govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01015-7

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
MICHAEL ABRAMOWITZ, et al., 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
Case No. 1:25-cv-887-RCL 
KARI LAKE, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
PATSY WIDAKUSWARA, et al., 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
Case No. 1:25-cv-1015-RCL 
KARI LAKE, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Before the Court are  cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the Administrative 
Procedure Act claims raised by the plaintiffs in the above -captioned cases.  The plaintiffs 
challenge the defendants’ actions in M arch 2025 to dramatically downsize the United States 
Agency for Global Media and its subsidiary, Voice of America, as violating Sections 70 6(1) and 
(2) of the APA.  After clearing a series of threshold hurdles, the Court  ultimately concludes that 
the plaintiffs prevail on all aspects of their APA claims except for certain contractors’ requests 
for reinstatement.  Accordingly, each parties’ motion will be GRANTED IN PART  and 
DENIED IN PART as set forth in an accompanying order.   
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I. BACKGROUND 
a. Statutory Structure 
Voice of America  (“VOA”) originated as a counter -propaganda operation  against the 
Nazi regime during World War II.  Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 
166-2, ¶ 1 (“SUMF”).1  Following the war, Congress codified VOA’s existence as a service “to 
disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people and policies promulgated by 
the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government 
having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs.”  Id. ¶¶ 2–3 (quoting U.S. Information and 
Educational Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 80 -402, § 2(1), 62 Stat. 6 , 6 (1948)).  Since that time, 
Congress has refined the legal and administrative framework governing VOA’s operations 
through a series of amendments.  E.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
94-350, § 503, 90 Stat. 823, 831 (1976) (expressing that “the long-range interests” of the United 
States “are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio”).   
The International Broadcasting Act ( the “Broadcasting Act”) of 1994 establishes VOA’s 
current governance structure and places VOA under the oversight of the U.S. Agency for Global 
Media (“USAGM”).  SUMF ¶¶ 7–8.  “The [Broadcasting Act] declared that ‘it is the policy of 
the United States to promote the right of freedom of opinion and expression, including the 
freedom “to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers,” in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”  
Turner v. U.S. Agency for Glob. Media , 502 F. Supp. 3d 333, 345 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Pub. 
L. No. 103-2436, § 302(1), 180 Stat. 433 (1994)); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6201(1).  
 
1 Unless otherwise specified, ECF citations refer to the docket in Widakuswara v. Lake, et al., No. 25-cv-1015-RCL.  
Facts cited herein are found not to be in material dispute unless specified. 
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The Broadcasting Act  requires “United States international broadcasting ” to be 
“conducted in accordance with the standards and principles” established by Congress in 22 
U.S.C. §  6202(a)–(b) and tasks the Chief Executive Officer of USAGM with “ensur[ing]” 
adherence to those standards .  22 U.S.C. §  6204(3).  As to standards, Congress requires, for 
example, that broadcast activities “shall be consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of 
the United States,” id. § 6202(a)(1), “not duplicate the activities of private United States 
broadcasters” or “government supported broadcasting entities of other democratic nations,” id. 
§ 6202(a)(3)–(4), “be conducted in accordance with the highest professional standards of 
broadcast journalism,” id. § 6202(a)(5), “be designed so as to effectively reach a significant 
audience,” id. § 6202(a)(7), and “promote respect for human rights, including freedom of 
religion,” id. § 6202(a)(8).  As to principles, Congress prescribes that USAGM’s “broadcasting 
shall include news which is consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective, and 
comprehensive,” id. § 6202(b)(1), and “information about developments in each significant 
region of the world,” id. § 6202(b)(6), among others.   
In 2021, with bipartisan support, Congress created the International Broadcasting 
Advisory Board, which advises the CEO  of USAGM and must approve, by a majority vote, the 
appointment and removal of the heads of USAGM’s broadcasting entities, including the director 
of Voice of America.  SUMF ¶  10; see also 22 U.S.C. §  6205(e)(1); Abramowitz v. Lake , 803 
F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2025), appeal filed Sept. 3, 2025. 
b. Congressional funding for USAGM 
USAGM and VOA  receive taxpayer funding through Congressional appropriations.  In 
2024, Congress appropriated $857,214,000 to USAGM to “carry out international 
communication activities.”  SUMF ¶  12 (quoting Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
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2024, Pub. L. No. 118 -47, div. F, 138 Stat. 460, 735 (2024) ).  Of those funds,  Congress 
earmarked $260,032,000 for Voice of America.  Id. (“[F]unds appropriated under this heading 
shall be allocated in accordance with the table included under this heading in the explanatory 
statement described in section 4.”); 118th Congress, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2024, Legislative Text and Explanatory Statement at 1167 (Comm. Print 2024) ( detailing VOA 
and grantee funding). 
Prior to receiving the 2024 appropriation, USAGM had submitted a budget justification , 
which described the reasons for USAGM ’s funding requests and how such funding  would be 
spent, including projected broadcasting hours across an array of countries and languages.  SUMF 
¶ 14 (citing Abramowitz ECF No. 49-3 (Congressional Budget Justification for FY2025)).  In the 
2024 appropriation , Congress required that “significant modifications to USAGM broadcast 
hours previously justified to Congress ,” to include “shortwave, medium wave, satellite, Internet, 
and television ” broadcasting,  “for all USAGM language services shall be subject to regular 
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.”  SUMF ¶  13 (quoting 138 Stat. 
460, 735–36). 
Congress funded USAGM and VOA at the same level, and subject to the same 
conditions, through three successive appropriation cycles in 2024 and 2025 .  SUMF ¶¶  15–17; 
Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-83, 138 Stat. 1524 (2024) 
(extending funding for fiscal year 2025  “at a rate for operations as provided in the applicable 
appropriations Acts for fiscal year 2024 and under the authority and conditions provided in such 
acts”); American Relief Act of 2025, Pub L. No. 118 -158, 138 Stat. 1722, 1723 (2025)  (same); 
H.R. 1968, 119th Cong. § 1101(a) (2025) (same).   
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c. USAGM’s Broadcasting Operations 
On March 1 4, 2025, Voice of America had  been providing multimedia broadcasting in 
forty-nine languages to approximately 362 million people around the world  each week.  SUMF 
¶ 20 (citing Decl. of Michael Abramowitz, Abramowitz ECF No. 4 -5 ¶ 1).  USAGM and VOA 
collectively employed 1,147 full-time employees and had entered into service contracts with 598 
contractors, whom the parties refer to as “personal  service contractors” or “PSCs.”   Id. ¶ 21.  
VOA personnel accounted for more than 1,300 of the total number of employees and contractors 
at USAGM .  Id.  The contractors included VOA journalists based in foreign countries whose 
reporting was focused  on audiences  abroad.  Id. ¶ 22.  Thirty-two radio broadcast technicians 
also facilitated programming operations.  Id. ¶ 23.  
On March 14, 2025, the President issued an Executive Order titled “Continuing the 
Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy ,” which directed seven federal agencies, including 
USAGM, to “reduce the performance of their statutory functions and associated personnel to the 
minimum presence and function required by law.”  Exec. Order No. 14,238, § 2(a)(ii), 90 Fed. 
Reg. 13043 (Mar. 14, 2025) (the “Executive Order” or “EO”) .  The President signed the 2025 
appropriations law later that day, including for continued  funding for USAGM and VOA as 
described above.  SUMF ¶ 25. 
The E xecutive Order led the defen dants t o bring USAGM ’s operations to a standstill.  
Defendant Kari Lake learned of the Executive Order on the evening of March 14, and USAGM’s 
leadership immediately began implementing the EO on March 15.  Id. ¶ 26 (citing Lake Dep. at 
97:13–14, 106:4–15).2  Although Lake’s role within USAGM at the time was “Senior Adviser to 
 
2 The defendants object to considering the depositions of Kari Lake, Frank Wuco, and Leili Soltani taken during 
show-cause proceedings as part of the summary judgment record .  The objection lacks merit.  First, the defendants 
have long withheld the administrative record in this case despite an obligation to produce it contemporaneously with 
 
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the CEO,” she testified in this case that she had been delegated nearly all of the CEO’s statutory 
authority.  See id. ¶ 28 (quoting Lake Dep. 55:3 –13 (testifying that Lake was exercising “95 
percent of” the “authorit[ies] of the CEO,” including everything apart from “[w]riting reports 
that were due”)); see also ECF Nos. 214-2, 214-3 (delegating CEO authorities to Lake).   
According to Lake, the leadership team made a decision on March 15  to reduce 
USAGM’s operations to the “statutory minimum ” based solely on the direction contained in the 
Executive Order.  Id. ¶ 26; see also id. ¶¶ 27–28.  But before even making a determination as to 
what the “statutory minimum” was, the defendants immediately began winding the agency down 
to only sk eletal operations.  Effective immediately, the defendants placed nearly all USAGM 
staff on paid administrative leave pending further study of  what the “statutory minimum” was.  
Id. ¶ 36–37.  Consequently, 1,042 out of USAGM’s 1,147 full -time employees were placed on 
administrative leave.  Id. ¶ 37.  On the same date, Lake “decided to terminate all the personal 
service contractors” under the ambit of VOA.  Id. ¶ 38 (quoting Lake Dep. at 102:14 –21).  The 
next day, USAGM notified 598 contractors that their agreements with the government would be 
terminated effective March 31, 2025.  Id.  The defendants  also “directed that VOA cease all 
programming” and “ordered . . . the VOA news services” to “shut down their transmitters.”  Id. 
¶ 40 (quoting Lake Dep. 109:7 –110:1).  Within days, USAGM also notified union official s that 
the agency intended to terminate all radio broadcast technicians and 594 union employees , 
 
the filing of their motion to dismiss.  See LCvR 7(n)(1).  Second, the depositions at issue were authorized precisely 
because of the defendants ongoing refusal to produce basic information about USAGM and VOA’s operations and 
future plans.  Indeed, not until this Court threatened the defendants with the specter of contempt proceedings did 
they produce the Statutory Minimum Memorandum  itself, the agency action implementing the Executive Order.  
The defendants’ persistent omission and withholding of key information in this case has been a Hallmark production 
in bad faith and is more than sufficient to justify consideration of the depositions .  See Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell , 
111 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that courts may consider extra -record evidence in administrative 
summary judgment proceedings when, inter alia, “the agency acted in bad faith”).   
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“including broadcast journalists, technicians, budget analysts, electronics engineers, and others.”  
Id. ¶ 41.   
The only documentation reflecting the  foregoing agency action is a memorandum dated 
March 18, 2025 (the “Statutory Minimum Memorandum” or “Memorandum”).  See id. ¶ 30; see 
also ECF No. 166-4.  The three-page Memorandum identified sixty-eight employee or contractor 
positions to retain, excluding members of the Senior Executive Service,  and provided that “[a]ll  
other positions would be terminated.”  Id.  It was signed by acting CEO Victor Morales, CFO 
Roman Napoli, HR Director Crystal Thomas, acting CMO Christopher Luer, legal officer Royce 
Min, and TSI director Terry Balazs, but not by L ake herself.  See ECF No. 166-4 at 5.  Lake 
testified that the Memorandum was a “foundational document” that leadership intended the 
agency to “rely on” in implementing the Executive Order.  SUMF ¶ 31 (quoting Lake Dep. at 
168:13–14).  Although the Memorandum described certain contents as “recommendations,” see 
ECF No. 166 -4 at 3, a ccording to Lake, the Memorandum provided “guidance” on “what the 
statutory minimum was” so that the defendants “could effectuate the President’s executive 
order.”  SUMF ¶ 31 (quoting Lake Dep. 156:13 –19).  The Memorandum “list[s] the number of 
employees that will fill various positions after the downsizing is accomplished ,” and the 
defendants do not dispute  that the document “contains no findings, analysis, or consideration of 
any relevant factors” apart from an assertion, as inscrutable as it is conclusory, that “[t]he Voice 
of America functional requirement and scope is duplicative with the activities of [United States] 
private broadcasters .”  Id. ¶¶ 32–33.  Lake testified t hat the Memorandum reflected USAGM 
leadership’s “decision that this was [the] statutory minimum.”  Id. ¶ 44 (quoting Lake Dep. at 
153:14–18).  It was meant to be used to “guide[] the agency’s decisions” in implementing the 
Executive Order.  Id.  As a result, for just over a year since March 15, 2025, “hundreds of VOA 
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and USAGM employees” have been “paid their full government salary but prohibited from doing 
any work.”  Id. ¶ 39. 
d. Procedural History 
Proceedings in these cases began shortly after the foregoing events.  On March 21, 2025, 
the Widakuswara plaintiffs sued defendants Kari Lake, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, and 
Victor Morales, in his official capacity as the acting CEO of USAGM, in the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York.  See Widakuswara Compl., ECF No. 1.  The Southern 
District granted a temporary restraining order  (“TRO”) on March 28, 202 5, concluding that the 
defendants likely violated several provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  
Widakuswara ECF No. 54 at 21–22.   
Meanwhile, on March 26, Voice of America director Michael Abramowitz , as well as 
three other plaintiffs, 3 sued Lake, USAGM, and Morales alleging similar legal violations based 
on the same facts.  See Abramowitz Compl., ECF No. 1.  On April 4, while the Widakuswara 
TRO was in effect but before the Southern District ruled on the pending motion for preliminary 
injunction, Widakuswara was transferred to this Court as related to Abramowitz.   
On April 22, 2025, th is Court entered a preliminary injunction granting relief in both 
cases, finding that the defendants had likely engaged in arbitrary and capricious action and 
unlawfully withheld required agency action under §  706(1) and (2) of the APA.  See 
Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 33 (D.D.C. 2025).  As relevant here, the  Court 
ordered the defendants to “take all necessary steps to return USAGM employees and contractors 
to their status prior to” the Executive Order “including by restoring all USAGM employees and 
personal service contractors, who were placed on leave or terminated, to their status prior to 
 
3 The first John Doe plaintiff in Abramowitz was terminated on March 28, 2025.  
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March 14, 2025” (“Prong One”) and to “restore VOA programming such that USAGM fulfills its 
statutory mandate [to] ‘serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news’” 
(“Prong Three”).4  Id. at 39–40 (quoting 22 U.S.C. §  6202(c)).  The defendants appealed Prong 
One and obtained a stay , Widakuswara v. Lake , No. 25 -5144, 2025 WL 1288817, at *1 (D.C. 
Cir. May 3, 2025) , which t he en banc D.C. Circuit left in place , see Widakuswara v. Lake , No. 
25-5144, 2025 WL 1521355, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2025)  (en banc).  However, a majority of 
the en banc court wrote separately to clarify that the denial of en banc review “should not be 
understood to accept .  . . the government’s assertion” that “the district court lacks any authority 
. . . ‘to order personnel decisions’” in the interim.  Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 25-5144, 2025 WL 
2787974, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2025) (en banc) (Statement of Srinivasan, C.J.). 
Prong Three of the preliminary injunction remained intact, but the defendants resumed 
only limited operations at Voice of America .  The plaintiffs therefore moved for an order to 
show cause regarding the defendants’ compliance with Prong Three.  After the defendants failed 
to provide satisfactory responses, the Court ordered the depositions of three USAGM and VOA 
employees: Kari Lake, Frank Wuco, and VOA Persia Service Division Director and acting Head 
of Programming Leili Soltani.  See Order on Mot. to Show Cause, Widakuswara ECF No. 72. 
The Abramowitz and Widakuswara plaintiffs have now  jointly moved for partial 
summary judgment on their respective APA claims.  The defendants cross -moved.  The motions 
are now fully briefed and ripe.5 
 
4 Under Prong Two of the preliminary injunction, t he Court also ordered restoration of grant funding to several 
grantee networks in separate related cases.  Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 40.  Those grantees are not parties to 
the instant dispute.  
5 While these motions remained pending, on March 7, 2026 , the Court granted summary judgment  in favor of the 
Widakuswara plaintiffs on separate claims under the Appointments Clause and Federal Vacancies Reform Act , 
holding that Defendant Lake had unlawfully exercise d the authorities of the CEO of USA GM.  See ECF Nos. 218–
 
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II.  LEGAL STANDARDS 
a. Motion for Summary Judgment 
A movant is entitled to summary judgment if he or she “shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A fac t is “material” only if “it might affect the outcome of a suit under 
governing law.”  Mayorga v. Merdon , 928 F.3d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting  Holcomb v. 
Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ).  A dispute is “genuine” only if “the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Rule 56(c) “explicitly require[s] a party opposing summary judgment to support an 
assertion that a fact is genuinely disputed with materials in the record.”  Oveido v. Wash. Metro. 
Area Transit Auth. , 948 F.3d 386, 396 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  “When parties file cross -motions for 
summary judgment, each motion is considered separately, in the light most favorable to the non -
moving party, and the court must determine, for each motion, whether the Rule 56 standard has 
been met.”  Am. Ctr. for Int’l Lab . Solidarity v. Chavez -DeRemer, 789 F. Supp. 3d 66, 80 
(D.D.C. 2025).   
III. ANALYSIS 
a. The plaintiffs have adequately shown Article III standing. 
The defendants dispute the plaintiffs’ Article III standing to pursue their claims , an 
argument the plaintiffs unsurprisingly resist.  For substantially the same reasons addressed in the 
Court’s preliminary injunction  ruling, the Court finds the associational and organizational 
plaintiffs have standing. 
 
19.  However, because the Statutory Minimum M emorandum was not issued under Lake ’s purported authority , the 
motions now before the Court continue to present a live dispute. 
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Because “standing is not dispensed in gross,” Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 
(1996), the Court must assess the plaintiffs’ standing with respect to the particular claim at issue 
and “each form of relief” sought, TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez , 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021).  
Article III standing requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate that, for each claim, they have (1) 
“suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” (2) that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant,” and (3) that  is “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.”  Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 –61 (1992) (citations omitted).  At summary judgment, proof of 
standing must consist of “affidavits or other evidence to demonstrate the specific facts necessary 
to support standing.”  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Regan , 597 F. Supp. 3d 173, 188 (D.D.C. 
2022).  Membership-based organizations may demonstrate standing through either of two 
avenues: they may invoke “ associational standing” to sue on behalf of their members, Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), or “organizational standing” to 
sue on their own behalf, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 797 
F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015).   
As the Court has previously addressed, the union plaintiffs in Widakuswara — the 
American Federation of Government Employees (“AFGE” ) and the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”)  — may assert associational standing.  
See Widakuswara, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 26–27.  To show associational standing, the  plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that “(1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his own right, (2) 
the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires that an individual member of the association participate 
in the lawsuit.”  Sierra Club v. EPA , 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002).   The defendants’ 
placement of union members on administrative leave and oft-repeated intention to remove 
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approximately 600 of the unions’ members  causes injury to AFGE and AFSCME’s  members 
within the meaning of Article III.  Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 26–27.  As to the second and 
third prongs of the  associational standing test , it remains germane to the unions’ purpose to 
defend “the existence of the agency where their members work, or that funds their members’ 
work,” and “the relief that Plaintiffs seek pertains to Defendants’ wholesale dissolution of 
USAGM and does not depend on the individual circumstances of any union member.”  Id. at 27.   
The defendants’ actions also inflict Article III injuries on Reporters Sans Frontières  
(“RSF”) and its correspondents as consumers of VOA broadcasting .  See Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to 
Dismiss at 22, ECF No. 131.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged a “right to ‘receive 
information and ideas,’” and has acknowledged a cognizable injury to that right “where the 
listener has a concrete, specific connection to [a] speaker” whose message  is curtailed by 
government action.  Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 75 (2024) (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).  RSF’s correspondents rely on VOA as a “critical flow of 
information” in locations around the world “where media is tightly controlled,” and where 
VOA’s broadcasts in local languages therefore “cannot be replicated by domestic outlets.”  Decl. 
of Thibaut Bruttin ¶ 9, Widakuswara ECF No. 16-15 (“Bruttin Decl.”).  Indeed, RSF has detailed 
at length how correspondents reporting on  countries including the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tibet and Vietnam suffer due to the sudden absence of VOA 
broadcasting in those countries.  See also id.  ¶¶ 10–12, 16 –17.  For example, an RSF 
correspondent in Vietnam relies on regular VOA broadcasts for information about the 
government that is not  otherwise available, and without which the correspondent would have to 
cultivate their own sources  at potential risk to their safety .  Id. ¶ 10 (explaining that at least one 
VOA journalist has been jailed in Vietnam for reporting on the government).  The Court finds 
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that these plaintiffs’ have a “concrete” and “specific connection” to USAGM’s broadcasting.  
Murthy, 603 U.S. at 75.  These injuries are likely to persist so long as VOA’s broadcasting 
remains broadly inoperative, as the Statutory Minimum Memorandum would require .  See Food 
& Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med. , 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024) (requiring plaintiffs 
seeking injunctive relief to show “sufficient likelihood of future injury”).  Taken together, these 
facts support the conclusion that severing RSF members’ access  to VOA broadcasting causes  
Article III injuries , and thus, RSF has standing .  See Carpenters Indus . Council v. Zinke , 854 
F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[When] constitutional standing ‘can be shown for at least one 
plaintiff,’ [the Court] need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise that claim.” 
(quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).6   
b. The plaintiffs’ APA claims are ripe. 
Next, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs’ APA claims are not ripe .  ECF No. 188  
at 30.  The ripeness doctrine is designed to “prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature 
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, 
and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has 
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.”  Nat’l Park 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 807 –08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Lab’ys v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 –49 (1967)).  Constitutional ripeness, however, is “subsumed” by 
standing’s injury-in-fact requirement.  See Am. Petroleum Inst. v EPA , 683 F.3d 382, 386 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012).  Th us, the plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the  Article III injury -in-fact requirement , as 
described supra, also satisfies the constitutional ripeness requirement. 
 
6 Although the defendants do not challenge Abramowitz’s standing to assert the related but independent APA claims 
raised in his Complaint, see Compl., Abramowitz ECF No. 1, the Court is satisfied that his placement on 
administrative leave gives rise to Article III standing to raise his APA challenge.  
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To the extent the defendants ’ Cross -Motion and Opposition to Summary Judgment  
incorporates the prudential ripeness arguments briefly raised in their motion to dismiss, see ECF 
No. 188 at 30; ECF No. 128  at 37, their challenge mischaracterizes the plaintiffs’ APA claims.   
To the extent it retains vitality, 7 the prudential ripeness inquiry asks courts to examine “both the 
fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.”  AT&T Corp. v. F.C.C. , 349 F.3d 692, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott 
Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 149).   The defendants contend that this case is premature because USAGM 
“is not closed and has employees to provide mission support.”  ECF No. 128  at 37.   But t he 
plaintiffs do not  premise th is litigation  on the literal nonexistence  of USAGM .  Nor does the 
Court take the defendants as suggesting that the Statutory Minimum Memorandum called for the 
closure of the agency.  Rather, they dispute whether the defendants’ downsizing of the agency 
accounted for relevant statutory factors, weighed reliance interests, and resulted i n the unlawful 
withholding of required action .  This argument provides no basis to conclude that the agency’s 
decision is prudentially unripe. 
Further, Lake’s testimony makes clear  that the agency had “ crystalliz[ed] its policy” by 
March 18.  Assante v. Azar , 436 F. Supp. 3d 215, 224 (D.D.C.  2020) (quoting Nevada v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy , 457 F.3d 78, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) ; see also AT&T Corp. , 349 F.3d at 699 
(“[Claims rais[ing] purely legal questions . . . [are] presumptively suitable for judicial review.”) .  
For example, Lake testified that the Memorandum reflected USAGM leadership’s “decision that 
this was [the] statutory minimum.”  SUMF ¶ 44 (quoting Lake Dep. at 153:14 –18).  Lake also 
 
7 The Court also harbors doubts about the vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine, which has been questioned by 
the Supreme Court by both word and deed in recent years.  See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U.S. 149, 
167 (2014) (doubting whether a court could “deem .  . . claims nonjusticiable ‘on grounds that are “prudential” rather 
than constitutional’” when a “‘court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction” is otherwise 
“virtually unflagging” (quoting Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014))). 
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testified that the agency has continued to rely on the Statutory Minimum Memorandum for 
“guidance” as to its ongoing operations,8 see id. ¶ 31 (quoting Lake Dep. 156:13–19), confirming 
that the policy is already in place  and that the Court need not wait for the defendants’ decisions 
to “tak[e] on a more definite form ,” AT&T Corp. , 349 F.3d at 699 –700.  In light of these 
undisputed facts, there is no reason to think the issues  on which the  plaintiffs seek summary 
judgment would benefit from further factual development  or that resolving those issues now 
would work a hardship on the d efendants.  See id. at 700 (“[W]here there are no institutional 
interests favoring postponement of review, [the plaintiff] need not satisfy the hardship prong.”).  
The claims before the Court do not raise theoretical disagreement over agency policies yet to be 
implemented or subject to future contingencies .  Cf. Trump v. New York , 592 U.S. 125, 134 
(2020).  Rather, the plaintiffs challenge identifiable agency action whose “effects” are manifestly 
being “felt in a concrete way” by USAGM personnel and consumers.  Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 
148.   
c. The Civil Service Reform Act does not extinguish jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
The defendants next contend that only the Merit Systems Protection Board  (“MSPB”), 
and not a federal district court, may exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ APA claims 
because, in the defendants’ view, the APA claims are quintessentially employment disputes 
subject to the Civil Service Reform Act  (“CSRA”).  The plaintiffs maintain that their APA 
challenge is trained on the Statutory Minimum Memorandum’s programmatic decision to draw 
down agency operations, not individual employment decisions, and that in any event, the claims 
of plaintiff RSF should be not channeled to the MSPB because their claims do not stem from 
 
8 As addressed further in the merits discussion that follows, to the extent the defendants have deviated from the 
Statutory Minimum Memorandum, they have done so only in response to the unstayed portions of the preliminary 
injunction entered in this case.   
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their own employment losses.  See Reply at 10; Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (observing 
that RSF, RSF-USA, and TNG-CWA “are not implicated” by the jurisdictional bar because their 
claims are not premised on employment relationships with the government). 
Subject to constitutional limitations, “Congress decides what cases the federal courts 
have jurisdiction to consider.”  Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007).  Thus, although 
district courts ordinarily enjoy jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, Congress may “preclude district court jurisdiction by establishing an alternative statutory 
scheme for administrative and judicial review ,” Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps., AFL -CIO v. Trump , 
929 F.3d 748 , 754 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  The defendants’ argument invokes that power.  When 
determining whether Congress has established an alternative statutory scheme , courts apply the 
two-step framework set forth in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich , 510 U.S. 200 (1994).  
Applying the Thunder Basin inquiry, a court may find “Congress intended that a litigant proceed 
exclusively through a statutory scheme,” thereby barring original district court jurisdiction, 
“when (i) such intent is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,’ and (ii) the litigant’s claims 
are ‘of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure.’”  Jarkesy v. 
SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207). 
In the context of government employment, the CSRA, which includes the Federal Service 
Labor-Management Relations Statute, “regulates virtually every aspect of federal employment.”  
Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors , 589 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  But although 
Congress “carefully constructed a system for review and resolution of federal employment 
disputes,” Filebark v. Dep’t of Transp., 555 F.3d 1009, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009)  (emphasis added), 
the defendants overstep the bounds of Congress’s dis cernible intent  by arguing that the non -
employee plaintiffs’ claims must be channeled under the CSRA .  RSF, as explained  supra, and 
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TNG-CWA raise claims based on their status as listeners of USAGM -sponsored broadcasts, and 
their claims against the defendants are whol ly independent of  the merits of any individual or 
collective employment actions taken by the defendants.  See Part III.a supra (discussing RSF).   
The defendants’ sole response is that the relief RSF and TNG -CWA “seek is undeniably 
based on injuries that would result from Defendants’ employment decisions,” citing Maryland v. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture , 151 F.4th 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2025) .  See ECF No. 188 at 20.  
But Maryland involved a distinct arrangement of facts ; t here, several states sued the federal 
government alleging violation s of the notice requirements for a reduction -in-force of federal 
employees.  See 151 F.4th at 206.  The Fourth Circuit held that those states lacked standing (not 
that the states’ claims were subject to Thunder Basin channeling) because the states’ alleged 
informational injuries were not cognizable.  Id. at 209.  “The real and direct harms were suffered 
not by the States, but by the terminated . . . employees,” none of whom were party to the lawsuit.  
Id. at 210.  The Court also reasoned that even assuming the states could show injury -in-fact, 
those injuries were unlikely to be redressable, in part because the CSRA would preclude 
affording the employees, and therefore the states, relief.  Id. at 215.  RSF ’s theory of standing, 
premised on harm to their rights as listeners and traceable to the  Statutory Minimum 
Memorandum and its effects, does not suffer from these defects.  Nor does the resolution of their 
claims turn on a merits -based determination of the employment actions that give rise to the 
employees’ injuries.  The record thus continues to compel the same conclusion that the Court 
reached at the preliminary injunction stage , which is that any jurisdictional bar would not apply 
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to the claims brought by  non-employee plaintiffs like RSF.9  Widakuswara, 779 F.  Supp. 3d at 
30. 
d. The Tucker Act precludes the Court from reinstating the personal service 
contractors’ agreements. 
The defendants next contend that the Tucker Act extinguishes the Court’s jurisdiction to 
hear the APA claims of  contractor Plaintiffs Anthony LaBruto, Abramowitz John Doe 2, and 
Widakuswara John Does 3 and 4  (together, the “ Contractor Plaintiffs”).  Opp’n at 25.  On this 
point, the Court agrees with the defendants .  Following the approach and reasoning in American 
Association of Physics Teachers v. National Science Foundation , the Court concludes that it 
lacks jurisdiction over the named Contractor Plaintiffs’ APA claims insofar as they seek an order 
reversing the cancellation of individual personal service contracts because those claims “are ‘at 
[their] essence ’ contract actions ‘over which the Court of [Federal] Claims has exclusive 
jurisdiction.’”  804 F. Supp. 3d 45, 60 (D.C.C. 2025)  (alterations in original ) (quoting 
Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).   
First, these plaintiffs were in a contractual relationship with the government .  See SUMF 
¶ 21; see also 48 C.F.R. §  37.104 (Federal Acquisition Regulation defining “personal services 
contract” as being “characterized by the employer -employee relationship it creates between the 
Government and the contractor’s personnel”).  Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact, nor do they 
argue that their particular agreements with the government  would fail to qualify as contracts for 
 
9 It bears mentioning that n o D.C. Circuit ruling has reasoned to the contrary.  The stay panel decision disagreed 
with this Court’s conclusion that the employees did not raise employment disputes (and therefore were not subject to 
channeling), but it did not address the Court’s alternat ive holding that the RSF TNG -CWA’s claims were not 
employment claims.   See Widakuswara v. Lake , 2025 WL 1288817, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2025) (per curiam) , 
vacated in part , 2025 WL 1521355 (May 28, 2025).   And the panel decision in a separate case set aside the 
jurisdictional bar based on similar reasoning.  See Nat’l Treasury Emp s. Union v. Vought , 149 F.4th 762, 776 (D.C. 
Cir. 2025), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 25-5091, 2025 WL 3659406 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025). 
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purposes of the Tucker Act.  See Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 785, 790 
(2001) (quoting Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).   
Second, the APA claims raised by the Contractor Plaintiffs are contractual in essence .  
Under binding precedent, “[c]laims based on ‘truly independent legal grounds,’ such as statutes 
or the Constitution, can be heard in district court, while those that ‘sound[] genuinely in contract’ 
belong in the Court of Federal Claims.”  Am. Ass’n of Physics Tchrs., 804 F.  Supp. 3d at 62 
(alterations in original) (quoting Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 969 –70).  Megapulse directs courts to 
examine the “essence” of APA claims implicating contractual arrangements with the government 
to determine whether the claim “presents a disguised contract action.”  672 F.2d at 967 –68.  To 
do so, the Court engages in a two-part inquiry, analyzing “the source of the rights” from which 
the claim arises and “the type of relief sought (or appropriate).”  Id. at 968. 
The first prong points to the contracts as the source of the rights at issue.  The Contractor 
Plaintiffs’ right to relief is premised on their contractual relationship with USAGM.  “[I]n no 
sense did it exist independently of th[ose] contract[s].”  Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States, 
764 F.2d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  The plaintiffs argue that the defendants were generally 
“required to comply with the APA before taking actions that resulted in the cessation of relied -
upon government services ” and ask the Court to “set aside” the “[c]ancell[ation] [of]contracts 
with [the] approximately 589 [contractors]” that were engaged by USAGM prior to May 30.  
Pl.’s Mot. at 31 –32.  But they do not argue, for example, that the defendants were under an 
independent and specific statutory obligation to enter into contracts with them.  Cf. Open Tech. 
Fund v. Lake , No. 1:25 -cv-840, 2025 WL 3289166, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2025)  (holding that 
because appropriations statutes “mandate [d] that USAGM allocate funding to OTF ” through 
grant agreements , APA claims challenging withholding of grant funds were grounded in 
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appropriations law, not contracts) .  The Contractor Plaintiffs “thus ‘complain[]  of wrongful 
termination’ of their government contract [s],” and their claims are therefore “founded upon the 
contract[s].”  Am. Ass’n of Physics Tchrs., 804 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
United States, 780 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).   
Prong two also points toward Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction .  An order setting 
aside not just the Statutory Minimum Memorandum but also the service-contract cancellations 
would implicitly require the defendants to continue to perform under — rather than breach — the 
contracts.  In these circumstances, an injunction of that nature would amount to an order for 
specific performance.  And case after case in the D.C. Circuit has made clear that where the 
relief sought “would mean that the government must perform” according to the terms of a 
written agreement, the case must “be resolved by” the Court of Federal Claims.  See Ingersoll-
Rand, 780 F.2d at 79–80 (holding that “an order directing the Air Force to reinstitute” a contract 
“amount[s] to a request for specific performance”); Spectrum Leasing, 764 F.2d at 894 (similar); 
Am. Ass’n of Physics Tchrs., 804 F. Supp. 3d at 62–63.   
To be sure, t he plaintiffs challenge not only the termination of their individual contracts 
but also the upstream agency action — including the Statutory Minimum Memorandum — that 
served as “guidance” for those determinations .  SUMF ¶ 31 (explaining that Lake characterized 
the Statutory Minimum Memorandum as “guidance” for the actions that followed, including the 
termination of contractors (quoting Lake Dep. 156:13 –19)).  The foregoing analysis does not 
affect the Court’s jurisdiction over the Contractor Plaintiffs’, or any other plaintiff’s, challenge to 
the Memorandum.  T hat challenge is “legally distinct” from the claim seeking performance of 
agreements affected by the guidance.  See Nat’l Inst. of Health  v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n , 145 S. 
Ct. 2658, 2661 (2025) (Mem.) (Barrett, J., concurring).   The mere fact that agency guidance 
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affects internal policies related to contractual performance “does not transform a challenge to 
that guidance into a claim ‘founded . . . upon’ [a] contract that only the [Court of Federal Claims] 
can hear.”  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §  1491(a)(1)).  Nevertheless, just “because [this] Court is the 
right forum for [a] challenge to the guidance” does not mean “it is necessarily also the right 
forum for the challenge to the [contract] terminations.”  Id.  The defendants will therefore 
receive a limited grant of partial summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act 
on the Contractor Plaintiffs’ APA claims insofar as they seek reinstatement  or specific 
performance of their individual agreements. 
e. Merits 
1. The plaintiffs challenge a discrete and final agency action. 
The threshold question on the merits of this case is whether the plaintiffs have challenged 
a discrete, final agency action for which judicial review is available under § 706(2) of the APA .  
The Court begins with the discreteness requirement.  A “person claiming a right to sue” under 
§ 706(2) “must identify some ‘agency action’ that affects him.”  Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed ’n, 
497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §  702).  The APA defines “agency action” to mean 
“the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 
thereof, or failure to act.”  5 U.S.C. §  551(13).  The Supreme Court has inferred from that 
definition that a cognizable agency action must be “circumscribed” and “discrete.”   Norton v. S. 
Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004).   
The Statutory Minimum Memorandum meets the APA’s qualifications for a ru le or the 
equivalent thereof.  To qualify as a “rule” or the “equivalent thereof” ( is the latter being  the 
category to which the plaintiffs assign the Statutory Minimum Memorandum), the action must be 
an “agency statement . . . designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”  5 U.S.C. 
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§ 551(4).  Here t he defendants spoke through a n official  written document  that reflected the 
agency’s decision to reduce its future operations.  A nd although, as discussed further below, the 
Memorandum contains no analysis or reasoning, it nevertheless reflects the agency’s official 
position regarding its existing legal obligations.   Cf. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler , 955 F.3d 
68, 8 3 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing an interpretive rule as one that purports to “derive[]” its 
conclusions from “statute[s]” or other “existing .  . . document[s]” that the agency interprets as  
“compel[ling] or logically justif[y ing] the proposition”).  As Lake testified, and the defendants 
do not seriously dispute, the Memorandum reflected USAGM leadership’s “decision” about what 
constituted the “statutory minimum” level of agency operations.  SUMF ¶ 44 (quoting Lake Dep. 
at 153:14–18).  Indeed, efforts to align USAGM’s operations with the Memorandum  had already 
been set into motion in the seventy-two hours before it was signed on March 18,  including by 
placing employees on leave effective March 15 , terminating con tractors, and br inging 
broadcasting operations to a halt.  Id. ¶¶ 36–38.  Critically, Lake testified that the Memorandum 
reflected not only a justification of the decisions made in the preceding days, but should serve as 
a forward -looking guide for future agency operations .  See Biden v. Nebraska , 597 U.S. 785, 
809–10 (2022) (holding that memorand a that “bound DHS staff by forbidding them to continue 
the [challenged] program in any way from that moment on” were “agency actions” that fit the 
§ 551(4) definition of a rule (emphases added) (citation omitted)).   Thus, the plaintiffs do not  
request “wholesale judicial review of Global Media’s management of the agency,” as the 
defendants contend,  Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890 n.2, but instead challenge a particular  and 
identifiable action that prescribed future agency operations. 
The Court next turns to  whether the Statutory Minimum Memorandum and its 
implementation constitute final agency action.  See 5 U.S.C. §  704.  “As a general matter, two 
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conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final.’”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 
(1997).  “First, the action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking 
process,” rather than “of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.”  Id. at 177–78 (quoting Chi. 
& S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp. , 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).  Second, “the action 
must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
consequences will flow. ’”  Id. at 178 (quoting Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. 
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic , 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).  These well -settled principles are 
meant to facilitate a “pragmatic and flexible” inquiry that evades “self-implementing, bright-line 
rule[s].”  Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor , 824 F.3d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2016)  (citation 
omitted). 
That standard is readily met here.  The record confirms  that the Memorandum reflected 
the defendants’ “decision” about what constituted the “statutory minimum” operations under the 
laws governing  USAGM.  SUMF ¶ 44 (quoting Lake Dep. at 153:14 –18).  The decision has 
never been revisited, nor has Lake hinted that it might be.  To the contrary, the agency has 
continued to take steps to implement the Statutory Minimum Memorandum, including by 
attempting to effectuate a reduction -in-force of USAGM staff in August 2025  and a deferred-
resignation program as an interim measure.   See Notice of February 26, 2026, ECF No. 212  
(describing proposed deferred -resignation program) ; see also ECF No s. 2 19–20 (vacating 
reduction-in-force due improper appointment of Lake as a cting USAGM CEO).  And concrete 
consequences have flowed from the decision, including the placement of hundreds of employees 
on administrative leave and the cessation of most Voice of America broadcasting. 
In the alternative, each implementing action taken by defendants as part of the drawdown 
of USAGM would be independently re viewable agency action under the APA.  Indeed, as the 
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Court held at the prel iminary inju nction stage , the “blanket placement of employees on 
administrative leave, termination of entire bargaining units of  employees, [and] termination of 
[contractors] . . . are . . . discrete, final agency actions subject to judicial review.”  Widakuswara, 
779 F. Supp. 3d at 33.  Even under the  defendants’ preferred view of the law, these actions are 
undoubtedly subject to APA review.  See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought, 149 F.4th 762, 
784 (D.C. Cir. 2025 (explaining that “firing employees” and “cancelling contracts” are “discrete 
actions”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated , No. 25 -5091, 2025 WL 3659406 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 17, 2025). 
Finally, the defendants’ limited restoration of certain employees and broadc asting 
operations since March 202 5 does not alter the finality of the agency action in this case.  
Broadcasting operations restarted only protracted litigation to enforce th e preliminary injunction 
in this case.  The defendants thus strain the boundaries of the post hoc ergo propter hoc  fallacy 
to the extent they assert that they  revived such operations on their own initiative.  In any event, 
even if the  Court were to credit the incredible, “[t]he possibility of revision is a common 
characteristic of agency action, and does not make an otherwise definitive decision nonfinal. ”  
POET Biorefining, LLC v. Ent ’l Prot. Agency, 970 F.3d 392, 404 (D.C. C ir. 2020) (quoting U.S. 
Army Corps. of Eng’rs v. H awkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 598 (2016).  As Lake’s testimony in this 
case make clear, the defendants “consummated [their] decision” in the actions challenged in this 
case.  The  Statutory Minimum Memorandum was signed  by the bulk of the agency ’s nominal 
leadership, with  Lake’s apparent approval, and it reflected their “decision that this was [the] 
statutory minimum.”  SUMF ¶ 44 (quoting Lake Dep. at 153:14 –18).  The Court takes the 
defendants at their word. 
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2. The agency action  is arbitrary and capricious because the defendants 
failed to consider statutory factor s, Congressional appropri ations, and 
reliance interests. 
Arbitrary and capricious review is “narrow,” evaluating only whether the defendants 
“examined ‘the relevant data’ and articulated ‘a satisfactory explanation’ for [their] decision, 
‘including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”  Id. (quoting 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto . Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983)).  The Court may not “substitute [its] judgment” for th at of the agency, “but instead must 
confine [itself] to ensuring that [they] remained ‘within the bounds of reasoned 
decisionmaking.’”  Id. (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat . Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 
87, 105 (1983)). 
To implement a  new policy without violating the APA , the defendants were required to 
demonstrate that  they had considered whether  “the new policy is permissible under the 
[governing] statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better” 
than its old policy.  FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc. , 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).   They must offer 
that explanation “contemporaneous[ly]” with their actions, and “post hoc rationalizations” are 
inadequate.  See, e.g. , Amerijet Int’l, Inc. v. Pistole , 753 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Courts are thus appropriately skeptical of swings 
in core agency policy  unaccompanied by substantive explanation because such conduct violates 
the “fundamental requirement” that the agency “set forth its reasons.”   Tourus Recs. Inc. v. Drug 
Enf’t Admin., 259 F.3d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ).  “[C]onclusory statements do not suffice to 
explain” agency action.  Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , 579 U.S. 211, 224 (2016); see also 
Open Tech. Fund, 2025 WL 3289166, at *10 (same). 
As the Court explained at the preliminary injunction stage, “[n]ot only is there an absence 
of ‘reasoned analysis’ from the defendants; there is an absence of any analysis whatsoever.”  
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Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 33.  Although the Court reached that conclusion prior to the 
defendants’ production of the Statutory Minimum Memorandum, which ref lects the only 
contemporaneous justification for the agenc y action at issue in this case, the Memorandum and 
the rest of the summary judgment record do nothing to change the Court’s preliminary bottom 
line.  The Memorandum is little more than a list of position s that the agency concluded are 
necessary to fulfill minimum statutory obligations.  SUMF ¶ 32.  It does not mention, let alone 
analyze, whether such staffing  would permit the agency to comply with the broadcasting 
standards and principles set by Congress  in 22 U.S.C. §  6202(a)–(b).  The failure to do so is 
arbitrary and capricious in its own right, particularly given the duty “[t]o ensure that United 
States international broadcasting is conducted in accorda nce with the standards and principles 
contained in section 6202.”  Id. § 6204(4).   
Although the Memorandum quotes certain statutes mandating the existence of certain 
positions, such as the director of Voice of America and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, it fails 
to address many requirements established by appropriation statutes, including notification 
requirements and region- and medium-specific broadcasting requirement s.  See, e.g., 138 Stat. 
460, 735–36.  Nor does the agency explain why it considered certain statutory requirements of 
the CEO to the exclusion of so many others.  For example, the Memorandum references the 
CEO’s obligation “[t]o submit to the President and the Congress an annual report”  concerning 
broadcasting activities.  See ECF No. 166-4 at 5; 22 U.S.C. § 6204(9).  But, for example, it gives 
no indication that the agency complied with the CEO’s obligation to “undertake .  . . studies” in 
order “to identify areas in which broadcasting activities under its authority could be made more 
efficient and economical.”  22 U.S.C.  § 6204(8).  It certainly does not account for reliance 
interests of the employees, the consuming public, or anyone else. 
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The one substantive requirement the agency did appear to address is the obligation to 
“consult[] with the  Secretary of State” prior to “the addition or deletion of language services.”  
Id. § 6204(4); see ECF No. 166-4 at 3 (“As part of this process, USAGM should engage with the 
State Department based on the deletion of services.”).  But because the Memorandum constituted 
USAGM leadership’s “decision that this was [the] statutory minimum,” it necessarily put the cart 
before the horse — effectuating the deletion of language services through the removal of staff 
before consulting the State Department.  SUMF  ¶ 44 (quoting Lake Dep. at 153:14 –18).  At 
bottom, the Memorandum is consistent with the Court’s characterization at the preliminary 
injunction stage: “a hasty, indiscriminate approach” to administrative action.  Widakuswara, 779 
F. Supp. 3d at 34.   
Nor does it suffice that, as Lake later explained, the action was taken in compliance with 
an Executive Order.  SUMF ¶ 26 (explaining the leadership team decided the next day to reduce 
USAGM’s operations to the “statutory minimum” based solely on the direction contained in the 
Executive Order).  “If an agency could avoid the need to justify its decisions simply by gesturing 
to an Executive Order . . . the President  could unilaterally eviscerate . . . the APA simply by 
issuing a carbon-copy executive order mandating that an agency act in a particular way before it 
does so.”  Kingdom v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-691-RCL, 2025 WL 1568238, at *10 (D.D.C. June 3, 
2025).  And the agency similarly failed to consi der either reliance interests or relevant statutory 
factors (and are therefore contrary to such laws).  See ECF No. 166 -1 at 36 –39.  Thus, the 
agency’s action cannot stand even under the “deferential” arbitrary -and-capricious standard.  
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York , 588 U.S. 752, 773 (2019).   The defendants do not offer, nor 
does the record disclose, any discernible “rational connection between the facts found and the 
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choice made.”  Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 816 F.3d 119, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting State Farm, 
463 U.S. 43).  On the face of the Memorandum itself, all signs point to arbitrariness. 
In response, and as at the preliminary injunction stage, the defendants do not defend their 
action on the merits.  Instead, the defendants attempt to evade APA review by suggesting that the 
relevant statutory factors are “committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. §  701(a)(2).  
“[T]he APA explicitly excludes from judicial review those agency actions that are ‘committed to 
agency discretion by law.’”  Sierra Club v. Jackson , 648 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The 
defendants are correct that, ordinarily, a gency action qualifies for that exception when a “statute 
is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s 
exercise of discretion,” rendering “meaningful judicial review impossible.”  Steenholdt v. FAA , 
314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1984)).  And 
it is true that the International Broadcasting Act tasks the CEO of USAGM with overseeing 
compliance with the broadcasting standards and principles set forth in §  6202(a) and (b)  in the 
agency’s broadcasting operations.  See 22 U.S.C. § 6204(3).   
Nevertheless, the defendants  overreach by contending that the allocation of some 
discretion is sufficient to render that discretion unreviewable, for two reasons.  First, 
administrative law embodies “a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action, which can only be overcome by ‘clear and convincing evidence of 
congressional intent to preclude judicial review.’”  Castaneira v. Noem , 138 F.4th 540, 549 
(D.C. Cir. 2025) (q uoting Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 589 U.S. 221, 229 (2020) ).  The 
defendants point to nothing in the Broadcasting Act apart  from language conferring some 
discretion to suggest that Congress intended to foreclose review entirely.  That text alone cannot 
bear the weight the defendants place on it.  Compare 22 U.S.C. §  6204(a) (requiring CEO to 
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“ensure that United States international broadcasting is conducted in accordance with the 
standards and principles contained in [§  6202]”) with Castaneira, 138 F.4th at 549 (delegating 
USCIS “sole and unreviewable discretion” to make risk assessments (emphasis added) (quoting 
8 U.S.C. §  1154a)(1)(A)(viii)(I))).  To the contrary, the statute commands that the CEO “shall” 
ensure compliance with the standards and principles  in § 6202.  See 22 U.S.C. § 6204(a); Bufkin 
v. Collins , 604 U.S. 369, 379 (2025) (holding that “the word ‘shall’ imposes a mandatory 
command” and “means ‘must’” (first quoting Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 43 (2025), then 
quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171–72 (2016))). 
Second, even if the statute committed the issue  to the CEO’s dis cretion, the CEO  still 
must exercise that discretion to fulfill Congress’s command, and  “[a] grant of discretion to an 
agency does not . . . authorize it to make an unprincipled decision .”  Ky. Mun. Energy Agency v. 
Fed. Energy Regul . Comm’n, 45 F.4th 162, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Chippewa & 
Flambeau Improvement Co. v. FERC , 325 F.3d 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ).  Here, a textual 
commitment of discretion could not change the fact that the defendants have provided nothing 
approaching a principled basis for their decision.   
The Court thus concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment  on 
their § 706(2) claim. 
3. The defendants have unlawfully withheld agency action. 
While the foregoing broadly addresses the plaintiffs’ claim under §  706(2) of the APA, 
they also claim they are entitled to judgment and relief under  5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which requires 
courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  To prevail on a 
§ 706(1) claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the  “agency failed to take a discrete agency 
action that it is required to take.”  Norton, 542 U.S. at 64.   The obligation “must amount to ‘a 
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specific, unequivocal command.’”  W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234, 1241 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) (quoting Norton, 542 U.S. 63–64).  
The Court must therefore “satisfy [itself] that,” first, “there indeed exists . . . a duty” for 
the agency to act,” and second, that the agency either has withheld or “has ‘unreasonably 
delayed’ the contemplated action.”  Bluewater, 234 F.3d at 1315 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)).   
The plaintiffs contend that the staffing levels required by the Statutory Minimum 
Memorandum and the placement of most employees on administrative leave cause the agency to  
violate the International Broadcasting Act and various language -specific broadcasting 
requirements.  By law, Voice of America must “communicat[e] directly with the peoples of the 
world by radio .”  22 U.S.C. §  6202(c).  In doing so, it must ensure that broadcasting includes 
“information about developments in each significant region of the world” and “a variety of 
opinions and voices from within particular nations and regions prevented by censorship or 
repression from speaking to their fellow countrymen.”  Id. § 6202(b)(6)–(7).  USAGM is also 
required, by law, to maintain “research capacity,” “transmitter and relay capacity,” and 
“capability to provide a surge capacity to support United States foreign policy objectives during 
crises abroad.”  Id. § 6202(b)(4), (8), (9).  Congress has also identified particular countries to 
which broadcasting must be directed.  Unsurprisingly, these include North Korea, Iran, and 
former members of the  Soviet Union .  See id. §§ 7813, 7814(a)(5)–(7), 8754, 8927.   These 
provisions amount to “ discrete agency action” that USAGM “ is required to take,” Norton, 542 
U.S. at 64, namely, that USAGM must broadcast by radio to particular areas of the world and 
must retain surge capacity to deploy during foreign crises.  While these statutes undoubtedly call 
for USAGM leadership’s judgment regarding how to effectuate Congress’s broadcasting 
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directives, they have no discretion regarding whether to do so.  See AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 803 F. Supp. 3d 164, 186 (D.D.C. 2025) (similar).   
The defendants do not dispute key facts demonstrating that they are in violation of these 
provisions.  To start, the defendants do not substantively dispute the factual claim that “VOA 
ceased all broadcasting activities” in March 2025.  SUMF ¶  42.  Nor do defendants dispute that 
in response this Court’s earlier orders, defendants have begun a skeletal operation  including 
“four language services in a substantially reduced fashion,” and “digital programming” in 
Russian and Korean.  Id. ¶ 44.  According to a declaration filed by Lake herself, of these four 
language services — Mandarin, Farsi, Pashto, and Dari — only Pashto and Dari are broadcast 
via radio.  See ECF No. 69 -2 ¶  6.  And t he plaintiffs have offered unrebutted evidence that 
USAGM’s surge capacity in fact amounts to  little more than “minor fluctuations in staffing”  
when “big stor[ies]” occur.  SUMF ¶  45.  Moreover, there is no dispute that the placement of 
most staff on administrative leave pursuant to the Statutory Minimum Memorandum leaves 
USAGM incapable of operating in regions where it is statutorily required to do so.  For example, 
the plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that Voice of America is unable to operate its Iran 
service at current staffing levels , despite a statutory mandate to do so.  Id. ¶ 46 (conceding, in 
deposition testimony, that “[c]urrent operation of [the] Persian service with two employees and 
zero [contractors] is not possible” (citation omitted)).   Apart from boilerplate responses, the 
defendants rebut none of these facts. 10  The Court thus finds that the defendants are unlawfully 
withholding mandatory agency action. 
 
10 Although the defendants do not offer any specific rebuttal of the foregoing facts, they did attempt to dispute the 
plaintiffs’ broader characterization of USAGM’s skeletal operations in dispute through a declaration filed by Frank 
Wuco during earlier proceedings in this case .  See Decl. of Frank Wuco,  Widakuswara ECF No. 174 -1 (“Wuco 
Decl.”).  The Wuco Declaration , however, is hardly a robust defense of VOA’s current operations, primarily 
describing future broadcasting operations , not current activities .  E.g., id. ¶ 6 (describing future plans for Korean 
 
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The withholding of these mandatory actions  requires relief.  Defendant Lake has 
repeatedly thumbed her nose at these statutory requirements, testifying that she has no opinion 
about which countries censor and repress their people  — or even the basic question of  which 
regions of the world qualify as significant, as would be required just to feign compliance with 22 
U.S.C. §  6202(b)(6) and (7).  See SUMF ¶  47.  These refusals constitute a “transparent 
violation[] of a clear duty to act.”  In re Core Commc’ns, Inc. , 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (quoting In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  It is a “bedrock 
principle[] of constitutional law” that the Executive Branch “must follow statutory mandates so 
long as there is appropriated money available and the President has no constitutional objection to 
the statute.”  In re Aiken Cnty ., 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 201 3) (Kavanaugh, J.)  (granting 
mandamus).  Following the defendants’ flagrant  and nearly year -long refusal to do so in this 
case, the Court will grant the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on their § 706(1) claim.  
f. Vacatur is the proper remedy. 
The foregoing discussion leaves the question of remedy.  “Vacatur is the ‘normal 
remedy’ for ‘unsustainable agency action .’”  See Ky. Mun . Energy Agency , 45 F.4th at 179 . 
Indeed, the plain text of the APA makes clear that a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and 
set aside agency act ion . . . found to be . . .  arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and 
otherwise not in a ccordance with law. ”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Yet despite the presumption in 
favor of vacat ur, the defendants resist such vacatur in this case  based on mistakes of  both law 
 
language “[c]ontent” that “ will be delivered via terrestrial radio and on digital platforms” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 7 
(same, for Kurdish broadcasting operations).  In any event , the Court need not  consider the declaration , as the 
defendants do not rely on  it in their  responses to the plaintiffs’ statement of undisputed facts.  See D.C. LCvR 
7(h)(1) (“In determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving 
party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine 
issues filed in opposition to the motion.” ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)  (“The court need consider only the cited 
materials.”).   
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and fact.  First, on the facts: the defendants suggest that the plaintiffs seek  vacatur of the  
Executive Order.  But the record makes crystal clear t hat the plaintiffs APA challenge targets the 
actions taken to implement the President’s decision  to down size the agency , including as 
reflected in the Statutory Minimum Memorandum.  Second, as to the law, the defendants rely 
almost entirely on Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in United States v. Texas , an opinion which, 
while thought provoking, does not reflect the current state of the law.  See United States v. Texas, 
599 U.S. 670, 701 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ( acknowledging that “vacatur has been the 
ordinary result when the D.C. Circuit determines that agency regulations are unlawful”) .  Nor 
does the Supreme Court’s ruling in  Trump v. CASA, Inc. affect the availability of vacatur, as the 
Court reserved judgment on the “ question whether the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes 
federal courts to vacate federal agency action.”  606 U.S. 831, 847 n.10 (2025).   
Although a court, in narrow circumstances, may justify departure from the normal rule of 
vacatur, those circumstances are not pres ent here.  De partures may be proper based on (1) “the 
seriousness of the deficiencies of the action, ” e.g., “how likely it is th e agency will be able to 
justify its decision on remand, ” and (2) any “disruptive consequences of vacatur.”  Heartland 
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius , 566 F.3d 193, 197 (D. C. Cir. 2009).  Both factors favor the 
plaintiffs.  First, the defendants have made no effort to defend the merits of the downsizing 
decision, and “[v]acatur is appropriate” in such circumstances.  Burke v. Coggins , 521 
F. Supp. 3d 31, 44 (D.D.C. 2021).  The Court can hardly imagine the defendants have a  non-
arbitrary justification for these actions  on remand after they have failed t o muster one in  
litigation.  Second, the potential for disruption favors vacatur, not an exception.  The effect of the 
defendants’ action has been t o keep  USAGM employees on administrative leave despite 
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