govinfo:USCOURTS-mtd-6_19-cr-00003-5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA 
HELENA DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY KENNETH KNAPP, 
Defendant. 
CR-19-03-H-CCL 
ORDER 
Before the Court is Defendant's "Post-Trial Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal Under Rule 29(c) Fed. R. Crim. P." (Doc. 84). The United States 
opposes the motion. The Court has reviewed the record in its entirety and is 
prepared to rule. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On April 4, 2019, the United States filed a criminal complaint charging Mr. 
Knapp with being a "Prohibited Person in Possession of a Firearm" in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l ). Magistrate Judge Lynch issued an arrest warrant and Mr. 
Knapp appeared before Magistrate Judge Lynch that day. Mr. Knapp was 
represented at his initial appearance by Andy Nelson of the Federal Defender's 
Office and Ms. Hunt was appointed to represent him for future proceedings. 
Magistrate Judge Lynch released Mr. Knapp, subject to certain conditions. 
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On May 1, 2019, a grand jury indictment was filed, charging Mr. Knapp 
with one count of "Prohibited Person in Possession of a Firearm" in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). The Court set trial for June 17, 2019. 
On May 28, Defendant filed a motion to continue all pretrial deadlines on 
behalf of her client. Her motion was based on her need to obtain information from 
the State of Colorado regarding the felony convictions that served as the basis for 
the charge against her client. The Court convened a telephone conference with 
counsel for both parties to discuss the need to set a new trial date and the parties 
agreed that they could be prepared for trial on September 3, 2019. The Court 
issued an order the same day setting trial for September 3, 2019, and extending 
other pretrial deadlines. 
On June 21, 2019, the Court granted Ms. Hunt's second motion to continue 
the pretrial deadlines, extending the motions deadline until June 27, 2019. The 
Court did not continue the trial or change the August 16, 2019, plea agreement 
deadline. 
On June 21, 2019, the United States Supreme Court held that to convict a 
defendant of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, the United 
States "must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he 
knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it." Rehaif v. United States, 
139 S.Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019). 
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On June 27, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment 
against him. The government opposed the motion, and the Court entered its order 
denying the motion to dismiss on July 25, 2019. Recognizing the potential impact 
of the Rehaif decision as to the essential elements of the charged crime, the Court 
asked the parties to submit briefs and proposed jury instructions as to the 
"knowing" element on or before August 16, 2019. 
On August 13, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to waive the grand jury 
indictment and allow the government to proceed by superseding information. The 
Court heard and granted the motion on August 21, 2019. On August 22, 2019, the 
Court entered an order resetting trial for October 22, 2019, the date agreed upon 
during the August 21, 2019, hearing. 
On October 22, 2019, at the close of the government's evidence, Defendant 
made a Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to the superseding 
information, which was denied. Defendant renewed his motion after both parties 
had rested, later that day, and the Court denied the renewed motion. On October 
23, 2018, a unanimous jury found Defendant guilty of being a prohibited person in 
possession of a firearm as charged in the superseding information. Now before the 
Court is Defendant's timely-filed renewed motion for judgment of acquittal as to 
the single count of the superseding information, which motion is again opposed by 
the government. 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
The familiar standard for deciding a motion for acquittal, as articulated in 
Jackson v. Virginia, requires this Court to determine whether, "after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)( emphasis in original). 
DISCUSSION 
The Court used the model Ninth Circuit instruction, as revised after the 
United States Supreme Court decided Rehaif, to instruct the jury as to the elements 
of the charged offense. The Court instructed the jury that the government must 
prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, the defendant knowingly possessed firearms 
and ammunition; 
Second, the firearms and ammunition had been 
shipped from on,e state to another; 
Third, at the time the defendant possessed the 
firearms and ammunition, the defendant had been 
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year; and 
Fourth, at the time defendant possessed the 
firearms and ammunition, he knew that he had been 
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year. 
(Doc. 79 at 13). 
I I I 
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The only element disputed by Defendant is the fourth element. He argued at 
trial and continues to argue that he did not know that he was a convicted felon and 
that his civil rights, including his right to bear arms, were restored when he was 
released from prison in 2003. The Court provided the following Ninth Circuit 
model instruction to explain the requirement that the defendant knew about his 
prior conviction: 
an act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the 
act and does not act through ignorance, mistake, or 
accident. The government is not required to prove that 
the defendant knew that his acts or omissions were 
unlawful. You may consider evidence of the defendant's 
words, acts, or omissions, along with all the other 
evidence, in deciding whether the defendant acted 
knowingly. 
(Doc. 79 at 15). 
At Defendant's request, the Court also instructed the jury that any 
"conviction that has been expunged, set aside, or for which a person has been 
pardoned or has had his civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction 
for purposes of a federal firearm violation, unless the pardon, expungement or 
restoration of civil rights expressly provides the person may not possess firearms." 
(Doc. 79 at 17). 
The Court properly instructed the jury that the government had the burden 
of proving every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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There was nothing in any individual instruction or in the instructions as a whole 
that created a presumption shifting the burden of proof regarding knowledge to the 
defendant. 
The government offered sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding as 
to the fourth element of the charged offense in presenting its case in chief. At the 
close of its case, the government offered the parties' stipulations, which included a 
stipulation that Defendant had prior convictions. Special Agent Sprenger testified 
that the convictions were for felonies and that Defendant was sentenced to terms 
of imprisonment exceeding one year. The government offered sufficient evidence 
during its case in chief to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that Defendant 
knew that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment 
exceeding one year. 
After the government rested, Defendant testified. He explained his 
understanding that, upon his release from imprisonment, his civil rights, including 
his right to bear arms, had been restored. Defendant offered his discharge 
paperwork (Exhibit 522, admitted without objections) to support his claim. 
Exhibit 522 provides no support for Defendant's claim that his civil rights 
were restored when he was discharged from prison in Colorado. It contains no 
reference to the term "civil rights." It refers only to this unconditional discharge 
from the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. 
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When cross-examined, Defendant admitted that Exhibit 522 does not 
include the term "civil rights" and does not state that he was pardoned or that his 
conviction was expunged or set aside. Defendant also admitted that he was still 
required to register based on those convictions. 
The government chose not to offer rebuttal testimony, apparently seeing no 
need to rebut Defendant's testimony. After retiring to deliberate at 11: 16 a.m., the 
jury reached its verdict by 11 :50 a.m. The jury's quick return of a guilty verdict 
demonstrates that it was not persuaded by Defendant's testimony or by his reliance 
on his discharge paperwork. 
The jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence as to each and every 
element of the charged offense. Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal (Doc. 84) is DENIED. 
Dated this 3rd day of December, 2019. 
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