govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01760-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
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Civil No. 3:24-cv-1760 (AWT) 
 
 
LAGUERRE LENSENDRO, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
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v. 
 
CAPITAL ONE BANK FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
 
  Defendant. 
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RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Pro se plaintiff Laguerre Lensendro (“Lensendro”) has filed 
a one-count Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) against 
defendant Capital One Bank (“Capital One”), claiming violation 
of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (the “ECOA”), codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq.. The defendant has moved to 
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set 
forth below, the motion to dismiss is being granted.  
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS  
The court must accept as true the factual allegations in 
the Second Amended Complaint for purposes of testing its 
sufficiency. See Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 
1997). It contains the following factual allegations. 
“On August 13, 2024, [the plaintiff] visited the official 
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Capital One website to request credit.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 11. 
The plaintiff “was asked to provide certain personal information, 
including [his] income.” Id. ¶ 12. The plaintiff “followed the 
instructions and submitted the information they requested.” Id. ¶ 
13. “After submitting information required, Capital One did not 
allow [him] to proceed further.” Id. ¶ 14. The plaintiff “later 
received a letter from Capital One stating that [his] income was 
insufficient for the credit requested.” Id. ¶ 15. “The letter 
list[ed] numerous Capital One open-end consumer credit plans for 
which [the plaintiff] was denied access.” Id. ¶ 16. The plaintiff’s 
applications for those open-end consumer credit plans “was 
rejected . . . because [his] income was insufficient.” Id. ¶ 17. 
“Exhibit C” attached to the Second Amended Complaint appears to be 
an August 14, 2024 letter from Capital One to the plaintiff. The 
letter states:  
We’re writing in response to your online request for 
pre-approval, submitted on August 13, 2024. 
 
Unfortunately, we can’t pre-approve you for a Capital 
One Quicksilver Rewards credit card, SavorOne Rewards 
credit card, Venture Rewards credit card, VentureOne 
Rewards credit card, Quicksilver Rewards for Good Credit 
credit card, [etc.]. . . . Rest assured, the form you 
filled out online was not a credit card application and 
your credit score was not affected.  
 
Here are the reasons why we couldn’t match you with an 
offer:  
 
Based on your Pre-approval form information, income is 
insufficient for amount of credit requested[.] 
 
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Second Am. Compl. (Pl. Ex. C) at 7. 
 
II. LEGAL STANDARD  
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the 
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the 
complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual 
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ 
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). On a motion to dismiss, courts “are 
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 
265, 286 (1986)).  
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked 
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 
Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all 
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in 
fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). However, the plaintiff must plead “only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
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face.”  Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility 
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks 
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” Id.  
Additionally, “[i]t is well established that the 
submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and 
interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they 
suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, pro se 
status “does ‘not exempt a party from compliance with relevant 
rules of procedural and substantive law’. . . .” Traguth v. 
Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). “[P]ro 
se litigants generally are required to inform themselves 
regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” Caidor v. 
Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (italics, 
internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The plaintiff’s sole claim is a claim for violation of 15 
U.S.C. § 1691(a). The plaintiff alleges that “Capital One 
precluded [him] from completing an application(s) because of 
[his] income, and such was discriminatory” in violation of the 
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ECOA. Id. ¶¶ 18, 28.  
Capital One argues that the Second Amended Complaint should 
be dismissed because the plaintiff fails to allege, among other 
things, that he is a member of a protected class. The court 
agrees.  
As explained in the April 14, 2025 ruling dismissing the 
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31), the ECOA provides in relevant 
part that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to 
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect 
of a credit transaction”:  
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the 
applicant has the capacity to contract); 
 
(2) because all or part of the applicant’s income derives 
from any public assistance program; or 
 
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any 
right under this chapter. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). A plaintiff seeking to prove a claim under 
the ECOA may do so “in a manner similar to that used in Title 
VII discrimination cases”. Gross v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 669 
F. Supp. 50, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 867 F.2d 1423 (2d Cir. 
1988). A plaintiff bringing such a claim must set forth factual 
allegations from which the court may reasonably infer (1) that 
he or she “belongs to a minority or protected class” or was 
discriminated against on another prohibited basis, (2) that he 
or she “applied for and was qualified for a loan,” (3) that 
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despite his or her “qualifications, [he or] she was rejected,” 
and (4) that others “of similar credit stature were given loans, 
or were treated more favorably than plaintiff in the application 
process.” Id. at 53.   
 Here, the plaintiff alleges that he was denied the 
opportunity to apply for a credit card “because of [his] 
income”. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 18. See also Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s 
Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 34) (“Pl.’s Objection”) at 2 
(“Capital One's use of income as a screening factor was improper 
and discriminatory under ECOA.”). The Second Amended Complaint, 
like the Amended Complaint, does not contain any factual 
allegations that could show that the plaintiff was denied credit 
on a prohibited basis. The plaintiff does not allege facts which 
could show that he was denied credit because of his “race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or 
age”, see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1); because all or part of his 
“income derives from any public assistance program”, see 15 
U.S.C. § 1691(a)(2); or because he “has in good faith exercised 
any right” guaranteed by the ECOA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(3). 
Rather, the Second Amended Complaint states that the plaintiff 
is bringing a claim for “violation of 1691(a) (excluding 
subsections (1), (2), and (2)).” Second Am. Compl. at 4 
(emphasis added). But 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) consists of only three 
subsections, which together comprise the complete and exhaustive 
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list of prohibited bases of discrimination under the ECOA. 
Moreover, as explained in the court’s prior ruling, 
discrimination on the basis of income is not prohibited by the 
ECOA. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.6(b)(5)-(6) (“a creditor may consider 
the amount and probable continuance of any income in evaluating 
an applicant’s creditworthiness”, as well as her “credit 
history”); Powell v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 481, 
488 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that creditors’ “reliance on 
indicators of creditworthiness, such as credit histories and 
income levels of applicants,” does not violate the ECOA); Jones 
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., No. 00-cv-8330 (LMM), 2002 WL 88431, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (“In evaluating whether to extend 
credit, ‘a creditor may consider any information obtained, so 
long as the information is not used to discriminate against an 
applicant on a prohibited basis.’” (quoting 12 C.F.R. §§ 
202.6(a))); Gross, 669 F. Supp. at 54-55 (“[T]he defendants 
rightfully considered the plaintiff to be a credit risk” based 
on their consideration of her “financial statements”, “income”, 
and current “debt”).  
The plaintiff argues in his opposition that applications 
for credit a
re securities under 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) and that 
his income is irrelevant to Capital One’s credit approval 
decisions. See Pl.’s Objection at 8-10. These arguments are 
frivolous.    
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Because the factual allegations in the Second Amended 
Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
and nothing in the plaintiff’s papers suggests that he could 
amend it to state such a claim, this case is being dismissed 
with prejudice.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33) is hereby GRANTED and 
this case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall close 
this case.  
It is so ordered. 
Dated this 10th day of December 2025, at Hartford, 
Connecticut. 
          /s/AWT                      
        Alvin W. Thompson 
         United States District Judge 
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