govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-4_24-cv-00123-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
OWENSBORO DIVISION 
 
JACK C. MORGAN, JR., Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, 
  
v. Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-123-DJH-HBB 
  
MERRILL, A BANK OF AMERICA 
COMPANY,  
 
and 
 
PAUL ADAMS, 
 
Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Cross-Claimant, 
 
 
 
Defendant/Cross-Defendant. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Jack C. Morgan, Jr. sued Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Cross-
Claimant Merrill, a Bank of America Company  and Defendant/Cross -Defendant Paul Adams , 
alleging unjust enrichment in relation to  a retirement account held by Merrill and seeking 
declaratory judgment and the creation of a constructive trust .  (Docket No. 12)  In its answer to 
Morgan’s complaint, Merrill asserted a counterclaim and crossclaim for interpleader relief.  (D.N. 
12)  Adams, proceeding pro se, moves for dismissal of all claims against him for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  (D.N. 20)   Merrill and Morgan oppose the motion  to dismiss.  (D.N. 22; D.N. 23)   
Also pending is Merrill ’s unopposed motion for interpleader relief.  (D.N. 25)   After careful 
consideration, the Court will grant the requested interpleader relief and deny as moot Adams’s 
motion to dismiss for the reasons explained below.  
I. 
Jack Morgan was married to Leanne R. Morgan.  (D.N. 12, PageID.50 ¶ 9)  Leanne had 
two children by prior marriage, one of whom is Paul Adams.  (Id. ¶ 11)  When Leanne opened an 
Individual Retirement Rollover Account (IRRA) with Merrill in 2000, Morgan was named as the 
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“100% primary beneficiary of the [a]ccount.”  (D.N. 14, PageID.81 ¶¶ 6–7)  Leanne began 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease around 2020.  (D.N. 12, PageID.50 ¶ 12)  On June 27, 2023, 
Merrill received a signed b eneficiary-designation form naming Adams as the 100% primary  
beneficiary.  (D.N. 14, PageID.81 ¶ 8)  Leanne died on March 6, 2024.  (D.N. 12, PageID.51 ¶ 18)  
As of October 31, 2024, the balance of the IRRA was $217,652.52.  (Id. ¶ 23) 
Morgan alleges that Leanne “lacked the requisite mental capacity” at the time of the change 
in beneficiary designation and that “Adams exerted undue influence over Leanne ” and “coerced 
her to change the beneficiary designation of the IRRA.”  (D.N. 12, PageID.52 ¶¶ 28–29)  Morgan’s 
complaint (1) requests that the Court declare him the rightful beneficiary of the IRRA, (2) seeks 
imposition of a constructive trust over the IRRA funds for Morgan’s benefit, and (3) asserts a 
common-law claim of unjust enrichment against Adams.  (Id., PageID.52–54)  Merrill does not 
claim any interest in the IRRA funds and “has been unable to determine the rightful beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the [a]ccount” due to Morgan’s claims.  (D.N. 14, PageID.81 ¶ 12; id., PageID.82 
¶ 17)  Merrill’s interpleader complaint asserts that it should be protected from litigation regarding 
entitlement the IRRA funds and seeks dismissal from the present action upon the Court’s 
acceptance of control of the account and the entry of an order requiring Adams and Morgan to 
resolve their conflicting claims to the IRRA before the Court (see D.N. 14).  See also Bankers Tr. 
Co. v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 139 F.R.D. 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (interpleader may be brought by 
crossclaim or counterclaim).  
Adams moves for dismissal of “all claims against him ” under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing that the requirements of Kentucky ’s long-arm statute and the Due 
Process Clause are not satisfied.  (D.N. 20, PageID.102; see D.N. 20-1)  Attached to the motion is 
a sworn  affidavit explaining Adams’s lack of connection to Kentucky and asserting that 
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“[d]efending this action in Kentucky would impose an undue burden.”  (D.N. 20, PageID. 103)  
Merrill contends that “these arguments bear no weight with respect to Merrill ’s [i]nterpleader 
[c]omplaint” under the federal interpleader statute .1  (D.N. 22, PageID. 117)  Morgan joins 
Merrill’s assertions, arguing that because the Court has personal jurisdiction over Adams as to the 
interpleader claims, the Court  also “possesses ancillary jurisdiction ” with regard to Morgan’s 
claims as “compulsory counterclaims.”2  (D.N. 23, PageID.121)  Adams appears to concede in his 
reply that the Court has personal jurisdiction as to the interpleader claim s, but he maintains that 
the federal interpleader statute is not a basis of personal jurisdiction for Morgan ’s “independent 
claims.”  (D.N. 24, PageID.128)  Merrill has since filed an unopposed motion for interpleader 
relief, requesting discharge from this matter with prejudice, an order to maintain the IRRA “as is,” 
a permanent injunction protecting Merrill from further litigation regarding the account, and  $5,000 
in attorney fees and costs to be taken from the proceeds of the IRRA.  (D.N. 25, PageID.132 
(“Morgan . . . [and] Adams . . . do not oppose the relief sought herein, including Merrill’s request 
for attorneys’ fees.”)) 
II. 
“[I]nterpleader is ‘an equitable proceeding that ‘affords a party who fears being exposed to 
the vexation of defending multiple claims to a limited fund or property that is under his control a 
procedure to settle the controversy and satisfy his obligation in a single proceeding. ’”  Pope v. 
Cranmer, No. 3:17 -CV-546-RGJ-CHL, 2019 WL 2372886 , at * 2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2019) 
(quoting United States v. High Tech. Prods., Inc., 497 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2007)).  Interpleader 
 
1 A party may seek interpleader relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 (rule interpleader) 
or 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (statutory interpleader).  Merrill’s interpleader complaint relies alternatively 
on both Rule 22 and the federal statute.  (See D.N. 14)  
2 Morgan does not address Adams’s arguments about due process or Kentucky’s long-arm statute.  
(See D.N. 23) 
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proceeds in two stages.  First, the Court “determines whether the stakeholder has properly invoked 
interpleader, including whether the court has jurisdiction over the suit, whether the stakeholder is 
actually threatened with double or multiple liability, and whether any equitable concerns prevent 
the use of interpleader.”  High Tech. Prods., 497 F.3d at 641 (citation omitted).  If interpleader is 
properly invoked, the Court “may issue an order discharging the stakeholder, if the stakeholder is 
disinterested, [and] enjoining the parties from prosecuting any other proceeding related to the same 
subject matter .”  Id.  In the second stage , the C ourt “determines the respective rights of the 
claimants to the fund or property at stake via normal litigation processes, including pleading, 
discovery, motions, and trial.”  Id.   
Because Adams does not appear to contest that the Court has personal jurisdiction as to 
Merrill’s interpleader claim s (see D.N. 24, PageID.128  (acknowledging that the federal 
interpleader statute “permits federal courts to bring parties before them .  . . in the context of 
resolving the interpleader dispute”); D.N. 25 (stating that Adams does not oppose Merrill’s motion 
for interpleader relief) ), the Cou rt will proceed with the first stage  to determine whether 
interpleader has properly been invoked.3  See Columbus Life Ins. Co. v. Walker-Macklin, No. 1:15-
CV-535, 2016 WL 4007092 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2016)  (considering whether interpleader was 
properly invoked although motion for interpleader relief was unopposed) , report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-535, 2016 WL 4449570 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2016).  But 
see Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Autrey-Miller, No. 13-14122, 2014 WL 2931786 (E.D. Mich. 
June 30, 2014) (granting unopposed motion for interpleader relief without analysis). 
 
3 “The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction over a party is a waivable right .”  
Preferred Cap., Inc. v. Assocs. in Urology, 453 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). 
 
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“[T]he ‘primary test ’ for determining whether interpleader is appropriate evaluates 
‘whether the stakeholder legitimately fears multiple  vexation directed against a single fund or 
property.’”  USAA Life Ins. Co. v. Space , No. 3:14-CV-00661-TBR, 2015 WL 3407323, at *2–3 
(W.D. Ky. May 26, 2015) .  “[T]his requirement [is] satisfied where multiple claimants present 
competing claims for the same identifiable [fund or property].”  Mudd v. Yarbrough, 786 F. Supp. 
2d 1236, 1240 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (citing High Tech. Prods., 497 F.3d at 642).  Here, Merrill is subject 
to competing beneficiary claims by Morgan and Adams over the IRRA (see generally D.N. 14), 
and thus the requirement is satisfied.  See Mudd, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
While Morgan ’s complaint invokes the Court ’s diversity jurisdiction ( see D.N. 12, 
PageID.49 ¶ 6), the federal interpleader statute confers to district courts independent original 
jurisdiction over “any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader ” where three 
elements are satisfied.   28 U.S.C. §  1335.  First, the amount subject to the dispute must exceed 
$500, 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) , as is the case in this action.  (D.N. 12, PageID.51 ¶ 23)  There must 
also be two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) .  This 
requirement is likewise met because the record indicates that Morgan is a citizen of Kentucky and 
Adams is a citizen of Wisconsin.  (See D.N. 12, PageID.49 ¶¶ 2, 4; D.N. 120, PageID.103)  Finally, 
the interpleader plaintiff is required to make a deposit with the Court  to ensure compliance with 
the Court ’s stage -two determination , either in the full amount at issue  or as a bond deemed 
appropriate by the Court.  28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2).  Because the Court will permit Merrill’s deposit 
of the IRRA funds upon finding that interpleader is properly invoked, the third requirement is met, 
and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the interpleader claims.4  See USAA, 2015 WL 
 
4 Merrill’s interpleader complaint request s either “[t]he entry of an Order requiring Merrill to 
transfer the assets of the [a]ccount  . . . [to] this Court; or in the alternative, the entry of an Order 
authorizing Merrill to continue to maintain the Account under such terms and conditions as the 
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3407323, at *3 (finding third requirement met although interpleader plaintiff had not yet deposited 
funds); see also Kirk Excavating & Constr., Inc. v. AYS Oilfield , No. 2:14 -CV-2097, 2015 WL 
6361667, at * 9 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2015) (“[A] stakeholder who has failed to deposit that full 
amount should have the opportunity to cure the defect. ” (citations omitted)); State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) ( noting that Federal Interpleader Act is “remedial 
and to be liberally construed”). 
Personal jurisdiction is  also required in interpleader actions.  See 4 Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 22.03[1][f] (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 521 (1916)).  Even 
if Adams has not waived personal jurisdiction as to the interpleader claims, see Boswell v. Mayer, 
169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of 
their pleadings and filings. ”), the lenient personal-jurisdiction requirements of the federal 
interpleader statute apply.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(C) states that  “[s]erving a 
summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . when 
authorized by a federal statute.”  And “Congress, through the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2361, which authorizes nationwide service of process, confers nationwide personal jurisdiction 
to district courts. ”  Yonko v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co. , No. 1 :20-CV-109-GNS-HBB, 2021 WL 
1428476, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 15, 2021) ; see also Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto , 245 F.3d 561 , 
 
Court directs.”  (D.N. 14, PageID.83)  But Merrill’s motion for interpleader relief only asks “[t]hat 
Merrill be ordered to restrict the Account and maintain the Account ‘as is .’”  (D.N. 25, 
PageID.134)  Unlike rule interpleader, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 , statutory interpleader requires 
deposit with the Court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) ; 6247 Atlas Corp. v. Marine Ins. Co. , 155 
F.R.D. 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ( “[S]tatutory interpleader relaxes the [Rule 22 interpleader] 
diversity jurisdictional requirements in exchange for the somewhat onerous requirement of 
depositing the stake with the Court.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 778 F. Supp. 925, 
930 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (“Deposit of the fund at issue, or a bond in that amount, is necessary for the 
district court to acquire jurisdiction over a statutory interpleader action.”).  The Court will therefore 
require that Merrill deposit the full amount at issue. 
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567–68 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a federal court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to a national 
service of process provision, it is exercising jurisdiction for the territory of the United States and 
the . . .  concern is whether the individual over which the court is exercising jurisdiction has 
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States.”).  Adams has been served in Wisconsin and 
does not deny minimum contact s with the United States.  (See D.N. 19 ; D.N. 21 ; D.N. 120, 
PageID.103)  Therefore, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Adams for purposes of the 
interpleader action.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2361. 
Adams specifically argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction as to Morgan’s claims.  
(See D.N. 20; D.N. 24)  But the second stage of interpleader will require the Court to resolve the 
legal question of IRRA-fund ownership as between Adams and Morgan.  See High Tech. Prods., 
497 F.3d at 641.  Therefore, because Morgan’s claims do not seek relief beyond determination of 
entitlement to the IRRA funds ( see D.N. 12, PageID.52 –55), they are effectively mooted by 
Merrill’s invocation of interpleader.  Adams’s challenge to those claims on personal -jurisdiction 
grounds is thus also moot.  See Mudd, 786 F. Supp. 2d at 1242–43 (finding personal jurisdiction 
under federal interpleader statute after interpleader was raised defensively in insurance-beneficiary 
case seeking declaratory judgment); see also Glenclova Inv. Co. v. Trans-Res., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 
2d 292 , 306  (S.D.N.Y. 2012)  (describing convergence of interpleader claims with subsequent 
crossclaims in the context of abstention because “the legal issues to be decided . . . [and] the relief 
to be granted are identical”). 
In sum, interpleader has been properly invoked by Merrill  under 28 U.S.C. §  1335.  See 
High Tech. Prods., 497 F.3d at 641.  The Court will therefore grant the motion for interpleader 
relief, award Merrill $5,000 in costs and attorney fees, dismiss Merrill from this proceeding with 
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prejudice and enjoin Morgan and Adams from instituting or prosecuting Merrill in further litigation 
related to the IRRA after deposit of the IRRA funds with the Court.5 
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above , and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is 
hereby 
 ORDERED as follows:  
(1) Adams’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (D.N. 20) is DENIED 
as moot.   
 (2) Merrill’s motion for interpleader relief (D.N. 25) is GRANTED.  Merrill SHALL 
deposit the balance of the IRRA account ending in -0G68, minus $5,000 in costs and attorney fees, 
into the Court Registry Investment System by check to the Clerk of Court for ultimate distribution 
by order of th e Court.  The Clerk of Court SHALL deposit the funds into an  interest-bearing 
account pending further order of the Court.   
 (3) Upon deposit of the funds with the Court:  
(a) Merrill shall be discharged from any and all liability on account of or in any 
way related to the IRRA or related to the handling or processing of any claims made 
in connection with the IRRA except as to the enforcement of the future order or 
judgment in the present matter.  Jack C. Morgan, Jr. and Paul Adams, and each of 
their respective attorneys, representatives, successors, assigns, and heirs shall be 
permanently enjoined  from instituting or prosecuting against Merrill a claim, 
 
5 “A federal court has discretion to award costs and counsel fees to the stakeholder in an 
interpleader action, whether brought under Rule 22 or the interpleader statute, whenever it is fair 
and equitable to do so.”  Holmes v. Artists Rights Enforcement Corp., 148 F. App’x 252, 259 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 
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action, lawsuit, arbitration, or proceeding related to the IRRA in any state or United 
States Court, arbitration forum, o r administrative tribunal except as to the 
enforcement of the future order or judgment in the present matter.
(b) Merrill shall be dismissed with prejudice from this action. 
(4) The Court REQUESTS that U.S. Magistrate Judge H. Brent Brennenstuhl (D.N. 
18) schedule a status conference with the remaining parties within thirty (30) days of the entry of 
this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
March 12, 2026
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