govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_19-cr-00228-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
Southern Division 
 
 *  
       
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA * 
       
 v. *      
                 CRIMINAL NO. PWG-19-228 
SEUN BANJO OJEDOKUN, * 
   
 Defendant *      
  
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Seun Banjo Ojedokun was convicted by a jury on September 15, 2020 of a single count of 
promotion and concealment money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 
The superseding indictment on which he was tried alleged that the “specified unlawful activity” of 
the money laundering conspiracy was wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  ECF No. 79.  
The superseding indictment was returned by the grand jury on August 10, 2020.  It superseded the 
original indictment, which was returned on May 6, 2018.  ECF No. 6.  The original indictment 
also charged a single count of promotion and concealment money laundering conspiracy, but the 
“specified unlawful activity” was identified as conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1349.  In both the original and superseding indictments, the conduct involved in the 
conspiracy ended in March, 2015, more than five years before the return date of the superseding 
indictment.  
 After the Government filed the superseding indictment, Ojedokun’s retained counsel filed 
a motion to dismiss it based on a variety of asserted deficiencies, one of which was that it was time 
barred by the statute of limitations.  ECF No. 86; 18 U.S.C. § 3282.  The issue was briefed (ECF 
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Nos. 86, 94) and following a hearing, I denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the superseding 
indictment neither broadened nor substantially  amended the original charge.  ECF No. 96.  
Following his conviction, Ojedokun’s retained counsel filed a “Motion for New T rial and/or 
Motion to Dismiss,” which, inter alia, reprised the statute of limitations argument.  ECF No. 128. 
I denied it, ECF N o. 140, and shortly thereafter Ojedokun’s retained counsel withdrew his 
appearance.  ECF No. 141.  A CJA panel attorney then wa s appointed to represent Ojedokun.   
Ojedokun’s new counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of my earlier denial of his motion for 
a new trial.  ECF No. 146.  It cited new authority to support the statute of limitations argument, 
and, for the  first time, argued that this Court lacked jurisdiction to  try Ojedokun because his 
conduct during the money laundering conspiracy all took place when he lived in Nigeria,  thereby 
precluding the extraterritorial application of the money laundering statute.  ECF No. 146 at 7.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(f)(1) (“There is  extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this 
section if—(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non- United States 
citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and (2) the transaction or series of related 
transactions involves funds or monetary instruments of a value exceeding $10,000.”) .1  The 
Government filed an opposition to the motion, ECF No. 151, Ojedokun filed a reply, ECF No. 
152, and a hearing was set for January 25, 2021.  Ojedokun’s new counsel then filed a Second 
Reply to the Government’s Response in Opposition, ECF No. 158, an Outline of Arguments for 
Oral Argument on the motion, ECF No. 159, and an email containing supplemental authorities , 
 
1  Ojedokun does not deny that the transactions involved in the money laundering conspiracy 
exceeded $10,000.00. 
 
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ECF No. 166, which I accepted (and have considered, this time ), despite the fact that their filing 
was in violation of the local rules of this court.2 
 At the hearing on January 25, 2021, I heard argument from counsel, then denied the motion 
for reasons I stated on the record, ECF No. 163, but advised that I intended to supplement the oral 
ruling with a memorandum, because the motion raises some difficult issues, and, somewhat 
surprisingly,  there is an absence of authority that gives clear guidance on what the outcome should 
be.  I will begin with the statute of limitations issue raised by the filing of the superseding 
indictment. 
1. Statute of Limitations Issue. 
 Ojedokun agrees that if the original indictment (identifying conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud as the “specified unlawful activity” that the money laundering conspiracy related to) was a 
legally viable indictment, then the superseding indictment “related back” to th e filing of the 
original indictment, and there is no statute of limitations issue , so long as the superseding 
indictment did not “broaden or substantially amend” the original charge .  United States v. 
Snowden, 770 F.2d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 1985)  (“Trivial or  innocuous” changes will not bar a 
superseding indictment from relating back to the date of the original indictment.); see also Handy 
v. United States, No. AW-09-2011, 2010 WL 3086350, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2010) (“ It is well-
established that ‘a valid indictment tolls the statute of limitations and that return of a superseding 
indictment prior to the dismissal of the original indictment does not violate the statute of 
limitations if the superseding indictment does no t substantially alter the charge.’”) ( citations 
 
2  L.R. 105.2.b prohibits last-minute filing of memoranda—defined as “filed after 4:00 p.m. 
on the afternoon before the last business day preceding the day on which the proceeding to which 
the memorandum relates is to be held.” L.R. 207 makes this rule applic able to filings in criminal 
cases.  The deadline for submitting memoranda in support of Ojedokun’s motion was Thursday, 
January 21, 2021.  The late filed documents were filed on January 23 and 24, 2021.  
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omitted); United States v. Brown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 518, 520 (W.D. Va. 2008) ( “As long as a 
superseding indictment  does not broaden or substantially amend the original indictment, the 
superseding indictment relates back to the filing of the original indictment, even if the superseding 
indictment is filed outside of the statute of limitations period. . . . In determini ng whether a 
superseding indictment broadens the charges in the original indictment, the touchstone is whether 
the original indictment provided notice of the charges such that the defendant can adequately 
prepare his or her defense.”) (citations omitted), aff'd on other grounds, 438 F. App'x 203 (4th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Crysopt Corp., 781 F. Supp. 375, 377 (D. Md. 1991) (“ [A] superseding 
indictment brought after the statute of limitations has expired is valid so long as the original 
indictment is still pending and was timely and the superseding indictment does not broaden or 
substantially amend the original charges.” (citation omitted)).  And, Ojedokun and the Government 
agree that, but for the statute of limitations issue, the supers eding indictment on which Ojedokun 
was tried and convicted was a legally viable indictment alleging a money laundering conspiracy. 
This is because wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, meets the definition of a “specified unlawful activity” 
found in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (A), § 1957 (f)(3), and § 1961(1) that will support a charge of 
money laundering or money laundering conspiracy.  Finally, the Government concedes that the 
offense of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, does not  meet the st atutory 
definition of “specified unlawful activity .”  But, Ojedokun and the Government disagree about 
whether the “specified unlawful activity” referenced in the money laundering statute constitutes 
an essential element of a money laundering conspiracy or money laundering charge, such that it 
must be pleaded in an indictment charging either offense in order for the indictment to be legally 
viable. 
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 The foundation of Ojedokun’s argument lies in United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th 
Cir. 1995).  At the outset, it is important to acknowledge what the issues in Smith did not involve, 
as much or more so than as what it did involve.  It did not involve a statute of limitations issue, 
neither did it involve the filing of a superseding indictment to replace an allegedly deficient 
original indictment.  And, it did not involve the issue of whether conspiracy to commit wire fraud 
would qualify as “specified unlawful activity” under the money laundering statute.  Rather, it 
involved an appeal of a money laundering conviction, in which the defendant argued that the 
money laundering charges in the original indictment were legally deficient because  they alleged 
that the laundered funds “‘were the proceeds of a wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343,’ 
without giving the details of the wire fraud,” thereby failing to “allege a necessary element of the 
offense of money laundering—that the property be ‘“derived from specified unlawful activity.’” 
Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 at 1263 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)).  Thus, the Smith case addressed whether 
the indictment, which alleged an underlying offense (wire fraud)  that clearly is within the 
definition of “specified unlawful activity” in the money laundering statute, adequately put the 
defendant on notice of the charges he was required to defend against.  
 The Smith court began with a tutorial about the basic principles governing what must be 
contained in a legally sufficient indictment.  It said:  
When considering whether an indictment properly charges an offense, we are 
guided by basic principles that (1) the indictment must contain a statement of “the 
essential facts constituting the offense charged,” (2) it must contain allegations of 
each element of the offense charged, so that the defendant is given fair notice of the 
charge that he must defend, and (3) its allegations must be sufficiently distinctive 
so that an acquittal or conviction on such charges can be pleaded to bar a second 
prosecution for the same offense. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  It added “[t]he allegations of an offense are generally sufficient if stated in 
the words of the statute itself.”  Id. at 1264.  
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 Although the indictment accurately cited the wire fraud statute and its elements, and despite 
the fact that it was not disputed that wire fraud i s among the long list of offenses included within 
the statutory definition  of “specified unlawful activity” in the money laundering statute, the 
defendant in Smith argued that the factual details alleged in the indictment referenced several 
classes of victims and multiple theories of guilt, confusing him as to what he had to defend against. 
Id.  The focus of his argument was that, the correct statutory reference to “specified unlawful 
activity” notwithstanding, the factual allegations of the indictment failed to provide him with the 
required notice of the charges against him.  But the Fourth Circuit was having none of this, stating: 
“Smith’s contention, we believe, feigns confusion.  The core transaction constituting the offense 
of money laundering is alleged with specificity and detail, and Smith cannot fail to know what  
transaction forms the basis of the charge.”  Id.  Ojedokun’s case, in stark contrast, involves the 
obverse of the issue in Smith .  Here the challenge is not to the factual sufficiency of the original 
indictment, but rather the correctness of its statutory citation to the “specified unlawful activity.” 
 Ojedokun seizes on the following language in Smith  to support his contention that t he 
“specified unlawful activity” in a money laundering or money laundering conspiracy charge 
constitutes an essential element of the charge, such that a failure correctly to cite a statutorily 
recognized offense as the specified unlawful activity renders the indictment invalid: 
The money laundering statute requires  . . . that the money . . .  be derived 
from “specified unlawful activity.” While it is necessary in order to state a money 
laundering offense to include such an allegation, the requirement is mere ly a 
categorical delineation of the type of funds that are subject to a money laundering 
charge. The core of money laundering, which distinguishes one such offense from 
another, is the laundering transaction itself. Because the requirement that the funds 
be illegally derived is not the distinguishing aspect and therefore does not lie at the 
core of the offense, details about the nature of the unlawful activity underlying the 
character of the proceeds need not be alleged. 
Just because the statute requires th at funds be obtained from “specified” 
unlawful activity does not mean that the government is required to detail the 
circumstances of the unlawful activity. Rather, the term “specified unlawful 
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activity” is a defined term referring to a list of offenses which qualify as unlawful 
activity for purposes of stating a money laundering offense. Section 1957(f)(3) 
adopts the definition of “specified unlawful activity” given in 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(c)(7), which in turn lists five separate categories of offenses that constitute 
“specified unlawful activity.” Wire fraud, penalized under § 1343, is included as a 
“specified unlawful activity” for purposes of money laundering in 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(c)(7)(A). Count 9 of Smith's indictment alleged not only that proceeds were 
derived from specified unlawful activity, but that the activity violated 18 U.S.C. § 
1343, which penalizes wire fraud. Nothing more need be alleged. 
 
Id. at 1264–65.  
 In this regard, Ojedokun and the Government are two parties separated by a common 
language—they each read the above quote to reach opposite conclusions.  Ojedokun reads it to say 
that the “specified unlawful activity” is a required element of a money laundering charge, without 
which the indictment is legally deficient.  In his view, the reference to “conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud” (§ 1349) as the “specified unlawful activity” in his original indictment rendered it invalid 
because § 1956(c)(7)(A), § 1957(d)(3), and § 1961(1) do not include conspiracy to commit wire  
fraud as a recognized “specified unlawful activity .”  It follows inexorably, he reasons, that the 
original indictment was invalid, and the superseding indictment fails to relate back to the original 
indictment or toll limitations, because there is no tolling if the original indictment is invalid.  Def.’s 
Reconsideration Mot. 3–6 (ECF No. 146). 
 The Government views this as nonsense.  It argues that Smith is not a case where the Fourth 
Circuit squarely addressed the essential elements of a money laundering charge, and concluded 
that the “specified unlawful activity” was an essential element of the charge that had to be among 
the statutorily recognized offe nses that meet this definition in the money laundering statute, and 
be correctly alleged in the indictment for the indictment to be valid.  Instead, the Government reads 
Smith to hold, narrowly, that a money laundering indictment that correctly alleges an offense 
recognized as specified unlawful activity in the money laundering statute is sufficient to meet the 
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minimum requirements of a valid indictment, but it is not a sine qua non  for doing so, because it 
is not an element of a money laundering charge.  Gov’t Opp. at 2–3 (ECF No. 151) .  To the 
Government, if the original indictment in this case incorrectly cited conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud (§ 1349) instead of wire fraud (§ 1343) , it was nothing more than a citation error, about 
which Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (2) says “[u]nless the defendant was misled and thereby prejudiced, 
neither an error in a citation nor a citation’s omission is a ground to dismiss the indictment or 
information or to reverse a conviction.”   Because, it argues, Ojedokun  was neither misled or 
prejudiced by the error, his motion must be denied.  
 The question of whether the citation to a statutorily recognized “specified unlawful 
activity” constitutes an essential element of a money laundering or money laundering conspiracy 
charge is not as easily resolved as might be hoped.  It is true, as the Government points out, that in 
United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236 (4th  Cir. 2008), the Fourth Circuit did squarely address the 
essential elements of a money laundering conspiracy charge, holding that “[i]n order to prove . . . 
[a] conspiracy, alleged under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), the prosecution was obliged to establish that: 
(1) an agreement to commit money laundering existed be tween one or more persons; (2) the 
defendant knew that the money laundering proceeds had been derived from an illegal activity; and 
(3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy.”  (citing United States 
v. Allere, 430 F.3d 681, 693–94 ( 4th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 
371 (4th Cir. 2010) (to prove money laundering conspiracy under § 1956(h) “the Government must 
prove the following essential elements: (1) the existence of an agreement between two or more 
persons to commit one or more of the substantive money laundering offenses proscribed under §§ 
1956(a) or 1957; (2) that the defendant knew that the money laundering proceeds had been derived 
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from an illegal activity; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became part of the 
conspiracy.”). 
And Sand’s Modern Federal Jury Instructions–Criminal, a well-respected and frequently 
used reference, further supports the Government’s position that the specified unlawful activity 
referenced in the money laundering statute is not an essential element of the offense .  The 
knowledge instruction reads: 
The fourth element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt is that the defendant knowingly engaged in an unlawful monetary transaction, 
as defined above. 
I instruct you that in a prosecution for an offense under this section, the 
government is not required to prove that the defendant knew the particular offense 
from which the criminally derived property was derived. However, the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the transaction 
involved criminally derived property, which, I remind you, means any property 
constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense. 
If you find that the government has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendant knew that the transaction involved property derived from a 
criminal offense, then this element is satisfied. 
 
3 L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions —Criminal, Instruction No. 50A –30 
(Matthew Bender).
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3  When Ojedokun’s jury was instructed, a slightly modified version of this instruction was 
given. It said:   
The second element of money laundering conspiracy charged in Count One 
of the Superseding Indictment, and which the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, is that the defendant must have known that the proceeds were 
derived from an illegal activity. 
It is not necessary that the defendant knew the particular offense from which 
the criminally derived property was derived.  However, the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the transaction or 
transactions that were the subject of the conspiracy involved criminally derived 
property, which means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds 
obtained from a criminal offense. 
If you find that the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant knew that the transaction(s) involved property derived from a 
criminal offense, then this element is satisfied for the defendant. 
Jury Instruction No. 39, ECF No. 113. 
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 Further, cases from other jurisdictions lend support to the Government’s view.  In United 
States v. Neuman, No. 3:11-CR-00247-BR, 2013 WL 5787176 (D. Or. Oct. 28, 2013) the district 
court addressed the issue of whether conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud could constitute 
“specified unlawful activity” under §§ 1956 or 1961.  In denying the defendants motion for arrest 
of judgment (filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 34), the court observed: “Defendants do not cite 
any controlling authority for their proposition that conspiracy to commit mail or wire fraud cannot 
constitute “specified unlawful activity” under §§ 1956 or 1961 . . . .”  Id. at *2.  The court added: 
“In addition, Defendants overlook the fact that the government is not required to prove a predicate 
act under § 1956(h).”  Id. (citing United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2006), 
which stated: “It is by now abundantly clear that in a  money laundering c ase (or in a money 
laundering conspiracy case), the defendant need not actually commit the alleged specified unlawful 
activity.”).   
 Similarly, United States v. Liersch, No. 04CR02521, 2005 WL 6414047 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 
2005)—a case cited by Ojedokun,
4 more directly addresses the issues in this case. The defendant 
sought to dismiss the indictment against him, in part based on his assertion that the concealment 
money laundering charge failed to allege all the essen tial elements of the statute.   The court 
rejected this argument, saying:  
Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) requires that the money being laundered be “proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity.” Defendant contends that the indictment is insufficient 
because it fails to allege the elements of the specified unlawful activity from which 
the funds that were transferred were allegedly derived.  Defendant’s suggestion to 
the contrary notwithstanding, it is clear in the Ninth Circuit that the elements of the 
specified unlawful activity are not elements of the crime of money laundering.  
 
 
4 Def.’s Mot. 5, ECF No. 146. 
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Id. at *7 (citing United States v. Lomow , 266 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th  Cir. 2001) (“Because the 
elements of money laundering do not include the elements of the ‘specified unlawful activity,’ the 
district court did not violate Rule 11 by  not informing Lomow of the elements of mail fraud.”).  
The Liersch court concluded: “Thus, there is no basis for dismissing the indictment for failing to 
allege the elements of the specified unlawful activity and the  motion to dismiss on this ground is 
denied.”  Id. at *7; see also United States v. Golb , 69 F.3d 1417, 1429 (9th  Cir. 1995) (holding 
that the district court was not required to instruct the jury on the elements of the predicate activity 
for the money laundering charge, because the predicate specified unlawful activity “was not part 
of the charged money-laundering offense.”).  
 Finally, in his second reply, defense counsel cite d Stirone v. United States , 361 U.S. 212 
(1960) to support the proposition that a change in the specified unlawful activity materially alters 
an essential element of the offense.  There, the Supreme Court held that convicting the defendant 
of interference with interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act stemming from his  interstate 
movement of steel —when the indictment alleged he interfered only with movements of sand—
was not fairly charged in the indictment.  Id. at 215. 
 Stirone is unpersuasive as it relates to the present issue.  There, the trial court allowed 
evidence about both prior interstate transfer of sand (as alleged) and potential future interstate 
transfer of steel (which was omitted from the indictment).  Id . at 214.  The trial court went on to  
instruct the jury that the defendant’s guilt could rest on either the sand or the steel allegation.  Id.   
But the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the prospective steel allegation amounted to a 
broadening of the indictment, reasoning “neither this nor any other court can know that the grand 
jury would have been willing to charge that Stirone’s conduct would interfere with interstate 
exportation of steel.”  Id. at 215–17.  Conviction on the steel charge amounted to an amendment 
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of the indictment and added an alternative theory of the defendant’s guilt.  Id . at 218.  Similar  
deficiencies are not present here:  the original and superseding indictment were returned by the 
grand jury. Thus, this is not an instance where the charge was effectively amended by the court 
mid-trial.  Moreover, here the underlying facts remained the same.   
 So, where does this leave us?  If the specified unlawful activity is not an essential element 
of a money laundering or money laundering conspiracy charge, and if the G overnment is not 
required to prove it at trial, or the judge to instruct the jury on the elements of it when making the 
jury charge, does the erroneous citation of wire fraud conspiracy as the “specified unlawful 
activity” in the original indictment against Ojedokun render it legally nugatory, such that the filing 
of a superseding indictment more than five years after the dat e of the last activity of the charged 
money laundering conspiracy is time barred?  And, if Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2) precludes dismissal 
of an indictment or reversal of a conviction when a money laundering conspiracy indictment omits 
a citation to, or erroneously cites , the charged offense (as opposed to the specified unlawful 
activity) in the absence of the defendant being misled or prejudiced, the n, a fortiori, how can an 
error in citation of the specified unlawful activity, which is not an element of the charged offense, 
be a basis for dismissal of the indictment or reversal of a conviction rendered pursuant to it? 
 Based on the discussion above, I agree with the Government that the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Smith cannot fairly be read to hold that the “specified unlawful activity” underlying a 
money laundering charge must be pleaded as an essential element of that charge in order for the 
indictment to be valid.  Rather, the court was faced with a case where the i ndictment correctly 
alleged that the laundered funds “were the proceeds of a wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1343,” but the defendant argued that, viewed collectively , the citation of  the money laundering 
statute (§ 1957) as the charge, the reference to wire fraud as the source of the laundered funds (§ 
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1343), and the factual allegations in the indictment still were insufficient to give him “the details” 
of the wire fraud.  Smith, 44 F.3d at 1263.  After stating the “basic principles” of what an indictment 
must include ((1) essential facts constituting the charge, (2) allegations of each element of charged 
offense, to give fair notice to the defendant, and (3) sufficiently distinctive allegations to allow the 
defendant to plead acquittal or conviction as a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense), 
the court noted that this usually is accomplished simply by using the words of the statute itself.  Id. 
at 1264.  It then concluded  that the word “ specified,” as used in the phrase “specified unlawful 
activity,” was a term of art referring to the type of unlawful activity  included in the statutory 
provisions relating to money laundering.  It did not mean that the indictment was required  to set 
forth in detail the underlying facts supporting the charge against the defendant.  Id. at 1265.  The 
court concluded that because t he indictment before it did allege that the proceeds were derived 
from specified unlawful activity, and that the activity violated § 1343, further factual details were 
not required.  Id.  In short, Smith is best read to hold that what was pleaded in the indictment in 
that particular case was sufficient to allege a money laundering charge.  It did not, as the Fourth 
Circuit did in Singh, 518 F.3d 236, and Green , 599 F.3d 360, undertake to set forth the essential 
elements of a money laundering charge.  And Singh and Green are consistent with the other cases 
cited above that held that the specified unlawful activity underlying a money laundering charge is 
not an essential element of the charge that must be pleaded, defined in the jury charge, and proved 
at trial.  
 In this case, the original indictment did plead the elements of a money laundering 
conspiracy, it did allege they were the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, but it mistakenly 
alleged that th e specified unlawful activity (as that term of art is used in the money laundering 
statute) was conspiracy to commit wire fraud (§ 1349), instead of wire fraud (§ 1343), and the 
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Government concedes that that was an error.  What must be determined now is the consequence 
of that error.  Did it result in a failure to allege the essential elements of a money laundering 
conspiracy?  Singh and Green say “no,” as many other courts have agreed.  If this error was not an 
omission of an essential element, then it was more akin to “an error in citation or a citation’s 
omission,” as referenced in Rule 7(c)(2) —which is not a basis for dismissing the indictment or 
reversing Ojedokun’s conviction, unless he was “misled and thereby prejudiced.”  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 7(c)(2).  And that inquiry dovetails nicely with the inquiry that must be made to determine 
whether the superseding indictment—which “cured” the citation error in the original indictment, 
relates back to it for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.  Both the “relation back” inquiry, 
and the “misled  and prejudiced” inquiry can be accomplished by comparing the original to the 
superseding indictment, to determine if the latter was a “trivial or innocuous change” which does 
not bar relation back, United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393, 398 ( 4th Cir. 1985), or one which 
materially broadened or substantially amended the original charges, United States v. Ratcliff, 245 
F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th  Cir. 2001), which would prevent relation back, and also suggest that 
Ojedokun was “misled and thereby prejudiced” for Rule 7(c)(2) purposes.  
 Both the original indictment and the superseding indictment  (ECF Nos. 6, 79)  charge 
Ojedokun with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).  In 
both charging documents , the statement of the conspirators and charged conduct reference 
Ojedokun, Mukhtar Haruna, and Gbenga Ogundele, and, with respect to the la tter, his company 
G.O. Benson Group, and Wells Fargo bank account number ending in 4126, into which proceeds 
of the underlying criminal conduct were deposited.  And, both discuss the source of the laundered 
funds as various types of internet “romance scams” (with common examples in both, but some 
additional online dating sites of the same nature identified in the superseded indictment).  In 
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addition, both charging documents describe related internet fraud scams that were the source of 
laundered funds, (including t ax return scams, lottery scams, counterfeit check scams, account 
takeovers, and business email scams).  And, while the superseding indictment added employment 
scams and unauthorized wire transfers, these additional examples do not amount to a substantial 
change in the nature of the conspiracy.  The superseding indictment also added that as part of the 
conspiracy, criminals transmitted images of bank deposits and wire transfer forms as proof that a 
victim had been tricked into making a wire transfer or bank deposit , Superseding Indictment ¶ 7, 
but this additional detail did not substantially change the nature of the conspiracy from the original 
indictment.  Similarly, the superseding indictment added that victim identity information also was 
used or tr ansferred during the criminal conduct , id. ¶ 8,  which, again, did not broaden or 
substantially amend the nature of the charged conduct.  Both charging documents charged that the 
conspiracy ended in March 2015, but the superseding indictment charged that the conduct began 
in 2013, instead of January 2011, the commencement date in the original indictment.  Id. ¶ 9.  Thus, 
the superseding indictment narrowed the scope of the conspiratorial conduct, it did not expand it.  
 Of course, as extensively discussed above, the original indictment identified the specified 
unlawful conduct as conspiracy to commit wire fraud (§ 1349), while the superseding indictment 
identified it as wire fraud (§ 1343).  While Ojedokun correctly points out that the elements of proof 
for conspiracy to commit wire fraud are not identical to the elements of wire fraud, both offenses 
are forms of criminal conduct made illegal by the Title 18, Chapter 63 (“Mail Fraud and other 
Fraud Offenses”), so they are similar in essence, and are subject to the same penalties .  § 1349 
(“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject 
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object 
of the attempt or conspiracy.”).  And, of course, the original indictment charged conspiracy to 
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commit wire fraud (as opposed to one of the other forms of fraud listed in Chapter 63 of Title 18), 
so the nature of the fraud itself was the same in both the original and superseding indictments.  
 When the superseding indictment is compared with the original indictment under the lens 
of the “basic principles” used to assess whether an indictment properly charges an offense, both: 
contained the same “essential facts constituting the offense charged”; alleged each element of the 
charged offense (money laundering conspiracy);  and the common factual  allegations were 
“sufficiently distinctive so that an acquittal or conviction” on the money laundering conspiracy 
charged could be pleaded by Ojedokun as a bar to a second indictment for the same offense.  Smith, 
44 F. Supp. 3d at 1263.   And, in each, the allegations of the money laundering conspiracy w ere 
stated in the words of the money laundering s tatute itself, which is “generally sufficient.”  Id.  at 
1264.  To the extent that  Ojedokun claims that he was misled by the content of the superseding 
indictment and was confused about the core transactions he was facing, my reaction is the same as 
the Fourth Circuit’s in Smith—the confusion is feigned.  Id.  
 The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “trivial or innocuous ” changes will not bar a 
superseding indictment from relating back to the date of the original indictment.  United States v. 
Snowden, 770 F.2d 393, 398 ( 4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).  While a change in the offense 
charged in the superseding indictment may not be thought of as “trivial or innocuous,” the offense 
charged in the original and superseding indictment was identical —money laundering conspiracy. 
And, as the Government points out, the original indictment was timely filed, and was still pending 
when the superseding indictment was brought , and I have concluded that the superseding 
indictment did not materially broaden or substantially amend the original indictment.  Under these 
circumstances, as the Eleventh Circuit persuasively has found (collecting cases from the First, 
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Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits holding the same), the touchstone for the relation-
back doctrine is whether the Defendant had notice of the charges against him: 
Notice to the defendant is the central policy underlying the statutes of limitation. If 
the allegations and charges are substantially the same in the old and new 
indictments, the assumption is that the defendant has been placed on notice of the 
charges against him. That is, he knows that he will be called to account for certain 
activities and should prepare a defense. 
 
United States v. Ratcliff, 245 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2001). 
As I have pointed out , the charges in the original and superseding indictment are 
substantially the same.  Ojedokun was placed on notice of the charges against him.  He knew what 
he would be called upon to account for, so that he could prepare his defense.  For that reason, the 
superseding indictment relates back to the timely filed original indictment, and Ojedokun’s statute 
of limitations defense is without merit.
5  
 Finally, for all the reasons why I have found that the superseding indictment did not 
materially broaden or substantially amend the original indictment, I also find that the erroneous 
citation to wire fra ud conspiracy as the “specified unlawful activity” of the money laundering 
conspiracy in the original indictment did not mislead Ojedokun, or prejudice him such that the 
 
5  During the hearing on January 25, 2021, Ojedokun argued that he was misled and 
prejudiced by the change in designation of the “specified unlawful activity ” in the superseding 
indictment.  He hypothesized that had the case gone to trial on the original indi ctment, he would 
have held his cards close to the vest, allowed it to proceed to trial, and if convicted, placed them 
on the table with a flourish in a motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the erroneous 
reference to wire fraud conspiracy in the  original indictment was fatal because that offense does 
not meet the statutory definition of “specified unlawful activity” in the money laundering statute.  
But, for this “defense” to succeed, Ojedokun would have to be correct that the specified unlawful 
activity was an essential element of the money laundering charge, an argument that I have rejected. 
For reasons I have explained at length above, the change in the designation of the “specified 
unlawful activity” did not change an essential element, and so there was no prejudice to him caused 
by his inability to raise his argument that he could not be convicted of money laundering 
conspiracy on an indictment alleging that conspiracy to commit wire fraud was the “specified 
unlawful activity.” 
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original indictment was subject to dismissal or that his conviction should be reversed, for purposes 
of Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2).  For all the reasons stated above, I find that the motion to reconsider 
my earlier denials of Ojedokun’s motion for a new trial or acquittal based on his statute of 
limitations defense must be DENIED. 
2. Extraterritoriality, Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Rule of Lenity, and Void for 
Vagueness. 
 
 In his several filings relating to the pending motion, Ojedokun added some arguments that 
his retained counsel did not raise in his various pretrial and posttrial motions.  Specifically, he now 
claims that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ojedokun (under either of the 
indictments) because, at all times relevant to the allegations in the charging documents Ojedokun 
was residing outside the Uni ted States (specifically, Nigeria ).
6  He supports this argument by 
citation to the extraterritorial jurisdiction provision of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(f), which states:  
There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibite d by this section if: 
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non -United States 
citizen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and (2) the transaction or 
series of related transactions involved funds or monetary instruments of a value 
exceeding $10,000.    
 
There is no dispute in this case that Ojedokun was not a United States Citizen during the 
conduct alleged in the charging documents, and that the money laundering transactions he was 
charged with exceeded $10,000.00.  Rather, Ojedokun hangs his hat on his contention that none 
of his conduct occurred w ithin the United States.   From this position, he argues that criminal 
statutes are presumed not to have an extraterritorial effect, and that this presumption cannot be 
 
6  The Government argues that these arguments were waived by not having been brought 
earlier.  But since subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, I have considered them. 
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overcome in this case, which deprives this court of jurisdiction over the charges brought against 
him.  For good measure, he adds that if I find that there is jurisdiction, I ought to exercise the rule 
of lenity to give him the benefit of the doubt ( assuming there is any doubt about the existence of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction ) and, as a belt- and-suspenders argument, that § 1956(f) is void for 
vagueness.  Because I find that § 1956(f) is not vague, and that the statutory language clearly rebuts 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, and that the conduct of Ojedokun’s co -conspirators 
most certainly (devastatingly, in fact, to the many victims) occurred within the United States , I 
DENY his motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, void for vagueness, and for lenity.  
 Ojedokun is correct that, as a general principle of law, criminal and  civil statutes do not 
have extraterritorial application .  RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community , 136 S. Ct . 2090, 
2100 (2016).  Moreover, in RJR Nabisco , the Supreme Court set forth an elaborate two- step 
framework that ordinarily must be followed for analyzing exterritoriality issues: 
At the first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been 
rebutted—that is, whether the statu te gives a clear, affirmative indication that it 
applies extraterritorially. We must ask this question regardless of whether the statute 
in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction. If the 
statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we determine whether the case 
involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by looking to the 
statute’s “focus.” If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United 
States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other 
conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a 
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application 
regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory. 
 
Id. at 2101. 
Fortunately, however, in this case, it is not necessary to undertake this two -step analysis. 
This is because the money laundering statute, § 1956(f), unambiguously states the circumstances 
when the money laundering statue does have extraterritorial effect.  As recently noted by the 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in United States v. Hawit, (a case 
cited by Ojedokun himself): 
[U]nlike the wire fraud statute, the federal money laundering statute contains a 
provision specifying the circumstances in which it can be applied extraterritorially, 
and thus overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f); 
see RJR Nabisco , 764 F.3d at 139 (“Applying Morrison’s presumption against 
extraterritoriality to [money laundering and material support] statutes, we conclude 
that . . . both apply extraterritorially under specified circumstances. . . .”). 
 
 United States v. Hawit, No. 15-cr-252 (PKC), 2017 WL 663542 at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 
2017).  
I agree with the analysis in Hawit , and similarly conclude that §  1956(f) explicitly 
overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality.  And, as the Government correctly pointed 
out in its opposition memorandum to Ojedokun’s pending motion, §  1956(f)(1) applies to him 
because the conduct of his co -conspirators took place in part in the United States.   Gov’t Opp. 4 
(The jury found Ojedokun conspired with Ogundele, a Maryland Resident; this is the clearest 
example of the instant conduct occurring in the United States.); see also United States v. Firtash, 
392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2019)  (holding district court had jurisdiction over defendants 
outside of the U.S. due to co- conspirator’s substantial actions in the U.S. in furtherance of the 
conspiracy); United States v. Hayes , 99 F. Supp. 3d 409, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)  (denying Swiss 
citizen defendant’s motion to dismiss in § 1349 prosecution upon finding Complaint alleged 
sufficient nexus between defendant and the U.S. where defendant’s and conduct occurred abroad); 
United States v. Hijazi, 845 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886 (C.D. Ill. 2011) (citing United States v. Wormick, 
709 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 1983)  (co-conspirator’s “actions in furtherance of the scheme to 
defraud can thus be attributed to [the defendant], even though he is a foreign national”); Unite d 
States v. Manuel, 371 F. Supp. 2d 404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The Supreme Court has specifically 
upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over conspirators who have never entered the United States, 
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where the conspiracy was ‘directed to violation of the United States law within the United 
States.’”); cf. United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1997) (“a conspiracy occurring 
partly within the United States is prosecutable without resort to any theory of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction”); United States v. Finch , Cr. No. 10-333 SOM–KSC, 2010 WL 3938176, at *2 (D. 
Haw. Sept. 30, 2010) (“if an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy occurs in this country, then 
the conspiracy falls within the jurisdiction of the United States”).  
 Because I have no doubt about the application of the unambiguous text of 18 U.S.C. §  
1956(f)(1) to this case, there is no basis to apply the rule of lenity to Ojedokun. And, as noted, I 
do not find that § 1956(f) is ambiguous, therefore it is not void for vagueness.  
Conclusion 
 For all of the above reasons, Ojedokun’s motion for reconsideration and related relief is 
DENIED.  A separate order follows.  
 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2021.  
       BY THE COURT:   
 
                /S/                         
Paul W. Grimm 
United States District Judge 
  
  
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