govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cv-02128-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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INITIAL REVIEW 
ORDER 
 
3:25-cv-2128 (MPS) 
DAVID YARIEL RODRIGUEZ, 
 
Plaintiff, 
    
-against- 
 
JANE DOE ASA, JANE DOE ASA, and STATE’S 
ATTORNEY WATSON, 
 
Defendants. 
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Self-represented Plaintiff David Yariel Rodriguez is an unsentenced inmate currently 
housed at New Haven Correctional Center (“NHCC”).1 He filed a complaint pro se and in forma 
pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert claims for constitutional violations  against t wo 
Connecticut Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) Jane Does and State’s Attorney Watson. ECF No. 
1.2 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts review complaints brought 
by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 
entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, the Court must dismiss the  complaint, or any portion 
 
1 The Connecticut DOC website reflects that Plaintiff  is an unsentenced inmate charged with stealing a firearm and 
was last admitted to the Connecticut Department of Correction (DOC) on October 22, 2025 . See 
http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=367632 . See Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164 
(2d Cir. 2012) (Court may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.”).  
 
 
2 Plaintiff does not specify whether he sues the defendants in their official or individual capacities, but he requests 
both damages and official capacity relief. ECF No. 1 at 15. Plaintiff cannot seek monetary damages against the 
defendants (all state employees) in their official capacities because such claims are barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. See e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Nor may he proceed against the defendants for 
any injunctive or declaratory relief against any defendants in their official capacities. A plaintiff may only proceed for 
injunctive or declaratory relief against a defendant in his or her official capacity to the extent he alleges an ongoing 
constitutional violation. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart , 563 U.S. 247, 254 –55 (2011) (citing Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations only describe conduct by the defendants in the past, and no 
allegations indicate any ongoing violations of his federal or constitutional rights.  
 
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of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). The Court has thoroughly reviewed all  factual allegations in the 
complaint and conducted an initial review of the allegations therein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
While the Court does not set forth all of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint, it 
summarizes his basic factual allegations here to give context to its rulings below. 
On October 9, 2023, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with possession of “burglary tools,” 
interference with an officer, risk of injury to a child, and two counts of larceny. Compl. at 4.  
On the next day, Plaintiff was brought to his arraignment where a Norwich ASA Doe stated 
that he was involved with the stealing of two dirt bikes, led the police on a car chase, risked the 
safety of a child, and was found in possession of burglary tools. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the 
Norwich ASA’s statement was false and did not reflect the statements in the Connecticut State 
Police Report. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff maintains that the Norwich ASA fabricated information “to 
prove probable cause.” Id. at 5. 
After he was given a court date later that month, Plaintiff made bail. Id.  
At his court date, the ASA represented to the court that the State Police had collected 
evidence from the crime scene, namely a cell phone and a pair of gloves. Id. Video cameras from 
the crime scene showed a person —who was stealing the two dirt bike s—drop a cell phone and 
gloves. Id.  
Plaintiff knew the gloves and cell phone would prove his innocence and begged the State 
to conduct forensic analysis on the evidence. Id. The State refused to do so. Id.  
Plaintiff advised that he had photographs, videos, and witness statements to prove that he 
did not commit the crimes described by the Norwich ASA. Id. at 6. After collecting evidence from 
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the crime scene, the State Police held the evidence for about three days and then returned the 
evidence to the victim of the theft, even though the cell phone and gloves belonged to the suspect. 
Id. at 6-7. The victim of the theft emailed the Norwich ASA to inquire if the ASA was going to 
recollect the gloves and cell phone that the victim received. Id. at 7. The ASA declined to do so. 
Id.  
Plaintiff believes that the State conducted a DNA test on the gloves and cell phone and sent 
the evidence to the victim after a determination that Plaint iff was not the proper suspect. Id. at 7. 
He maintains that he was denied the opportunity to prove his innocen ce because the ASA was 
keeping quiet about the State’s return of the evidence to the victim. See id. at 6-7.  
Despite her alleged awareness that the evidence was returned to the victim and 
contaminated, the Norwich ASA Doe continued to represent that the gloves and cell phone 
belonged to Plaintiff. Id. at 7. He alleges that she intentionally withheld this exculpatory evidence 
and fabricated inculpatory evidence when she made her statements to the superior court about his 
criminal conduct at his arraignment. Id. at 8.  
In July 2024, Plaintiff’s criminal case was moved to state superior court in New Britain. 
Id. at 5, 8. In New Britain, Supervising State’s Attorney Watson reviewed Plaintiff’s case 
concerning his charges from October 9, 2023 , and determined that the gloves, cell phone , and 
video footage had been lost. Id. at 9.  
Although Plaintiff attempted to show his innocence based on his cell phone location, ASA 
Doe represented to the superior court in New Britain that the cell phone and gloves found at the 
crime scene were believed to belong to Plaintiff. Id. at 9.  
In October 2024, the State’s Attorney in New Britain offered Plaintiff a plea agreement if 
he pleaded guilty to larceny in the second degree and violation of his probation. Id. at 10. Plaintiff 
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refused to enter into the plea agreement because he knew the evidence —the gloves and cell 
phone— would prove him to be not guilty. Id. He offered videos and photographs and witness 
statements that showed he was at his friend’s party —and not at the crime scene —at the time of 
the crime. Id.  
After he was permitted to represent himself, Plaintiff filed a motion for a bill of particulars, 
a motion to run DNA on all collected exculpatory evidence, and a request to show GPS location 
of the cellular phone. Id. at 12.  
On May 27, 2025, after twenty months of prosecution, the State’s Attorney stated on the 
record:  
The state hereby dismisses all charges against the defendant. It seems after review of the 
case evidence has gone missing and we no longer believe we have enough to prosecute. 
We believe he might not be the suspect of the crime. 
 
Id. 
II. DISCUSSION 
“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under 
color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 
(1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). A plaintiff must show a violation of a federally protected 
constitutional or statutory right which was the result of state action, or action “under color of 
law.” See Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994).  
Plaintiff seeks to hold the defendants liable for malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
Amendment, see Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 562 (2024) (noting 
“constitutional violation alleged in [malicious prosecution] suit is a type of unreasonable seizure” 
under the Fourth Amendment); violation of his right to call witnesses under the Sixth 
Amendment; and violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
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Compl. at 6, 8. He primarily complains that the defendants withheld exculpatory evidence and 
fabricated inculpatory evidence. See Compl., generally.  
Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the defendants arise from their conduct in 
prosecuting his criminal case for the State and are barred by prosecutorial immunity.  
“The doctrine of absolute immunity applies broadly to shield a prosecutor from liability 
for money damages (but not injunctive relief) in a § 1983 lawsuit, even when the result may be 
that a wronged plaintiff is left without an immediate remedy.” Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 863 
(2d Cir. 2022). It provides immunity from suit for “virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, 
associated with [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate.” Id. at 864 (quoting Hill v. City of 
New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)). A prosecutorial supervisor is entitled to absolute 
immunity for failure to provide supervision and training “directly connected with the conduct of 
a trial.” See Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344-46 (2009). 
Absolute immunity protects even “reprehensible” prosecutorial misconduct committed in 
the course of performing the advocacy function. Anilao, 27 F.4th at 867 (collecting cases). 
Absolute immunity applies where a prosecutor “‘conspir[es] to present false evidence at a 
criminal trial.’” Id. at 864 (quoting Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2014)). “‘The fact that such a 
conspiracy is certainly not something that is properly within the role of a prosecutor is 
immaterial, because the immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he 
performed it.’” Id. (quoting Dory, 25 F.3d at 83). 
In assessing whether a defendant is covered by absolute immunity for acts taken while 
serving as a prosecutor, the court “take[s] a ‘functional approach,’ examining ‘the nature of the 
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Simon v. City of New York, 
727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); see also Flagler v. 
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Trainor, 663 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]mmunity is not a function of the prosecutor's title. 
Rather, it attaches to prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or 
presenting the State's case.”).  
Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends only to a prosecutor’s acts “in preparing for the 
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an 
advocate for the State….” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Malik v. City of New York, 841 F. App'x 
281, 284 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order). But absolute immunity does not extend to 
“administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's 
preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.” Warney v. Monroe 
Cnty., 587 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273).  
“The Supreme Court has identified evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as 
falling on the absolute immunity side of the line, leaving ‘searching for the clues and 
corroboration’ that might lead to a recommendation for an arrest on the qualified immunity 
side.” Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273) (other citation omitted). Thus, 
“investigative acts reasonably related to decisions whether or not to begin or to carry on a 
particular criminal prosecution, or to defend a conviction, are shielded by absolute immunity 
when done by prosecutors.” Id. But “investigative acts that are entitled to only qualified 
immunity are those undertaken in the phase of law enforcement that involves the gathering and 
piecing together of evidence for indications of criminal activities and determination of the 
perpetrators.” Id. (citing Smith, 147 F.3d at 94); see also Simon, 727 F.3d at 172 (“Investigation, 
arrest, and detention have historically and by precedent been regarded as the work of police, not 
prosecutors, and they do not become prosecutorial functions merely because a prosecutor has 
chosen to participate.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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Here, Plaintiff challenges ASA Doe’s presentation of charges against him, her 
representation of the state police report to the superior court at his arraignment in Norwich, and 
the decisions of the defendants to continue the prosecution of the charges against him despite his 
claim of innocence and their asserted knowledge about the evidence in the case. See Compl. at 4, 
7-10. This conduct is shielded by absolute immunity, which applies to a prosecutor's conduct 
about “whether to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an 
indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to 
present.” Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 165 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33); see Simon, 727 F.3d at 
171 (noting that absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to prosecutors’ decisions to bring 
charges and present a case to a grand jury, “along with the tasks generally considered adjunct to 
those functions, such as witness preparation, witness selection, and issuing subpoenas”).  
Plaintiff complains about the defendants’ failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, which 
stymied his ability to present witnesses. Compl. at 8-11. But deciding what evidence to turn over 
is a prosecutorial function, see Hill v. City of N.Y., 45 F.3d 653, 662 (2d Cir. 1995) (failure to 
turn over Brady material protected as discretionary advocacy function); Kweller v. County of 
Broome, 2025 WL 2719897, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2025) (failure to identify and disclose 
exculpatory evidence is advocacy function to which absolute immunity ordinarily attaches), 
reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 3280745 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025). Thus, the defendants are 
“absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for [Brady] violations,” McClean v. County of 
Westchester, 2018 WL 6329420, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018), aff'd sub nom. McClean v. City 
of Mount Vernon, 776 F. App'x 725 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order).  
Because Plaintiff’s claims of constitutional violation arise from the defendants’ “conduct 
in furtherance of prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or 
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presenting the State's case,” Flagler, 663 F.3d at 546, the defendants are immune from suit. All 
the claims against the defendants are thus dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(b)(1), (2).  
The Court understands Plaintiff’s frustration, as expressed in the complaint.  If what he 
alleges was true, he lost job opportunities, and his family relationships suffered because 
prosecutors either negligently or deliberately failed to do their jobs properly.  Unfortunately for 
the plaintiff, this is the cost of the rule of absolute immunity that applies to the prosecutorial 
function.  The cost to society of not having such a rule would be that prosecutors would be 
reluctant or unwilling to advocate zealously on behalf of crime victims and the State lest they 
face liability for making mistakes.  The Supreme Court has decided that the need to avoid the 
latter cost outweighs the potential injustice that may sometimes be visited on individuals like the 
plaintiff.   
III. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).  
The clerk is instructed to close this case. 
      ________/s/______________ 
Michael P. Shea 
United States District Judge 
 
SO ORDERED this 24th day of March 2026, at Hartford, Connecticut. 
 
 
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