district court’s abstention was appropriate. Therefore, the Thibodaux abstention applies 
when a case raises an unsettled question of state law that is “intimately involved with” the state’s 
“sovereign prerogative.” Id. at 28–29. 
The Court sees no such circumstances in this case, and again, Francis has failed to present 
the Court with any reason to reach the opposite conclusion . Francis asserts that the laws at issue 
here are “so bound up with a state’s sovereign prerogatives . . . that [this Court] should refrain 
from proceeding.” Motion, DN 9 at PageID# 60. But she does not support this contention with any 
facts or any law. Again, the Court has no obligation to make arguments for Francis. Moreover, 
Kentucky’s discrimination law is  not unsettled. There are long lines of Kentucky precedent 
governing claims, like Francis’, which are brought pursuant to Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act and 
under the common law of Kentucky. Nor do Francis’ claims “intimately involve” Kentucky’s 
sovereign pre rogative. There is no issue that touches upon the State of Kentucky’s ability to 
exercise any power granted to it under any law. For these reasons, abstention under Thibodaux is 
not warranted.  
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B. Omni’s Motion to Compel Arbitration   
The parties dispute the validity of the arbitration agreement they both signed. Omni asserts 
that the agreement is valid and enforceable. Motion, DN 12. Francis asserts that it is void because 
it violates Kentucky law and public policy. Response, DN 13. However, Francis’ assertion is 
misplaced. Because the arbitration agreement here operates within the bounds of Kentucky law, 
the Court finds that the agreement is valid, and Francis’ argument fails. Accordingly, the Court 
will grant Omni’s motion to compel arbitration and stay this case.    
The Federal Arbitration Act generally favors the enforceability of valid arbitration 
agreements, subject to generally applicable contract principles, such as illegality . 9 U.S.C. § 2 ; 
Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). State law determines whether such 
an agreement is illegal and thus enforceable. Fazio v. Lehman Bros., 340 F.3d 386, 393 (6th Cir. 
2003). Under Kentucky law, a contract that has a direct objective or purpose which violates a 
statute is illegal. Yeager v. McLellan, 177 S.W.3d 807, 809 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted). Finally, 
the party seeking to invalidate the agreement bears the burden of demonstrating that it is invalid. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).   
Francis has not carried this burden of proof. She contends that her arbitration agreement is 
invalid because it is illegal. However, she relies on a selective and incomplete reading of the 
governing statutes for that contention. Francis relies on KRS 366.700(2) for the proposition that 
arbitration agreements are illegal if they “waive or diminish a substantive statutory right .” And, 
because KRS 344.450 gives her the right to be heard in a Kentucky circuit court, her arbitration 
agreement forces her, illegal ly, to waive that right.  Response, DN 14 at PageID# 11 9. But her 
contention fails because she selectively quotes certain language from KRS 366.700(2) and omits 
other language that dispels her argument. Francis partially quotes KRS 366.700(2) as follows:   
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“no employer shall require as a condition or precondition of employment that any 
employee or person seeking employment waive or otherwise diminish any existing 
or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or person seeking 
employment would otherwise be entitled under any provision of the Kentucky 
Revised Statutes or any federal law.” [emphasis added] 
 
Id. She omits the following key language, emphasized here for clarity:  
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary 
and except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, no employer shall require 
as a condition or precondition of employment that any employee or person seeking 
employment waive or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or 
benefit to which the employee or person seeking employment would oth erwise be 
entitled under any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or any federal law. 
 
(emphasis added). The italicized language is dispositive —it exempts subsection (3)  from 
subsection (2)’s prohibition. Subsection 3 reads as follows:  
Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section: 
Any employer may require an employee or person seeking employment to execute 
an agreement for arbitration, mediation, or other form of alternative dispute 
resolution as a condition or precondition of employment. 
 
(emphasis added).  Clearly, KRS 336.700(3) expressly exempts employment arbitration 
agreements—like the one Francis signed —from the broader prohibition contained in subsection 
(2). Id. For this reason, Francis’ illegality argument fails outright. The same statute evinces a public 
policy in favor of permitting employers to require their employees to sign  arbitration agreements 
as a condition to their employment. For this reason, Francis’ void -as-against-public-policy 
argument is unavailing.  
 Moreover, Francis has mistakenly contended that her arbitration agreement extinguishes 
her right to have her case heard. Id. at PageID# 124. She argues that this result violates Kentucky’s 
interest in e nforcing its civil rights laws. Response, DN 14 at PageID# 124. Francis cites KRS 
344.450 for this proposition Id. at PageID# 118 (KRS 344.450 states that “Any person injured by 
any act in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action in Circuit 
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Court.”). An arbitration agreement does not extinguish Francis’ right to be heard. It only changes 
the forum in which she will be heard. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler -Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  And, absent a clear legislative intent to preclude arbitration of claims 
outside a judicial forum, parties should be held to the arbitration agreements they sign. 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett , 556 U.S. 247, 258 (2009). KRS 336.700 ’s express language shows that the 
Kentucky Legislature’s inten t was to permit arbitration of employment -related claims. See also 
Jackson v. Legacy Health Servs. Inc., 640 S.W.3d 728, 735 (Ky. 2022) (citing Schnuerle v. Insight 
Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 574 (Ky. 2012)). Finally, when the Kentucky legislature permits 
a practice, courts may not find that same practice to be in violation of its public policy. See JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Longmeyer , 275 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Ky. 2009)  (citations omitted); 
Kentucky State J. Co. v. e Comp. Bd., 161 Ky. 562, 170 S.W. 437, 438 (1914) (“The public policy 
of a state is expressed in its . . . statutes . . . and if the . . . statutes speak upon a subject, the public 
policy of the state is fixed to that extent.”).  
 Francis’ right to have her claims heard have not been abrogated by her arbitration 
agreement. She simply agreed to pursue her claims in an arbitral as opposed to a judicial forum. 
Her claims are preserved. Kentucky’s public policy as evinced in the statutes on which Francis has 
relied does not require a different conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Abstention is not warranted in this case under either Burford, 319 U.S. at 315, or 
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 25. Accordingly, plaintiff Francis’ Motion to Remand (DN 9) is DENIED. 
Because Francis’ arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable under Kentucky law, defendant 
Omni’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay All Proceedings (DN 12) is GRANTED. The 
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parties to this action are COMPELLED to arbitrate all claims. This case is STAYED pending the 
conclusion of the ordered arbitration.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
March 26, 2026
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