govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-17393-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
CHAMBERS OF 
MADELINE COX ARLEO  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE 
50 WALNUT ST. ROOM 4066 
NEWARK, NJ 07101 
973-297-4903 
 
March 4, 2026
 
VIA ECF 
All Counsel of Record 
  
LETTER ORDER 
  
Re: Eve Taylor v. 240 Realty, LLC, et al. 
Civil Action No. 25-17393 
 
Dear Litigants: 
 
Before the Court, among other motions,
1 are: 
(1) Plaintiff Eve Taylor’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for default judgment as to Defendant  
Roberta Tarkan (“Tarkan”), ECF No. 93 (“Default Motion”); 
(2) Tarkan’s cross-motion to vacate the default entered against her  and opposing the 
Default Motion, ECF No. 101 (“Vacatur Motion”); and 
(3) Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and injunction against Tarkan, ECF 
No. 98 (“TRO Motion”). 
Tarkan opposes the TRO Motion.  See ECF No. 105.  For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s 
Default Motion, ECF No. 93, is DENIED; Tarkan’s Vacatur Motion, ECF No. 101, is 
GRANTED; and Plaintiff’s TRO Motion, ECF No. 98, is DENIED. 
I. B
ACKGROUND 
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against more than 60 Defendants asserting , inter alia, civil 
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans With Disabilities 
Act; claims for negligence and reckless endangerment; and claims for retaliatory eviction and 
harassment.  See  ECF No. 1, Compl. at 8–12.  At their core, Plaintiff’s claims appear to stem 
 
1 There are currently multiple motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint and motions for temporary restraining orders 
and default judgments against other named Defendants pending before the Court.  See, e.g. , ECF Nos. 24, 32, 54, 64, 
95, 96, 97, 103, 114, 117, 120, 121.  This Order does not resolve those motions.     
 
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from an ongoing landlord-tenant dispute.  See id. at 8–9. 
In mid-January 2026, Plaintiff filed several requests for entry of default against certain 
named Defendants, including Tarkan, which the clerk of court subsequently entered.  See ECF 
No. 73.  Plaintiff then filed  the Default Motion against Tarkan.  See  ECF No. 93.   
Before Plaintiff filed the Default Motion, Tarkan filed an informal letter with the Court 
requesting the entry of default be vacated.  See ECF No. 91.  It explained that Tarkan became 
aware of the entry of default on January 28, 2026; attempted, through Tarkan’s counsel, to contact 
Plaintiff the same day to request Plaintiff stipulate to vacate the entry of default; and, the following 
day, sent Plaintiff a proposed stipulation to vacate the entry of default.  See id.  On January 29, 
the same day she would have received the proposed stipulation, Plaintiff called Tarkan’s counsel 
and refused to stipulate to vacate the entry of default.  See id.  Tarkan then filed the informal 
letter.  See id.  She has since filed the formal Vacatur Motion.  See ECF No. 101.2   
Plaintiff separately filed the TRO Motion.  See ECF No. 98.  It alleges that Tarkan , who 
is representing Plaintiff’s landlords in ongoing state court proceedings, is harassing Plaintiff and 
contacting her in violation of separate restraining and no-contact orders.  See  id. at 1–3.  She also 
alleges that without relief, she would be required to appear opposite Tarkan at state court 
proceedings and could be at risk of homelessness (evidently through a state court judgment 
ordering her eviction).  See id.  The TRO Motion therefore seeks an order barring Tarkan from 
contacting or communicating with Plaintiff.  See id. at 6. 3    
II. ANALYSIS  
A. Default Motion and Vacatur Motion 
Rule 55 permits a court to set aside an entry of default for good cause.  See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 55(c).  In assessing whether good cause exists, a court considers: “(1) whether the plaintiff will 
be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; [and] (3) whether the default 
was the result of the defendant’s culpable conduct.”  Doe v. Hesketh , 828 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quotation marks omitted).  The decision is left to the court’s sound discretion.  Bailey v. 
United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2002).  Courts disfavor entries of default and prefer 
to decide cases on the merits; therefore, they resolve any doubtful issues in favor of the party 
moving for vacatur.  See United States v. Mulvenna, 367 F. App’x 348, 350 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, 
the Court finds good cause exists to vacate the entry of default.   
First, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced if the Court vacates the entry of default.  “Prejudice 
may be shown if, in the time elapsed from entry of default, the non- defaulting party’s ability to 
pursue [her] claim has been hindered.”  Engie Power & Gas LLC v. Adorama N.J., No. 24-6480, 
2024 WL 4818772, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2024).  This may arise from a loss of available 
 
2 In her reply in support of the Default Motion, Plaintiff argues that Tarkan failed to oppose the Default Motion.  See 
ECF No. 116.  The Vacatur Motion, however, clearly opposes Tarkan’s Default Motion.  See, e.g., Vacatur Mot. at 
12 (“Defendant now files this brief respectfully requesting that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment 
and vacate the entry of default against Defendant”).      
3 The TRO Motion also seeks an order denying Tarkan’s request to vacate the entry of default.  See TRO Mot. at 6. 
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evidence, an increased potential for fraud, or the development of substantial reliance on the entry 
of default.  See Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co. , 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1982).  None of 
these circumstances are present here.  Plaintiff does not contend that Tarkan’s delay has resulted 
in a loss of evidence or increases the risk of fraud.  And, Tarkan contacted Plaintiff requesting 
that she consent to vacate the entry of default just twelve days after Plaintiff requested it, and eight 
days after default was entered by the clerk.  See ECF No. 91.  That cuts against any concern that 
Plaintiff could have developed substantial reliance on the entry of default.  See Dambach v. U.S., 
211 F. App’x 105, 109 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no prejudice when “Defendants moved to vacate 
the defaults shortly after their entry”).   
Second, Tarkan has two potential meritorious defenses.  To vacate an entry of default, a 
defendant “need not prove [her] case”; she “must only ‘set forth with some specificity the grounds 
for [her] defense.’”  Fed. Express Corp. v. Jo-Ed Trucking, Inc., No. 24-10132, 2025 WL 551472, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2025) (quoting Mrs. Ressler’s Food Prods. v. KZY Logistics LLC , 675 F. 
App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2017)).  Tarkan has done this.  She has represented that she may have a 
defense based on improper service, as well as a defense pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  At this stage, 
the Court accepts “Defendant’s mere allegations as true” and finds they support vacating the entry 
of default.  Fed. Express, 2025 WL 551472, at *4 (quotation marks omitted).        
 Third, Tarkan’s failure to timely answer was not based on culpable conduct.  “In this 
context[,] culpable conduct means actions taken willfully or in bad faith.”  Gross v. Stereo 
Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 123–24 (3d Cir. 1983).  This occurs if a party’s actions are 
“intentionally designed to avoid compliance with court notices.”  Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 
1178, 1183 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here, the opposite is true.  As Plaintiff was aware, Tarkan was taking 
steps to actively defend herself in this litigation before Plaintiff filed the request for a clerk’s entry 
of default.  See ECF No. 89.  Moreover, Tarkan swiftly sought to vacate the entry of default and 
proceed on the merits once she became aware of it, and Plaintiff has provided no basis to justify 
her bald refusal of Tarkan’s request that Plaintiff consent to vacatur .  This series of events does 
not suggest Tarkan was intentionally seeking “to avoid compliance with court notices.”  Hritz, 
732 F.2d at 1183.   
 Accordingly, the Default Motion is denied and the Vacatur Motion is granted.  The case 
will proceed on the merits.4           
B. TRO Motion 
Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that is not routinely granted.  See Then v. INS, 
37 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351 (D.N.J. 1998) .  To obtain this extraordinary relief by form of a 
preliminary injunction or TRO, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) that denial would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff ; (3) that the balance of 
equities favors granting the injunction; and (4) that the injunction would be in the public interest .  
Riley v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2017).  Although a court must balance 
all four factors together to determine if injunctive relief is  warranted, at a minimum, the moving 
party must establish that the “two gateway factors” —a likelihood of success on the merits of a 
 
4 For these same reasons, the TRO Motion’s request for an order denying Tarkan’s request to vacate the entry of 
default is denied.  
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plaintiff’s claims and irreparable harm—“are met.”  Id. at 179.       
Here, Plaintiff seeks an order barring Tarkan from having any communication with her 
based on complaints of harassment in underlying state court proceedings related to Plaintiff’s 
tenancy.  See TRO Mot. at 6.  But she has not adequately shown she is entitled to such 
extraordinary relief.  Plaintiff’s argument that she is likely to succeed on the merits is based 
entirely on the entry of default that the Court has ordered to be vacated, and she does not otherwise 
justify how she is likely to succeed under any of the statutory or common law causes of action she 
asserts against Tarkan in her Complaint.  See TRO Mot. at 4.  This alone dooms the TRO Motion.  
See In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982) (explaining that 
“a failure to show a likelihood of success . . . must necessarily result in the denial of [injunctive 
relief]”). 
III. C
ONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Default Motion, ECF No. 93, is DENIED, and 
Tarkan’s Vacatur Motion, ECF No. 101, is GRANTED.   
The Clerk is ORDERED to vacate the entry of default entered against Defendant Tarkan 
on January 20, 2026.  Tarkan is ORDERED to answer or otherwise respond to the C omplaint 
within twenty-one (21) days of the issuance of this Order. 
Separately, Plaintiff’s TRO Motion, ECF No. 98, is DENIED. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
 
s/ Madeline Cox Arelo            
MADELINE COX ARLEO 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
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