govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01631-1

IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Rural Development Innovations Limited, et al., 
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25-1631 (RJL) 
V. 
Pete Marocco, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
.J>h. 
March /3 , 2026 [Dkt. #36, 37, 42, 43] 
Article II of the Constitution gives the President power to appoint "Officers of the 
United States" only "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." The advice-and-
consent requirement is "a calculated feature of the constitutional framework," "not a bug." 
NL.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 601 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). President 
Trump appointed Pete Marocco on February 28, 2025 as acting Chair of the Board of the 
U.S. African Development Foundation ("USADF") without obtaining Senate approval. 
Marocco then made himself USADF president and proceeded to terminate nearly all of 
USADF's employees, grants, and contracts. On July 1, 2025, I held that Marocco's 
appointment was likely unlawful and granted a preliminary injunction, halting Marocco's 
efforts. Later I modified the preliminary injunction to narrow the scope of relief. 
Undaunted, Marocco once again assumed control of USADF and blocked the remaining 
USADF employees from using the USADF offices, IT systems, or financial systems. 
Plaintiff Rural Development Innovations Ltd. ("RDI"), a USADF grantee, used to 
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communicate regularly with USADF about the implementation of its grant. Now ROI 
appears to have no way to communicate with any USADF employees besides Marocco­
whom this Court has already found was likely unlawfully appointed. Unfortunately for the 
defendants, the Constitution, principles of equity, and the Federal Vacancies Reform Act 
do not permit such a result. Therefore, the Court will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN 
PART the parties' summary judgment motions and will enter declaratory and injunctive 
relief for plaintiffs. 
BACKGROUND 
I. Pete Marocco's Appointment to USADF 
As I described in my previous preliminary injunction opinion, USADF is "a federal 
agency established by Congress to support and invest in African-owned and African-led 
enterprises." Rural Dev. Innovations Ltd. v. Marocco ("RDI"), 2025 WL 1807818, at * 1 
(D.D.C. July 1, 2025), opinion vacated on reconsideration, 2025 WL 4083332 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 19, 2025). USADF makes grants to African organizations consistent with USADF's 
statutory purposes. See id. 
The African Development Foundation Act ("USADF statute") "vests the 
management ofUSADF in a Board of Directors" ("Board"). Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 290h-
5(a)(l)). "The Board is 'composed of seven members appointed by the President [of the 
United States], by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."' Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 290h-5(a)(l)). The USADF statute in tum gives the Board 
authority to appoint the president ofUSADF. See 22 U.S.C. § 290h-5(d)(l). 
On February 19, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14,217, which 
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ordered that USADF "be eliminated to the maximum extent consistent with applicable 
law." Compl. [Dkt. #1] ,r,r 44-47; 90 Fed. Reg. 10577, 10577 (Feb. 19, 2025). On 
February 28, 2025, USADF management were notified that "Pete Marocco had been 
appointed as Acting Chair of the Board of USADF." Id. ,r 51. Marocco proceeded to 
appoint himself as president of USADF. Id. ,r 52. Marocco then terminated the 
employment of numerous USADF employees, placed other employees on administrative 
leave, cancelled contracts, and terminated almost all partner grants. Id. ,r,r 58-64. Among 
the grants terminated was that of Rural Development Innovations Ltd. ("RDI"), a Zambia­
based consulting firm that "offers technical support to micro small and medium size 
enterprises." Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. A, Deel. of Victor Makasa [Dkt. #7-2] ,r,r 2, 6. 
RDI relies on USADF for 100% of its funding. Id. ,r 5. Marocco's layoff of USADF 
employees included Paul Olson and Solomon Chi. Compl. ,r,r 14-15. 
II. Preliminary Injunction 
On May 21, 2025, RDI, Olson, and Chi ("plaintiffs") sued Pete Marocco, the 
Director of the White House Presidential Personnel Office, the U.S. DOGE Service, the 
U.S. DOGE Service Temporary Organization, the Acting Administrator of DOGE, the 
Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of the Interior, and President Donald J. Trump ("defendants"). See 
Compl. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants acted ultra vires in violation of the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act, the African Development Foundation Act, and the U.S. 
Constitution. See id. ,r,r 75-93. Plaintiffs also brought a claim under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and sought declaratory and mandamus relief. Id. ,r,r 94-102. 
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Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. #7]. 
After briefing and a hearing, I granted the preliminary injunction on July 1, 2025 as to 
plaintiff RDI. See RD/, 2025 WL 1807818, at * 1. I held that plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed in their arguments that the Court has jurisdiction. Id. at *3-4. On the merits, I 
held that the "Constitution likely does not vest the President with the authority to appoint 
Marocco as an acting Board member at USADF," and Congress likely "has not authorized 
the President to appoint acting USADF Board members." Id. at *5. I found that only 
plaintiff RDI had shown irreparable harm. Id. at *6. 
I ordered that Marocco was "preliminarily enjoined from taking actions as the acting 
chairperson" of USADF and further ordered that defendants were "preliminarily enjoined 
from implementing or giving effect to directives from Marocco that he took in the capacity 
as the acting chairperson ofUSADF's Board of Directors and president ofUSADF." See 
Order [D kt. #2 7]. 
"It took multiple months for USADF to implement" the preliminary injunction. 
Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. A, Deel. of Elisabeth Feleke ("Second Feleke Deel.") [Dkt. #36-
1] 15. USADF's Management Committee ran the agency in the absence of a lawfully 
appointed Board or president. Id. 12. 
III. Modification of the Preliminary Injunction 
On August 26, 2025, defendants moved to modify the preliminary injunction in light 
of the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025). See Mot. 
to Modify the Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. #29]. I granted the motion and narrowed the scope of the 
preliminary injunction, ordering that defendants were "preliminarily enjoined from 
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implementing or giving effect to Marocco's termination ofRDl's cooperative agreement," 
and that Marocco was "preliminarily enjoined from interfering with USADF's 
performance ofRDl's cooperative agreement." Mem. Order [Dkt. #34] at 6. 
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and the Parties' Summary Judgment 
Motions 
On December 18, 2025, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the decision to 
modify the preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, to enforce the injunction. See Mot. 
to Reconsider Modification of the Prehm. Inj. or, in the Alternative, to Enforce Compliance 
("Mot. to Reconsider") [Dkt. #36]. In support, plaintiffs reported that after the narrowing 
of the injunction, Marocco began asserting that he was "President and CEO of USADF." 
Second Feleke Deel. ,r 7. Marocco directed that all USADF staffs access to their offices 
be terminated. Id. Marocco also terminated all USADF staffs access to the "U.S. 
Department of the Treasury financial systems," as well as "all remaining remote access to 
USADF IT systems." Id. ,r,r 10, 17. These changes meant that all USADF employees­
besides Marocco-"lost all official and direct communication with RDI." Id. ,r 19. 
Based on these facts, plaintiffs argued that "it is not feasible for Marocco to be 
treated as the lawful head of USADF for some purposes and the agency's Management 
Committee to be treated as the lawful head for others." Mot. to Reconsider at 5. 
Defendants opposed, arguing that "it is RDI that has refused to communicate with the 
Foundation." Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. to Reconsider [Dkt. #40] at 1. 
While the motion to reconsider was pending, the parties submitted a joint status 
report indicating their agreement to "convert the parties' respective submissions on 
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plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to briefing on the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment on the merits." Joint Status Rep. [Dkt. #37] at 1. The parties submitted 
statements on the scope of final relief on January 26. See id.; see also Defs.' Statement 
Regarding the Scope of Relief ("Defs.' Statement on Relief') [Dkt. #42]; Pis.' Mem. 
Regarding Scope of Relief ("Pls.' Mem. on Relief') [Dkt. #43]. 
The motion to reconsider and the cross-motions for summary judgment are now ripe 
for decision. On February 24, plaintiffs reported that Marocco was attempting to fire the 
two remaining members of the USADF Management Committee. See Notice of Factual 
Developments [Dkt. #44]. On March 10, plaintiffs reported that Marocco was attempting 
to fire all remaining USADF employees except plaintiffs Olson and Chi, and "one 
employee who Marocco has directed to recover overseas assets and shut down field 
offices." Notice of Supplemental Authority & Factual Developments [Dkt. #45] at 2. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs say that "[t]ime is of the essence" and have requested a ruling on 
the pending motions. Id. at 3. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court "must 
assume the truth of all statements proffered by the non-movant except for conclusory 
allegations lacking any factual basis in the record." Dist. lntown Props. Ltd. P'ship. v. 
Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1999). "When parties file cross-motions 
for summary judgment, each motion is considered separately, in the light most favorable 
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to the non-moving party, and the court must determine, for each motion, whether the Rule 
56 standard has been met." Am. Ctr.for Int'! Lab. Solidarity v. Chavez-DeRemer, 789 F. 
Supp. 3d 66, 80 (D.D.C. 2025). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Merits 
Plaintiffs' claims fall into two categories. First, plaintiffs argue that Pete Marocco 
was unlawfully appointed as acting Chair and president ofUSADF, so any actions that he 
took in those roles are invalid. Second, plaintiffs argue that Marocco's actions-including 
canceling grants and terminating employees and contracts-violate the "separation of 
powers, the Spending Clause" and are "ultra vires by violating USADF's organic statute 
and appropriations statute." Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Pis.' Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Pls.' PI 
Br.") [Dkt. #7-1] at 19. The Court will grant summary judgment to plaintiffs on the first 
set of claims and summary judgment to defendants on the second. 1 
A. Claims About Marocco's Unlawful Appointment 
I previously held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their argument that 
Marocco was unlawfully appointed as an acting USADF Board member without the advice 
and consent of the Senate under the Appointments Clause. See RDI, 2025 WL 1807818, 
at *5; see also U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. I also held that "Congress has [likely] not 
authorized the President to appoint acting USADF Board members" under the Federal 
1 I previously rejected defendants' arguments that I lack jurisdiction over this case under the Tucker Act 
and the Civil Service Reform Act. See RDI, 2025 WL 1807818, at *3. I adopt the same reasoning here and 
conclude that the Court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,490 (2010) (court had jurisdiction when petitioners "object[ed] to the Board's 
existence"). 
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Vacancies Reform Act ("FVRA"). RD!, 2025 WL 1807818, at *5. I see no reason to 
revisit this analysis and will grant summary judgment to plaintiffs on their claims about 
Marocco's unlawful appointment. See Avie! v. Gor, 2025 WL 1600446, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 
June 5, 2025) (Katsas, J., concurring) ("[I]t is unlikely that the Take Care Clause gives the 
President unfettered discretion to designate acting principal officers with neither Senate 
confirmation nor a Senate recess nor even statutory authorization through the FVRA."); 
see also Avie! v. Gor, 2025 WL 2374618, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (Marocco's 
appointment as an "acting" member to the Board of the Inter-American Foundation 
"contravene[d]" Article II). Marocco's appointment as acting Chair of USADF without 
advice and consent of the Senate violates the Appointments Clause and is ultra vires under 
the FVRA and the USADF statute.2 
B. Claims About Dismantling USADF 
Separate from plaintiffs' challenge to Marocco' s appointment, plaintiffs also 
challenge Marocco's actions as Chair and president of USADF under the Administrative 
Procedure Act ("APA"), the Constitution, and the USADF statute. Pls.' PI Br. at 19. I will 
grant summary judgment to defendants on these claims because ( 1) there is no discrete 
final agency action under the APA; (2) plaintiffs' constitutional claims are statutory; and 
2 Neither party explains or grapples with the requirements for ultra vires claims in our Circuit. For the 
plaintiffs' unlawful appointment claims, the requirements are satisfied because "(i) there is no express 
statutory preclusion of all judicial review" in either the FVRA or the USADF statute; "(ii) there is no 
alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim" because, among other reasons, the President (who 
appointed Marocco) is not subject to the AP A, and (iii) the statutory requirement that appointments be made 
with the advice and consent of the Senate is "clear and mandatory." Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of 
Com., 39 F.4th 756, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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(3) defendants' actions do not rise to the level of ultra vires. 
First, plaintiffs' AP A challenge to the series of actions Marocco has taken at 
USADF fails for lack of final agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704; id. § 551(13). Final 
agency action must be "specific," Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 894 (1990), 
and "discrete," Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004). "Under the 
terms of the APA, [plaintiff] must direct its attack against some particular 'agency action' 
that causes it harm" and "cannot seek wholesale improvement ... by court decree." Lujan, 
497 U.S. at 891. Plaintiffs claim that defendants "cannot unilaterally eliminate a 
congressionally created agency," Pis.' Pl Br. at 21, but plaintiffs do not identify a single 
decision or rule shutting down USADF. Instead, plaintiffs argue that "eliminat[ing] 
USADF's staff' and "terminat[ing] the agency's contracts and grants" amount to shutting 
down the agency. Id. at 19. This Court, however, may not review an "abstract decision 
apart from specific agency action, as defined in the APA." Eiden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 
809 (2022). Plaintiffs' APA claim thus fails for lack of discrete final agency action.3 
Second, plaintiffs' constitutional separation-of-powers and Spending Clause claims 
are in effect statutory, so plaintiffs lack a constitutional cause of action to bring them. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants have violated the separation of powers and the Spending 
3 The question of what constitutes a "discrete" final agency action is disputed in our Circuit and courts 
across the country. See Nat'/ Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought, 149 F.4th 762, 783 (D.C. Cir. 2025), reh 'g 
en bane granted, opinion vacated, No. 25-5091, 2025 WL 3659406 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025); Rhode Island 
v. Trump, _F. Supp. 3d_, 2025 WL 3251113, at *9 (D.R.I. Nov. 21, 2025), appea/filed, No. 26-1070 
(1st Cir. Jan. 21, 2026). To the extent plaintiffs are simply challenging the grant terminations or loss of 
employment, those claims may require a different jurisdictional analysis. This Court's conclusion that it 
had jurisdiction rested on the premise that "this lawsuit is chiefly concerned with Marocco's appointment" 
and RDI's efforts to "remediate Marocco's allegedly unlawful appointment." RD/, 2025 WL 1807818, at 
*3. 
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Clause by effectively shutting down USADF and failing to spend money appropriated by 
Congress. Under Global Health Council v. Trump, 153 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2025), these are 
but statutory claims because they are really allegations that defendants have violated the 
USADF statute and the appropriations acts by canceling grants and refusing to spend 
appropriated funds. Plaintiffs' claims are thus "predicate[d]" on statutory violations, id. at 
15, and cannot be repackaged as constitutional claims. 
Third, absent a cause of action under the AP A or Constitution, plaintiffs must satisfy 
the high bar for ultra vires claims. See Nuclear Regul. Comm 'n v. Texas, 605 U.S. 665, 
681 (2025). For purposes of their "dismantl[ing] USADF" claim, Pis.' PI Br. at 19, 
plaintiffs have not. Ultra vires review "applies only when an agency has taken action 
entirely 'in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition' in a 
statute." Nuclear Regul. Comm 'n, 605 U.S. at 681 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ry. Clerks 
v. Ass'n for Benefit of Non-contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 660 (1965)). Here, the 
statutes invoked by plaintiffs are not well-suited to ultra vires review. The USADF statute 
provides that USADF "shall carry out [its] purposes," including "strengthen[ing] the bonds 
of friendship and understanding between the people of Africa and the United States" and 
"support[ing] self-help activities at the local level designed to enlarge opportunities for 
community development." 22 U.S.C. § 290h-2. The relevant appropriations statute 
allocated $45 million to USADF "[ f]or necessary expenses to carry out" the USADF 
statute. Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, Div. F, tit. 
III, 138 Stat. 460, 746 (2024). Defendants' termination of employees, grants, and contracts 
does not rise to the level of a legal error "so extreme that one may view it as jurisdictional 
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or nearly so." Changji Esque! Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also New York v. Eiden, 636 F. Supp. 3d 1, 29 
(D.D.C. 2022) (concluding that "[u]ndefined terms and phrases such as 'efficient,' 'meet 
the needs of,' and 'ready access to ... ' are not sufficiently specific or unambiguous as to 
be susceptible to ultra vires review"). 
II. Scope of Relief 
The parties' most significant dispute is the appropriate scope of relief on plaintiffs' 
unlawful appointment claims. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief ordering that 
"Marocco has no legal authority to serve at USADF and that the remaining Defendants 
(other than the President) cannot treat Marocco as ever having had that authority." Pls.' 
Mem. on Relief at 1. Defendants argue that any relief "should be limited to cover only 
actions Marocco took insofar as they affected Rural Development, Olson, and Chi." Defs.' 
Statement on Relief at 2. Specifically, defendants argue that relief should include only 
"permanent restoration of [RDI's] grant agreement" and "reinstatement of [Olson's and 
Chi's] employment." Id. Plaintiffs have the better argument here. How so? 4 
A. Declaratory Relief 
Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief that ( 1) Marocco was not lawfully 
appointed as a Board member and president ofUSADF, and that (2) "action[s]" taken by 
Marocco "in the performance of any function or duty" of the USADF Board or president, 
4 The Court's grant of declaratory and injunctive relief precludes plaintiffs' request for mandamus relief 
because mandamus "is only proper where there is no other adequate remedy available." Avie!, 2025 WL 
2374618, at *18. 
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have "no force or effect." 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(l). Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a 
court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 220l(a). 
"Whether to grant such a remedy 'always rests within the sound discretion of the court."' 
Avie! v. Gor, 2025 WL 2374618, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (quoting President v. 
Vance, 627 F.2d 353,364 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
Declaratory relief is justified here because it will "serve a useful purpose in 
clarifying the legal relations at issue" and will "afford relief from the uncertainty, 
insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Glenn v. Thomas Fortune Fay, 
222 F. Supp. 3d 31, 36 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Vance, 627 F.2d at 364 n.76). Indeed, the 
center of this controversy is whether Marocco was lawfully appointed and whether he may 
act, in any capacity, as a Board member or president of USADF. Declaratory relief will 
help to "clarify[]" Marocco's "legal relation[ship]" to plaintiffs. Id. 
It follows that Marocco's actions as Board member and president of USADF are 
void under the Constitution and the FVRA. Regarding the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
has suggested that where there is a "constitutional defect" regarding "appointment to [an] 
office," "actions taken by" that office may be "void." Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 257-
58 (2021); see also id. at 283 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("Whether unconstitutionally 
installed or improperly unsupervised, officials cannot wield executive power except as 
Article II provides. Attempts to do so are void."); Noel Canning v. NL.R.B., 705 F .3d 490, 
493 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (order of unlawfully constituted board was "void ab initio"), ajf'd on 
other grounds, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
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Regarding the FVRA, the parties have disputed its precise application to USADF. 
Section 3348 states, in relevant part, that an office not filled consistent with the FVRA 
"shall remain vacant," and "[a]n action taken by any person who is not acting under section 
3345, 3346, or 3347, or as provided by subsection (b), in the performance of any function 
or duty of a vacant office to which this section and sections 3346, 3347, 3349, 3349a, 
3349b, and 3349c apply shall have no force or effect." 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b)(l), (d)(l) 
(emphasis added). Those actions "may not be ratified." Id. § 3348(d)(2). Accordingly, 
"actions taken by persons serving in violation of the [FVRA are] void ab initio." SW Gen., 
Inc. v. NL.R.B., 796 F.3d 67, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2015), aff'd, 580 U.S. 288 (2017). 
I agree with plaintiffs that the FVRA's remedial language in§ 3348(d)(l) applies to 
USADF. See Avie/, 2025 WL 2374618, at *9 ("Section 3348(d)(l), which nullifies all 
actions taken by improperly appointed officers, expressly applies to 'vacant office[s] to 
which ... [Section] 3349c appl[ies]."' (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3348(d)(l)). "Read in context and reduced to its simplest terms, 'acting' officers who 
are not appointed through the FVRA's acting-appointment provisions lack authority to 
'perform any function or duty of a vacant office."' Id. ( cleaned up). 
The FVRA' s remedial language encompasses Marocco' s actions taken in his 
capacity as a Board member and president of USADF. The FVRA defines "function or 
duty" as "any function or duty of the applicable office that ... is established by statute," 
and "is required by statute to be performed by the applicable officer," or "is established by 
regulation," and "is required by such regulation to be performed by.the applicable officer." 
5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2). The USADF statute specifies that the "management of the 
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Foundation shall be vested in" the Board, 22 U.S.C. § 290h-5(a)(l), and regulations further 
state that the "Board establishes policy for the Foundation and is responsible for its 
management," 22 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a); see also id. § 1501.3(b) ("The President has 
responsibility for directing the day to day activities of the Foundation."). Marocco's 
actions in "establish[ing] policy for" and "managing" USADF are thus in the "function or 
duty" of a USADF Board member. 22 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a); 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d)(l)). 
Defendants argue that "action" in the FVRA refers only to "agency action[s]" under 
the AP A, so "not ... all actions taken by such an official are automatically null and void." 
Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Modify [Dkt. #33] at 4. The FVRA, however, provides 
that'"action' includes any agency action as defined under" the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(l) 
( emphasis added). The use of "includes" instead of "means" shows that "action" in the 
FVRA is not limited to "agency action[ s]." Id.; see Nw. Ass 'n of lndep. Schs. v. Labrador, 
166 F.4th 1148, 1161 (9th Cir. 2026) ("'[W]here "means" is employed, the term and its 
definition are to be interchangeable equivalents,' whereas 'the verb "includes" imports a 
general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the definition.'" 
(quoting Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.1 (1934))). 
As such, the FVRA provides a basis for declaratory relief that Marocco' s actions in 
the "function or duty" of a USADF Board member and president "have no force or effect." 
Id.; see also Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 25-cv-1015, slip op. at 16--17 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2026) 
(holding that unlawfully appointed officer's "actions taken" were "void"). 
B. Injunctive Relief 
The Court previously granted defendants' request to narrow the scope of the 
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preliminary injunction after Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025). Now that I have 
considered the full scope of plaintiffs' claims, as well as the factual developments in this 
case, I have concluded that plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief is proper. 
To obtain a permanent injunction, the plaintiff "must demonstrate '(l) that it has 
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and ( 4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.'" Anatol Zukerman 
& Charles Krause Reporting, LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., 64 F.4th 1354, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 
2023) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,391 (2006)). "When the 
defendant is the government, factors (3) and (4) merge." Id. 
The Court previously found that RDI had demonstrated irreparable injury, which 
suffices for purposes of permanent injunctive relief. See RD/, 2025 WL 1807818, at *6. 
Beyond RDI's economic injuries, RDI is also suffering harm because defendants have, in 
essence, compelled RDI to submit to interactions with an unconstitutionally appointed 
actor. Cf Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 212 (2020) 
(unconstitutional removal restriction "inflicts a here-and-now injury on affected third 
parties" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Defendants do not dispute that Marocco has 
blocked all USADF employees from accessing USADF's offices and systems. See 
generally Defs.' Opp'n to Pis.' Mot. to Reconsider [Dkt. #40]. RDI has thus been unable 
to receive guidance on its implementation of the grant or to carry out its regular activities 
in partnership with USADF. Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. B, Deel. of Victor Makasa ("Second 
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Makasa Deel.") [Dkt. #36-2] ,r,r 6-7, 11-12. Monetary damages are inadequate to 
compensate RDI for these ongoing harms. Cf Avie!, 2025 WL 2374618, at *17 ("A 
paycheck ... [ will not] guarantee the continued existence of [plaintiffs] role or the agency 
in a spectral state."). 
The balance of hardships and the public interest also favor granting a permanent 
injunction. Defendants have no legitimate interest in perpetuating the unlawful 
appointment of a USADF Board member and president. See RDI, 2025 WL 1807818, at 
*6. And the public interest is served by enforcing the constitutional and statutory guardrails 
around appointments. See League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 
1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("[T]here is a substantial public interest 'in having governmental 
agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations."' ( quoting 
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
Defendants' arguments in favor oflimiting injunctive relief to only plaintiffs fail for 
the following reasons. 
First, CASA did not squarely address the proper scope of equitable relief for the 
unconstitutional exercise of power by a person unlawfully appointed-as opposed to 
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 837 ("prohibit[ing] 
enforcement of a law or policy against anyone ... likely exceed[ s] the equitable authority 
that Congress has granted to federal courts" (emphasis omitted)); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Jefferson,_ F. Supp. 3d _, 2026 WL 145277, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 2026) 
(distinguishing CASA in the appointments context). 
Second, the unique facts of this case strongly suggest that "complete relief," CASA, 
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606 U.S. at 850, for plaintiffs requires an injunction against Marocco from acting as a 
USADF Board member and president. According to the undisputed facts, RDI "relies on 
USADF for more than payments ofinvoices." Second Makasa Deel. ,r 4. "Ordinarily, RDI 
interacts with USADF staff on a daily basis." Id. This is because USADF "must be able 
to perform portfolio management and oversight, including soliciting and reviewing 
quarterly reports from grantees, as well as reviewing disbursement requests, site-visit 
reports, project audits, work plans and performance assessments, implementation-related 
amendments, and close outs." Pls.' PI Br. at 10. 
Since I narrowed the preliminary injunction, Marocco has blocked all other USADF 
employees from accessing USADF systems and has sought to terminate the remaining two 
USADF employees with management authority. See Mot. to Reconsider at 3-4; Notice of 
Factual Developments at 1-2. While Marocco insists that he has "personally reached out 
to all known RDI contact information" himself, forcing RDI to conduct all of its grant 
management through an unlawfully appointed actor amounts to requiring RDI to be 
"regulated by an unconstitutionally structured agency," which only compounds RDl's 
harms! John Doe Co. v. Consumer Fin. Prat. Bureau, 849 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, it has proven to be unworkable to isolate Marocco' s actions that affect 
plaintiffs from his actions that do not affect plaintiffs. See Pls.' Statement on Relief at 3 
("[T]o ensure that Marocco could not continue to wield that power as to Plaintiffs, the 
Court would also have to determine what structures, employees, contracts, and systems are 
necessary so that Plaintiffs would not be subjected to Marocco's illegal authority in the 
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future."). While an order prohibiting Marocco from acting as USADF president moving 
forward may "incidentally" benefit "nonparties," any incidental effects should not limit the 
Court from providing complete relief to plaintiffs. CASA, 606 U.S. at 851. 
Third, the remedy prescribed by the FVRA suggests that the scope of plaintiffs' 
requested relief is correct. The FVRA specifically provides that "an action taken by" 
someone acting without authority under the FVRA, so long as that action is "in the 
performance of any function or duty" of the office, "shall have no force or effect." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3348(d)(l). Congress may authorize remedies that may be unsupported by "background 
equitable principles." Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 
799, 838 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining why vacatur of an unlawful 
agency rule is proper under the AP A, as opposed to enjoining enforcement of the rule 
against the plaintiff). While, for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' requested relief is 
consistent with equitable principles, Congress's authorization of a broad remedy in the 
FVRA underscores the propriety of that relief here. I will therefore enjoin Marocco from 
acting as a Board member or president of USADF and will enjoin defendants ( excluding 
the President) from implementing or giving effect to Marocco's directives in those 
capacities. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part, and defendants' summary judgment motion is GRANTED in 
part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider [Dkt. #36] is DENIED as moot. 
An accompanying order will issue contemporaneously with this opinion. 
RICHARD J. LEON 
United States District Judge 
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