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govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-00879-0
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARLES DENNARD, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
BROOKE ROLLINS, Secretary of Agriculture et al.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:25-cv-879 (ACR)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are three motions. Pro se Plaintiffs Charles Dennard and Corey
Lea move to stay this case and remand it to a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Administrative Law Judge, Dkt. 14, and seek leave to issue third-party subpoenas, Dkt. 22.
Defendants—USDA and its Secretary Brooke Rollins—move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Dkt. 23.
For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Motion to Stay and Remand,
GRANTS the Motion to Issue Third-Party Subpoenas, and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART the Motion to Dismiss. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not plausibly plead
most of their claims. It will dismiss those claims without prejudice to provide Plaintiffs an
opportunity to cure the deficiencies.
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiffs Charles Dennard and Corey Lea are black farmers who owned farms
financed through USDA’s loan programs. Dkt. 1 (Compl.) ¶ 4. They filed this action against
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USDA and Secretary Rollins (collectively, USDA), alleging that USDA discriminated against
them in administering its loan and relief programs and in handling their civil rights complaints.
Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. They
allege, inter alia, that USDA prohibits black farmers from obtaining “new farm ownership
loan[s],” id. ¶ 3, and “unlawfully foreclosed” their farms, id. ¶ 4. They also allege that USDA
automatically sends black farmers’ complaints to USDA’s Office of Civil Rights, where the
“complaints go unresolved,” id., while “[w]hite farmers may take their grievances to the
administrative law judge,” id. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs further allege that USDA denied them financial
assistance and debt relief comparable to what white farmers received, id. ¶ 23, and that USDA
conspired with three private banks—Windsor Group, Midtown Group, and Analytic
Acquisition—to discriminate against them, id. ¶ 100.
1
Earlier, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Dkt. 2. After briefing and a hearing on the motion, the Court denied Plaintiffs’
request. See June 3, 2025, Minute Order. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to stay this case and
remand it to a USDA Administrative Law Judge. Dkt. 14. They also ask the Court for leave to
issue third-party subpoenas. Dkt. 22. USDA, in turn, moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 23.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction while a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. See Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
1 Plaintiffs name the private banks as co-defendants. See Compl. at 1–3.
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reviewing both motions, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
“construe[s] the complaint liberally” in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Am. Nat. Ins. v.
F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
On a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge, the court considers whether the plaintiff has established
that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear its claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). On a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, it considers whether the plaintiff has
pleaded “sufficient factual matter” to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, (2007)). Although courts construe pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), a pro se plaintiff must plead enough “factual content [to] allow[ ] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court begins by addressing USDA’s Motion to Dismiss and then turns to Plaintiffs’
Motion to Stay and Remand and Motion to Issue Third-Party Subpoenas.
A. Motion to Dismiss
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
USDA first argues that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. The Court agrees. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal
Government and its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Congress
has not waived sovereign immunity for § 1981 claims against the federal government. See
Benoit v. Dep’t of Agric., 608 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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Plaintiffs offer no meaningful response to USDA’s argument. Instead, they assert that
“[t]he Court has already ruled on the jurisdictional issue in this case.” Dkt. 28 at 10. It has not.
Because sovereign immunity applies, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
Next, USDA argues that Plaintiffs fail to state claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court addresses each argument in turn.
2. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) makes it “unlawful for any creditor to
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of credit transaction” based on the
applicant’s membership in a protected class. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). The United States is
considered a “creditor” under ECOA. Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 629 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
2006). And “[t]he regulations governing ECOA define a credit transaction as every aspect of an
applicant’s dealings with a creditor regarding an application for credit or an existing extension of
credit.” Id. (cleaned up).
Plaintiffs allege that USDA violated ECOA by (1) denying their loans, (2) “stating that
they intended to deny” their future loans, (3) “subjecting them to discriminatory lending terms,”
and (4) “delaying or obstructing their loan applications and approvals.” Dkt. 28 at 15–16. They
allege both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
a. Disparate Treatment—Loan Denial
According to USDA, Plaintiffs’ must establish four elements to make a disparate
treatment claim: (1) that they were “‘member[s] of a protected class,’” (2) applied for and were
qualified for loans with USDA, (3) were rejected for the loans despite their qualifications, and
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(4) that USDA “‘continued to approve loans for applicants with similar qualifications.’” Dkt. 23
at 12 (quoting Rahmaan v. Fed. Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n., No. Civ. A. 02-1822, 2003 WL 21940044,
at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2003)). In Plaintiffs view, the “four-part test” does not apply because
they “have pleaded something other than a traditional ECOA loan-denial claim.” Dkt. 28 at 16.
To plead a loan-denial claim under ECOA, Plaintiffs must meet the four-factor test
Defendants identified. According to USDA, Plaintiffs have only alleged the first element—that
they are members of a protected class. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs do not allege that they
qualified for the contested loans, that they were rejected for those loans despite their
qualifications, or that similarly situated white farmers received more favorable treatment. See
Hildebrandt v. Vilsack, 102 F. Supp. 3d 318, 326 (D.D.C. 2015). Therefore, the Court dismisses
Plaintiffs’ loan-denial claim.
b. Disparate Treatment—Loan Processing
2
Things are less straight-forward with Plaintiffs’ loan-processing claims. Plaintiffs allege
that USDA took measures to ensure “that any alleged debt could not be contested
administratively and delayed any monetary relief to [b]lack farmers . . . so that alleged past due
debts could not be paid.” Compl. ¶ 31; see also id. ¶ 52. The problem is that “[w]hen an ECOA
plaintiff claims something other than a discriminatory loan denial, courts have applied something
other than the standard four-part test.” See Pride v. Dep’t of Agric., Civ. A. No. 23-2292, 2024
WL 3924579, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2024) (collecting cases). But the parties have not fully
briefed which standard does apply. The Court will thus allow Plaintiffs’ loan-processing claims
to move forward. See id.
2 The Court categorizes Plaintiffs’ claims concerning prospective loan denials, discriminatory
lending terms, and delays or obstructions as Plaintiffs “loan-processing” claims.
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c. Disparate Impact
The D.C. Circuit has “expressed no opinion on whether a disparate impact claim can be
pursued under ECOA.” Garcia, 444 F.3d at 633 n.9. But it has explained that, if it can, a
plaintiff would need to “identify a specific policy or practice which the defendant has used to
discriminate and must also demonstrate with statistical evidence that the practice or policy has an
adverse effect on the protected group.” Id. at 633 (cleaned up).
To the extent Plaintiffs assert a disparate impact claim based on USDA’s failure to
investigate their discrimination complaints, see Compl. ¶¶ 19–20; Dkt. 28 at 18, that claim fails.
The ECOA’s definition of “credit transaction” does not include “failure to investigate a
discrimination complaint.” Love v. Johanns, 439 F.3d 723, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Otherwise, viewing the complaint liberally, Plaintiffs have met the standard identified by
the D.C. Circuit. See infra Section III.A.5. Thus, the Court will permit Plaintiffs’ ECOA
disparate impact claim to move forward, reserving for now judgment on its viability given the
current uncertainty in the law. See Garcia, 444 F.3d at 633; Pride, 2024 WL 3924579, at *8.
3. Administrative Procedure Act
Plaintiffs fail to state a viable claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Their allegations are difficult to follow. And, at minimum, do not satisfy Rule 8’s requirement
that each allegation “be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); see generally
Compl. ¶¶ 79–121.
Plaintiffs attempt to clarify their allegations in their opposition brief, stating that USDA
violated the APA by “implementing the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)
3 loan relief provisions” in
3 Congress enacted the IRA as a broad legislative measure to combat inflation. Pub. L. No. 117–
169, 136 Stat. 1818 (2022). Among other things, the Act appropriates funding to USDA’s loan
and conservation programs. See id. §§ 21001–23005.
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an arbitrary and capricious manner. Dkt. 28 at 19 (cleaned up). Their arguments focus on two
USDA programs: the Distressed Borrower Program and the Discrimination Financial Assistance
Program. See Dkt. 28 at 18–27; Inflation Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 117–169, §§ 22006–07,
136 Stat. 2021–23 (2022). In response, USDA argues that Plaintiffs’ claims “are based on
misunderstandings of how these programs work.” Dkt. 35 at 7. The Court agrees.
First, as to the Distressed Borrower Program, Plaintiffs allege that USDA provided cash
payments to borrowers with guaranteed loans, but for borrowers with direct loans, USDA
applied the funds as credits toward their outstanding loan balances. See Dkt. 28 at 19. In other
words, borrowers with direct loans did not receive cash; they received a reduction on their
existing debt. Plaintiffs claim borrowers with guaranteed loans could use the cash deposits “for
working capital, equipment, or other farm needs,” id., and that “USDA has offered . . . no
rational justification for treating direct loan borrowers differently from guaranteed loan
borrowers,” id. at 20. According to Plaintiffs, USDA should have provided similar cash deposits
to both types of borrowers because the Distressed Borrower Program was designed to provide
“‘immediate debt relief’ to farmers and ranchers who had suffered from decades of
discrimination and financial distress.” Id. at 19–20.
This misconstrues the statutory scheme. The Distressed Borrower Program was designed
“to assist people who have had difficulty paying back loans that they owe to” USDA. Dkt. 25
(June 3 Hr’g Tr.) at 38. And so it was not designed to “infuse capital into the hands of
disadvantaged farmers” for unrestricted use, as Plaintiffs suggest, Dkt. 28 at 20, but to assist
“farmers who were delinquent on their loans,” Dkt. 35 at 8; see § 22006, 136 Stat. at 2021.
Giving cash to direct borrowers would have the opposite of the intended effect. As USDA
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explains, “no borrower would have received a cash payment or direct deposit that he or she could
have used for seed, equipment, or any purpose other than debt relief.” Dkt. 35 at 7.
Second, as to the Discrimination Financial Assistance Program, Plaintiffs argue that
although “Congress designed [the program] to provide accountability for discrimination” USDA
implemented it “in a manner that disclaims discrimination entirely.” Dkt. 28 at 25. According to
Plaintiffs, USDA made no formal findings of discrimination, relied on a “validation” model to
score applications, and “offered no transparency into how scores were translated into dollar
amounts.” Id. (cleaned up).
Again, not so. The Discrimination Financial Assistance Program was designed “to
compensate farmers who have faced discrimination in [USDA’s] lending programs” prior to
January 1, 2021. June 3 Hr’g Tr. at 38; § 22007, 136 Stat. at 2022–23. To award relief to an
applicant, USDA must find that the applicant “experienced discrimination by USDA in USDA
farm loan programs.”
4 Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that USDA ignored that requirement.
They identify no facts showing that USDA failed to evaluate applicants’ experiences with
discrimination when it made award decisions. To the contrary, USDA published the scoring
rubric and the methodology it used to calculate award amounts, both of which incorporate
whether—and to what extent —an applicant experienced discrimination. See Dkt. 35 at 9.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ APA claims. “In the interest of justice,”
however, it “will allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint, if they so choose,” to state their
claims with greater clarity. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Plaintiffs
4 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., DF AP Validation Guide 63, 184–89 (2024),
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/dfap-usda-validation-review-guide-
08092024.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XKR-3 X5T]. The Court takes judicial notice of USDA’s
validation guide. See Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs of Am. v. of Health & Hum. Servs., 43 F. Supp. 3d
28, 33 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases).
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would do well to confer with counsel for USDA to understand the scope of the programs before
amending their complaint.
4. Due Process
Plaintiffs also allege that USDA violated their due process rights by making “intentional
misrepresentations” and denying their loan applications. Compl. ¶¶ 28–33.
As to a due process challenge, the Court must first consider “whether the plaintiff has
been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Only after identifying such an
interest can it consider whether the government’s actions “comport with due process.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ claim fails at the first step. To establish a property interest in a government
benefit, a plaintiff must show a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to that benefit. Bd. of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). They have not done so. Plaintiffs do not
identify the eligibility criteria for the loans they sought, much less allege facts showing that they
satisfied those criteria.
Their opposition brief compounds this error by asserting more conclusory allegations.
Plaintiffs say they “have property interests in continued eligibility for USDA credit programs”
and that “USDA regulations have long guaranteed fair consideration of loan applications, which
itself is a property interest.” Dkt. 28 at 28. Because bare assertions cannot establish a protected
property interest, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ due process claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
5. Equal Protection
The Court now turns to Plaintiffs Equal Protection claim. Because Plaintiffs allege
discrimination based on race, see Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11–12, the Court construes their claim as a
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traditional equal protection claim rather than a “class-of-one” claim, see Kelley v. D.C., 893 F.
Supp. 2d 115, 122 (D.D.C. 2012).5
Plaintiffs maintain that USDA enforced facially neutral lending rules with discriminatory
intent and that those rules disproportionally affect black farmers. See Compl. ¶ 2. They point to
several eligibility conditions governing access to USDA loans, including a rule barring
applicants from receiving certain loans if they have held a direct loan “outstanding for more than
a total of 10 years prior to the date the new . . . loan is closed.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs also allege that
USDA created rules imposing civil and criminal penalties on grant applicants who have
outstanding complaints or past-due debts. Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiffs elaborate on these arguments in their opposition brief.
6 They say the eligibility
requirements in USDA’s handbook systematically disadvantages black farmers. Dkt. 28 at 17.
According to Plaintiffs, these requirements result in “substantially higher rates of loan denials,
loan withdrawals, and onerous loan conditions” for black farmers than for white farmers. Id.
Plaintiffs also point to disparities in loan approvals. They state that in 2020, USDA approved
approximately 70 percent of direct loan applications submitted by white farmers but only 40
percent of applications submitted by black farmers. Id. at 17–18.
Disparate impact alone, however, does not establish an equal protection violation. Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). Plaintiffs must
5 To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to proceed under a class-of-one theory, that claim must fail. A
class-of-one plaintiff must identify a similarly situated comparator who received more favorable
treatment. See e.g., Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 159 (D.D.C. 2014).
Plaintiffs identify none.
6 “When considering pro se complaints, courts may ‘consider supplemental material filed by a
pro se litigant in order to clarify the precise claims being urged.’” Wada v. U.S. Secret Serv., 525
F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir.
2007)).
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also plead facts that permit a reasonable inference that USDA acted with “racially discriminatory
intent or purpose.” Id. at 265; see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
“[G]iving Plaintiffs the full benefit of all inferences that can be drawn in their favor, it
appears that they have stated a claim on which relief can be granted.” Smith v. Henderson, 982
F. Supp. 2d 32, 50 (D.D.C. 2013). Plaintiffs point to the historical background behind USDA’s
lending programs. See Compl. at 42; Dkt. 28 at 1–2, 17. They also point to a statistical disparity
in the approval rate of loan applications. See Dkt. 28 at 17–18. They allege that USDA adopted
certain eligibility requirements despite USDA’s knowledge that “the eligibility requirements
result in worse outcomes for black farmers.” Id. at 17 (cleaned up).
“A plaintiff may survive a 12(b)(6) motion even if ‘recovery is very remote and
unlikely.’” Henderson, 982 F. Supp. at 50 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiffs’
allegations “may prove to be entirely untrue, but the Federal Rules entitle” them to an
opportunity to develop evidence in support of their claims. Save Our Schs.-Se. & Ne. v. D.C. Bd.
of Educ., Civ. A. 04-01500, 2006 WL 1827654, at *9 (D.D.C. July 3, 2006). Because the Court
finds that Plaintiffs allegations permit a reasonable inference that USDA acted with
discriminatory intent, it will allow their Equal Protection claim to move forward.7
B. Motion to Stay and Remand
Plaintiffs also move to stay this case and remand it to a USDA administrative law judge
(ALJ). Dkt. 14. Plaintiffs argue that their case should proceed before an ALJ under “[S]ection
741 of 15 U.S.C. 1961.” Dkt. 17 at 1. Section 741, however, does not apply to Plaintiffs
7 Plaintiffs also attempt to state a claim for declaratory judgment. See Compl. ¶¶ 37–52; Dkt 28
at 29. But declaratory judgment “is not cognizable as a separate cause of action.” Malek v.
Flagstar Bank, 70 F. Supp. 3d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up); see C&E Servs., Inc. of
Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C.Cir.2002). Therefore, the
Court dismisses the claim.
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because they did not file “a ‘nonemployment related complaint’ with the USDA before July 1,
1997 that alleged discrimination occurring between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996.”
Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
USDA’s ALJs may only hear matters arising under statutes that provide for hearings
under the APA. Neither Section 22006 nor Section 22007(e) of the Inflation Reduction Act—the
provisions establishing the Distressed Borrower Program and the Discrimination Financial
Assistance Program— authorize such hearings. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.27(a), 15d. Judge Jill Clifton
(ALJ) previously determined that “Administrative Law Judges have no authority to grant the
relief [Plaintiffs’] request[].” Dkt. 17-1 at 2, 13. This Court agrees and finds that the same
reasoning applies here. See id. at 8–9. Because remanding the case would be futile, the Court
denies Plaintiffs’ motion.
C. Motion for Third-Party Subpoenas
Lastly, Plaintiffs have moved for leave to issue third-party subpoenas. Dkt. 22. USDA
does not oppose. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion, with the caveat that the Court sign
off on each subpoena before it is issued.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Issue Third-Party Subpoenas, Dkt. 22;
DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay and Remand, Dkt. 14; and
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART USDA’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 23.
USDA’s Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ § 1981, ECOA loan-denial, APA, and Due
Process claims. Those claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Motion is DENIED as to
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Plaintiffs’ ECOA loan processing and disparate impact claims, and Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection
claim. Those claims may move forward.
Within 90 days of this Order, the parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status
report updating the Court on the status of the subpoenas and stating whether Plaintiffs intend to
file an amended complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Date: March 23, 2026 _________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge
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