govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cr-00288-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
 
 
United States of America, 
 
v. 
 
Jabez Marshall, 
 
Defendant. 
 
_________________________________/ 
 
 
 
Case No. 1:24-cr-288-MLB 
 
 
 
  
 
ORDER 
A grand jury indicted Defendan t Jabez Marshall, charging him 
with two counts of producing child pornography and one count of 
distributing child pornography.  (Dkt  20.)  He filed mo tions to suppress 
statements he made to law enforcement immediately following his arrest 
and after he executed a Miranda waiver form.  (Dkt 41.)  He also moved 
to suppress three search warrants—on e for the search of his home, one 
for the search of his person and ph one, and one for the search of his 
Snapchat account.  (Dkts. 42, 43, 46 .)  The Magistrate Judge issued a 
Report and Recommendation, saying th is Court should deny all of his 
motions other than suppressing statements he made after his arrest but 
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before signing the Miranda waiver.  (Dkt. 74.)  Marshall filed objections.  
(Dkt. 76.)  For the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules Marshall’s 
objections and adopts the Report and Recommendation.  
I. Standard 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) requires distri ct courts to “make a de novo 
determination of those portions of [an R&R] to which objection is made.”  
Any such objection “must specifically identify the portions of the [R&R] 
to which objection is made and th e specific basis for objection.”  
McCullars v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 825 F. App’x 685, 694 (11th Cir. 
2020)1; see United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A] party that wishes to preserve its objection must clearly advise the 
district court and pinpoint the specif ic findings that the party disagrees 
with.”).  “Frivolous, conclusive, or  general objections need not be 
considered by the district court.”  Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 
(11th Cir. 1988).   
 
1 The Court recognizes McCullars is unpublished and not binding.  The 
Court cites it and other unpublished ca ses as instructive, nonetheless.  
See Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 902 F.3d 1342, 1355 n.5 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (“Unpublished cases do no t constitute binding authority and 
may be relied on only to the extent they are persuasive.”). 
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“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court 
review of a magistrate’s factual or le gal conclusions, under a de novo or 
any other standard, when neither pa rty objects to those findings.”  
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).  And,  in most cases, “[a] party 
failing to object to [an R&R] waives the right to challenge on appeal the 
district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 
conclusions.”  McGriff v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 654 F. App’x 469, 472 
(11th Cir. 2016).  Ultimately, whether or not objections are filed, a district 
court “may accept, reject, or modify, in  whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  
II. Background 
In August 2025, FBI agents ar rested Defendant Jabez Marshall 
pursuant to an arrest warrant charging him with using a minor to engage 
in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual 
depiction of that conduct in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). 2  A 
 
2 Marshall seeks to incorporate his “factual and legal citations and 
arguments” from several prior filings “as if set forth herein.”  (Dkt. 76 at 
3.)  The Court does not consider thos e.  It considers only the specific 
objections he raises in hi s objections to the R&R.  United States v. 
Matthews, 2024 WL 688666, at *2 (N.D. Ga . Feb. 20, 2024) (Brown, J.) 
(“[W]hen a party merely makes general objections, such as incorporating 
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video of the arrest shows 5 agents approaching Marshall from different 
directions as he walked down the street. 3  (Dkt. 82.)  Marshall contends 
the agents were wearing “militar y-style, camouflage, battle dress 
uniforms, complete with vests.”  (Dkt. 76 at 4.)  Leaving this 
characterization aside, it’s more accurate to say they were wearing jeans 
or casual pants, t-shirts, baseball hats, and FBI tactical vests.  (Dkt. 82.)  
Each agent had an assault rifle and sidearm.  (Dkt. 82 at 4:20.)  The 
agents ordered Marshall to the gro und and told him to put his hands 
behind his back.  ( Id. at 4:30.)  He complied. 4  ( Id.)  Agents handcuffed 
 
by reference other arguments made in  prior briefs, the objecting party 
does not receive a de novo review.”); United States v. Middleton , 595 F. 
Supp. 3d 1277, 1283 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (Batten, J.) (“[A] party does not state 
a valid objection to an R&R by merely incorporating by reference previous 
filings. . . .  Because [defendant’s] objections were general and merely 
incorporated their prior briefing, th e Court will overrule them.”).  
Marshall also begins his objections with a statement that agents arrested 
him on August 8, 2025–but that happened on August 8, 2024.   
3 Marshall contends nine to twelve  agents were “on the team” that 
morning and that seven “were tasked with arresting him.”  (Dkt. 76 at 3, 
4.)  The video shows five  actively involved in his arrest with Special 
Agents Norris and Dervish arriving moments after.  Nothing about the 
number of agents involved suggests an excessively coercive atmosphere.      
4 Marshall says one agent pointed his rifle “directly into Marshall’s back” 
as he lay on the ground.  (Dkt. 76 at 4 (emphasis added).)  He includes a 
still-photo from the arrest video that  he says shows this moment.  ( Id.)  
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him, pulled him up by his arms, led him across the street, and sat him on 
a wall.  (Id. at 5:25.)   
The lead investigators, Special Ag ents Dervish and Norris, joined 
Marshall and the other agents.  They had a warrant to search Marshall’s 
phone and apartment.  Without advising Marshall of his Miranda rights, 
they questioned him about the apartm ent, specifically confirming he 
lived in Unit 4 and asking whether th ere were people or weapons in the 
home.  (Id. at 7:01-7:24.)  Marshall said his father was home but he did 
not have his father’s phone number and did not know whether his father 
had a firearm.  (Id.)  Special Agent Norris told Marshall he was going to 
enter the home to execute the search warrant, said he wanted to go in 
“without having to hurt anyone,” and asked if he could contact Marshall’s 
 
That’s hard to see and totally out of context.  It appears that, while the 
agent was straddling and handcuffing Marshall, he positioned his rifle to 
point behind his own leg and away fr om Marshall.  The video does not 
have a great view so it’s possible th at, while getting into position to 
handcuff Marshall, the agent pointed his rifle at Marshall’s back for a 
split second as he was moving it.  After that, the agent allowed his rifle 
to hang on a sling while he used both hands to cuff Marshall before 
putting his hand back on the rifle and directing it beyond Marshall’s legs.  
The agent certainly did not point the gun “into” Marshall’s back or hold 
Marshall at gunpoint as Marshall s eems to suggest.  A quick and easy 
arrest.     
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father to ask him to come outside because “that way we don’t have to kick 
the door and do the whole crazy thing that you see on tv.”  (Id. 7:30-7:58.)  
Special Agent Norris also said, “that’s  where people start getting hurt.”  
(Id.)  
Marshall suggested calling his mo ther to have her contact his 
father but said he did not have her number.  When Special Agent Norris 
asked Marshall if he had his cell ph one, Marshall gestured to his front 
pocket.  (Id. at 8:16.)  One of the arresting agents took the cellphone from 
Marshall’s pocket and gave it to Special Agent Norris. 5  (Id.)  He asked 
 
5 Marshall says this was the same agent “who pointed his assault rifle 
directly into Marshall’s back minutes earlier” and that “while [getting 
Marshall’s phone] the agent was still holding the assault rifle by the 
pistol grip with his index finger resting on the magazine well, right next 
to the trigger.”  (Dkt. 76 at 7.)  The Court has already addressed the claim 
the agent pointed his rifl e into Marshall’s back while handcuffing him.  
The claim the agent held his rifle by th e pistol grip with his finger next 
to the trigger is also not accurate.  The entire event is included in the 
video.  ( Id. at 8:20-9:50.)  The agent never touched his rifle as he 
approached Marshall to get the phone and used both hands to fish the 
phone from Marshall’s pocket (as Marshall was sitting down).  He put his 
hand on his weapon for a split seco nd as he stepped back after getting 
the phone, apparently to stop the ri fle (which was hanging by a sling) 
from swinging.  He then stood to the side with his hand on the pistol grip 
until Marshall asked the agent to take out Marshall’s headphone and the 
agent again approached to get a headphone case from Marshall’s pocket.  
When he had to use both hands, he  again removed his hand from the 
weapon.  After that, he stood with both hands to his side and his weapon 
hanging across his leg, before walking away to speak with a patrol officer 
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Marshall to unlock the phone and id entify his mother’s number.  ( Id. at 
8:58-9:35.)  Special Agent Norris calle d Marshall’s mother and, while 
sitting next to Marshall, told her about the warrant, that they were going 
to have to go into the apartment, that  they wanted to do it as safely as 
possible, that they wanted the father to come out before they entered, 
and that they wanted his phone number.  ( Id. at 10:33-11:20.)  After a 
pause when the mother must have been asking questions, Special Agent 
Norris reiterated that they wanted to  enter the apartment as safely as 
possible, did not want to have to “b reak doors and do all the crazy stuff 
you see on tv,” and wanted to give them the opportunity “not to damage 
any property.”  ( Id. at 11:30-12:58.)  He said they  wanted to do it “safe 
and easy.”  (Id.)  At that point, Marshall offered the key to the apartment, 
and an agent took it to execute the search warrant.  (Id. at 12:40-13:00.)  
Marshall remained on the wall, handcuffed, while agents went 
 
across the street.  At no time during  this interaction did the agent point 
his rifle anywhere close to Marshall or brandish it in any way.  His 
movements of placing his hand on the pistol grip from time to time were 
subtle and, to the Court, appear th e movements of a well-trained officer 
acting naturally rather than to intimidate anyone.  The Court rejects any 
suggestion the agent acted in an a ggressive, hostile, or threatening 
manner.            
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through his backpack and spoke with him, mostly about his relationship 
with his parents, the time he had to be at work, how he got to work, how 
he was feeling, why they were sear ching his person and backpack, and 
that they would allow him to leave personal items at home before taking 
him to jail.  (Dkt. 81 at 13:30-15:00.)  At one point, Marshall became dizzy 
so the agents gave him water and (a bit later) took him in their air-
conditioned car to his home so he co uld change clothes.  (Dkts. 81 at 
18:55-19:20; 22:26-23:25; 60 at 24.)  Special Agent Dervish testified that, 
before driving Marshall to lockup and after letting him change, they 
briefly removed his handcuffs so they could place his hands in front of his 
body and connect the handcuffs to a belly band.  (Dkt. 60 at 23-24.)   
Marshall was in custody for about 30 minutes when Special Agent 
Dervish placed him in the back seat  of Special Agent Norris’s car for 
transportation to lockup.  (Id. at 29:08.)  She sat next to him.  (Dkt. 60 at 
24.)  Special Agent Dervish either had her firearm in her holster or locked 
it away.  ( Id. at 51.)  She never brandished it. 6  (Id.)  While waiting for 
 
6 Marshall says she wore her fire arm despite Special Agent Dervish’s 
testimony that she could not recall if she had locked it in the trunk of her 
car (as she does sometimes for s afety reasons while transporting 
arrestees) or was still wearing it.  (Dkt. 60 at 25, 51.)   
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Special Agent Norris to get in the ca r, Special Agent Dervish explained 
she was going to read Marshall his Miranda rights, explaining “I wanna 
make sure you know and understand your rights before we ask any 
questions because it’s really importan t that, that you’re  clear on all of 
that.”  (Dkt. 81 at 29:45.)  Special Agent Dervish asked Marshall 
background questions, like his name, date of birth, education, whether 
he had taken any controlled substance,  explaining she was doing this to 
make sure he could understand their conversation and his rights.  (Id. at 
30:30.)  She then read him the Miranda warning:  
Dervish: So I’m gonna read thes e to you, and then if you can 
just acknowledge that yo u understand after each 
one, that would be great. All right. So before we 
ask you any questions, you must understand your 
rights. So you have the ri ght to remain silent. Do 
you understand that?  
 
Dervish: Do you mind saying yes?  
 
Marshall:  Oh yes.  
 
Dervish:  Thank you. Anything  you say can be used against 
you in court.  
 
Marshall:  Yes ma’am.  
 
Dervish:  You have the right to  talk to a lawyer for advice 
before we ask you any questions.  
 
Marshall:  [Not clear].  
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Dervish:  You have the right to have a lawyer with you 
during questioning.  
 
Marshall:  Yes ma’am. 
  
Dervish:  And if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be 
appointed for you before any questioning if you 
wish.  
 
Marshall:  Oh, Yes ma’am. 
  
Dervish:  Also, and this is rea lly important. If you decide to 
talk to us, but then you decide to answer the 
questions now without a lawyer, you can stop 
answering at any time. So if I ask you something 
and you’re like, I don’t want to answer that 
question, that’s fine. We’ll move on. I’m not gonna 
make you say anything. If you say you don’t want 
to talk at all, also fine. I’m like, Josh said it’s not a 
movie. We’re not gonna beat anything out of you. I 
think so far you’ve been  very respectful. We’ve 
tried to be respectful. We’d like to keep that going.  
 
Marshall:  Mm-hmm.  
 
Dervish:  So this is, this just says I have read this statement 
of my rights and I understand what my rights are 
at this time. I’m willin g to answer questions 
without a lawyer present.  
 
Marshall:  Sure.  
 
Dervish:  Okay. Um, <laugh>, can you sign that?  
 
(Id. at 31:00-32:23.)  Marshall signed the Miranda form, acknowledging 
he had read the statement, underst ood his rights, and was willing to 
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answer questions without a lawyer present.  (Dkt. 77-2.)7   
After considerable questioning from Special Agent Dervish, Special 
Agent Norris began asking questions.  Apparently thinking Marshall was 
not being forthcoming, he said:  
Okay. So as [Dervish] mentioned these things in our 
experience, right? No promises these things, the judge is going 
to ask you guilty, not guilty just  in a little bit, right? Just 
because you tell us right now doesn’t mean that you’re guilty, 
right? But we need some closure for these victims. We need to 
know if there’s other victims. We need to know what’s going 
on with these kids, right?  
 
(Dkt. 81 at 59:00-59:26.)  A few minutes later, Special Agent Norris made 
another statement:  
We’re trying to give you the olive branch here. Once we, once 
we leave this and things change, they change, right? If we can 
go to the judge and the United States Attorney’s Office and be 
like, Hey, Jabez was awesome dude, he made a mistake. That 
matters, right? It’s not gonna me an that you’re gonna get off 
 
7 Marshall contends Special Agent De rvish “extracted a waiver at the 
scene in the back of a hot FBI car.”  (Dkt. 76 at 16.)  That’s not true.  
Special Agent Dervish testified that, wh en they first got in the car, the 
air conditioning was not ru nning.  (Dkt. 60 at 70-71 .)  So it must have 
been hot.  Indeed, she remarked on the recording that she “did not think 
[Special Agent Norris] was going to le ave [them] in a hot car.”  (Dkt. 81 
at 29:26.)  But she also testified that, when Special Agent Norris started 
the car, he turned on the air cond itioning and the temperature was not 
uncomfortable.  (Dkt. 60 at 71.)  And that happened one minute after 
Marshall and Special Agent Dervish got into the car and before she read 
him his Miranda rights.  (Dkt.  81 at 30:01.)   
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scot-free because you’re in hand cuffs in the back of an FBI 
vehicle. It is what it is at this point, right? We’re both men 
here. We can speak frankly. 
  
(Id. at 1:00:15-10:00:45.)  Afte r further discussion about the specifics of 
Marshall’s alleged communications with a victim and after Marshall 
claimed not to remember many th ings, Special Agent Dervish gave 
Marshall the victim’s first name and her online usernames, prompting 
this exchange:  
Marshall: Yeah, I can’t rememb er that. I’m, maybe I’m not 
just good with the names. I’m better off at the 
visuals. I do apologize if I did because I don’t like 
that kind of stuff. I like doing things, but I honestly 
just don’t remember. I don’t remember talking to 
nobody at that age and I don’t remember the name.  
 
Dervish:  Okay.  
 
Marshall: Yeah, I plead the fifth because <laugh>. Yeah 
‘cause that’s me, that’s my name and stuff. So I 
can’t sit here and say somebody took my stuff and 
did it ‘cause I don’t know if they did. So I told me 
auntie, I’ll be honest here I’m, I would rather just 
tell him that the I’m guilty because I don’t know if 
somebody else did it. And to be honest, I don’t want 
to go to jail for nobody or anything. And even if I 
can try to prove my inno cence, I can’t remember 
that girl. So I don’t remember the like, the stuff.  
 
Dervish:  Okay. And you’re go nna have an opportunity to, 
you know, try to prove your innocence. I will tell 
you that based on the information that we have 
back from Instagram and Snapchat, the account is 
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registered to your name, to an email address that 
I believe is either Jabez Marshall at gmail or 
Jabez.Marshall at gmail. The phone numbers are 
registered to you and the IP login, you know what 
that is, right? When you connect to the internet. It 
c o m e s  b a c k  t o  a n  I P  t h a t  i s  r e g i s t e r e d  t o  y o u r  
mom’s name.  
 
Marshall:  Oh, her apartment?  
 
Dervish:  Yeah, correct.  
 
(Id. at 1:11:45-11:13:53.)  Ma rshall then provided the agents with his 
phone passcode.  (Id. at 1:14:05-1:14:21.)  The agents ended the interview 
a few moments later. 
III. Motion to Suppress Statements 
Marshall moved to suppress his st atements arguing the agents 
coerced him into signing the waiver and otherwise said things during the 
interview that rendered his statem ent involuntary.  The Magistrate 
Judge held a hearing and allowed post-hearing briefing before issuing the 
Report and Recommendation saying th is court should deny Marshall’s 
motion.   
A. Valid Miranda Waiver 
“Before the [United States] can introduce a defendant’s 
uncounseled, self-incriminating stat ements made during a custodial 
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interrogation, the [United States ] must show that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his [or her] Miranda rights[.]”  
Schoolcraft v. Warden, G.S.P., 2023 WL 7014049, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 
2023).  It must make this showing by  a preponderance of the evidence.  
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).   The “knowing” element 
requires the United States to show  the defendant’s waiver “was the 
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, 
or deception” while the “voluntary” element requires it to show the 
defendant made the waiver “with full awareness of both the nature of the 
right being abandoned and the conseque nces of the decision to abandon 
it.”  Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 3 82–83 (2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  A waiver is thus effective where 
the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal[s] 
both an uncoerced choice and the re quisite level of comprehension.”  
United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 585 (11th Cir. 1995).  “An express 
written or oral statement of waiver . . . is usually strong proof of the 
validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient 
to establish waiver.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
The Magistrate Judge concluded th at, despite the tense situation 
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arising from Marshall’s arrest and th e search of his home, the United 
States presented evidence est ablishing Marshall knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  Marshall objects and argues (as 
he did before the Magistrate Judge)  the totality of the circumstances—
being arrested at gunpoint, placed in handcuffs, and having to answer 
questions about who was in his home—c reated a coercive environment.  
Marshall includes several alleged “ facts” that he says added to the 
“coercive environment.”  (Dkt. 76 at  12.)  That includes his unfair 
characterizations (discussed above) about the agent allegedly pointing 
his assault rifle “into” Marshall’s back during the initial arrest and then 
holding his finger near the trigger while retrieving Marshall’s phone as 
well as his inaccurate claim (also discussed above) that Special Agent 
Dervish presented the Miranda waiver when Marshall was in a hot car.  
(Id.)   
He adds a claim that Special Agent Norris made “a clearly implied 
threat expressed to Marshall and his mother–—that people and property 
would be harmed without cooperation.”  (Dkt. 76 at 10.)  He says Special 
Agent Norris “stated to both Marshall and his mother  that, if they did 
not cooperate and facilitate their entry into an empty apartment, agents 
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would ‘break doors and do all the crazy stuff you see on tv’” and “ twice 
stated that he did not want to hurt anyone by going in with force.”  (Dkt. 
82 at 7:36-8:02).  Marshall argues “the  prospect of ‘not having to hurt 
someone’ and then blithely offering the peaceful option of cooperation” 
created the coercive situation.   
The Court rejects this argument for two reasons.  First, this is an 
unfair characterization of the spec ial agent’s statements and totally 
devoid of context.  The arrest video shows the agents were having a calm 
conversation with Marshall about th eir intention to enter his home to 
execute a search warrant and their desired to minimize any difficulty—
like conducting a forced entry—by contacting Marshall’s father and 
asking him to come out of the house.  No part of that conversation with 
Marshall or his mother co uld plausibly have been construed as a threat 
or as anything other than the agents trying to explain they wanted to get 
the father out of the apar tment before having to enter.  Second, this 
conversation happened 30 minutes be fore Special Agent Dervish spoke 
with Marshall about his Miranda rights.  That is more than enough time 
for the excitement of the initial (an d rather mundane) arrest to have 
dissipated.  United States v. Johnson, 379 Fed. App’x 964, 969 (11 th Cir. 
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2020) (finding allegedly coercive acti ons of crying children, handcuffs, 
and battering down a door had dissipated in 30 minutes prior to Miranda 
warning).   
In the end, Marshall’s claim of a coercive environment rests on the 
fact that five agents arrested him at  gunpoint, placed him in handcuffs, 
and searched his home before presenting the Miranda waiver.  None of 
that shows coercions beyond the level necessary to effectuate nearly any 
arrest.  United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 362 (11th Cir. 1989) (large 
number of officers does not establ ish coercions absent evidence that 
officers employed tactics “to augmen t the degree of coercion that is 
inherent in any arrest”); Shriner v. Wainwright , 715 F.2d 1452, 1456 
(11th Cir. 1983) (“The use of handcuffs does not establish coercion.”).  To 
hold that conduct excessive would render even the most rudimentary 
arrests so coercive as to render any subsequent waiver involuntary.8 
Furthermore, no evidence suggests the circumstances of the arrest 
had any coercive impact on Marshall .  As the Magistrate Judge noted, 
 
8 Marshall criticizes the agents for not taking him “to a neutral location, 
away from the scene, to allow him time to process the emotions and fear 
of what had just happened” before seeking to interview him.  (Dkt. 76 at 
16.)  He cites no authority suggesting that step was required.  
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both the arrest video and Special Ag ent Dervish’s audio recording show 
Marshall’s tone was calm and conversational throughout his involvement 
with the agents.  (Dkt. 74 at 12.)  Marshall attacks that conclusion saying 
“speculation about demeanor is u nhelpful given the various responses 
people offer in the face of force and fear.”  (Dkt. 76 at 12.)  But the Court 
must consider the totality of the circumstances and that includes 
Marshall’s reaction—or perceived reaction—to what was happening.  He 
certainly did not seem upset, agitated, scared, or overborn with emotion.  
To the contrary, he seemed calm and rational throughout, wanting to call 
his employer, asking agents to remove his ear pods, and otherwise being 
in control of himself.  As discussed, he became dizzy at one point after his 
arrest—perhaps because of the situation or perhaps because of the heat.  
(Dkt. 76 at 8.)  The agents help ed him, and nothing suggests his 
discomfort lingered. 
Both the signed form and Specia l Agent Dervish’s audio recording 
indicate Marshall understood his rights and voluntarily agreed to waive 
them.  In support of that conclusi on, the Magistrate Judge found that 
“[a]t the time Special Agent Dervis h administered the warnings, no 
weapons were drawn, her firearm re mained holstered or secured, the 
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tone of the interaction was conversati onal rather than confrontational,” 
and no evidence suggests Marshall was confused about his rights.  (Dkt. 
74 at 12, 15.)  Marshall objects, arguing the circumstances “demonstrates 
a mechanical, command-and-control formality and compliance, not a free 
and voluntary waiver.”  (Dkt. 76 at 12.)  To support this, he notes the 
agent did not hand him the form to read himself but rather read it to him, 
thus suggesting “passive complianc e.”  The Court disagrees.  Special 
Agent Dervish went through each po rtion of the waiver to ensure 
Marshall understood its contents.  He said he understood and signed the 
form.  No evidence suggests Marshall felt compelled to comply.   
Marshall also notes that—at the start of the exchange—Special 
Agent Dervish said “do you mind saying yes.”  (Dkt. 76 at 13.)  Marshall 
challenges the Magistrate Judge’s acceptance of Special Agent Dervish’s 
testimony that she was not “instructing him to say yes” but instead was 
telling him he had to answer ve rbally after Marshall “nodded 
affirmatively.”  (Dkt. 74 at 13.)  Ma rshall says this Court should not 
accept that testimony because (1) there was no “pause” between her 
saying “do you understand that?” and her saying “do you mind saying 
yes” and (2) Special Agent Dervish “concede[s] she did not know if 
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Marshall perceived her instruction to say ‘yes’ as a directive.”  (Id. at 13-
14.)  Marshall says this exchange  suggests Special Agent Dervish was 
telling him to say yes (rather than thinking about what he wanted to do) 
and that, in response, he “mechanica lly” answered “yes ma’am” to each 
subsequent question.  ( Id.)  So he says that one statement infected the 
entire colloquy. 
Having listened to the audio reco rding, the Court overrules this 
objection.  There is a sufficient paus e or break in the conversation for 
Special Agent Dervish to have reac ted to Marshall nodding as she was 
reading the form.  Special Agent De rvish recalled this event without 
hesitation, saying she had a “specific recollection he was nodding.”  (Dkt. 
73 at 8, 12.)  And she said she di d not know Marsha ll’s perception in 
response to a leading question.  Th at answer does not undermine her 
testimony that he nodded affirmativel y.  The recording also does not 
suggest a mechanical response by Marshall.  The agent read each 
paragraph of the form slowly (pau sing appropriately), and Marshall 
answered each time.  The Court concludes Special Agent Dervish’s 
explanation is “the most natural understanding of what happened.”  
(Dkt. 74 at 13.)   
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Marshall also attacks the final part of the Miranda discussion, 
specifically Special Agent Dervish’s statement amidst a laugh “Okay, can 
you sign that?”  Marshall suggests Special agent Dervis was “directing” 
him to sign rather than giving him the option of doing so.  (Dkt. 76 at 14.)  
The Magistrate Judge—after ques tioning Special Agent Darvish 
himself—accepted her testimony that, when she said “can you sign this,” 
she was not instructing him to sign but rather was asking if he was 
physically capable of doing so sinc e his hands were cuffed and attached 
to a belly band.  (Dkt. 74 at 10.)  He also accepted her testimony that she 
laughed because “the way that [Marshall] was holding the paper and the 
way his hands could move because of the handcuffs and the belly band, 
it was just a difficult position for [them both] to be in.”  (Dkt. 60 at 28.)  
Marshall objects saying this explanat ion “is not credible” but offers no 
explanation or any evidence to contradict the agent 
The Court disagrees.  Before this exchange, Special Agent Dervish 
read the “consent” portion of the Miranda form, saying “So this just says 
‘I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights 
are at this time.  I’m willing to answer questions without a lawyer 
present.”  (Dkt. 21 at 32:00.)  Marshall paused for several seconds before 
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answering “sure.”  (Id. at 31:15.)  So he unequivocally waived his rights 
before the agent said “can you sign here.”  And the laughter corroborates 
the strange situation that caused her to ask if he could sign.   
The Court overrule Marshall’s objections and adopts the magistrate 
Judge’s conclusion that the United States has shown Marshall knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.      
B. Voluntariness of Marshall’s Statements 
Beyond Miranda, a Court cannot allow the United States to use a 
defendant’s post-arrest statement at trial unless it finds the defendant 
made that statement voluntarily.  Jackson v. Denno , 378 U.S. 368, 378 
(1964) (“[A] defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law 
if his conviction is founded, in whol e or in part, upon an involuntary 
confession[.]”).  This looks to the to tality of the circumstances, including 
the lengthy of the interrogation, the defendant’s education, intelligence, 
and maturity, and whether law enforcement made any 
misrepresentations, threats, or prom ises to induce the statement.  
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Hubbard v. Haley, 
317 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th Ci r. 2003).  The ultimate question is whether 
a defendant’s statement was the pr oduct of “an essentially free and 
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unconstrained choice.”  Garcia, 890 F.2d at 355.   “Sufficiently coercive 
conduct normally involves subjecting the accused to an exhaustingly long 
interrogation, the application of physic al force or the threat to do so, or 
the making of a promise that  induces a confession.”  United States v. 
Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1295–96 (11th Cir.  2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Marshall moved to suppress his post-waiver statement as 
involuntary and the product of coerci on, citing Special Agent Norris’s 
alleged pressure tactics near the end of the interview, the continuation 
of questioning after Marshall said, “I plead the Fifth,” Special Agent 
Dervish’s alleged suggestion Mars hall would have to “prove his 
innocence,” and false information Sp ecial Agent Dervish gave about an 
IP address.  (Dkt. 63.)  The Magistrate Judge rejected each argument and 
Marshall objects to those conclusions.  
Marshall first attacks Special Agent Norris’s statements that, while 
Marshall would have to go before a judge “in a little bit” to say if he was 
guilty or not guilty, “[j]ust because you tell us right no w, doesn’t mean 
that you’re guilty, right?”  Marsha ll contends this was coercive and 
deceptive because it led Marshall to believe he could confess and still be 
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not guilty.  He says this representa tion was “no different that telling an 
accused that the conversation is ‘confidential’ . . . or that the accused can 
speak ‘of the cuff.’”  (Dkt. 76 at 18-19.)   
The Eleventh Circuit has held that false assurances to a defendant 
that law enforcement will not use the defendant’s statement against him 
or her renders any subsequent  statement involuntary.  United States v. 
Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285–87 (11th Ci r. 2010).  But—contrary to 
Marshall’s insistence—that is no t what happened here.  As the 
Magistrate Judge noted, Special Agent Dervish had already told 
Marshall that anything he said could be used against him.  In the portion 
of the statement at issue, Special Agent Norris explained he would like 
to tell the judge that “[Marshall] was awesome dude, he made a mistake.”  
(Dkt. 81 at 1:00:33)  He continued: “T hat matters, right?  It’s not gonna 
mean that you’re gonna get off scot -free because you’re in handcuffs in 
the back of an FBI vehicle.  It is what it is at this point, right?”  ( Id. at 
1:00:40.)  So the agent told Marshall  he would tell the judge if Marshall 
cooperated but Marshall would not get off scot-free.  
In his objections, Marshall says none of that context matters 
because Special Agent Norris was still telling Marshall he could confess 
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and still not be guilty.  (Dkt. 76 at 20.)   But that’s not what he said.  He 
said he could provide them the info rmation they wanted (which focused 
on the identity of potential victims) and still plead not guilty.  And that 
was true.  Marshall could not have believed speaking to the agents would 
guarantee a favorable outcom e or that what he said would not be used 
against him.  This was not a deceptive or coercive statement. 
Marshall next argues the agents should have stopped all 
questioning when he said “I plead the fifth.”  “When a person undergoing 
a custodial interrogation states that he  [or she] wishes to remain silent, 
the questioning must end.”  United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1098 
(11th Cir. 2019).  A suspect's invocation of his rights, however, must be 
unequivocal, meaning it must be arti culated “sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the 
statement to be a request [by the suspect] to exercise his [or her] right to 
remain silent and terminate the interrogation, not that it might be  a 
request to remain silent.”  Owen v. Florida Dept. or Corrections, 686 F.3d 
1181, 1194 (11
th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotations omitted).   
The Magistrate Judge concluded Marshall’s statement was not 
unequivocal because, immediately after  saying “I plead the fifth,” he 
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continued speaking at length.  (Dkt. 74  at 19.)  So, the Magistrate judge 
concluded Marshall’s statement “a ppears less like an unequivocal 
invocation and more like a colloqui al expression of frustration or 
uncertainty, followed by  a voluntary continuation of dialogue.”  ( Id.)  
Marshall objects, insisting this was a clear invocation.  (Dkt. 76 at 20.)  
Marshall suggests the agents had to interrupt him immediately and stop 
him from talking further because “the burden is not in the defendant to 
cease the dialogue.”  ( Id. at 22.)  Marshall cite s no authority for this 
contention.  Marshall also claims th e Magistrate Judge erred in relying 
on United States v. Dawes , 495 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2021), for the 
proposition that “context matters” in assessing whether Marshall was 
invoking his right to end the in terview because the defendant in Dawes 
mentioned his Fifth Amendment righ ts before agents read him his 
Miranda rights.  (Dkt. 76 at 22.)  But context must matter.  The Eleventh 
Circuit in Owen found it was reasonable for a state court to conclude a 
defendant’s statement “about not wanting to ‘talk about it’—which were 
isolated statements, made nearly 30 minutes apart, in response to 
questions about very specific details , in the midst of a give-and-take 
discussion of the evidence against [the defendant]—did not constitute an 
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unequivocal invocation of [the defendant’s] right to remain silent.”  686 
F.3d at 1194 (assertion must be unequivocal considering “the 
circumstances”).  It considered context.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized the same.  See also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 
(1994) (“if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous 
or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances 
would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right 
to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation”) (emphasis 
added). 
 In the circumstances, Marshall’s statement “I plead the Fifth” was 
not an invocation of his right to end the interview.  Not even close.  Not 
only did he blow right past this reference and continue talking, the 
context of the exchange shows he was not expressing any desire to stop 
talking.  The agents explained that , although Marshall claimed not to 
know a certain victim, they had evidence he obtained videos from her via 
his social media accounts.  Marshall responded by explaining he did not 
recognize the name, volunteered “I plead the fifth,” and clarified he said 
that because he could not explain away incriminating information on his 
social media accounts.  Under these circumstances, no reasonable officer 
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would have believed Marshall wa s invoking his right to end the 
interview.   
Marshall next argues the agents coerced him when Special Agent 
Dervish said he would “have an oppo rtunity to, you know, try to prove 
[his] innocence.”  (Dkt. 76 at 23.)  Marshall says the agent made that 
worse by immediately telling him his efforts would be “futile” because the 
Instagram and Snapchat accounts (which allegedly contained evidence of 
the crime) were registered in his name, included his email, had phone 
numbers registered to him, and used an IP address “registered to [his] 
mom’s name.”  ( Id. at 24.)  The part about the IP address was untrue 
because (as discussed below) law enforcement had not linked the primary 
Instagram account to Marshall’s mother’s home.   
The Magistrate Judge concluded that, in context, the agent was 
“mirroring” Marshall’s words when sh e said he could try to prove his 
innocence rather than trying to mi slead Marshall about the burden of 
proof in a criminal case.  (Dkt. 74 at  20.)  The Court agrees.  Marshall 
had just said that “even if I can try to prove my innocence, I can’t 
remember that girl,” and the agent was using that context to tell 
Marshall he would have an opportunity to do that (prove his innocence) 
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but she wanted him to know the evidence they already had against him.  
(Id.)  Marshall does not really respond to this other than saying the agent 
cannot “be absolved of responsibility” for the statement given her 
experience and training.  (Dkt. 76 at 27 n.10.)  He cites no authority that 
a statement like this—in the context of  responding to a suspect’s choice 
of words—amounts to coercive behavi or.  The agent’s statement did not 
suggest Marshall’s statements would not be used against him or 
otherwise try to mislead him about the legal process.  She was being 
conversational to his diction.  The Court overrules this objection. 
The Magistrate Judge also rejected his claim that the agent’s  
misstatement about the IP address rendered his statement involuntary.  
The Magistrate Judge concluded law enforcement’s misrepresentations 
of fact—even if deliberate—are “not enough to render a suspect's ensuing 
confession involuntary.”  (Dkt. 74 at 22 ( citing Lall, 607 F.3d at 1285).)  
He further concluded that, in the li ght of the other (accurate) evidence 
the agent provided, the statement abo ut the IP address did not unduly 
deceive or coerce Marshall into  making any statement.  ( Id. at 29.)  
Marshall acknowledges this preceden t but says his case is different 
because “the misrepresented evidence was objective data from an ISP, 
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seemingly foreclosing any claim that a third party may be responsible.”  
(Dkt. 76 at 25.)  He says his case is  “the essence” of what the Eleventh 
Circuit found coercive in Lall.  Not so.  In that case, the officers promised 
the defendant they would not use hi s statement against him.  697 F.3d 
at 1287.  The misstatemen t about the IP address is not similar and did 
not render the interview coercive.   
As a final objection, Marshall contends that the totality of all these 
circumstances created a coercive envi ronment.  The Court disagrees.  
None of these individual circumstan ces created any kind of coercive 
situation and the sum of their parts is no greater (at least not here).  
C. Conclusion 
Having reviewed the arrest vid eo, Special Agent Dervish’s audio 
recording, and the transcripts from the evidentiary hearings, the Court 
overrules Marshall’s objects, co ncludes Marshall knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily continued 
speaking with the agents, ad opts the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation, and DENIES Marshall’s motion to suppress his post-
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Miranda statements.9 
IV. Marshall’s Motion to Suppress the Seach of His Home 
As already explained, Marshall lived at 379 Atwood Street with his 
mother and father.  Agents obtained a search warrant for the apartment 
for evidence related to the production, possession, receipt, and 
distribution of child pornography and the enticement of a minor.  (Dkt. 
43-1).  The parties agree Special Agen t Dervish’s affidavit inaccurately 
stated the IP address data for Marshall’s “chill.beezy” Instagram 
account—which he allegedly used to communicate with the primary 
victim in this case—“resolved” to Marshall’s mother’s home at the Atwood 
Street address when that was not true.  In fact, the IP address for two of 
Marshall’s other Instagram accounts “unknown_beezy” and 
“beezy_braclets” resolved to that addr ess.  (Dkt. 74 at 27.)  Marshall 
moved to suppress the search, arguin g the warrant failed to establish a 
constitutional nexus between crimina l conduct and the residence, the 
information in the warrant affidavit was stale, and the warrant was a 
 
9 The Magistrate Judge concluded the United States did not intend to 
introduce any of his post-arrest, pre- Miranda statements.  The United 
States has not objected, and the Court adopts that conclusion.    
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“general warrant.”  (Doc. 43.)  He also moved for a Franks hearing as to 
whether Special Agent Dervish intentionally misled the issuing 
magistrate judge.  (Dkt. 48.)  The Magistrate Judge refused a Franks 
hearing and recommends the Court deny her other attacks on the 
warrant.  Marshall objects. 
A. Franks Hearing 
A search warrant may be voided if the affiant deliberately or 
recklessly included false statements  or failed to include material 
omissions that were essential to the finding of probable cause.  Dahl v. 
Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002 ).  In order to obtain a so-
called Franks hearing to explore this issu e, a defendant must “make a 
substantial preliminary showing that (1) the af fiant deliberately or 
recklessly included false statements , or failed to include material 
information, in the affidavit; an d (2) the challenged statement or 
omission was essential to the finding of probable cause.”  United States 
v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11
th Cir. 2006).  So “even in the face of 
a deliberate omission, no hearing is  required when there was enough 
evidence to support a probable cause finding even after considering the 
effect of the omission”  United States v. Leonard , 4 F.4th 1134, 1147-48 
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(11th Cir. 2021).   
1. Substantial Preliminary Showing 
The Magistrate Judge concluded Marshall failed to make a 
substantial preliminary showing.  He objects and insists he did that by 
(1) establishing that the misrepresent ation was “material to the finding 
of probable case” and (2) alleging  the agents acted deliberately or 
recklessly.  He claims “reckle ssness can be inferred when the 
misrepresentation or omission sign ificantly impacts probable cause.”  
(Dkt. 76 at 29-30.)  Marshall cites out of circuit cases for that proposition 
but no Eleventh Circuit authority.  To the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit 
has explained negligent misstatements  or omissions are not enough to 
obtain a hearing, United States v. Whyte , 928 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11 th Cir. 
2019), and obviously negligen t omissions can be material.  And, even if 
recklessness can sometimes be inferred from the importance of the false 
information, that would not carry th e day here.  As discussed in more 
detail below, the warrant had plenty of other information to establish 
probable cause.  Indeed, the agents  had identified three Instagram 
accounts associated with Marshall and concluded two of them “resolved” 
to his home.  In the light of that detail, the fact Special Agent Dervish 
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switched up the accounts does no t suggest intentional or reckless 
behavior.   
In his objections, Marshall adds other points to his substantial 
showing argument.  First he argues recklessness can be inferred from the 
fact the agent made the same mistake twice: in the warrant affidavit and  
when interviewing Marshall “to convince him to confess.”  (Dkt. 76 at 30.)  
The Court does not agree.  She ob tained the warrant the day before 
arresting and interviewing Mars hall.  That she had the same 
misinformation in her head two days in a row does not suggest 
intentionality or recklessness on eith er occasion.  Perhaps Marshall’s 
argument makes more sense if one be lieves she was trying to convince 
him to confess by misleading him.  But, as stated above, the audio tape 
of that interaction does not support his allegation.  Special Agent Dervish 
was not hostile or disrespectful to Marshall, overly aggressive in 
challenging his statement, or feedin g him false information throughout 
the interview.  Her demeanor in the interview—calm and professional—
supports the Court’s conclusion th at no evidence suggests she 
intentionally or recklessly misrepresented the IP address.   
Next, Marshall adds that the agen t did not even send a subpoena 
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to Comcast for the “chill.beezy” acco unt until after arresting Marshall.  
He does not explain how that helps his situation.  Perhaps he suggests 
she could not have thought her st atement in the affidavit was true 
because she had not yet subpoenaed Comcast.  But, that’s the point.  She 
switched up the accounts.  Finally,  Marshall alleges the agent knew he 
did not live at the Atwood home  until January 2024, “so IP login 
information relevant to any criminal conduct in March of 2023 could not 
resolve to that apartment.”  (Dkt. 76 at 30-31.)  Again, that’s a false trail 
to recklessness.  As described in more detail below, agents tied the March 
2023 sexual exploitation of a mino r to Marshall in several ways, 
associated one of his phon es to an area near the Atwood residence, tied 
Marshall’s mother to that home as of January 2024, and tied Marshall to 
that home as well.  Nothing in the affidavit suggests Marshall stopped 
using the “chill.beezy” account before moving into that home or that the 
IP information they had was linked to the time of the original conduct.   
For these reasons, the Court overrules Marshall’s objections and 
adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclu sion the Marshall has not made a 
substantial preliminary showing that Special Agent Dervish 
intentionally or recklessly misidentified the Instagram account linked to 
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the Atwood home.  
2. Probable Cause 
The Magistrate Judge concluded th at, even if Marshall made that 
preliminary showing, probable cause for the warrant still existed once 
the erroneous information about the “chill.beezy” IP address was set 
aside—thus precluding a Franks hearing.  Marshall objects, claiming the 
affidavit failed to establish a nexus between Marshall’s alleged crime and 
his home. 
“Probable cause to support a sear ch warrant exists when the 
totality of the circumstances allows th e conclusion that ‘there is a fair 
probability that contraband or eviden ce of a crime w ill be found in a 
particular place.’”  United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11
th 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  For the 
search of a residence, law enforcement must establish “a reasonable basis 
for concluding [a defendant might] keep evidence of his [or her] crimes at 
his [or her] home, i.e., a ‘safe yet accessible place.’”  Id.  In this regard, 
the Eleventh Circuit has explained: 
[t]he justification for allowing a search of a person's residence 
w h e n  t h a t  p e r s o n  i s  s u s p e c t ed of criminal activity is the 
common-sense realization that one tends to conceal fruits and 
instrumentalities of a crime in  a place to which easy access 
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may be had and in which privacy is nevertheless maintained. 
In normal situations, few plac es are more convenient than 
one's residence for use in pla nning criminal activities and 
hiding fruits of a crime. 
 
Id.   
Special Agent Dervish’s affidavit established probable cause to 
believe evidence of Marshall’s alleged crimes would be found in his house 
even excluding her misstatement abou t the IP address.  Special Agent 
Dervish first presented significant evidence that Marshall used two 
social media accounts linked to hi s phones in March 2023 to sexually 
exploit a minor and to retain evidence  of that crime.  This included 
information that he used an Instagram account linked to one his phones 
(ending in 5301) to communicate with a 12-year-old girl, convinced her to 
film herself masturbating and send hi m the video, convinced her to film 
herself kissing and (separately) perf orming oral sex on her 4-year-old 
brother and send him the videos, and retained the videos (as he sent them 
back to the victim).  (Dkt. 43-1 and 5-6.)  The affidavit also established 
that he used a Snapchat account linked to another phone (ending in 4487) 
to send one of the videos back to the victim via Snapchat.  (Id.)  The agent 
then explained law enforcement connected Marshall and the 4487 
number to the Atwood home in June 2024 through geolocation, 
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specifically that the results of a ge o-location warrant showed Marshall’s 
phone “routinely to be in a geograph ic location surrounding” the home.  
(Id.)  She also connected him to th e home (1) in July 2024 through the 
registration of his mother’s truck and information he lived with his 
mother, (2) in August 2024 through hi s mother’s registration with the 
U.S. Postal Service, and (3) on Au gust 2 and 6, 2024 through physical 
surveillance when officers watc hed Marshall leave the apartment 
building and walk to a Marta station.  ( Id.)  This established probable 
cause to believe Marshall committed  a federal offense involving the 
exploitation of children, that he kept  evidence of that crime on social 
medial accounts linked to his phones  (at least in March 2023), that he 
still had the 4487 phone, and that he lived at the Atwood residence—all 
without considering the erroneous information linking the IP address for 
“chill.beezy” to the home.  Marshall really does not dispute this. 
To establish probable cause to believe evidence of Marshall’s crime 
would be found in the home, she also relied on her knowledge, experience, 
and training that people who receiv e child pornography often maintain 
their collection of illegal images in the privacy and security of their home 
or some other secure location and keep  that material for several years.  
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(Dkt. 43-1 at 11.)  She averred: 
[b]ased upon the conduct of in dividuals involved in the 
collection of child pornography . . . namely, that they tend to 
maintain their collections at a secure, private location for long 
periods of time, and that forensic evidence of the downloading, 
saving, and storage of such evidence may remain on the 
computers or digital media for months or even years after 
such images and videos have been deleted from the computers 
or digital media, there is pr obable cause to believe that 
evidence of the offenses of  producing, receiving, and 
possessing child pornography, as well as enticement of a 
minor, is currently located in [Marshall’s residence]. 
 
(Id. at 12.)   
 Marshall says the Magistrate Judge erred in relying on these 
“experienced based platitudes about the storage and collection” habits of 
people who possess child pornography.  (Dkt. 76 at 32.)  He says that, to 
establish probable cause, the affidavit should have included allegations 
about Marshall’s specific internet  activity showing his conduct was 
consistent with collectors of child pornography.  The Court disagrees.  
The Eleventh Circuit has said a magist rate judge can rely on an agent’s 
expertise and training in approving a warrant.  United States v. Carroll, 
886 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11
th Cir. 2018) (noting affiant’s “seven years of 
experience in the GBI and … spec ial[] train[ing] in computer 
investigations involving crimes agai nst children” in assessing probable 
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cause for search warrant).  Marshall also identifies no reason a 
magistrate judge should not be permitted to rely on an agent’s experience 
and expertise as one factor in assessing probable cause.  He cites several 
cases but none of them involve anything like the situation here—an FBI 
agent’s experience and training about  the habits of people who possess 
child pornography.  He cites, for example, United States v. Olgesby, 2019 
WL 1877228, (S.D. Tex. 2019), in which a district court suppressed the 
search of a phone found in a car when a defendant was arrested for 
burglary.  But, the affidavit presented no evidence a phone had been used 
in the robbery and relied exclusivel y on the agent’s general statement 
that people who commit crimes ofte n talk with coconspirators on the 
phone.  That is not the case here, as Special Agent Dervish explained why 
she believes people who commit the crime  at issue in this case retain 
evidence of their crimes in their ho mes.  Marshall similarly relies on In 
re Search of White Apple Phone, 2012 WL 2945996, (S.D. Tex. April 11, 
2012), a case in which a magistrate de nied a warrant for the search of a 
phone belonging to an individual who failed to register as a sex offender.  
The affiant included no details to suggest the target committed any 
offense (other than not registering) and never “explain[ed] how access to 
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the cell phone [would] likely provide information regarding the criminal 
offenses.  Id. at *2.  Indeed, the magistrate judge in that case concluded 
the affidavit “failed even to estab lish a reasonable likelihood that an 
offense had been committed, not to mention the establishment of a nexus 
between the targeted cell phone and the purported criminal offense.”  Id.   
Those cases are not helpful to Ma rshall.  Special Agent Dervish 
provided the Magistrate Judge ample evidence that Marshall committed 
the child exploitation offense, that he used social medial accounts linked 
to the two phones to receive, retain, and transmit evidence of the crimes, 
and the basis for her belief that the evidence would likely be in the house 
(because people involved in these of fenses often retain the contraband 
and keep it in a secure location li ke their homes).  The affidavit also 
linked Marshall’s 4487 phone near the home in June 2024.  These facts 
distinguish the authority Marshall cites.   
Based on the totality of the allega tions in the affida vit, the Court 
adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclu sion that the warrant established 
the constitutionally required ne xus between the crimes Marshall 
allegedly committed and the location to be searched.  The Court thus also 
concludes the warrant provided pro bable case—without considering the 
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misstated information. 
B. Staleness and Overbreadth Attacks on the Warrant 
Marshall next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the 
17-month gap between the time Marsha ll allegedly exploited the minor 
(March 2023) and the execution of  the warrant (August 2024) did not 
render the warrant stale.  (Dkt. 76 at 34.) 10  The Magistrate Judge 
relied—in part—on this Court’s decision in United States v. Maxson, 2020 
WL 703137, (N.D. Ga, Feb. 12, 2020), holding an 8-month delay between 
a defendant’s distribution of child pornography and the execution of a 
search did not render the warrant stale.  Id. at *5.  In that case, the Court 
noted “staleness is an issue which mu st be decided on the peculiar facts 
of each case [including] the nature of the suspected crime (discrete crimes 
or ongoing conspiracy), habits of the accused, character of the items 
sought, and nature and function of the premises to be searched.”  Id.  
(citing United States v. Touset , 890 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018)).  
 
10 Marshall says the Instagram account “used in the criminal conduct was 
deactivated in March 14, 2023.”  (Dkt. 76 at 34.)  He ci tes no authority 
for that assertion nor explains how it should be used to assess the 
constitutionality of the search within  the four corners of the warrant.  
And, as discussed below, there is no claim the agents knew about that at 
the time.     
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Finally, the Court recognized “the Eleventh Circuit has followed the lead 
of other circuit courts in finding that  the type of charges at issue here 
(the possession of child pornograph y) elongates the probative value of 
prior possession, keeping it fresh and preventing it from going stale as 
quickly as other evidence might. . . because ‘pedophiles rarely, if ever, 
dispose of child pornography’ and because evidence of child pornography 
can remain on electronic  devices long after someone attempts to delete 
it.”  Id.  (citing Touset, 890 F.3d 1238).  
In his objections, Marshall suggests this case is different because 
no evidence linked Marshall’s alleged crime to his home.  (Dkt. 76 at 34.)  
He says the 17-month delay might be reasonable if “illegal activity had 
been more tightly connected  to the residence.”  ( Id.)  But, as this Court 
noted in Maxson, the nature of the charges “elongates the probative value 
of prior possession.”  Maxson, 2020 WL 703137 at *5.  And the Eleventh 
Circuit has rejecting a staleness challenged based on an 18-month delay 
between the time a defendant allegedly paid to receive child pornography 
and the date of a search.  Touset, 890 F.3d at 1239.  Again Special Agent 
Dervish’s affidavit showed Marshall had the 4487 phone at (or near) his 
home in the month or so before the search.  The Court adopts the 
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Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and rejects Marshall’s staleness 
challenge.   
Finally, Marshall objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that 
the warrant was not overbroad.  He argues it fails this requirement 
because it contains insufficient subject-matter or time limitations.  As to 
the first, he argues the listing of it ems to be seized in Attachment B, 
which includes all cell phones, elec tronic media devices, computers and 
computer software without regard to f ile type, is so broad as to render 
any limitation to the crimes under investigation “meaningless.”  (Dkt. 76 
at 35.)     
The Magistrate Judge correctly re jected this argument because—
regardless of the breadth of Attachment B—the first page of the warrant 
only allowed agents to seize items id entified in the list that “constitute 
evidence of a crime, contraband, fruits of crime, or items illegally 
possessed, and property designed for use, intended for use, or used in 
committing a crime, concerning violations of Title 18, United States Code, 
Sections 2251, 2252, 2252A, and 2422(b).”  (Dkt. 43-1 at 1.)  The Eleventh 
Circuit has held this limitation comports with constitutional 
requirements.  See United States v. Brooks , 648 F. App’x 791, 793 (11
th 
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Cir. 2016) (“that some of the desc riptions of the items-to-be-seized 
contained no express reference to child pornography or to the exploitation 
of children fails to render the sear ch warrant impermissibly overbroad. 
When read within the context of the entire warrant, the descriptions are 
sufficiently particular to enable offi cers to ‘reasonably ascertain and 
identify the things to be seized’ as being only those items pertinent to an 
investigation related to child pornography”). 
Next, the Magistrate Judge concluded the agent’s failure to include 
a time limitation did not render the warrant overbroad given the nature 
of the charges.  (Dkt. 74 at 48.)  Marshall objects “to the Magistrate 
Judge’s conclusion that child sex ca ses eliminate the need for any time 
restrictions in a search warrant.”  ( Id.)  The Magistrate Judge did not 
hold that.  He simply cited cases ex plaining that, given the fact people 
who possess child sex abuse materials “have a propensity to hoard and 
keep it indefinitely,” the lack of a time restriction does not automatically 
doom a warrant.  (Dkt. 74 at 39.)  And Marshall cites no cases to the 
contrary.  As explained above, the El eventh Circuit has recognized that 
propensity.  The Court co ncludes the lack of a ti me restriction in the 
warrant case does not render it invalid.    
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C. Conclusion 
The Court agrees with the Magist rate Judge’s conclusion that 
Marshall failed to establish his right to a Franks hearing.  The Court also 
adopts his conclusion that the warrant established probable cause 
(including a nexus to Marshall’s home) and was neither stale nor 
overbroad.  So the Court ad opts his recommendation and DENIES 
Marshall’s motion to suppress the search of his home. 
V. Motion to Suppress Search of Person and Phone 
Law enforcement also obtained a search warrant for Marshall’s 
person and any phone he had on him.  (Dkt. 42-1.)  It was the same as 
the warrant for his home in all mate rial respects and law enforcement 
used it to seize and search the phon e he was carrying on the day of his 
arrest.  Marshall filed a motion to suppress, saying the warrant failed to 
establish a nexus between any crim inal conduct and items in his 
possession (specifically any cell phone) .  (Dkt. 42.)  He also raised the 
same staleness and overbreadth argume nts he raised in regard to the 
search of his home.  The Magistra te Judge adopted his conclusions 
regarding the latter two issues, addr essed only the nexus attack, and 
concluded the warrant passed constitutional muster.  (Dkt. 74 at 41.)  
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Marshall objects.  (Dkt. 76 at 38.)   
This Court also adopts its prior reasoning and overrules Marshall’s 
staleness and overbreadth objections.  Regarding nexus, the Magistrate 
Judge concluded the affidavit established that Marshall used Instagram 
and Snapchat accounts associated with both the 5301 and 4487 phones 
to engage in conversations with a minor victim in March 2023.  (Dkt. 74 
at 41.)  He determined Special Agent Dervish’s averments, his prior 
conclusion that the warrant was no t stale, and the special agent’s 
experience that people who communicate about child sex abuse material 
maintain their collections establis hed the necessary nexus between the 
crimes in March 2023 an d any phone Marshall might have in his 
possession.  (Dkt. 74 at 42.)   
Marshall insists the lack of evidence anyone used the phones to 
commit a crime after March 2023 rend ered the information stale and 
precluded a link between the crim e and any phone he possessed in 
August 2024.  As part of his object ion, Marshall analyzes subscriber 
information the FBI received from T-Mobile and Snapchat.  According to 
him, the documents show the 5301 num ber linked to the “chill.beezy” 
Instagram account that communicate d with the victim in March 2023 
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was associated with someone else from 2022 through 2024.  (Dkt. 76 at 
39 (citing Dkt. 42-2).)  But it appears the FBI received that information 
on August 19, 2024, after execution of the warrant.  (Dkt. 42-2.)  He also 
says the “last active date” for the Snapchat account that was used to 
communicate with the victim was March 4, 2023, “weeks before the final 
communication.”  (Dkt. 76 at 39 ( citing Dkt. 42-3).)  He says the 4487 
phone number was also removed from that account on March 4, 2024.  
(Id.)
11  B u t  h e  o f f e r s  n o  e v i d e n c e  t o  support his interpretation of the 
 
11 Marshall’s observation regarding the 5301 number could be explained 
by the fact Special Agent Dervish linked Marshall to the number via 
Instagram rather than through T-Mobile.  Instagram identified the user 
of the “chill.beezy” account as “J abez Marshall”, included the email 
address “jabez.marshall@gmal.com”, and listed the 5301 number.  (Dkt. 
42-1 at 5.)  The point is whoever created that account listed that number.  
And Marshall’s observation about the Snapchat account may be wrong.  
While the FBI report includes a “last active date” of March 4, 2023, it also 
identifies the “Status” of the accoun t as “Active.”  (Dkt. 42-3 at 2.)  It 
appears the discrepancy can be explai ned by the fact that, on March 4, 
2023, someone “changed the number associated with the account” and 
did not include a new number.  ( Id.)  The same records Marshall cites 
indicate he remained the subscriber to the 4487 number until the time of 
the search.  (Dkt. 42-2 at 2.)  His suggestion the Snapchat account became 
inactive in early March 2023 is inconsistent with Special Agent Dervish’s 
averment that the user of the account sent the illegal videos to the minor 
victim on March 29, 2023 and that a subsequent subpoena to Snapchat 
listed Marshall as the user along with his date of birth.  All of this shows 
the danger of jumping to conclusi ons about the interpretation of 
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document (received by the FBI before it obtained the warrant).  He says 
this “draws into question the va lidity of the data and certainly 
connections to Marshall.”  (Id. at 40.) 
The problem for Marshall is that the Court must assess the validity 
of the warrant based on the allegations contained in the affidavit rather 
than in the light of subpoena responses the FBI received after execution 
of the warrant or based on docume nts for which Marshall offers no 
evidentiary explanation.  United States v. Lockett , 674 F.2d 843, 845 
(11th Cir. 1982) (“In passing on the validity of [a] warrant, consideration 
may be given only to information brought to the attention of the 
magistrate.”); United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d 961, 969 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(“Probable cause exists if, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit . . . , there is a fair probabilit y that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in a particular place.”); United States v. Lott , 2025 
WL 784396, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025) (“A reviewing court may 
consider only the information presen ted to the magistrate judge” who 
issued the warrant.).  
 
documents without evidence and th e importance of evaluating the 
warrant within its four corners.   
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The Court has already walked thro ugh the significant evidence in 
the affidavit tying Marshall to the phones, his use of social media 
accounts associated with the phones to sexually exploit the minor victim 
(including by receiving, possessing, and retransmitting images of the 
exploitation), and his continued use of the 4487 phone in June 2024.  The 
Court agrees with the Magistrate Ju dge that this information and the 
other information Special Agent Dervish provided (including that people 
who engage in this conduct keep these kinds of images for years and that 
even deleted files can be recovere d) established the necessary nexus 
between the crimes alleged and any phone Marshall might have in his 
possession at the time of his arrest.   
The Court overrules all Marsha ll’s objections, adopts the 
Magistrate Judge conclusions, and DENIES Marshall’s motion to 
suppress this warrant as well.   
VI. Motion to Suppress Search of Snapchat Account 
Marshall moved to suppress a sea rch warrant to Snapchat for 
information involving the “luv_life626” account—an account identified by 
Special Agent Dervish as having been  in contact with the minor victim 
and linked to the 4487 phone.  The Magistrate Judge concluded the 
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warrant was not overboard because, although Section B.I of the warrant 
required Snapchat to produce a la rge amount of data, Section B.II 
allowed law enforcement to seize only data associated with violations of 
child pornography laws involvin g Marshall (or the user of the 
“luv_life626” account) and information necessary to identify the user of 
that account.  (Dkt. 74 at 43.)  He also noted the warrant covered a short 
time frame—March 27, 2023 (when the user of that account 
communicated with the minor victim) through July 19, 2023 (the date of 
the warrant).  (Id.)   
Marshall objects, saying this two-step approach—first requiring 
production of a significant amount  of information from the service 
provider and, second, allowing agen ts to seize a more narrow subset—
violates the constitution.  In support, he cites United States v. Blake, 868 
F.3d 960 (11th Cir. 2017).  (Dkt. 76  at 41–45.)  But the court in Blake 
discussed in dicta (and in unflattering terms) the expansive information 
the warrant required a social media platform to provide in a “first step,” 
it did not find the warrant or the two-step process unconstitutional.  See 
Blake, 868 F.3d at 974 (“[W]e need not decide whether the Facebook 
warrants violated the Fourth Amendment because, even if they did,” the 
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warrants “fall into the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule.”).  What’s more, the warrant at  issue in this case includes an 
important limitation that the warrant in Blake lacked: a limited 
timeframe for items to be provided.  The court in Blake emphasized 
(among other things) that the warrant  at issue “should have requested 
data only from the period of time during which” the suspected criminal 
conduct occurred.  Blake, 868 F.3d at 974.  The warrant here includes 
this very limitation by seeking Marshall’s information from the day he 
allegedly messaged the victim (two days before the victim allegedly 
shared the sexually explicit video)  until agents obtained the warrant 
several months later.   
As the Magistrate Judge accurately noted “[f]ederal courts in this 
circuit and others . . . routinely uphold warrants requiring production of 
all information associated with a co mputer hard drive or email account 
in the face of challenges based on th e particularity requirement, so long 
as the warrant limits seizure to rele vant evidence.”  (Dkt. 74 at 45 
(quoting United States v. Addaquay, No. 1:20-cr-126-LMM-JSA, 2021 WL 
1541051, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2021) (collecting cases)).)  In the 
absence of authority from the Elev enth Circuit and for the reasons 
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discussed above, the Court follows th at lead, adopts the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation, and DENIES Marshall’s motion to suppress 
the warrant as unconstitutionally overbroad.   
VII. Application of the Good-Faith Exception 
In United States v. Leon , the Supreme Court explained a court 
should not exclude evidence “obtaine d by officers acting in reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 
but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.”  United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984).  This good-faith exception applies in all 
but four circumstances: (1) where the issuing magistrate judge was 
misled by information in a warrant application the applicant knew was 
false or would have known but for re ckless disregard for the truth; (2) 
where the magistrate “wholly abandone d” his or her judicial role; (3) 
where the affidavit supporting the application was “so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause as to render offici al belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable”; or (4) where the warrant  was “so facially deficient” that 
officers couldn’t have reasonably presumed it to be valid.  United States 
v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
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The Magistrate Judge addressed th is issue but did not apply the 
good faith exception as an alternat ive ruling.  Marshall insists Special 
Agent Dervish’s misstatement about  the IP address and the other 
challenges he raises in regard to ea ch warrant preclude findings of good 
faith as to each warrant.  (Dkt. 76 at 46.)  Having consider the issue, the 
Court applies the Leon good-faith exception as an alternative basis for 
denying Marshall’s motions to suppress each warrant. 
No evidence suggests Special Agent Dervish intentionally or 
recklessly misled the issuing magistrate judges.  That she misstated the 
IP address related to the home does  not suggest that for the reasons 
already stated.  The warrants also are not so lacking in probable cause 
or otherwise defective on their face to suggest the issuing magistrate 
judges abandoned their “judicial roles” or to suggest no reasonable agent 
could have believed them valid.   Marshall’s probable cause and 
overbreadth arguments certainly do not show such glaring deficiencies in 
the warrants for the reasons set forth above.  And, in Blake, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded the good-faith exce ption applied to avoid suppression 
of items seized pursuant to a “two-step” warrant that required Facebook 
to disclose to the government “virtua lly every kind of data that could be 
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found in [the defendant’s]  social media account.”  868 F.3d at 974.  The 
Court follows that approach here.    
The Court concludes Special Agen t Dervish acted in reasonable 
reliance on the validity of search warrants issued by detached and 
neutral magistrate judges.  So ev en if the warrants are otherwise 
defective, the United States is enti tled to the good-faith exception to 
suppression.  
VIII. Conclusion 
The Court OVERRULES Marshall’s Objections (Dkt. 76), 
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 74) 
with the addition that the Court also applies the good-faith exception to 
suppression, and DENIES Marshall’s Motions to Suppress his 
statements (other than pre-Miranda statements), the search of his home, 
the search of his person  and phone, and the se arch of his Snapchat 
account (Dkts. 41, 42, 43, 46).  
SO ORDERED this 13th day of March, 2026. 
 
   
 
1 (1 1 (1 
MICH" KEL  L.  BROWN 
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