govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01203-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
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Civil No. 3:24-cv-1203 (AWT) 
THERESA COLLINS, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
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v. 
 
APPLEGREEN CT TRAVEL PLAZAS, 
LLC, 
 
  Defendant. 
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RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
Plaintiff Theresa Collins has filed a six-count Amended 
Complaint against defendant Applegreen CT Travel Plazas, LLC 
(“Applegreen”), bringing a claim for sexual harassment in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”) (Count One), a claim for retaliation in violation of Title 
VII (Count Two), a claim for gender discrimination in violation 
of Title VII (Count Three), a claim for gender discrimination in 
violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 (“CFEPA”) (Count Four), a claim for 
retaliation in violation of CFEPA (Count Five), and a claim for 
sexual harassment in violation of CFEPA (Count Six). 
Defendant Applegreen moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
(ECF No. 26) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For 
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the reasons below, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is being 
granted. 
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
The court “must accept [the complaint] as true for the 
purposes of testing its sufficiency.” Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 
F.3d 243, 244 (2d Cir. 1997). 
Plaintiff Theresa Collins began working at defendant 
Applegreen’s service plaza in Plainfield, Connecticut on or 
about April 6, 2022. She worked at the Dunkin Donuts location 
inside the service plaza as an Associate. The service plaza is 
“one large open space,” where “[t]here are no walls separating 
the Dunkin Donuts store from the rest of the building.” Am. 
Compl. ¶ 71. Also inside that service plaza was a Mobil Mart 
location, whose manager was David Dixon.  
The Amended Complaint alleges, in general, that once 
plaintiff Collins began working at the Dunkin Donuts inside the 
service plaza, “[f]or five (5) months, plaintiff was subjected 
to abuse and harassment on account of her gender.” Am. Compl. ¶ 
19. The plaintiff alleges that “Dixon subjected plaintiff to the 
following abusive behavior: inappropriate touching; throwing of 
objects; calling her a f-cking scumbag; threatening to 
physically hurt her; telling a co-worker that he was going to 
wait by her car and beat her a[**]; loudly making rude and 
insulting comments.” Id. ¶ 22. 
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“Plaintiff’s first day on the job was April 6, 2022. During 
her first day, Dixon came up behind the plaintiff and proceeded 
to tug on both of her ears.” Id. ¶ 39. “The tugging on the ears 
incident took place at the Dunkin front counter next to the 
swing door where the employees enter.” Id. ¶ 40. “Plaintiff told 
Dixon to never touch her again.” Id. ¶ 41. 
“From April 6, 2022 through September 30, 2022, Dixon threw 
objects at the plaintiff,” including “pens, straws, bags of 
chips and pastries.” Id. ¶¶ 42-43. “Dixon threw these items 
directly at the plaintiff while she was on the clock working 
behind her Dunkin counter.” Id. ¶ 43. There were approximately 
twenty-five to thirty incidents of Dixon throwing an object at 
the plaintiff. On one such occasion, “Dixon straightened out a 
coat hanger and threw it directly at plaintiff barely missing 
her.” Id. ¶ 45. 
“In May 2022, Dixon called plaintiff a ‘f-cking scumbag’” 
“while plaintiff was working behind her Dunkin counter and 
waiting on a customer.” Id. ¶ 46. “From April 6, 2022 through 
September 30, 2022, Dixon made loud, rude, insulting and abusive 
remarks to the plaintiff (about 25 to 30 times).” Id. ¶ 48. 
Dixon made these remarks “while standing against the wall 
directly across from the Dunkin counter while plaintiff was 
waiting on customers.” Id. Other such remarks included: “a. ‘and 
she plays sports . . . being this slow . . . really?’ b. ‘a five 
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year old could do a better job’ [and] c. ‘need help . . . want 
me to . . . go back there and show you how a man gets the job 
done.’” Id. ¶ 49. In addition, “Dixon would walk up to the 
Dunkin counter, take the tip jar and comment: ‘you don’t deserve 
half the tips in here.’” Id. ¶ 50. 
Approximately two weeks after the “plaintiff began working 
for the defendant, Jennifer Dadio visited the service/travel 
plaza.” Id. ¶ 51. (It is undisputed that Dadio is Applegreen’s 
district manager.) “Dadio witnessed Dixon throwing an object at 
the Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 52. Collins “told Dadio that Dixon had 
touched her ears, was throwing objects at her and making 
comments about how allegedly slow she was with customers,” and 
Collins “asked Dadio what could be done about Dixon’s abusive 
behavior.” Id. ¶ 53-54. Dadio told Collins to “just ignore him 
... he will get bored with it and stop.” Id. ¶ 55.  
Kaylee Chubka was the store manager of the Dunkin Donuts 
and was also employed by defendant Applegreen. “Chubka witnessed 
Dixon’s harassment of the plaintiff,” including “Dixon throwing 
objects at plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 59. Collins “reported to Chubka 
that Dixon was making harassing remarks.” Id. ¶ 60. Collins 
asked Chubka “how she could contact ‘upper’ management so that 
she could report Dixon’s harassment.” Id. ¶ 57. Chubka told 
Collins “to go get a restraining order against Dixon” and “never 
provided the plaintiff with the contact information for upper 
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management.” Id. ¶¶ 61-62. Collins also “called defendant’s 
corporate phone number to report Dixon’s harassment but the 
defendant did not respond to her calls.” Id. ¶ 63. Collins 
“called three to four times between June and August 2022.” Id.  
In addition, the plaintiff “spoke to Dixon’s employer at 
the end of August 2022 and told the owner of the Mobil Mart that 
Dixon had been throwing objects at her and that he had been 
making offensive and inappropriate remarks towards her.” Id. 
¶ 64. “The owner of the Mobil Mart told plaintiff that he would 
check the security cameras and follow up with her,” but he never 
did. Id.  
“Collen Rivera was employed by the defendant as an 
assistant manager” and “worked at the same Dunkin Donuts 
location as the plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 72. “Rivera informed plaintiff 
that Dixon had threatened to physically hurt her. Rivera told 
plaintiff that Dixon stated that plaintiff should watch her back 
because one day he would be waiting at her car when her shift 
was over.” Id. ¶ 73. “Dixon made this threat after learning that 
the plaintiff had been attempting to get help with stopping 
[Dixon’s] abusive behavior.” Id. ¶ 74. 
Applegreen terminated Collins’s employment on or about 
September 30, 2022. Applegreen “told plaintiff that she was 
terminated because her deposit was $100 short.” Id. ¶ 30. 
Collins alleges that her “drawer had never been short,” id. ¶ 
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31, and further alleges that other employees had not been 
terminated for discrepancies in their cash drawers, see id. ¶ 
32. In particular, the plaintiff points to six other Associates 
employed by defendant Applegreen “who did the same job as the 
plaintiff” and “had discrepancies in their cash drawer” but 
were, to plaintiff’s knowledge, not terminated. Id. ¶¶ 65-66. 
“To plaintiff’s knowledge, the other associates [who had 
discrepancies in their cash drawers] had not complained to 
management about discrimination or harassment.” Id. ¶ 67. 
Collins also points to three other Associates employed by 
defendant Applegreen in the same role as Collins who had “no 
calls-no shows” but “were not terminated for the no calls no-
shows.” Id. ¶ 68-69. “[T]he Associates [with the no calls-no 
shows] had not complained to management about discrimination or 
harassment.” Id. ¶ 70. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the 
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the 
complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, 
. . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
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cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). On a 
motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a 
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 
U.S. at 286. “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . 
. . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint 
are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555 (citations and internal quotations omitted). However, the 
plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has 
facial plausibility when the [claimant] pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678. 
“The function of a motion to dismiss is ‘merely to assess 
the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight 
of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’” 
Mytych v. May Dep't Store Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D. Conn. 
1999) (quoting Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch 
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Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). The issue 
on a motion to dismiss “is not whether [the] plaintiff will 
prevail, but whether [the plaintiff] is entitled to offer 
evidence to support his claims.” United States v. Yale New Haven 
Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing Scheuer, 
416 U.S. at 236).  
In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the 
pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by 
reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice 
may be taken.” Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Sexual Harassment (Counts One and Six) 
In Counts One and Six, the plaintiff brings claims for a 
hostile work environment, because of her sex, in violation of 
Title VII and CFEPA, respectively. 
Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e–2(a)(1)). “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of 
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employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment . . . in employment,’ 
which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily 
hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 
64). “To establish a hostile work environment under Title VII . 
. . a plaintiff must show that ‘the workplace is permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” 
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320–21 (2d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). 
CFEPA provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be a 
discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . [f]or 
an employer . . . to harass any employee . . . on the basis of 
sex or gender identity or expression.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-
60(b)(8). CFEPA defines “sexual harassment” in relevant part as 
“any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or 
any conduct of a sexual nature when . . . such conduct has the 
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an 
individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive working environment.” Id. Because 
“Connecticut courts look to federal law for guidance when 
analyzing CFEPA hostile work environment claims,” the court 
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evaluates such CFEPA claims using Title VII precedent. Martin v. 
Town of Westport, 558 F. Supp. 2d 228, 242 (D. Conn. 2008). 
The legal standard for a claim for a hostile work 
environment was articulated in Patane v. Clark: 
To state a claim for a hostile work environment in 
violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must plead facts that 
would tend to show that the complained of conduct: (1) “is 
objectively severe or pervasive—that is, . . . creates an 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or 
abusive”; (2) creates an environment “that the plaintiff 
subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive”; and (3) 
“creates such an environment because of the plaintiff’s 
sex.” 
 
508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007). “In determining whether a 
plaintiff suffered a hostile work environment, we must consider 
the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.’” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321 
(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).  
 It is undisputed that Dixon was not an employee of 
defendant Applegreen. “[I]n the title VII context . . . the 
conduct of certain non-employees may be imputed to the employer 
where (1) the employer exercises a ‘high degree of control over 
the behavior’ of the non-employee, and (2) the employer’s ‘own 
negligence’ permits or facilitates that non-employee’s 
discrimination.” Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 38-39 
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(2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 
124 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
The plaintiff alleges that during her first day on the job, 
Dixon came up behind her and proceeded to tug on both of her 
ears. She alleges that this incident took place at the Dunkin 
front counter next to the swing door where employees enter. She 
“told Dixon to never touch her again”. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. In 
general, “the law . . . deems unwanted touching to be a highly 
significant factor contributing to a hostile work environment.” 
Sowemimo v. D.A.O.R. Sec., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). See, e.g., Girardi v. Ferrari Express, Inc., 
2023 WL 2744027, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2023) (finding that 
the plaintiff stated a claim for a hostile work environment 
based on a pleading including allegations that the perpetrator 
engaged in “suggestive, unwanted, touching of Plaintiff”); Parra 
v. City of White Plains, 48 F. Supp. 3d 542, 547, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations that the 
defendant subjected her to unwanted sexual touching, including 
rubbing her hands, arms, shoulders, neck, feet, head and hair 
were sufficient to plead a hostile work environment); Johnson v. 
J. Walter Thompson U.S.A., LLC, 224 F. Supp. 3d 296, 307-08 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations that 
the defendant subjected her to unwanted sexual touching, 
including rubbing her shoulders and stroking her face, were 
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sufficient to plead a hostile work environment). 
However, assuming arguendo that the plaintiff could 
plausibly argue to a jury that (i) Dixon would not have touched 
her in this way had she been a man--particularly in light of his 
comment about showing her “how a man gets the job done,” Am. 
Compl. ¶ 60, and (ii) all of the other harassment and abuse 
described in the Amended Complaint must be viewed through the 
prism of that incident on her first day of work, Collins has 
nonetheless failed to plead a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. The Amended Complaint does not contain factual 
allegations that could establish that Applegreen exercised a 
“high degree of control over the behavior” of Dixon. Menaker, 
935 F.3d at 39. The harassment described in the Amended 
Complaint took place either while Dixon and the plaintiff were 
both in the area in front of the Dunkin counter or while Collins 
was behind the Dunkin counter and Dixon was on the other side, 
in some instances while Dixon was standing against the wall 
directly across from the Dunkin counter and Collins was behind 
the counter waiting on customers. Nothing in the Amended 
Complaint suggests that Applegreen had an ability to control 
Dixon’s behavior, and the plaintiff does not address this 
element in her opposition. In fact, the plaintiff herself 
recognized the necessity of speaking to Dixon’s employer, the 
owner of the Mobil Mart, about Dixon’s behavior. 
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Nor does the Amended Complaint contain factual allegations 
that could establish that Applegreen’s negligence permitted or 
facilitated sexual harassment of the plaintiff by Dixon. See 
Menaker, 935 F.3d at 39. The Amended Complaint alleges: 
“Plaintiff complained about the harassment,” Am. Compl. ¶ 23; 
“Plaintiff informed her manager of the harassment,” id. ¶ 24; 
“Plaintiff informed her district manager of the harassment,” id. 
¶ 25; “Plaintiff notified the owner of Mobil Mart of the 
harassment,” id. ¶ 26; “Plaintiff notified the owner of the 
Plaza of the harassment,” id. ¶ 27; “Nothing was done and the 
harassment continued.” Id. ¶ 28.  
The discrimination claim against Applegreen is for sexual 
harassment. Applegreen cannot be negligent by permitting or 
facilitating sexual harassment by a non-employee if Applegreen 
is not aware that the type of harassment in which the non-
employee is engaged is sexual harassment. What is required is 
not simply a hostile or abusive work environment, but a 
“discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Harris, 510 
U.S. at 21. While there are numerous factual allegations that 
could establish that the plaintiff complained about a hostile 
work environment, none could show that she advised her employer 
that she was being subjected to sexual harassment by Dixon, nor 
that she even advised Dixon’s employer that she was being 
subjected to sexual harassment. See Am. Compl. ¶ 64. Rather, she 
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alleges that Dixon threw an object at her “approximately 25-30 
times,” id. ¶ 44, and made “loud, rude, insulting and abusive 
remarks to the plaintiff (about 25 to 30 times).” Id. ¶ 48. She 
alleges that Jennifer Dadio witnessed Dixon throwing an object 
at the plaintiff. While the plaintiff told Dadio that Dixon had 
“touched her ears,” this was in the context of also complaining 
that Dixon was throwing objects at her and making comments that 
she was slow with customers. Id. ¶ 53. As to Chubka, the 
plaintiff alleges that Chubka witnessed Dixon throwing objects 
at the plaintiff, as well as his comments about her being slow 
with customers, how a “five year old could do a better job,” and 
how she needed help and Dixon could “go back there and show you 
how a man gets the job done.” Id. ¶ 60. These factual 
allegations do not show that Collins made Applegreen aware that 
she was being subjected to sexual harassment so as to create a 
duty on the part of Applegreen to avoid permitting or 
facilitating sexual harassment by Dixon. 
Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims for sexual harassment 
(Counts One and Six) are being dismissed. 
B. Gender Discrimination (Counts Three and Four) 
 In Counts Three and Four, the plaintiff claims that 
defendant Applegreen discriminated against her on the basis of 
her sex when it terminated her employment, in violation of Title 
VII and CFEPA, respectively. She claims that Applegreen’s stated 
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reason for terminating her employment, i.e. the deposit in her 
cash drawer was $100 short, was pretextual. 
“Title VII prohibits an employer from ‘taking an adverse 
employment action’ against an individual ‘because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” 
Menaker, 935 F.3d at 30 (citation omitted).  
CFEPA provides, in relevant part, “[i]t shall be a 
discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . [f]or 
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual in 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment 
because of the individual’s . . . sex, gender identity or 
expression . . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(1). Because 
“‘[t]he Connecticut Supreme Court looks to federal precedent 
when interpreting and enforcing the CFEPA,’ . . . [a] CFEPA sex 
discrimination claim is analyzed in the same manner as [a] Title 
VII sex discrimination claim.” Kelley v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 
520 F. Supp. 2d 388, 400–01 (D. Conn. 2007) (quoting Williams v. 
Quebecor World Infiniti Graphics, 456 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 
(D. Conn. 2006)). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only 
establish “a prima facie case of sex discrimination by 
demonstrating that (1) [he] was within the protected class; 
(2) [he] was qualified for the position; (3) [he] was 
subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the 
adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to 
an inference of discrimination.” If a plaintiff 
successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the employer at the summary judgment stage “to 
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articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment action.” Finally, if the employer 
carries that burden, a plaintiff must submit admissible 
evidence from which a finder of fact could “infer that the 
defendant’s employment decision was more likely than not 
based in whole or in part on discrimination.” The burden-
shifting framework thus “reduces the facts needed to be 
pleaded under Iqbal” at the 12(b)(6) stage of a Title VII 
suit. A plaintiff need only allege facts that give 
“plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory 
motivation.” 
 
Menaker, 935 F.3d at 30 (alterations in original) (footnotes and 
citations omitted).  
The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint do not 
provide plausible support to a minimal inference of 
discriminatory motivation, i.e. that “the adverse action 
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
discrimination.” Menaker, 935 F.3d at 30 (citation omitted). The 
Amended Complaint states that “[a]ny and all reasons to be 
proffered by the defendant to explain the termination would be a 
pretext to cover up unlawful discrimination and/or retaliation,” 
Am. Compl. ¶ 34, but such a “naked assertion[] devoid of . . . 
factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), does not suffice.  
The Amended Complaint alleges that “[o]ther similarly 
situated employees had discrepancies in their drawers and 
deposits and were not terminated.” Am. Compl. ¶ 32. “A showing 
of disparate treatment—that is, a showing that the employer 
treated plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated 
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employee outside his protected group—is a recognized method of 
raising an inference of discrimination for purposes of making 
out a prima facie case.” Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 
368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). “A plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence 
‘must show she was similarly situated in all material respects 
to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself.’” Id. 
(citation omitted). The Amended Complaint gives the names of six 
other Associates who had previously experienced similar 
discrepancies in their cash drawers but did not have their 
employment terminated. See Am. Compl. ¶ 65 (“Other Associates, 
Emily[ ](do not recall last name), Brad (do not recall last 
name), Austin Keanan, Dakota Lajeunese, Katherine (do not recall 
last name), Jordan Gonyer, employed by the defendant and who did 
the same job as the plaintiff, had discrepancies in their cash 
drawer.”). However, three of the employees the plaintiff alleges 
were not terminated although they had cash drawer discrepancies 
were female, so these factual allegations actually show that 
Applegreen did not treat female employees less favorably than 
male employees. See Alcy v. Northwell Health, Inc., 2025 WL 
835647, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2025) (“[C]ourts in the Second 
Circuit regularly hold that the existence of similarly situated 
comparators in a plaintiff’s protected group undermines an 
inference of discrimination on the basis of the protected 
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characteristic, even when there are other comparators outside of 
plaintiff’s protected group.”). The Amended Complaint also 
alleges that other Associates were not terminated for “no calls-
no shows,” Am. Compl. ¶ 69, but the plaintiff was not terminated 
for a “no call-no show.” 
The plaintiff argues in her opposition that the 
defendant was on notice that its employee, the plaintiff, 
was being subjected to a hostile work environment on 
account of her gender. Defendant did not remedy the 
problem. Instead, the harassment continued. An employer 
that tolerates harassment on the basis of sex serves as 
circumstantial evidence of individualized gender 
discrimination. 
Pl.’s Obj. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) (“Pl.’s 
Opp’n”) at 23.
1 This argument fails because, as discussed above, 
the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint cannot 
establish that the plaintiff made Applegreen aware that she was 
being subjected to sexual harassment. 
Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims for gender discrimination 
(Counts Three and Four) are being dismissed. 
C. Retaliation (Counts Two and Five) 
 In Counts Two and Five, the plaintiff brings claims against 
defendant Applegreen for retaliation, in violation of Title VII 
and of CFEPA, respectively. 
 “Section 704(a) of Title VII includes an anti-retaliation 
 
1 The page numbers cited to in this ruling for documents that have been 
electronically filed refer to the page numbers in the header of the documents 
and not to the page numbers in the original documents, if any. 
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provision that makes it unlawful ‘for an employer to 
discriminate against any . . . employee[ ] . . . because [that 
individual] opposed any practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or 
‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title 
VII investigation or proceeding.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 315 
(alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). 
CFEPA provides, in relevant part: “It shall be a 
discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any . . . employer . . . to 
discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person 
because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment 
practice or because such person has filed a complaint . . . .” 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(4). “CFEPA retaliation claims are 
analyzed in the same manner as Title VII . . . retaliation 
claims.” Kelley, 520 F. Supp. 2d. at 402. The court therefore 
analyzes the plaintiff’s CFEPA retaliation claim under the Title 
VII standard. 
“Retaliation claims under Title VII . . . are . . . 
analyzed pursuant to Title VII principles and the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting evidentiary framework.” Littlejohn, 795 
F.3d at 315 (footnote omitted) (citing Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 
159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
To establish a presumption of retaliation at the initial 
stage of a Title VII litigation, a plaintiff must present 
evidence that shows “(1) participation in a protected 
activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected 
activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a 
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causal connection between the protected activity and the 
adverse employment action.” Hicks, 593 F.3d at 164 
(internal quotation marks omitted). As with our analysis of 
the disparate treatment claim, the allegations in the 
complaint need only give plausible support to the reduced 
prima facie requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas 
in the initial phase of a Title VII litigation. 
 
Id. at 315-16. 
With respect to the first element of a claim for 
retaliation, i.e., that the plaintiff participated in a 
protected activity, she must plausibly allege facts that show 
she participated in a protected activity.  
An employee’s complaint may qualify as protected activity, 
satisfying the first element of this test, “so long as the 
employee has a good faith, reasonable belief that the 
underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the 
law.” Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(quotation marks omitted). And not just any law—the 
plaintiff is “required to have had a good faith, reasonable 
belief that [she] was opposing an employment practice made 
unlawful by Title VII.” McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 
F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001); see also id. (vacating 
summary judgment where plaintiff’s “belief that 
[defendant’s] alleged sexual harassment violated Title VII 
was reasonable”). “The reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
belief is to be assessed in light of the totality of the 
circumstances.” Galdieri–Ambrosini [v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. 
Corp.], 136 F.3d [276,] 292 [(2d Cir. 1998)]. 
 
Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 
716 F.3d 10, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2013)). A plaintiff “need not 
establish that the conduct she opposed was actually a violation 
of Title VII, but only that she possessed a good faith, 
reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice was 
unlawful under [Title VII].” Summa, 708 F.3d at 126 (quoting 
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Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 292). 
With respect to the second element of a claim for 
retaliation, i.e., “that the defendant knew of the protected 
activity,” the plaintiff must plausibly allege facts that the 
defendant knew of the protected activity. Littlejohn, 795 F.3d 
at 316. An employee’s “complaints must be sufficiently specific 
to make it clear that the employee is complaining about conduct 
prohibited by Title VII. Generalized complaints about a 
supervisor’s treatment are insufficient.” Taylor v. Dollar Tree 
Stores, No. 18-CV-1306-SJB, 2020 WL 2478663, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 13, 2020) (citing Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
Defendant Applegreen did not engage in an unlawful 
employment practice related to Dixon’s alleged sexual harassment 
of the plaintiff unless Applegreen exercised a high degree of 
control over Dixon’s behavior and Applegreen’s negligence 
permitted or facilitated Dixon’s alleged discrimination. See 
Menaker, 935 F.3d at 39. To state a claim for retaliation, 
Collins must allege facts showing that she engaged in the 
protected activity of reporting Applegreen’s alleged unlawful 
employment practice. The Amended Complaint alleges that the 
plaintiff informed her manager and her district manager of the 
harassment and also that both of them witnessed Dixon harassing 
her. The Amended Complaint also alleges that the plaintiff 
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called the defendant’s corporate phone number three or four 
times to report Dixon’s harassment. However, there is no factual 
allegation in the Amended Complaint that shows the plaintiff 
complained to defendant Applegreen that it was permitting or 
facilitating Dixon’s harassment of her. Thus, there are no 
factual allegations that could support a conclusion that the 
plaintiff had a good faith reasonable belief that she was 
opposing an employment practice by Applegreen that was unlawful 
under Title VII.   
Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims for retaliation (Counts 
Two and Five) are being dismissed.
2 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is hereby GRANTED. The Amended Complaint is 
dismissed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close 
this case.  
It is so ordered. 
Dated this 18th day of March 2026, at Hartford, 
Connecticut. 
   
         /s/AWT        
        Alvin W. Thompson 
       United States District Judge 
 
2 There is no need for the court to reach the question of whether the 
plaintiff has satisfied the causal-connection element of a retaliation claim. 
See Def. Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 30-1) at 12-14. 
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