govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cv-01054-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
O.E., BY AND THROUGH HIS 
PARENTS, C.E AND C.E. 
CIVIL ACTION 
  
VERSUS NO. 25-1054 
  
ADVOCATES FOR ARTS-BASED 
EDUCATION, D/B/A THE WILLOW 
SCHOOL 
SECTION: “P” (5) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
  Before the Court is a motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 30) filed by Defendant, Advocates for 
Arts-Based Education, and a motion for a preliminary injunction (R.  Doc. 16) filed by Plaintiff, 
O.E.1 This action arises out of allegations that a public charter school is using an admissions 
assessment to discriminate against students with intellectual disabilities. For the following reasons, 
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is 
DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Relevant Procedural History 
In early February 2025, about four months prior to the commencement of this action in 
federal court, Plaintiff, O.E., filed a Request for a Due Process Hearing with the Louisiana Division 
of Administrative Law, challenging The Willow School’s (“Willow”)  “blanket refusal to accept 
students with intellectual disabilities.”
2 The Request sought a due process hearing to establish 
violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Louisiana Human Rights Act (“LHRA”) for Willow’s use of an 
 
1 O.E. is a minor and brings this action by and through his parents, C.E. and C.E., so the  docket lists three plaintiffs. 
For ease of reference, however, the Court simply refers to the plaintiff party in the singular as O.E. 
2 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 120.  
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academic achievement assessment as an admissions criterion  and “because its lower -school 
campus is not wheelchair accessible.”3 Among other relief, the Request sought an order “barring” 
Willow from using the assessment  as an admissions criterion .4 Willow moved to dismiss the 
request,5 and the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) granted the motion, concluding that the issues 
were “outside the jurisdiction of th[e] tribunal” because, under the Louisiana Administrative Code, 
a Request for Due Process Hearing may only be sought on certain matters relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a student with a disability, or to the 
provision of a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to the student with a disability.
6 And 
the ALJ found that O.E.’s “allegations of systemic discriminatory admissions practices, as well as 
issues under the ADA and the LHRA ” were “ unrelated to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement, or the provision of FAPE to [O.E.].”
7 The ALJ’s order notified O.E. that 
he had 90 days to seek review in a civil action, to which this action followed.8 
O.E. brought this action in federal court in May 2025, but it did not pick up speed until 
some months later when O.E. filed a motion for partial summary judgment.9 This Court denied the 
motion, without prejudice.10 Although procedurally proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(b), it violated this Section’s standard scheduling order, which requires leave of court for the 
filing of motions of this type before the close of discovery. 11 About one week later, O.E. filed a 
motion for preliminary injunction. 12 Willow filed an opposition in response 13 and two days later 
 
3 R. Doc. 30-3 at 14. 
4 Id. at 14–15. 
5 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 121; see also R. Doc. 30-4 at 1. 
6 R. Doc. 30-4 at 2–3; see also R. Doc. 1 ¶ 121. 
7 R. Doc. 30-4 at 3; see also R. Doc. 1 ¶ 121. 
8 R. Doc. 30-4 at 6; see also R. Doc. 1 ¶ 122. 
9 R. Doc. 11. 
10 R. Doc. 15. 
11 Id. 
12 R. Doc. 16. 
13 R. Doc. 27. 
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filed a motion to dismiss the case. 14 O.E. then filed a motion to renew the motion for partial 
summary judgment, which remains pending.15 In December 2025, this Court heard oral argument 
on the motion to dismiss 16 and then, some days later, held an evidentiary hearing on the motion 
for preliminary injunction.17  
O.E. asserts that Willow, by using an academic achievement assessment  as a criterion in 
its admissions process, (1) violates Title II of the ADA; (2) violates O.E.’s right to a free 
appropriate public education under the IDEA; (3) violates the LHRA; and (4) commits negligence 
under state law.18 O.E. also claims that Willow’s lower -school campus is not fully wheelchair 
accessible.19 O.E. seeks monetary and injunctive relief, as well as attorney’s fees and costs.20  
B. Charter Schools 
At the center of this case is a public charter school in a school district comprised almost 
entirely of charter schools , so some legal background on charter schools is necessary . Charter 
schools are a relatively recent phenomenon in the education space. 21 They are publicly funded 
educational institutions that operate pursuant to a contract, or “charter,” with a state, school district, 
or some other public entity. 22 Because they operate through this separate agreement rather than 
under the standard rules and regulations of a school district, they typically have more autonomy in 
areas such as curriculum, instruction, and budget , much like traditional private schools. 23 
 
14 R. Doc. 30. 
15 R. Doc. 32. 
16 R. Doc. 66. 
17 R. Doc. 67. 
18 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 143–63. 
19 Id. ¶¶ 139–42. 
20 Id. at 20. 
21 Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, V alidity, Construction, and Application of Statute or Regulation Governing § 2 
Charter Schools , 78 A.L.R.5th 533 (Originally published in 2000) (“Charter schools have become the public 
educational innovation of the 1990s.”). 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3996(A) (“Notwithstanding any state law, rule, or regulation to the contrary and except 
as may be otherwise specifically provided for in an approved charter, a charter school established and operated in 
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Accordingly, charter schools are often tools of innovation and provide families with greater 
educational choice within the public school system.24  
Given that charter schools arise from contracts with state entities, states have enacted 
statutory schemes governing the creation and legal status of charter schools. 25 Congress has not 
enacted a comprehensive federal statutory scheme governing the creation or legal status of charter 
schools, so charter schools remain creatures of state law. That said, as public education institutions 
and (often) federal funding recipients, charter schools  are subject to federal laws governing civil 
rights, special education, and constitutional protections, though the specific implementation of 
these laws may vary based on the state’s charter school statutory framework.  
The state statutory scheme relevant here is Louisiana’s charter school law .26 Louisiana 
Public Charter School Law defines charter school as “an independent public school that provides 
a program of elementary or secondary education, or both, . . . to provide a learning environment 
that will improve pupil achievement.”
27 The statute seeks to advance several goals , including  
“increas[ing] school choice options throughout the state”; “[e]ncourag[ing] the use of different and 
innovative teaching methods, educational models, and a variety of governance, management, and 
 
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and its approved charter and the school’s officers and employees shall 
be exempt from all rules and regulations of the state board and those of any local school board that are applicable to 
public schools and to public school officers and employees except for the following rules and regulations otherwise 
applicable to public schools . . . .”). See also Voices for Int'l Bus. & Educ., Inc. v. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. , 905 F.3d 770, 
774 (5th Cir. 2018) (“ One of the perceived virtues, if not the virtue, of charter schools is that a lack of political 
oversight gives them freedom to experiment.”). 
24 See, e.g., La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3972(A) (“It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this Chapter to authorize school 
choice options for parents, teachers, and pupils through the creation of innovative kinds of independent public charter 
schools.”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 501 (West) (referring to “independent ‘charter’ schools” when stating that “[t]his 
chapter is intended to . . . encourage the use of different and innovative or proven school environments and teaching 
and learning methods; provide parents and students with measures of improved school and student performance and 
greater opportunities in choosing public schools . . . .”); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71, § 89(b) (West) (“The purposes 
of establishing charter schools are: (i) to stimulate the development of innovative programs within public education . . . 
(iii) to provide parents and students with greater options in selecting schools within and outside their school 
districts . . . .”). 
25 As of 2002, 37 states had some type of charter school law.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 683 n.9 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
26 See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:3971–4002.6. 
27 Id. § 17:3973(2)(a).  
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administrative structures”; and “[i] ncreas[ing] learning opportunities and access to quality 
education for pupils.”28  
Louisiana’s statutory scheme  provides for five “types” of charter schools. 29 Although 
creation of a charter school depends on its “type,” generally, charter schools in the State are created 
pursuant to a performance-based contract, or charter, between a nonprofit corporation and the State 
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education or the local school board. 30 That contract 
establishes, among other things, the school’s mission and educational model ; “[a]dmission 
requirements, if any, that are consistent with the school’s role, scope, and mission” ; and 
accountability measures.31  
Consistent with the statute ’s purpose, charter schools in the State enjoy significant 
operational flexibility, including authority over curriculum and instructional methods, budgeting 
and finances, and personnel decisions. 32 As to enrollment, charter schools are generally required 
to be open to all students within the authorized geographic area and use random lotteries if 
applications exceed the available seats.
33 Limited admissions criteria are permitted, however,  in 
certain circumstances. For example, Louisiana law permits charter schools to establish specific 
admission requirements “related to a school’s mission [,] such as auditions for schools with a 
performing arts mission or proficiency in a foreign language for schools with a language 
immersion mission.”
34 In addition, any school chartered prior to July 2012 that previously 
“incorporated achievement of a certain academic record as part of its admissions requirements may 
 
28 Id. § 17:3972(B). 
29 Id. § 17:3973(2). 
30 See id. § 17:3973(2)(b); see also Voices for Int'l Bus. & Educ., Inc. v. Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. , 905 F.3d 770, 772 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
31 See id. § 17:3991(B). 
32 Cf. id. § 17:3996. 
33 See id. § 17:3991(C)(1). 
34 Id. § 17:3991(B)(3). 
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continue to use such admission requirements .”35 With Louisiana’s charter-school framework in 
mind, the Court turns to the instant motions. 
II. MOTION TO DISMISS 
Willow seeks to dismiss O.E.’s IDEA, ADA, and LHRA claims, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.36 Willow 
also asserts that the IDEA claim should be dismissed for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction , 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because O.E. lacks standing.37 In the alternative, Willow asserts that the 
entire case should be dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), for failure to join Orleans Parish School 
Board (“OPSB”), an entity Willow alleges is an indispensable party under Rule 19.38  
This Part will address the IDEA and ADA claims in turn. Although the Court heard 
evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court considers that evidence only where 
relevant to the preliminary injunction analysis and not in evaluating the sufficiency of the 
pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Court dismisses O.E.’s ADA and IDEA claims under 
Rule 12(b)(6) and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims , the 
Court will not address Willow’s 12(b)(7) argument.  
A. Factual Allegations 
i. Plaintiff, O.E. 
Plaintiff, O.E., is a nine-year-old boy with profound physical and intellectual disabilities.
39 
Compared to a typically developing child, his cognitive functioning is that of a one- to two-year-
 
35 Id.  
36 R. Doc. 38. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.; R. Doc. 38-1 at 34–35. 
39 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11–35. 
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old child.40 O.E. is non-verbal, so to communicate, he uses an “eye -gaze”-enabled augmentative 
and alternative communication device. 41 Because of his physical disabilities, he cannot walk 
without assistance and uses a wheelchair. 42 When O.E. was four years old, he was evaluated by 
the Jefferson Parish Public School System, the district in which he was living at the time, and an 
individualized education program (“IEP”) was created for O.E.43 Now, O.E. and his parents reside 
in New Orleans, so he is currently a resident of Orleans Parish. 44 At the time of the events giving 
rise to the instant action, O.E. was homeschooled.45 
ii. Orleans Parish School System 
Orleans Parish has a unique public school system. The school system is comprised almost 
entirely of public charter schools with only one “traditional” public school. 46 To attend a public 
school in Orleans Parish, students apply to schools through a parish- wide application system 
governed by Orleans Parish School Board (“OPSB”). 47   In a “lottery” fashion, OPSB’s system 
assigns students to schools. 48 In addition to OPSB’s application, Willow has its own admissions 
criteria that a student must meet for him or her to be eligible to attend Willow.49 
 
40 Id. ¶ 12. 
41 Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
42 Id. ¶ 19. 
43 Id. ¶ 25. 
44 Id. ¶ 2; Orleans Parish Profile , LOUISIANA.GOV, https://www.louisiana.gov/local-louisiana/orleans-
parish#:~:text=Orleans%20Parish%20%2D%20The%20official%20website%20of%20Louisiana.  
45 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 27–31. 
46 Id.  ¶¶ 38–39. 
47 Id. ¶ 77. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. ¶¶ 76–81. 
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iii. Defendant, Advocates for Arts-Based Education (The Willow School) 
Advocates for Arts -Based Education  is a nonprofit corporation that operates a school 
known as The Willow School.50 Willow is a public charter school located in New Orleans.51 Under 
Louisiana law, Willow is a “Type 3” charter school .52 A Type 3 school is “a preexisting public 
school converted and operated as the result of and pursuant to a charter between a nonprofit 
corporation and the local school board.”53  
As part of its admissions process, and in addition to other admissions criteria, Willow 
requires each applicant to take an assessment known as the Iowa Assessment.54 An applicant must 
obtain a minimum score on the Iowa Assessment to be eligible for assignment to Willow. 55 That 
is, if an applicant does not obtain a certain minimum score on the Iowa Assessment, he or she may 
not continue with Willow’s admissions process, and thus may not attend Willow.  
Generally, students seeking admission into fourth grade, like O.E., have only three to six 
hours to complete the assessment.56 Willow creates a “scorecard,” or “matrix,” for each applicant, 
and an applicant’s score on the Iowa Assessment makes up the largest share of possible points on 
an applicant’s matrix.
57 Therefore, “the higher [an applicant] score[s], the[] higher their chances 
of admission.”58 
 
50 Id. ¶ 5. 
51 Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
52 Id. ¶ 40. 
53 La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3973(2)(b)(iii). 
54 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 83. 
55 Id. ¶ 85. 
56 Id. ¶ 84. 
57 Id. ¶ 92. 
58 Id. ¶ 94. 
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iv. O.E.’s Experience with The Willow School’s Admissions Process 
Last school year, O.E. applied to Willow for the 2025- 2026 school year through OPSB’s 
system. The events giving rise to the instant action began in November 2024 when O.E.’s father 
contacted admissions officials at Willow to discuss O.E.’s application.59 Around this time, Willow 
received O.E.’s IEP and other documents related to O.E.’s testing accommodations. 60 At some 
point, O.E.’s father also requested that Willow waive the Iowa Assessment for O.E., which Willow 
refused to do.
61 In response, O.E.’s father threatened Willow with a lawsuit.62 Nevertheless, O.E. 
submitted a complete application for Willow through OPSB’s system , and O.E. took the Iowa 
Assessment on Willow’s middle school campus over a span of two days in mid-February 2025.63 
O.E. did not obtain the minimum score necessary to be eligible for admission into Willow.64 
B. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Claim 
The Court begins with Willow’s attack on O.E.’s claim  under the IDEA  for denial of a 
FAPE. Willow first contends, under Rule 12(b)(1), that O.E. lacks standing to sue Willow based 
on the absence of standing under the IDEA.65 Willow’s second argument challenges O.E.’s right 
to relief under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the ALJ’s finding that “allegations of systemic 
discriminatory admissions practices . . . are unrelated to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement, or the provision of FAPE.”
66  
 
59 Id. ¶¶ 95–96. 
60 Id. ¶ 104. 
61 Id. ¶¶ 95, 108. 
62 Id. ¶ 103. 
63 Id. ¶¶ 115–16.  
64 Id. ¶ 118. 
65 R. Doc. 30-1 at 12–13. 
66 Id. at 30–34. 
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i. The IDEA’s Administrative-Exhaustion Requirement 
This claim comes before the Court in an unusual procedural posture. Generally, a plaintiff 
is required to exhaust the state’s administrative remedies before filing suit in the district court to 
seek relief under the IDEA.67 The district court then reviews the decision of the hearing officer.68 
But there are exceptions to the administrative-exhaustion requirement. For instance, if exhaustion 
would be futile or if the “gravamen” of the plaintiff’s complaint is disability discrimination and 
not denial of a FAPE, then the plaintiff need not clear the IDEA’s administrative hurdles.
69 The 
plaintiff may also avoid the administrative -exhaustion requirement if the relief sought is not one 
that the IDEA can provide.70 On top of that, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
“has not yet determined whether exhaustion under the IDEA is a jurisdictional requirement” or a 
mandatory claim -processing rule.
71 Nor has it “‘directly addressed the point’ of whether a 
plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA deprives the court of subject 
matter jurisdiction.”
72  
Here, the ALJ decided that she lacked jurisdiction over O.E.’s “allegations of systemic 
discriminatory admissions practices,” which she determined “are unrelated to the . . . provision of 
FAPE.” That language implicates a host of potential issues under the IDEA’s administrative 
requirement, like whether exhaustion was, as the ALJ determined, futile or whether  the 
“gravamen” of O.E.’s complaint, like the ALJ implies, is disability discrimination. But Willow 
 
67 Lartigue v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 100 F.4th 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 
U.S. 154 (2017)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). 
68 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). 
69 Gardner v. Sch. Bd. Caddo Par., 958 F.2d 108, 111–12 (5th Cir. 1992); Lartigue, 100 F.4th at 515. 
70 Lartigue, 100 F.4th at 515 (citing Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 149–50 (2023)). 
71 T. B. by & through Bell v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 980 F.3d 1047, 1050 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the Supreme 
Court has recently held that Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional but is, instead, a 
mandatory claim-processing rule” (citing Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019))). 
72 T. B. by & through Bell, 980 F.3d at 1050 n.2 (quoting Doe v. Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-20-CV-00960-
JKP, 2020 WL 6566854, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020)). 
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does not dispute O.E’s exhaustion of administrative remedies under the statute. 73 Instead, the 
essence of Willow’s 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) arguments is that it never had an obligation to O.E. 
under the IDEA because O.E. was never enrolled in Willow. Finding merit in Willow’s argument, 
this Court declines to review the ALJ’s finding and dismisses his IDEA claim on other grounds. 
ii. Willow’s IDEA Challenge is More Appropriately Analyzed Under 
Rule 12(b)(6) 
Willow’s basis for dismissal is a question of legal duty under the statute in question—
whether Willow has an obligation to provide a FAPE to O.E. under the IDEA. This  is a merits 
determination, not a question of the Court’s power. Thus, Willow’s 12(b)(6) motion—not its 
12(b)(1) motion—is the proper avenue to  review the legal viability of O.E.’s IDEA claim. 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
74 “A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
75 “‘[D]etailed factual 
allegations’ are not required.”76 “The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the 
complaint states a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the 
light  most favorable to the plaintiff.”77 The court’s task is not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood 
of success but instead to determine whether the claim is both legally cognizable and plausible. 78 
Here, determining whether O.E. has both a legally cognizable and plausible claim for relief under 
the IDEA requires examining the statute itself. 
 
73 R. Doc. 30-1 at 30. 
74 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 663. 
77 Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P . v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). 
78 Id. 
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iii. Analysis Under the IDEA 
“The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a ‘free 
appropriate public education’—more concisely known as a FAPE —to all children with certain 
physical or intellectual disabilities.” 79 “[A] FAPE comprises ‘special education and related 
services’—both ‘instruction’ tailored to meet a child’s ‘unique needs’ and sufficient ‘supportive 
services’ to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.” 80 The “primary vehicle” for 
providing a FAPE is the individualized education program (“IEP”).81  
To ensure each child within a state receiving IDEA funds has access to a FAPE, “Congress 
established a three-tiered funding, administration, and implementation scheme . . . .”82 “[T]he state 
must submit a plan of compliance to the Secretary of Education which provides federal IDEA 
funds to the state.”83 “The state is then responsible for administering the funds on the state level, 
including the distribution of federal funds to local education[al] agencies (LEAs) . . . .” 84 To 
receive funds from the state, an LEA must submit a plan of compliance to the state educational 
agency (“SEA”).
85 “The LEA then provides services directly to children with disabilities using the 
funds obtained from the SEA.” 86 Accordingly, while the LEA is responsible for the direct 
provision of services under the IDEA, the SEA is responsible for general supervision of the IDEA’s 
implementation in the state.
87 Thus, the state, through its SEA, is the ultimate guarantor of a FAPE 
for each child with a disability who resides there.88 
 
79 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017). 
80 Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29)). 
81 Fry, 580 U.S. at 158 (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). 
82 Gadsby by Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 942 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412–14)). 
83 Grasmick, 109 F.3d at 942; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). 
84 Grasmick, 109 F.3d at 942; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412. 
85 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a). 
86 Grasmick, 109 F.3d at 942; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1413. 
87 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(11), 1413(a)(1). 
88 See id. § 1412(a). 
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The IDEA defines an LEA as a “public board of education or other public authority legally 
constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service 
function for, public . . . schools in a city, . . . school district, or other political subdivision of a 
State.”
89 Typically, LEAs are school districts within a state, so an individual public school is 
usually not an LEA, but part of an LEA. Thus, in the usual situation, the school district —not an 
individual school—is directly responsible for ensuring access to a FAPE. A public charter school, 
however, may be part of an LEA or its own LEA.90 If a charter school is its own LEA, it is generally 
held to the same standards as all other LEAs,  i.e., school districts, “unless State law assigns that 
responsibility to some other entity.”91 
O.E. hangs his IDEA claim on this final point: he asserts that because Willow has 
established itself as its own LEA, and because Louisiana law does not assign the responsibility for 
providing a FAPE to some other entity, Willow “bears the sole responsibility for ensuring that its 
IDEA obligations are met” for students residing in Orleans Parish’s district.
92 Thus, according to 
O.E., LEAs like Willow must educate all handicapped children who live in the district, so O.E. is 
entitled to a FAPE from Willow. 93 Willow disagrees; according to Willow, it is enrollment—not 
residence—that triggers an LEA’s obligations under the IDEA. 94  
While the IDEA requires a state to provide a FAPE to children with disabilities “residing 
in the State,”95 it contains no similarly unambiguous provision dictating that a public charter school 
that is its own LEA  (“charter-school LEA”) must provide a FAPE to students “residing” within 
 
89 Id. § 1401(19)(A). 
90 34 C.F.R. § 300.209(a)–(b). 
91 See id. § 300.209(c); Charlene R. v. Solomon Charter Sch., 63 F. Supp. 3d 510, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.209(c)). 
92 R. Doc. 38 at 16–17. 
93 Id. at 20 (quoting Timothy W. v Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 966 (1st Cir. 1989)); see R. Doc. 1 ¶ 74. 
94 R. Doc. 30-1 at 24–30. 
95 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
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the district in which the charter-school LEA is located. When it comes to whom  an LEA must 
serve, the IDEA indicates that an LEA’s obligations extend to children “within its jurisdiction,” 
but the statute does not define that jurisdictional boundary. 96 Instead, the IDEA’s three -tiered 
accountability framework, which “is frequently described as a model of cooperative federalism,”97 
and which “leaves to the States the primary responsibility for developing and executing 
educational programs for handicapped children,” leaves to participating s tates the primary 
responsibility of determining how special-education responsibilities are allocated among state and 
local agencies.
98 Accordingly, states have the power to define the scope of an LEA’s jurisdiction,99 
and courts therefore look to state law to determine the boundaries of an LEA’s jurisdiction, which 
state law often defines as residence within a geographic boundary.100 Thus, to determine Willow’s 
 
96 Id. § 1413(a)(1) (“The local educational agency, in providing for the education of children with disabilities within 
its jurisdiction, has in effect policies . . . .”); see also Est. of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist. , 743 F.3d 982, 989 
(5th Cir. 2014) (“Specifically, IDEA requires each federally funded school district to: ‘(1) provide each disabled child 
within its jurisdictional boundaries with a “free appropriate public education” . . . .’” (quoting Cypress -Fairbanks 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F ., 118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997))). 
97 See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney , 183 F.3d 
816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
98 See Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Crisman, 306 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[N]o court has stated that the IDEA itself 
mandates that a state make determinations of school district liability based invariably on . . . residency.”) (finding that 
the IDEA does not dictate which district or agency within a state must assume financial liability for special education 
services and, instead, leaves the assignment and allocation of financial responsibility for special education costs of 
local school districts to each individual’s state legislature); Charlene R. v. Solomon Charter Sch., 63 F. Supp. 3d 510, 
521 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“In light of the structure of the statute, Manchester is read more naturally to mean that the State 
has broad authority to distribute responsibility among the LEAs within the state in discharging its responsibility to 
assure proper education. . . . The proposition that a SEA has the power to allocate responsibility among LEAs subject 
to its supervision is self -evident . . . .”); Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 669 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 
2012), certified question answered,  58 Cal. 4th 175, 314 P.3d 767 (2013) (“Each state is responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the IDEA and must specify which state or local educational agency (SEA or LEA) is responsible for 
providing special education services to certain students . . . . Thus, questions of which agency is responsible for 
providing a student with a FAPE are determined under state law.”). 
99 See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.209(c). 
100 See, e.g., Cumberland Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Freehold Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 293 F. 
App'x 900, 902–03 (3d Cir. 2008) (looking to state law governing the determination of domicile to resolve a dispute 
between two school districts over which district was responsible for providing a child with divorced parents residing 
in the different districts with a FAPE under the IDEA); Herbert v. St. James Par. Sch. Bd., No. CV 25-758, 2025 WL 
1685256, at *5 (E.D. La. June 16, 2025) (Ashe, J.) (“Thus, whether a local education authority is responsible for 
providing a FAPE to a given child, which would entitle that child to IDEA protections a s to that local education 
authority, is dependent upon the threshold determination of residency under the applicable state law.”); R.F . v. Delano 
Union Sch. Dist. , No. 116CV01796LJOJLT, 2017 WL 633919, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2017) (finding that, under 
state law, the school district responsible for the education of a child is the district in which the child’s parent or legal 
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“jurisdiction,” and hence to whom it owes  the IDEA obligation of providing a FAPE , the Court 
turns to Louisiana law.  
According to Louisiana’s Regulations for Implementation of the Children with 
Exceptionalities Act, “[e]ach LEA is responsible for making available a [FAPE] to each eligible 
student with a disability . . . who resides within its jurisdiction . . . .” 101 The Regulations then go 
on to define jurisdiction as “the right and obligation of an LEA to exercise authority over all 
students residing within its geographic area  . . . .”102 For “city/ parish school systems, the 
geographic area is the boundary of the school district as defined in [Louisiana law].”103 But “[f]or 
a charter school that is considered an LEA, the geographic area is the boundary of the educational 
facility.”104 Although an LEA’s jurisdiction is referred to as  “resid[ence] within [a] geographic 
area,” that language cannot be read literally as applied to charter -school LEAs , given that a 
charter-school LEA’s geographic area is limited to the educational facility itself .  J urisdiction, 
then, must turn on enrollment rather than physical residence  when it comes to charter -school 
LEAs.105 This conclusion comports with Louisiana’s regulations governing charter schools.  
According to the charter school regulations, a charter -school LEA “located in Orleans 
Parish” shall “provide all identification, evaluation, and special education . . . services to students 
enrolled at the school required by the . . . [IDEA] and other applicable federal and state laws and 
 
guardian resides, so “[d]etermining which LEA is a responsible for providing a FAPE to a given child, then, is 
primarily a determination of residence”). 
101 La. Admin. Code tit. 28, pt. XLIII, § 230(B).  
102 Id.  § 230(D). 
103 Id.  § 230(D)(1). 
104 Id. § 230(D)(2) (emphasis added). 
105 SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 2000- 1695 (La. 6/29/01), 808 So. 2d 294 (“[W]here a literal 
interpretation would produce absurd consequences, the letter must give way to the spirit of the law and the statute 
construed so as to produce a reasonable result.”). See Camacho v. Ford Motor Co., 993 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2021) 
(noting that when interpreting a state statute, the federal court uses the same methods of statutory interpretation used 
by the state’s highest court). 
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regulations for LEAs[.]” 106 Thus, for charter-school LEAs  that are located in Orleans Parish , 
enrollment—not residence—triggers IDEA obligations, including the obligation “for making 
available a [FAPE] to each eligible student with a disability.” But for parish school systems, like 
OPSB, it is residence within the school district’s geographic boundaries that  triggers FAPE 
obligations. Accordingly, a logical reading of  Louisiana’s regulations provides that OPSB is 
responsible for ensuring a FAPE to eligible students who reside within Orleans Parish but are not 
yet enrolled in a school or are enrolled in schools that are not their own LEAs. But Willow, or the 
applicable charter-school LEA, becomes responsible for ensuring a FAPE to eligible students once 
the students are enrolled in that school.  
Such a reading aligns with the purpose of the IDEA, which was enacted in part to “assure 
a single line of responsibility with regard to the education of handicapped children.”
107 If residency 
was to trigger a charter -school LEA’s FAPE obligation in Orleans Parish’s charter -dominant 
district, the statute would be flipped on its head. In a traditional school district, a residence-based 
obligation works because one LEA, the school district, serves children according to residence 
within the district, and thus only one LEA —the school district in which the child resides —is 
responsible for ensuring a child has access to a FAPE. But in a charter -dominant district, like 
Orleans Parish, a student residing in the district may attend any number of charter -school LEAs 
within the school-district LEA. Thus, if residence triggered IDEA responsibility in such a district, 
multiple LEAs could simultaneously owe a FAPE to the same child. This would create overlapping 
and indeterminate obligations, which would be untenable under the IDEA’s framework.  
 
106 La. Admin. Code tit. 28, pt. CXXXIX, § 2303(B)(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). 
107 St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd. v. State of La., 142 F.3d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Gadsby by Gadsby v. Grasmick, 
109 F.3d 940, 952 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
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For example, consistent with the IDEA’s multi-tiered accountability scheme, the SEA steps 
in to provide services directly to eligible children if the SEA determines that the LEA responsible 
has not met the IDEA’s requirements for providing a FAPE.108 If multiple entities simultaneously 
owe the obligation to provide a FAPE to a child, the SEA would have difficulty determining which 
LEA’s failure triggers state intervention. In Orleans Parish, for instance, the charter-school LEAs 
could point at each other or at OPSB as the entity responsible for providing a FAPE to a particular 
child to subvert responsibility under the IDEA, which is exactly what the IDEA seeks to prevent.109  
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a claim if a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. “[T]he only ‘relief’ the IDEA makes ‘available’ is relief for the denial 
of a FAPE.”110 Here, for all the reasons stated above, the Court has concluded Willow did not owe 
O.E. a FAPE under the IDEA. Accordingly, O.E  has failed to state a legally cognizable claim 
against Willow for violating his right to a FAPE under the IDEA, and this claim must be dismissed.  
 O.E. heavily relies on Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist.,111 a First Circuit case, and 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.,112 a United States Supreme Court decision, in support of his 
arguments. But his reliance on these cases is misplaced. Significantly, in both cases, it was 
undisputed that the defendant was the LEA responsible for providing a FAPE. Thus, the issues in 
those cases presupposed the answer to the question before this Court, which is whether the 
defendant–LEA has an obligation to the plaintiff–student in the first place. Those cases, then, are 
 
108 See 18 U.S.C. § 1413(g). 
109 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 (1988) (noting that Congress “sought ‘to assure that all handicapped children 
have available to them . . . a [FAPE] . . . .’” after congressional studies revealed that “one out of every eight of these 
children were . . . were neglectfully shepherded through the system until they were old enough to drop out”). 
110 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 169 (2017). 
111 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989). 
112 557 U.S. 230 (2009). 
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inapposite here. Accordingly, O.E.’s arguments fail, and O.E. does not have a claim for relief  
against Willow under the IDEA. 
C. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Claim 
The Court now turns to Willow’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss O.E.’s ADA claim using the 
same 12(b)(6) standard articulated above. Willow’s motion includes a series of factual assertions, 
as well as attachments like its operating agreement with OPSB. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss, “[t]he court’s review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the 
complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and 
referenced by the complaint.”
113 N ot only does O.E. object to the Court’s consideration of 
Willow’s factual assertions and attachments, 114 O.E.’s claims do not rely on the operating 
agreement, and Willow uses the agreement to advance a factual defense.115 Accordingly, this Court 
proceeds by addressing O.E.’s ADA claim based only the factual allegations in the complaint, 
which, at this stage, this Court must accept at true, and on the legal arguments in the briefing. 
“The ADA is a ‘broad mandate’ of ‘comprehensive character’ and ‘sweeping purpose’ 
intended ‘to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them into the 
economic and social mainstream of American life.’”
116 While the IDEA imposes “an affirmative 
obligation on states to assure disabled children a free appropriate public education,” the ADA 
broadly prohibit s discrimination against disabled  persons. 117 The ADA consists of five Titles, 
 
113 Id. 
114 See R. Doc. 38 at 1. 
115 Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding district court erred in considering report 
that defendant provided in motion to dismiss when, even though plaintiffs relied on attachment in their complaints, 
the attachment alone was not central to plaintiffs’ claims and was much more central to the defendant’s defenses). 
116 Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 
(2001)). 
117 D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Lartigue v. Northside 
Indep. Sch. Dist. , 100 F.4th 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2024) (describing the IDEA and ADA as “two distinct, but linked, 
statutes”). 
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covering various areas such as employment (Title I) and public accommodations (Title III). 118 
Relevant here is Title II, which covers state and local government services.119  
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”120 
Thus, “[t]o make out a claim under Title II,” a plaintiff must show “(1) that he is a qualified 
individual with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits 
of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or was other wise 
being discriminated against; and (3) that such discrimination is because of his disability.”
121 
Notably, “the language in the ADA generally tracks the language set forth in” § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act,122 and “the rights and remedies afforded plaintiffs under Title II of the ADA 
are almost entirely duplicative of those provided under § 504 . . . .”123 “The only material difference 
between the two provisions lies in their respective causation requirements.” 124 Therefore, 
“[j]urisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.”125  
O.E. alleges Willow violates the ADA in two respects. First, he alleges that Willow 
excludes students with intellectual disabilities through its use of the Iowa Assessment in its 
admissions process. Second, he alleges that Willow’s lower -school campus is not wheelchair 
accessible. Assuming without deciding that Willow is a public entity under Title II and that O.E. 
 
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17; Id. §§ 12181–89. 
119 Id. §§ 12131–34. 
120 Id.  § 12132. 
121 Luke v. Texas, 46 F.4th 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2022). 
122 Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002). 
123 Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). 
124 Id. Whereas § 504 provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall be excluded or denied benefits “solely 
by reason of his or her disability,” Title II does not require that discrimination be the sole reason for the exclusion or 
denial of benefits. Id. 
125 Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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is an individual with a disability, O.E.’s ADA claim fails because he cannot establish that he was 
excluded “by reason of his disability,” or alternatively, that he is “qualified” to attend Willow. 
i. The Iowa Assessment 
To satisfy the second and third elements of the prima facie test, a qualified individual with 
a disability must be excluded from or denied the benefit of a public program or discriminated 
against “by reason of his disability” in one of several ways.126 The public entity may do so based 
on, at least in part, the individual’s disability , triggering what has been referred to as conscious 
discrimination or disparate treatment.127 Alternatively, the public entity may have a facially neutral 
policy or practice that prevents individuals with disabilities  from “meaningfully accessing” the 
service or benefit.128 In this latter situation, “reasonable modifications” may have to be made  to 
ensure meaningful access.129 If the public entity knowingly fails to accommodate an individual’s 
request or need for a reasonable modification that would give him meaningful access, the failure-
to-accommodate theory is triggered.130 But if the denial of meaningful access is based on a “more 
‘systemic’ obstacle to access,” some courts recognize the denial as a disparate-impact claim.131  
But Title II is not limitless. “[A] public entity is not ‘required to undertake measures that 
would impose an undue financial or administrative burden . . . or effect a fundamental alteration 
 
126 See Carter as next of friend of Carter v. City of Shreveport, 144 F.4th 809, 813 (5th Cir. 2025). 
127 Id.; Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1033–34 (5th Cir. 2022). 
128 Luke v. Texas, 46 F.4th 301, 305–06 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Lack of meaningful access is itself the harm under Title II, 
regardless of whether any additional injury follows.”).  
129 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 –02 (1985); see also Smith v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th 
Cir. 2020) (“In addition to prohibiting discrimination, the ADA . . . ‘impose[s] upon public entities an affirmative 
obligation to make reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals.’” (quoting Bennett-Nelson, 431 F.3d at 454)). 
130 Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2021); Smith, 956 F.3d at 317–18; Block v. Texas 
Bd. of L. Examiners, 952 F.3d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 2020) (“A public entity’s failure to make a reasonable modification 
may satisfy the second and third prongs of the prima facie case.”). “Accommodation” and “modification” are used 
interchangeably in the case law. 
131 See Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, 80 F.4th 15, 31 (1st Cir. 2023); Payan , 11 F.4th at 738. But see 
Payan, 11 F.4th at 740–44 (Lee, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
do not allow plaintiffs to sue based on a disparate impact theory of discrimination, especially since the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), wherein the Supreme Court rejected a private cause 
of action for disparate impact under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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in the nature of the service.’” 132 Further, evidence of intentional discrimination is necessary to 
support a claim for monetary damages. 133 The standard for liability, while imprecise, “requires 
something more than deliberate indifference.”134  
O.E.’s complaint tells a story within a story.  The embedded narrative is O.E’s individual 
experience with Willow’s admissions process, namely, his attempt at overcoming the “barrier” 
that the Iowa Assessment poses to his eligibility. 135 Because of O.E.’s cognitive functioning, he 
allegedly will never be able to obtain the minimum score necessary for admission into Willow and, 
thus, waiver of the Iowa Assessment is the only accommodation that will provide him meaningful 
access.136 The broader narrative  is that this “barrier” was designed to exclude children with 
intellectual disabilities. According to O.E., Willow uses the Iowa  Assessment as a sort of IQ test 
to “screen out” intellectually disabled students, which enables Willow to receive a “windfall” in 
“per-pupil” funding from the State of Louisiana, and O.E. is just one victim of this practice. In any 
event, he alleges that Willow virtually has no students with intellectual disabilities  and attributes 
the disproportionate impact on such students to Willow’s use of the Iowa Assessment . Thus, the 
complaint speaks to the three theories of liability described above; though, Willow’s motion 
addresses only the conscious-discrimination and failure-to-accommodate theories.
137  
 
132 Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 232 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004)); 
Lane, 541 U.S. at 532 (Title II “requires only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature 
of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for service.”) . 
133 T.O. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 2 F.4th 407, 417 (5th Cir. 2021). 
134 J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 451 (5th Cir. 2023). 
135 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 74–82, 95–118, 143–48. 
136 Id. ¶¶ 80, 111. 
137 R. Doc. 30-1 at 16–22. But see Shaikh v. Texas A&M Univ. Coll. of Med., 739 F. App'x 215, 221 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(“On a motion to dismiss, a court ‘must examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief of any 
possible theory.” (omitting citations)). 
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a. Disparate Impact 
O.E.’s complaint primarily relies on the disparate -impact theory. The  Fifth Circuit, 
however, has not squarely recognized or h eld that disparate impact is a cognizable theory under 
Title II of the ADA  (or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) . Claims of conscious discrimination , or 
disparate treatment, and failure to make reasonable accommodations are established in the case 
law, but disparate-impact claims remain an unsettled area. While several circuits have recognized 
disparate-impact claims under Title II, 138 and the Fifth Circuit has alluded to such claims ,139 the 
Fifth Circuit has also declined to recognize disparate -impact private causes of action in a related 
statutory context, raising substantial questions as to whether such claims are cognizable under Title 
II in this circuit. Further, to recognize disparate-impact claims would contravene basic principles 
of statutory interpretation. 
The United States Supreme Court left open the question in 1985 in Alexander v. Choate 
when it “assume[d] without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an 
unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped.”140 Then, in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, 
the Supreme Court held that no private right of action exists to enforce regulations acknowledging 
disparate-impact discrimination promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
141 
 
138 See Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, 80 F.4th 15, 31 (1st Cir. 2023); Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty. , 3 
F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2021); A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty., MD, 515 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2008); Wisconsin 
Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir. 2006); Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 
F.4th 729, 738 (9th Cir. 2021); J.V . v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 813 F.3d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 2016).  But see Doe v. 
BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that § 504 does not prohibit 
disparate-impact discrimination).  
139 See T.O., 2 F.4th at 417 (stating that while “[e]vidence of intentional discrimination is necessary to support a claim 
for monetary damages, . .  . a plaintiff seeking only equitable relief may succeed on a disparate impact theory” in 
finding that, absent identifiable theory, complaint contained no allegations to meet “by reason of disability” element). 
140 469 U.S. 287, 299 (holding that, assuming § 504 or its implementing regulations reach some claims of disparate -
impact discrimination, the effect on the handicapped of a state’s reduction in annual inpatient hospital coverage under 
Medicaid is not among those claims). If disparate-impact claims are recognized under § 504’s more stringent causation 
standard, then it follows that such claims are recognized under Title II, whose only difference from § 504 is a less 
stringent causation standard.  
141 532 U.S. 275, 293. 
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This potentially has significant implications for Title II of the ADA—Title II’s statutory language 
is almost entirely duplicative of § 504, 142 which was modeled after  Title VI ,143 and Title II’s 
disparate-impact language is also found only in its regulations.  
Then, in the unreported decision Kamps v. Baylor University, the Fifth Circuit, relying on 
Sandoval, found that the Age Discrimination Act—whose language is similar to that of Title II —
does not prohibit policies that have a disparate impact. 144 The Kamps Court distinguished the 
language of the Age Discrimination Act from that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and that of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). W hereas Title VII’s  and the 
ADEA’s statutory language prohibit policies that have a disparate impact, the Age Discrimination 
Act’s statutory language does not. 145 Instead, the Age Discrimination Act’s  disparate-impact 
language is found only in its regulations.146 Noting that the Age Discrimination Act’s “prohibition 
is almost identical to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits only intentional 
discrimination,” the Fifth Circuit found that “if a statutory provision prohibits only intentional 
discrimination . . . regulations adopted to effectuate the provision may be enforceable through its 
private cause of action only to the extent that they, too, prohibit intentional discrimination.”147 
 
142 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or 
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”) with 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .”). 
143 United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. , 736 F.2d 1039, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984)  (“[Section] 505(a)(2) of the 
Rehabilitation Act points directly to Title VI as a model for Section 504 . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
144 592 F. App'x 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2014). 
145 Id. at 286. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. (quoting Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Frame v. 
City of Arlington , 657 F.3d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Moreover, to the extent Title II’s implementing regulations 
‘simply apply’ Title II’s substantive ban on disability discrimination and do not prohibit conduct that Title II permits, 
they too are enforceable through Tit le II’s private right of action.” (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 
(2001))). 
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Not only does Title II’s language nearly mirror that of the Age Discrimination Act’s,148 but 
examining Title II alongside Titles I and III yields results analogous to the Kamp Court’s 
comparison of the Age Discrimination Act with Title VII and the ADEA . Title I (employment) 
and Title III (public accommodations) both contain disparate -impact language, but Title II does 
not; instead, the disparate-impact language found in Titles I and III is found only in the regulations 
of Title II.149 And the principles of statutory interpretation instruct the Court to give weight to this 
omission: “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it 
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 150 Further, to find that Title II also creates a 
private cause of action for disparate impact would render the disparate -impact language in Titles 
I and III superfluous, and this Court is “reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage” in any 
setting.
151   
In short, where  the Fifth Circuit has not held that a private right of action for disparate -
impact liability  exists under Title II, Title II’s text indicates it does not, and Supreme Court 
precedent is indeterminate, this Court would be remiss to find that such a cause of action is 
 
148 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12132 with 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (“Pursuant to regulations prescribed under section 6103 of this 
title, and except as provided by section 6103(b) and 6103(c) of this title, no person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
149 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (“As used in subsection (a), the term “discriminate against a qualified individual 
on the basis of disability” includes . . . using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that 
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities . . . .” and 42 
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (“For purposes of subsection (a), discrimination includes . . . the imposition or application of 
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with 
disabilities . . . .”) with 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (“A public entity shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that 
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully 
and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity . . . .). 
150 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th 
Cir. 1972)).  
151 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995) ; United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 520 (1955) (“It is [a court’s] duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute . . . .’” (quoting Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell , 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)) ). See also Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (quoting Ramsdell, 107 U.S. at 152) (describing this rule as a “cardinal principle of 
statutory construction”).  
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cognizable under Title II. Accordingly, O.E.’s ADA claim under the disparate-impact theory is not 
cognizable. 
b.  Conscious Discrimination or Disparate Treatment 
O.E.’s ADA claim , however, does not end there because his complaint also contains 
allegations that implicate the disparate- treatment or conscious -discrimination and failure -to-
accommodate theories. Both are avenues to ADA liability in the Fifth Circuit.152  
 Starting with the disparate -treatment claim, O.E. implies that Willow is  using the Iowa 
Assessment as a pretext to exclude students with intellectual disabilities  so that it receives a 
“windfall” in government funding. In his opposition, O.E. makes clear that he is not alleging 
disparate treatment in his personal experience  through the admissions process . In other words , 
O.E. concedes that he was treated equally as  other students going through the admissions 
process.153 Because he abandons that argument, the Court will not analyze his ADA claim  under 
that set of facts. Instead, the Court considers O.E.’s allegations that the use of the Iowa Assessment 
in Willow’s admissions process is an illegal policy because it is being used to discriminate against 
or exclude students with disabilities. 
It is undisputed that O.E. was “excluded” from Willow because he did not obtain the 
necessary score on the Iowa Assessment to be eligible for admission into Willow. The key inquiry 
for purposes of his ADA claim is whether such exclusion is “by reason of his disability.” The “by 
reason of disability” element requires facts “making it ‘plausible that he was discriminated against 
“because of”’—but not necessarily solely because of —his disability.” 154 In other words , the 
 
152 Carter as next of friend of Carter v. City of Shreveport, 144 F.4th 809, 813 (5th Cir. 2025). 
153 R. Doc. 38 at 8. 
154 Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1033 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Olivarez v. T -Mobile 
USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 2021)). 
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“[d]isability-related animus ‘need not be the sole reason’ for the challenged decision.” 155 Thus, 
O.E. must show a causal connection between his exclusion from Willow and his intellectual 
disability, but he need only show that the disability “play[ed] a role ” in the exclusion and that it 
had “a determinative influence on the outcome.” 156 Specifically, O.E. “must include facts that 
allow the court to reasonably infer that his disability affected the decision.” 157 “After assuming 
those allegations to be true, [the court] must undertake a ‘sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial 
and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’”158  
Stripping away all legal conclusions, the complaint’s factual allegations  relevant to the 
ADA claim  can be boiled down to the following: (1) Willow is  a public charter school  in a 
charter-school district that educates students in grades kindergarten through twelfth and has elected 
to establish itself as its own LEA ;159 (2) Willow is receiving  “per pupil” funding from the 
government, some of which is dedicated to serving students with disabilities ;160 (3) Willow 
currently has no students with “profound cognitive disabilities requiring a special -education 
curriculum;”161 (4) Willow requires all students applying for admission to sit for an academic 
achievement assessment called the Iowa A ssessment;162 and (5) prospective students must attain 
a minimum score on this assessment or else be disqualified from continuing with the admissions 
process.
163 O.E. alleges that this creates a “windfall” in government funding for Willow, implying 
that Willow is intentionally or consciously excluding students with intellectual disabilities for 
 
155 Pickett, 37 F.4th at 1033 (quoting Soledad v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury , 304 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Ahrens v. Perot Sys. Corp., 205 F.3d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 2000))).  
156 Pickett, 37 F.4th at 1033 (quoting Soledad, 304 F.3d at 503–04). 
157 Pickett, 37 F.4th at 1033 (citing Olivarez, 997 F.3d at 601). 
158 Pickett, 37 F.4th at 1033 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
159 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 46. 
160 Id. ¶¶ 62–63. 
161 Id. ¶ 65. 
162 Id. ¶ 83. 
163 Id. ¶ 85. 
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financial gain.164 But this cleverly pled narrative requires the Court to make the sort of inferential 
leap that is prohibited by Twombly and Iqbal.  
Although it is possible that Willow may have adopted the Iowa  Assessment, at least in part, to 
exclude students with intellectual disabilities, without more, it is only “merely consistent with” 
liability and “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.”165 That is because, when 
drawing on experience and common sense, there are “more likely explanations” for Willow’s 
decision to use an achievement assessment in its admissions process. 166 Namely, accepting the 
windfall theory would require this Court to ignore the generally known fact  that there exist  
elementary and high schools with additional academic admission requirements, which is especially 
pertinent given that Louisiana law allows such schools. 167  Although the general legality of such 
schools or such admissions practices has been a topic of discussion, that issue is not the one 
presently before this Court.168 The issue here is a much narrower one: whether O.E. has plausibly 
alleged that the exclusion of students with intellectual disabilities played a role in Willow’s 
decision to use the Iowa Assessment in its admissions process. And he has not.  
That is because O.E. pleads no facts  suggesting students with an intellectual disability  
played a role in Willow’s decision to use the Iowa A ssessment in its admissions process. He 
includes allegations that attempt to paint Willow in a sinister light, but these allegations collapse 
 
164 Id. ¶ 63. 
165 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 
166 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64, 681–82. 
167 See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:3991(B)(3). See also C.O. v. Portland Pub. Schs., 679 F.3d 1162, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“In particular, Congress has explicitly contemplated that public school districts might create magnet and charter 
programs. . . . Hundreds of school districts have taken advantage of these procedures, many creating schools with 
competitive admissions policies more stringent than those here. And yet, we know of no case holding such institutions 
liable for violations of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.”). 
168 See, e.g., Suzanne E. Eckes & Jonathan A. Plucker, Charter Schools and Gifted Education: Legal Obligations , 34 
J.L. & Educ. 421 (2005); Janet R. Decker, J.D., Ph.D. (ABD), Suzanne E. Eckes, J.D., Ph.D., & Jonathan A. Plucker, 
Ph.D., Charter Schools Designed for Gifted and Talented Students: Legal and Policy Issues and Considerations, 259 
Ed. Law Rep. 1 (2010); Jay P. Heubert,  Schools Without Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the 
Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301 (1997). But see C.O., 679 F.3d at 1169–70. 
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under closer scrutiny. First, he alleges that , “prior to 2015,” Willow, when it was known as 
“Lusher,” was forced by the state attorney general  to disclose the name of its prior admissions 
assessment after it had initially refused to do so.169  While such alleged “secrecy” may be suspect, 
this isolated incident occurred ten plus years ago when Willow operated under a different name, 
involved a different assessment, and possibly occurred under different leadership. Thus, its 
relevance here is attenuated. Second, he alleges that “Willow has also used confusing and 
Kafkaesque procedures” that were allegedly “designed to weed out certain families,” such as 
“refusing to accept applications from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.”
170 Not only is much of this allegation 
conclusory, but it too concerns events that took place ten plus years ago. Further, it is unclear how 
these “confusing and Kafkaesque”  procedures target families who have  intellectually disabled 
children. Such remote allegations  do not support an inference  that students with intellectual 
disabilities played a role in Willow’s decision to use the Iowa A ssessment in its admissions 
process.171  
Also relevant, O.E., who admits that the Iowa Assessment is an achievement test,
Generally, an
172 alleges 
that “[t]he IOWA assessment is an examination that identifies a student’s ‘intelligence level’ or 
identifies a student as a ‘student with an exceptionality.’”173 But as a matter of ordinary meaning, 
an achievement test is distinct from a test that measures intelligence .  achievement 
test measures what someone has done, that is, what he or she has learned, while a test that assesses 
for intelligence measures what someone can do, that is, one’s potential or ability to learn. O.E. 
 
169 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 87–89.  
170 Id. ¶¶ 90–91. 
171 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). 
172 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 83 (“As noted, Willow requires all students applying for admissions (even kindergarteners) to s it for 
an achievement ‘assessment,’ called the IOWA assessment.”); see also R. Doc. 1 at 1 (“Instead, it accepts only those 
who obtain a certain score on a 3-hour ‘assessment,’ an achievement test called the ‘IOWA assessment.’”). 
173 Id. ¶ 134. 
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contends that this distinction is “legally irrelevant” because “[r]egardless of what label one attaches 
to the assessment, the outcome is the same: O.E. cannot achieve the minimum score because of 
his disability.”
178 But the distinction is relevant: an intelligence test is ordinarily designed to 
measure general cognitive ability, the defining characteristic of the disability at issue, while an 
achievement test is ordinarily designed to measure mastery of specific academic content typically 
acquired through academic instruction.
179 Although some level of cognitive ability is needed to 
“pass” an achievement test, the achievement test measures much more, namely a student’s mastery 
of academic content, which experience and common sense tell us is affected by a host of factors, 
like prior schooling, parental involvement, home life, personality traits, et cetera. If Willow were 
to use an intelligence test in its admissions process, then it would be  plausible to say it was 
excluding children based on intellectual disability because Willow would be assessing for the very 
defining feature of the disability. But by using an academic achievement test, Willow is assessing 
for mastery of academic content.  
Even though O.E. alleges that the Iowa A ssessment “identifies a student’s ‘intelligence 
level’ or identifies a student as a ‘student with an exceptionality ,’ he also alleges that the Iowa 
Assessment measures reading and math.
180 And in his opposition, he supports this allegation , 
explicitly stating that the Iowa A ssessment “is a multiple-choice exam that tests a child’s ability 
 
178 R. Doc. 38 at 15. 
179 Compare Hall v. Fla., 572 U.S. 701, 710– 14 (2014) (“In the context of a formal assessment, ‘[t]he existence of 
concurrent deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning has long been the defining characteristic of intellectual 
disability.’”) (defining intellectual disability according to three criteria, one of which is significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning, and explaining that intellectual functioning is usually measured with a standardized 
intelligence test) with  Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. , 665 F. Supp. 487, 495 (N.D. Miss. 
1987), aff'd, 854 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that “[s]tudents are required to take an achievement test once a year 
to determine how well they are learning the material taught in class”). See also Simpson v. Quarterman, 593 F. Supp. 
2d 922, 937 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that “grades and achievement test scores do not measure IQ”). 
180 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 117 (“O.E.’s scores on the IOWA assessment were as follows: 8 percentile in reading; 2 percentile in 
math.”). 
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in reading, math, and various other subjects, as compared to their peers.” 181 This is a textbook 
description of an academic achievement test, and besides O.E.’s blanket assertion that the test 
identifies a student’s intelligence or exceptionalities, there are no factual allegations that allow this 
Court to reasonably infer that the Iowa  Assessment measures intelligence. That is, there are no 
facts showing how or why that is so. Therefore, this Court cannot reasonably infer that Willow is 
measuring applicants’ intelligence or general cognitive ability.  In sum , O.E. has  not plausibly 
alleged that Willow’s use of the Iowa Assessment in its admissions process is connected to the 
disability in question in a manner that would support an inference of conscious discrimination and 
thus has failed to adequately plead a conscious-discrimination or disparate-treatment claim. 
c. Failure to Accommodate 
In addition to its prohibition on disability discrimination, Title II also imposes an 
“affirmative obligation” on public entities to make “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices” for disabled individuals,
182 “unless the entity can show that a modification would 
‘fundamentally alter the nature’ of the service or program it offers.”183 Accordingly, “[t]he failure-
to-accommodate theory augments the last element of the general ADA claim such that 
discrimination ‘by reason of his disability’ is established  ‘by showing that the disability and its 
consequential limitations were known by the covered entity, and the entity failed to make 
reasonable accommodations.’”
184 “But Title II ‘does not require States to compromise their 
essential eligibility criteria for public programs’ —‘[i]t requires only reasonable modifications,’ 
and ‘only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for service.’”185 
 
181 R. Doc. 38 at 3 (citing R. Doc. 1 ¶ 117). 
182 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). See also Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). 
183 Block v. Texas Bd. of L. Examiners, 952 F.3d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 2020). 
184 Carter as next of friend of Carter v. City of Shreveport, 144 F.4th 809, 814 (5th Cir. 2025). 
185 Block, 952 F.3d at 618 (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532 (2004)). 
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To succeed on a failure- to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show that in addition to 
being a qualified individual with a disability, that “the disability and its consequential limitations 
were known by the covered entity; and the entity failed to make r easonable accommodations.”186 
The “knowledge requirement is satisfied when either (1) the plaintiff ‘specifically identif[ies] the 
disability and resulting limitations’ and . . . request[s] an accommodation in ‘direct and specific’ 
terms,’ or (2) ‘the disability, resulting limitation[s], and necessar y reasonable accommodation’ 
were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.”
187 
The knowledge element is plainly satisfied by O.E.’s allegations. Willow had knowledge 
of O.E.’s disability and resulting limitations when O.E.’s father sent Willow O.E.’s IEP, along 
with “myriad medical documents” and a note from O.E.’s pediatrician.
188 Additionally, O.E. 
requested the sought-after accommodation in terms that could not be any more direct or specific 
by explicitly asking Willow to waive the assessment. 189 It is undisputed that O.E. received 
accommodations on the assessment, but in his opposition, O.E. makes clear that he is only 
concerned with waiver of the assessment itself.
190 Thus, whether O.E. states a plausible claim for 
relief under this theory boils down to whether waiver of the Iowa Assessment is reasonable.191  
“An accommodation is reasonable if ‘it does not impose undue financial or administrative 
burdens or fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.’” 192  Although the 
public-entity defendant may raise fundamental alteration or undue burden as a defense, the plaintiff 
 
186 Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1032 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Smith v. Harris Cnty. , 
956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020)). 
187 Carter as next of friend of Carter, 144 F.4th at 814. 
188 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 105–06. 
189 Id. ¶¶ 95–96. 
190 R. Doc. 38 at 13–14. 
191 Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents , 431 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he existence of a violation 
depends on whether under . . . the ADA, the demanded accommodation is in fact reasonable and therefore required.”). 
192 Smith v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 
724 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7))). 
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“bears the burden of showing that he requested the accommodation and that it was reasonable.”193 
Because O.E.’s requested accommodation is waiver of an eligibility criterion, however, O.E.’s 
failure-to-accommodate claim is inextricably linked with the question of whether O.E. is 
“qualified” to attend Willow.  
Title II applies only to “qualified individual[s] with a disability.” An individual with a 
disability is “qualified” if he “meets the essential eligibility requirements” “with or without 
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices[.]”194 Accordingly, “an individual does not 
need to satisfy non-essential program requirements to be ‘otherwise qualified.’”195 “A requirement 
is ‘essential’ if ‘the nature of the program would be fundamentally altered’ without it.”196 “Courts 
have therefore reasoned that essential eligibility requirements, unlike ‘rules, policies, [and] 
practices,’ . . . are not subject to reasonable modification or waiver.”
197 Thus,  whether waiver of 
the Iowa Assessment is a “reasonable modification” to Willow’s admissions policy speaks directly 
to whether O.E. is “qualified” to attend Willow. If obtaining the minimum score on the Iowa  
Assessment is an “essential” requirement, then waiver of the assessment is not “reasonable,” as 
waiver would result in a fundamental alteration of the program. Thus, the inquiry starts with 
whether waiver of the Iowa Assessment is an “essential” eligibility requirement. 
The Fifth Circuit explored what makes an eligibility requirement essential when analyzing 
a § 504 disability discrimination claim in Shaikh v. Texas A&M University College of Medicine.198 
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, t he Shaikh Court sought to determine whether a medical school 
student had satisfied a medical school program’s “essential” requirements , namely, whether 
 
193 Block v. Texas Bd. of L. Examiners, 952 F.3d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 2020). 
194 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added). 
195 Shaikh v. Texas A&M Univ. Coll. of Med., 739 F. App'x 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (omitting citations). 
196 Id. (citing Mary Jo C. v. New York State & Loc. Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
197 Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 156. 
198 739 F. App'x at 220–21. 
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passing a required exam by the end of a certain time period was an “essential requirement” or just 
“a requirement.” 199 In finding that passing the exam in a timely manner was not essential, t he 
Shaikh Court noted that “nothing on the face of his complaint establishes that doing so was an 
‘essential’ requirement of the program.”200  
Conversely, here, the facts alleged in the complaint tend to establish that the Iowa 
Assessment is an “essential” requirement of Willow’s program. O.E. alleges that “Willow requires 
all students applying for admission (even kindergarteners)” to sit for the Iowa A ssessment.201 He 
further alleges that prospective students must attain the minimum score or else be disqualified and 
that “a student’s score on the IOWA assessment makes up the largest share of the possible point 
total” for a student’s matrix score.
202 And “ [t]he higher [an applicant] scores, the higher [an 
applicant’s] chances of admission.”203 Thus, the very mechanism that Willow uses to determine 
eligibility prioritizes an applicant’s score on the Iowa Assessment more than any other eligibility 
requirement. The fact that this criterion constitutes the largest component of the eligibility matrix 
strongly suggests that it is central to the admissions determination , as opposed to a peripheral 
consideration. This in turn suggests the assessment criterion is fundamental to the nature of  
Willow’s program. Accordingly, it is speculative whether  O.E. is even “qualified” to attend 
Willow.
204 
Even assuming O.E. is a qualified individual, O.E. has failed to plausibly allege that waiver 
of the Iowa Assessment is reasonable. By its definition, the reasonableness determination requires 
an inquiry into the nature of Willow’s  program, but O.E. alleges no facts whatsoever regarding 
 
199 See id. 
200 Id. 
201 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 83. 
202 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 85, 92. 
203 Id.  ¶ 94. 
204 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.”). 
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Willow’s program. This is especially relevant where a purpose of charter schools in Louisiana is 
to support innovation, which necessarily permits such schools to pursue educational missions that 
differ from those of traditional public schools.  
Further, Louisiana law requires charter schools to have a mission, and, to that end, allows 
certain charter schools to use admissions requirements that “incorporate[] achievement of a certain 
academic record” if those admissions requirements are “related to the school’s mission, scope, or 
role.”
205 But the complaint is completely devoid of any facts regarding Willow’s mission, purpose, 
role, or scope; in fact, outside of his allegation that all of Willow’s students require only a general 
education curriculum, O.E.  provides no facts  whatsoever about the school’s curriculum, 
instruction, or program. Also, he provides no substitute to the Iowa Assessment criterion, such as 
consideration of O.E.’s past grades  in its place , and thus complete waiver would give O.E. a 
distinct advantage over his peers, who are required to take the assessment and obtain the requisite 
score.206 Thus, O.E. has established no facts allowing this Court to draw a reasonable inference 
that waiving the Iowa Assessment is a reasonable accommodation.    
In his opposition, O.E. argues that the assessment is not “necessary” because Willow’s  
“testing requirement is not a ‘necessary’ condition of educating students.”207 But this statement is 
completely devoid of law and context. At this level of generality, almost no condition is 
“necessary” to educate a student; taken to its logical conclusion, O.E.’s argument would eliminate 
all discretionary admissions criteria in public education, even at the postsecondary education level, 
on the theory that education can occur without them.  O.E. also contends that “[i]t would be absurd 
for Willow to argue that screening out students is ‘necessary’ when the school explicitly agreed to 
 
205 La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3991(B)(3). 
206 See Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 867  (7th Cir. 2005) (“Accommodations which require 
special dispensations and preferential treatment are not reasonable under the ADA . . . .”). 
207 R. Doc. 38 at 11. 
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educate students with intellectual disabilities under federal and state law.” 208 This argument, 
however, is circular because it assumes that Willow’s use of the Iowa Assessment violates the 
ADA.  
Finally, O.E. asserts that  “[w]hile Willow did make modifications to its usual ‘policies, 
practices, or procedures,’ . . . the issue here is more fundamental, as the ‘eligibility criteria’ itself 
‘screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out’ intellectually disabled students . . . .”209 “In other words,” 
he asserts, “no amount of accommodations or modifications —short of waiving the test 
altogether—could ever eliminate the discriminatory effect.” 210 Thus, according to O.E., “the 
‘modifications’ that Willow provided were not ‘reasonable.’”211 But O.E. is mistaken: the law is 
clear— reasonableness is not the same as effectiveness. That is, whether an accommodation is 
reasonable does not depend on how well it accommodates the handicapped individual; instead, it 
concerns the effect the requested accommodation has on the entity providing the 
accommodation.
212 Further, this argument is an  attempt to repackage the disparate-impact claim 
as a failure-to-accommodate claim.213 In making this argument, O.E. effectively seeks to invalidate 
the eligibility criterion because of its alleged screening -out effect. But a failure -to-accommodate 
claim presupposes that some reasonable modification will allow plaintiff meaningful access to the 
program. By conceding that no accommodation or modification w ill suffice, O.E.’s failure-to-
accommodate claim collapses into a challenge to the policy itself, i.e., a disparate-impact claim.   
 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 13 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)–(8)). 
210 Id. at 13. 
211 Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). 
212 See Smith v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that an accommodation is reasonable 
if it does not impose undue burdens on the public entity or fundamentally alter the nature of the entity’s program, 
service, or activity). 
213 See Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep't of Correction, 80 F.4th 15, 31 (1st Cir. 2023) (“[A] reasonable accommodation 
claim focuses on ‘an individualized request or need’ for a reasonable modification, while a disparate impact claim 
alleges a more ‘systemic’ obstacle to access.” (citing Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11 F.4th 729, 738 (9th 
Cir. 2021)).  
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In short, although a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not well suited to th[e]  type of 
evidence-intensive inquiry” implicated by a failure -to-accommodate claim, O.E. must still clear 
Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility hurdle.214 And for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that 
O.E. has not. 
ii. Wheelchair Accessibility of Willow’s Lower-School Campus 
O.E.’s wheelchair-accessibility claim must meet the same three-element test applicable to 
all Title II claims.215 If Willow’s program is not readily accessible to a qualified individual with a 
disability because its facilities are not wheelchair accessible, and thus that individual is excluded 
from Willow by reason of his disability, the individual will have stated a claim under the ADA for 
wheelchair accessibility.216  
Even assuming O.E. is qualified to attend Willow, he does not sufficiently plead that 
Willow’s facilities are wheelchair inaccessible and thus fails on the “by reason of disability” 
element. In his attempt to plead that Willow’s lower-school campus is wheelchair inaccessible, he 
plainly alleges, multiple times , that “Willow’s lower -school campus is not wheelchair 
accessible.”
217 But such an allegation is a legal  conclusion dressed up as a factual assertion  and 
not entitled to the assumption of  truth.218 O.E. does not point to facts showing how the lower-
school campus is inaccessible. 219 He further alleges that the inaccessibility of the lower -school 
campus is the reason he took the assessment at Willow’s middle-school campus, but again, there 
 
214 Shaikh v. Texas A&M Univ. Coll. of Med., 739 F. App'x 215, 221 n.6 (5th Cir. 2018). 
215 See Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 472 F. App'x 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2012). 
216 See id. 
217 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 116; see also R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 139, 141. 
218 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
219 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 
enhancement.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); see also S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Supreme Ct. of State 
of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)  (“[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” (quoting Fernandez -Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 
F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993))). 
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are no facts showing why O.E. could not physically take the assessment at the lower -school 
campus. Were the lower -school classrooms inaccessible by wheelchair because they were only 
reachable by stairs? Were the lower -school classrooms inaccessible because they were unable to 
fit a wheelchair ? These are possible reasons for having O.E. take the assessment at the middle -
school campus, but there are innumerable “obvious alternative explanations” having nothing to do 
with wheelchair accessibility, such as staffing and personnel issues, space constraints at the lower-
school due to contemporaneously occurring school functions, or construction or repairs being done 
at the lower -school campus.220 Therefore, where the motion- to-dismiss standard “asks for more 
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” the Court cannot find that O.E.’s 
wheelchair allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and thus he has failed to plead 
a Title II claim based on wheelchair inaccessibility of Willow’s lower-school campus. 
For the foregoing reasons, O.E.’s ADA claim cannot survive Rule 12(b)(6), and dismissal 
is warranted. But because the Court cannot conclude at this stage that —excluding the 
disparate-impact claim— amendment would be futile, the Court will permit O.E. an opportunity to 
file an amended complaint under Title II of the ADA. 
D. State Law Claims 
The Court possesses federal subject matter jurisdiction over the federal law claims under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and thus exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, including 
the claim brought pursuant to the LHRA,  under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But § 1367 also allows a 
district court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances when 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction may be imprudent.  
 
220 See Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1034 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Plausibility just requires 
that there is no ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the decision.”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682). 
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Where “all federal claims have been eliminated[,]” the “district court has ‘wide discretion’ 
in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over state law claims . . . .”221 Indeed, in the Fifth Circuit, 
the “general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are 
dismissed.”222 But that rule is “neither mandatory nor absolute,” and the district court must 
“analyze the statutory and common law factors that are relevant to the question of its jurisdiction 
over pendent state law claims.”
223 
The relevant statutory factors are those circumstances found in section 1367(c), including 
“(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; (2) whether the state claims 
substantially predominate over the federal claims; (3) whether  the federal claims have been 
dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons for 
declining jurisdiction.”
224 “The common law factors . . . include judicial economy, convenience, 
fairness, and comity.” 225 “These interests are to be considered on a case- by-case basis, and no 
single factor is dispositive.”226 
Here, the second and third statutory factors collapse into each other and heavily weigh in 
favor of dismissal, especially given the Fifth Circuit’s general rule articulated above.227  Because 
all federal claims have been dismissed (the third factor), the state law claims wholly predominate 
over the non- existent federal law claims (the second factor). The first factor also tips the scales 
 
221 Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Guzzino v. Felterman, 191 F.3d 588, 595 (5th 
Cir. 1999)). 
222 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 
F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
223 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160–61. 
224 Francis v. Louisiana, No. CV 21- 706, 2022 WL 1134935, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2022)  (V ance, J.) (quoting 
Enochs, 641 F.3d at 158–59 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c))). 
225 Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159. 
226 Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 587). 
227 See Smith v. Amedisys Inc. , 298 F.3d 434, 447 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Considering the second and third factors, our 
analysis above affirms the trial court’s dismissal of the only federal claims alleged. Thus, the state law claims now 
predominate over the nonexistent federal claims.”). 
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toward dismissal because this case potentially involves statutory interpretation questions regarding 
Louisiana’s charter school law.228 Therefore, the balance of the statutory factors weighs in favor 
of dismissal. 
The common law factors too support dismissal. First, judicial economy would not be served 
by retaining jurisdiction over the LHRA and negligence claims because this case is still in its early 
stages and has mainly involved only early- stage pleadings.229 Although a preliminary injunction 
hearing was held, that hearing concerned only the federal law claims. Second, dismissal will likely 
not cause undue inconvenience to the litigants because it is unlikely that much discovery has been 
completed at these early stages , and the applicable state court , along with the parties, evidence, 
and witnesses, are all located in New Orleans, Louisiana.
230 Third, and in that same vein,  the 
parties will likely not be unduly prejudiced by dismissal ; as just indicated, the parties probably 
will not have to repeat much of the effort and expense of the discovery process. 231 Further, O.E. 
will have the same amount of time to file his state suit as he had to file his federal suit because , 
under Louisiana law, the entire prescriptive period runs anew from the date of dismissal if a suit 
is involuntarily dismissed without prejudice.
232 Additionally, “allowing Louisiana courts to rule 
on Louisiana law encourages fairness between the parties ‘by procuring them a surer -footed 
reading of applicable law.’”233 Finally, comity considerations only further favor dismissal as “[t]he 
 
228 See R. Doc. 30-1 at 18–19. 
229 See Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 587–88. 
230 See Hicks v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. , 564 F. App'x 747, 749 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (comparing locations of 
federal and state courthouses when balancing common law factors). 
231 See Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588. 
232 Henry v. Sw. Airlines , 23 -522 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/24), 392 So. 3d 1176, 1182,  writ denied , 2024-1081 (La. 
11/20/24), 396 So. 3d 68 (citing Louisiana appellate court cases and a Louisiana Supreme Court case); see also Artis 
v. D.C., 583 U.S. 71, 88 (2018) (explaining that in some cases, the state -law tolling period “undoubtedly will” be 
longer than § 1367(d)’s 30-day grace period, like Louisiana, which “provides that after dismissal the limitations period 
‘run anews’” (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 3462, 3466 (West 2007))). 
233 Watt v. New Orleans City, 647 F. Supp. 3d 496, 507 (E.D. La. 2022),  aff'd, No. 23-30050, 2023 WL 6807033 (5th 
Cir. Oct. 16, 2023) (citing Fountain v. New Orleans City, No. CV 18-145, 2018 WL 3475375, at *2 (E.D. La. July 19, 
2018) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))). 
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federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and often are not as well equipped for 
determinations of state law as are state courts.” 234 Given that both the statutory and common law 
factors weigh in favor of dismissal, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
O.E.’s remaining state law claims. 
III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Having addressed the motion to dismiss , the Court  now turns to O.E.’s motion for 
preliminary injunction.235 “A court considering a motion to dismiss and a motion for preliminary 
injunction simultaneously will commonly deny the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot if 
it determines dismissal is appropriate.”
236 Given the nature of this case, namely its compressed 
timeline and the likelihood of an appeal, it is worth separately addressing the motion for 
preliminary injunction.
237 
In his motion, O.E. seeks to enjoin Willow from “using an ‘achievement’ test as a criteria 
in admissions.”238  In response, Willow incorporates, and relies largely on, its motion to dismiss 
and memorandum in support of the motion.239 At the preliminary injunction hearing, Willow also 
purported to make new arguments, including O.E.’s lack of standing under the ADA. The Court 
declines to consider these arguments, as they were raised for the first time at the hearing.  
A. Legal Standard 
“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . .”
240 As such “[t]he 
decision to grant a preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.”241 
 
234 Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 972 F.2d at 588–89 (internal citation omitted). 
235 R. Doc. 16. 
236 Orbit Sports LLC v. Taylor, 546 F. Supp. 3d 832, 850 (D. Minn. 2021). 
237 See id. 
238 Id. 
239 R. Doc. 27 at 3. 
240 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689 (2008). 
241 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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“It should only be granted if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion” on the 
following four prerequisites: 
(1) a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
merits, (2) a substantial threat that irreparable injury will result if the 
injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the 
threatened harm to the defendant, and (4) that granting the 
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.
242 
 
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the 
parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”243 “Given this limited purpose, and given the haste 
that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily 
granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a 
trial on the merits.”
244 Thus, “the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting 
a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.”245 
B. Factual Findings 
Based on the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, including witness 
testimony and admitted exhibits, the Court makes the following findings. These findings are made 
solely for purposes of the Court’s preliminary injunction analysis and do not constitute final 
findings of fact on the merits. 
i. NOLA-PS 
The additional facts presented at the preliminary injunction hearing provide fuller context 
of Willow’s role as a school within Orleans Parish. New Orleans Public Schools (“NOLA -PS”), 
which is described as a “community of schools,” is a unique public school system.
246 It is made 
 
242 Id. (citing Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
243 Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 R. Doc. 71 at 61:7–10; R. Doc. 67-11.  
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up almost entirely of public charter schools. In fact, out of NOLA-PS’s 60-plus schools, only one 
school is a “direct -run” school, meaning only one is  a traditional public school run directly by 
OPSB; the rest are charter schools.247  
In a traditional public school district, public charter schools that are their own LEAs are 
generally independent of the school district in which they may be located.248 That is, unless local 
or state law dictates otherwise, charter -school LEAs are generally  not answerable to the local 
school board or its policies and procedures. 249 In the typical school district, then, charter-school 
LEAs are their own islands, acting like miniature independent school districts. But because of the 
unique nature and make -up of NOLA -PS, charter schools in Orleans Parish have a different 
relationship with the local school board, OPSB. 250 OPSB, which is  an elected governing board, 
sets policies for all schools  in Orleans Parish —charter and direct -run alike — and the 
Superintendent of OPSB is responsible for overseeing administration of those policies. 251 While 
NOLA-PS public charter schools retain much autonomy in their day-to-day operations, much like 
public charter schools in typical school districts, OPSB’s policies govern three key areas: 
authorization and renewal of charters , student enrollment, and facilities. 252 This hybrid system  
allows NOLA-PS to operate as  a district of choice, meaning families are not confined to their 
neighborhood school. 253 Instead, they may apply to any school or schools within the district 
through the centralized application and enrollment process governed by OPSB, known as the 
NOLA-PS Common Application Process, or “NCAP.”254  
 
247 R. Doc. 71 at 62:1–4. 
248 Id. at 181:2–24. 
249 Id. at 181:18–21. 
250 Id. at 178:2–9. 
251 Id. at 45:3–22; R. Docs. 67-3, 67-11. 
252 R. Doc. 71 at 182:3–25. 
253 Id. at 178:12–25; id. at 179:1–20. 
254 Id. at 183:14–25. 
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To apply to Orleans Parish schools during the “main round” of admissions, a student  
completes a single online application through NOLA -PS’s website.255 On that application, the  
student can rank up to 12 schools based on their preferences.256 While most schools—charter and 
direct-run alike — are “open -enrollment” schools, meaning they have no admissions criteria 
beyond the NCAP, three groups of schools have additional admissions criteria.257  The first group 
includes schools, like Willow, that have academic eligibility criteria.258 The second group includes 
language-immersion schools that require applicants to “pass” a language-proficiency test to remain 
eligible.259 And the third group is a military and maritime academy that requires  applicants to 
attend an open house and learn about the school’s mission to remain eligible. 260 Thus, for those 
three groups of schools, applicants must complete an additional step to determine eligibility .261 It 
goes without saying that if an applicant does not meet the requisite eligibility criteria, the student 
is no longer eligible to attend the respective school. Once an applicant’s eligibility is determined, 
the school reports the applicant’s eligibility status to OPSB .262 OPSB then runs an algorithm -
driven, lottery -type process where each applicant is assigned a random number. The process  
“matches” each student to a school using his or her number after considering the student’s ranked 
schools, priorities, and eligibilities, along with the number of available seats in the applicable grade 
level at each ranked school. 263 Students then have the option to directly enroll in a school  during 
 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 184:1–2. 
258 Id. at 184:2–5. 
259 Id. at 184:6–10. 
260 Id. at 184:11–15. 
261 Id. at 184:16–18. 
262 Id. at 184:18–21. 
263 Id. at 184:23–25; id. at 185:1–9. 
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the “open enrollment” period that follows the main round’s matching process, provided there are 
available seats and they meet the school’s eligibility criteria, if any.264  
Every school authorized or directly run by OPSB must participate in the centralized 
enrollment process, even those schools with additional admissions criteria.265 This system, which 
has been in effect since 2011, prevents families from receiving multiple offers and enables NOLA-
PS schools to track and predict  enrollment. 266 Overall, NOLA- PS’s hybrid school system has 
proven successful for New Orleans’s public school system, as schools and students are performing 
better than they were before Hurricane Katrina.267 
ii. Willow and Its Admissions Process 
As previously noted, three groups of schools within NOLA-PS impose additional eligibility 
criteria that applicants must satisfy before they may be matched to those schools. These schools 
offer specialized programs  and function as “magnet” schools .
268  According to Willow’s CEO, 
OPSB maintains a variety of magnet -style schools to ensure all the needs of Orleans Parish 
students are being met.269  
Willow is part of a group of four schools with additional academic eligibility criteria.270 
These schools are referred to as “high academic” schools, whose curricula meets the needs of 
students “who require a challenge.”
271 Willow’s mission, specifically,  is to provide “a 
developmentally appropriate learning environment in which high academics” and “comprehensive 
arts education . . . enable each child to achieve as a learner, a person, and a valuable member of 
 
264 Id. at 178:18–21. 
265 Id. at 186:15–19. 
266 Id. at 186:1–15. 
267 Id. at 179:20–24; 180:3–11. 
268 Id. at 46:10–19. 
269 Id. at 62:23-25; id. at 63:1–4. 
270 Id. at 198:2–4. 
271 Id. at 62:21–25; id. at 62:1 
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our society.” 272 To ensure Willow is serving its high- academics and arts -focused mission, it 
provides a rigorous academic environment that focuses on the arts.273 To ensure that students are 
ready for Willow’s “rigorous experience” and arts program, Willow uses a “matrix” score in its 
application process that is composed of a reading score, a math score, a grade point average 
(“GPA”) calculated from a previous report card, and an arts -interest profile.
274 Students earn 
“points” for each component of the matrix; some points are awarded based merely on completion, 
while some points are awarded based on performance. 275 For instance, if a student completes the 
arts-interest profile, he or she automatically receives three points upon submission of the 
application, but a student must obtain a minimum reading and math score or have a minimum GPA 
to obtain the requisite number of points necessary for eligibility.
276  
The reading and math score are obtained using an academic achievement assessment 
known as the Iowa Assessment. 277 The Iowa  Assessment, which was previously given as the 
end-of-year state assessment in Louisiana to measure a student’s academic growth, is a “norm -
referenced” standardized assessment, meaning it is used to measure a student’s academic 
improvement relative to peers in his grade level nationwide.278 Thus, where a GPA based on prior 
grades from a previous school is a subjective measure of a student’s performance in that particular 
academic environment, the Iowa Assessment is an objective measure that provides “real-time, non-
biased information about a student’s standing in the curriculum at the time of the test.” 279 
Significantly, the Iowa Assessment is not regarded as an IQ test, and Willow currently has students 
 
272 R. Doc. 67-3 at 49. 
273 R. Doc. 71 at 187:1–2; id. at 19–24. 
274 Id. at 187:1–19.  
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 187:14–19; 193:19–24. 
277 Id. at 193:19–24. 
278 Id. at 188:6–14; 112:13–7; 122:16–19. 
279 Id. at 125:17–25; 126:1–6. 
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who have tested in the borderline intellectual functioning range and are scoring “high” on their 
classroom assessments or on the annual state assessment. 280 Also, Willow’s matrix process does 
not inquire about intellectual disabilities, and Willow’s Admissions Director testified that there is 
no way of knowing how many applicants have an intellectual disability. 281 Further, Willow 
provides appropriate testing accommodations to those students who need them, but Willow has 
never waived the Iowa Assessment for any student. 282 Each applicant must meet each eligibility 
requirement and obtain the requisite amount of matrix points  to be eligible for admission into 
Willow.283 
Thus, coupled with OPSB’s centralized enrollment system, a student may fail to be enrolled 
at Willow for a number of reasons, such as failing to complete Willow’s application process, 
NOLA-PS’s matching algorithm, or failing to obtain the requisite score on the Iowa Assessment. 
In any event, Willow has no way of knowing how many students with intellectual disabilities apply 
to but do not enroll in Willow and why.
284  
In 2022-2023, less than five percent of Willow’s students ha d intellectual disabilities.285 
But other NOLA -PS charter schools also ha d extremely low percentages of students with 
intellectual disabilities, and notably, these schools are open -enrollment schools and thus do not 
have additional admissions criteria. For example, in 2022-2023, less than five percent of the 
students at Bricolage Academy had intellectual disabilities , and only six percent of students at 
Hynes Charter School had intellectual disabilities.286  
 
280 Id. at 126:11–20; 127:14–19. 
281 Id. at 190:25; id. at 191:1–25. 
282 Id. at 197:7–9; id. at 198:16–25. 
283 Id. at 199:1–17. 
284 Id. at 190:1–25; id. at 191:1–25. 
285 R. Doc. 67-5 at 8; R. Doc. 71 at 106:16–25; R. Doc. 71 at 107:4–25. 
286 R. Doc. 67-5 at 8. 
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iii. O.E. and His Experience with Willow’s Admissions Process 
O.E. is a nine-year-old boy who is physically and intellectually disabled.287 He is nonverbal 
and uses an augmentative alternative communication (“AAC”) device to communicate. Because 
of his intellectual disability, he has the cognitive functioning of a one - or two-year-old. While he 
can express basic wants and needs using his AAC device, he cannot recite the alphabet or answer 
questions such as two plus two.
288   
In mid -November 2025, O.E.’s father, C.E., reached out to Maggie Schodell, the 
Admissions Director at Willow.289 C.E. provided a copy of O.E.’s most recent IEP and evaluation, 
dated from 2020 and obtained when O.E. was four years old. C.E. informed Schodell that because 
of the profoundness of O.E.’s disabilities, O.E. would never be able to “pass” the Iowa 
Assessment.
290 Therefore, C.E. requested a waiver of the assessment. 291 Schodell and C.E. 
exchanged email communications back and forth, as Schodell worked to get C.E. a response to his 
request for a waiver.
292 Meanwhile, O.E. and his parents completed the main round application for 
NOLA-PS, completed Willow’s Supplemental Admissions Form, and scheduled O.E. to take the 
Iowa Assessment in mid -January.293 A month after C.E.’s initial email, Schodell responded that 
Willow would not waive the assessment because Willow is “legally permitted” to have academic 
eligibility criteria in its admissions process. She also expressed that it was important to Willow 
that its admissions process remain fair and non -discriminatory and that to accommodate students 
with disabilities during the admissions assessment, the school is required to provide rea sonable 
accommodations, “in lieu of an automatic waiver.” Schodell also requested a “more recent 
 
287 R. Doc. 71 at 15:24; id. at 21:20–23. 
288 Id. at 16:5–19; id. at 17:1–2, 16–19. 
289 R. Doc. 67-6 at 7. 
290 Id. at 5–6. 
291 Id. at 7–8. 
292 Id. at 6–7. 
293 Id. at 6. 
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document” that shared more information about the appropriate testing accommodations for O.E. 
because Willow’s policy requires that an applicant’s IEP must be current and dated within the last 
three years.294 
C.E. responded with a lengthy email requesting Schodell’s availability for a meeting and 
reiterating that no matter the accommodations provided that O.E. would never be able to obtain 
the required minimum score on the Iowa  Assessment. He also argued that IEPs “do not expire” 
and “always remain in effect,” despite the fact that “school districts are suppo sed to update them 
at least every three years,” and offered to provide a letter from O.E.’s doctor(s) and therapist(s) 
explaining that O.E. cannot pass the Iowa Assessment. C.E. ended the email by explaining that 
“[i]f Willow is taking a hard line on this (i.e. refusing to even consider providing a waiver of the 
assessment), then Willow is violating [federal] law . . . .”
295 With no response from Schodell, C.E. 
emailed again asking whether Willow would meet with C.E. and whether Willow would waive the 
Iowa Assessnent. Schodell eventually confirmed Willow’s refusal to waive the Iowa Assessment 
but reaffirmed “Willow’s commitment to providing reasonable accommodations for students with 
documented disabilities, ensuring they have equal access and opportunity during entrance exams.” 
Schodell also expressed that she was open to exploring accommodations that C.E. believed would 
best support O.E. and welcomed any relevant documentation to that effect, as “it is not standard 
practice during the admissions process to meet individually with families.”
296  The email exchange 
ended with C.E. stating that he would provide the relevant documentation but “guarantee[ing]” 
 
294 Id. at 5–6. 
295 Id. at 5. 
296 Id. at 3–4. 
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that Willow will “face a lawsuit” “if Willow is unwilling to waive the assessment.” 297 At some 
point, C.E. emailed Willow eight medical documents regarding O.E.298 
O.E. ended up taking the Iowa Assessment over a span of two days in February 2025 at 
Willow’s middle school campus.299 Willow provided various accommodations to O.E.’s taking 
the assessment including a human reader to read the entire assessment aloud, alternative response 
format, answers recorded, breaks as needed, extended and flexible testing time over the course of 
multiple days, wheelchair -accessible testing environment with appropriate seating and physical 
accommodations, a quiet room with minimal distractions, and comfort objects.
300 O.E. was 
permitted to use his AAC device to communicate throughout the assessment days, but he did not 
use the device as an accommodation because it was not used for the assessment responses.
301  
O.E. scored in the eighth and second percentiles on the Iowa Assessment .302 Because he 
did not obtain the requisite minimum score on the Iowa Assessment, he was not eligible to attend 
Willow for the 2025-2026 school year. Instead, O.E. is currently attending NOLA-PS’s one direct-
run school and is “thriving” there; though, his mother expressed that “there’s been a lot of 
speculation about whether the school will be in existence after this year,” which puts O.E.’s family 
in “limbo” regarding O.E.’s future schooling.
303 
 
297 Id. at 2–3. 
298 Id. at 12. 
299 R. Doc. 71 at 201:4–6. 
300 R. Doc. 67-9; R. Doc. 71 at 201:18–23. 
301 R. Doc. 67-9 at 1. 
302 R. Doc. 71 at 138:12–17. 
303 Id. at 22:1–17. 
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C. Law and Analysis 
i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
“To satisfy the first element of likelihood of success on the merits, the [plaintiff’s] evidence 
in the preliminary injunction proceeding ‘is not required to prove [his] entitlement to summary 
judgment.”304 In other words, a “plaintiff must present a prima facie case but need not show a 
certainty of winning.” 305 But “[n]o matter how severe and irreparable an injury one seeking a 
preliminary injunction may suffer in its absence, the injunction should never issue if there is no 
chance that the movant can show some likelihood of ultimate success.”
306 Thus, “‘the absence of 
likelihood of success on the merits is sufficient to make a district court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction improvident as a matter of law[.]’”
307 To assess the likelihood of success on the merits, 
the court looks to standards provided by the substantive law. 
a. ADA Claim 
Applying the ADA’s three-prong prima facie test articulated above,  O.E.’s ADA claim is 
likely to fail for a multitude of reasons. First and foremost, for the reasons stated above, O.E. has 
failed to state a claim for relief under Title II of the ADA. Second , even assuming O.E. has 
plausibly alleged a Title II ADA claim, O.E. still fails the likelihood- of-success element. O.E. 
primarily relies on his disparate-impact claim to enjoin Willow from using the Iowa  Assessment. 
For the reasons previously articulated, this Court declines to find that a disparate -impact claim is 
cognizable under Title II of the ADA. But even if this Court were to find a disparate-impact claim 
cognizable, O.E.’s statistical evidence does not demonstrate a causal relationship between 
 
304 Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
305 § 2948.3 Grounds for Granting or Denying a Preliminary Injunction—Likelihood of Success on the Merits, 11A 
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2948.3 (3d ed.). 
306 State of Tex. v. Seatrain Int'l, S. A., 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975). 
307 Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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Willow’s use of the Iowa Assessment and Willow’s low enrollment of students with intellectual 
disabilities. To prove a disparate -impact claim, a plaintiff must show that the challenged policy 
causes the disparity at issue. 308 Statistics introduced at the h earing undermine that contention. 
While Willow enrolls fewer than five percent of students with intellectual disabilities, two other 
NOLA-PS charter schools that do not use additional admissions criteria report nearly the same 
percentages. This similarity weakens any argument that the Iowa Assessment is responsible for 
the disparity.309  
Third, O.E. introduced no evidence upholding the conscious -discrimination theory. T he 
evidence introduced established that the Iowa Assessment is not an IQ test, and the fact that Willow 
has students with borderline intellectual functioning only underscores this fact. Additionally, the 
evidence introduced shows that Willow has legitimate , non-discriminatory reasons for using the 
Iowa Assessment; unlike GPA, which is a subjective measure of an applicant’s academic 
performance, the Iowa Assessment provides the school with an objective measure  of whether an 
applicant is ready for Willow’s rigorous academic environment. And this measure appears to be a 
valid measure b ecause Willow currently has students in the borderline intellectual functioning 
range who are performing well on school assessments. 
Finally, as noted above, “a public entity is not ‘required to undertake measures that would 
impose an undue financial or administrative burden, . . . or effect a fundamental alteration in the 
nature of the service.’”
310 At the hearing, Willow introduced evidence establishing that enjoining 
 
308 See Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. , 576 U.S. 519, 542 (2015) (“[A] 
disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy 
or policies causing that disparity.”). 
309 See id.; Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that evidence presented 
at trial could not establish a case of employment discrimination based on the disparate impact model where statistics 
presented showed that, on the whole, blacks were overrepresented in the lower levels of defendant–company’s 
workforce but that the overrepresentation might have resulted from any number of causes).  
310 Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 232 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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use of the Iowa Assessment in its admissions practices would likely fundamentally alter the nature 
of its program. Willow made clear that the school’s mission and purpose is to serve students who 
“require a challenge” by providing them with “high academics” curriculum and instruction. Not 
only does an academic achievement test provide an objective predictor of performance in Willow’s 
program, but Willow already takes several other measures into consideration , such as GPA and 
parental input. Therefore, it is hard to imagine what other criterion Willow could substitute in place 
of an assessment , and O.E. proposed no other measures that could replace an assessment’s  
objective, consistent function in Willow’s application process. 
Additionally, the evidence introduced suggests that Willow and the other groups of schools 
that have additional admissions criteria play an important role in NOLA -PS’s hybrid district, a 
district that has  improved and experienced success  since Hurricane Katrina. For those reasons, 
O.E. has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his ADA claim.  
b. IDEA Claim 
For the reasons explained above, the law does not provide relief to O.E. under the IDEA  
because he was not enrolled in Willow. Therefore, it is unlikely that O.E.  will succeed on the 
merits of his IDEA claim. 
ii. Other Factors 
“If the party requesting a preliminary injunction cannot show a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits, the injunction should be denied and there is no need for the court to address 
the other requirements for a preliminary injunction.”
311 Because O.E.’s ADA and IDEA claims 
 
311 Butts v. Aultman, 953 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 328 
F.3d 192, 203 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s dismissal of claims when plaintiffs lacked standing and claims 
were not supported by law and then affirming district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining 
order and preliminary injunction based on grounds for dismissals under likelihood- of-success-on-the-merits prong, 
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fail on the merits, he has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success. Therefore, he is not 
entitled to preliminary relief. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly,  
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff s’ claim under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (R. Doc. 30) is GRANTED and that Plaintiffs’ IDEA 
claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1), (R. Doc. 30) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act  (R. Doc. 30)  is GRANTED and that Plaintiffs’ 
ADA claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs have twenty-one (21) days to 
file an amended complaint if they  believe that they can allege, in good faith , sufficient facts to 
state a plausible claim under Title II of the ADA. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff s’ state law claims are DISMISSED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), Plaintiff s shall have the applicable 
time period under Louisiana law to file their remaining claims in state court, if they so choose, or 
twenty-one (21) days to refile the claims in this Court as part of the Amended Complaint. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under 
the Louisiana Human Rights Act for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), (R. Doc. 30) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
 
stating that there is no need for court to address other requirements for preliminary injunction when merits prong not 
met). 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to join a 
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(7), (R. Doc. 30) is DENIED AS MOOT.  
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (R. Doc. 
16) is DENIED.  
In light of the foregoing,  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to renew 
his partial summary judgment (R. Doc. 32) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
 New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of March 2026. 
 
__________________________________________ 
DARREL JAMES PAPILLION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
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