govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-0_26-cv-00002-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
AT PIKEVILLE 
 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-91-DLB-EBA 
 
BRANDON BANNISTER PLAINTIFF 
 
 
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 
KEVIN C. PEARCE, JR., et al. DEFENDANTS 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 Kevin C. Pearce, Terry L. Melvin, and Hector Joyner (“Defendants”) have each 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.  (Do cs. # 22, 23, and 27).  Bannister filed his 
Responses to each Motion (Docs. # 28, 29, and 32), and Defendants filed Replies (Docs. 
# 30, 31, and 34).  For the reasons stat ed below, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are 
granted in part and denied in part.   
I. FACTUAL AND PR OCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Brandon Bannister was incarcerated at U.S. Penitentiary Big Sandy (“Big 
Sandy”) when the incidents that gave rise to his Complaint took place.  (Doc. # 1 ¶ 4).   
He brings this case against Defendants Kevi n C. Pearce, Terry L. Melvin, and Hector 
Joyner for violation of his Constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment and his right to equal protection of the laws.  (Doc. # 1).  Defendants Pearce 
and Melvin were Lieutenants at  Big Sandy.  (Doc. #1 ¶¶ 1- 2).  Defendant Joyner is 
Warden of Big Sandy.  (Doc. #1 ¶ 3).     
Bannister alleges that on the morning of April 20, 2021, he an d his cellmate were 
removed from their cell at Big Sandy a nd taken to a body scanner for a contraband 
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search.  (Doc. #1 ¶ 8).  When the scanner results were  negative, Bannister and his 
cellmate were taken to Defendant Pearce’s of fice, placed in connected cells, and strip-
searched.  ( Id. ¶ 9).  Bannister then asked to go to the bathroom, to which Pearce 
allegedly responded, “we do things different [in Big Sandy]” and that Bannister was “going 
to have a long day.”  ( Id. ¶¶ 10-11).   Bannister alleges that soon after, Pearce pepper 
sprayed him while laughing and saying, “why do you keep banging your head.”  (Id. ¶ 12).  
Pearce then handcuffed Bannister, entered t he cell Bannister was being held in, and 
proceeded to “beat, stomp, and kick” Banniste r while calling him the n-word and other 
racial slurs.  (Id. ¶¶ 14-15).  After this assault, Pearce and another officer picked Bannister 
up off the ground, bent him over, and walked him backwards to the Special Housing Unit 
(“SHU”).  (Id. ¶ 16).  In SHU, Bannister was st ripped, put in a paper gown, and chained 
at his waist and feet.  ( Id. ¶ 17).  Later that day, Bannister began the grievance process 
by filing an informal complaint through a BP-8 form, to which he did not receive a 
response.  (Id. ¶¶ 18-19).  A few months later, in August of 2021, Bannister filed another 
BP-8 form. (Id. ¶ 20).   
On August 27, 2021, Bannister alleges th at Pearce, this time with Defendant 
Melvin, approached his cell, handcuffed him,  and forced him to walk backwards to a 
restraint room that had no surveillance cameras.  (Id. ¶¶ 21-22).  Bannist er alleges that 
while in the restraint room, Pearce and Melvin  “beat him for several minutes while using 
racial slurs.”  (Id. ¶ 23).  Pearce and Melvin alle gedly threatened Bannister, saying they 
would kill him if he complained about his treatment.  (Id. ¶ 24).  After this assault, Bannister 
was returned to his cell by Pearce and Melvin and left to bleed for several hours.  (Id. ¶¶ 
25-26).  An officer on the next shift took Bannister to get medical treatment.  ( Id. ¶ 27).  
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On September 7, 2021, Bannister filed a formal complaint through a BP-9 form, to which 
he did not receive a response.  (Id. ¶¶ 28-29).  Bannister alleges that other inmates at Big 
Sandy have reported similar abuse, and as such, Defendant Joyner was on notice that 
these abuses were occurring but did nothing to protect prisoners. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 37).   
Bannister brings his claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Conspiracy 
to Interfere with Civil Rights.  Bannister alleges in Count One that Pearce, Melvin, and 
Joyner violated Bannister’s Eighth Amendment right to be  free from cruel and unusual 
punishment.  ( Id. ¶¶ 33, 34).  Bannister alleges in Count Two th at Pearce and Melvin 
conspired to deprive him of equal protection of  the laws on the basis of his race.  ( Id. ¶ 
39).  On August 26, 2022, Banni ster filed his Complaint wit h the Court. (Doc. # 1).  
Defendants each filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.  (Docs. # 22, 23, 
and 27).  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.  R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the plaintiff’s 
pleading must meet the plaus ibility standard set forth in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  In order to have “facial plausibility,” the plaintiff must “plead[] factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678  (2009) (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  This requires that the plaintiff plead sufficient factual matter 
to show he is entitled to re lief under a viable legal theory.   See  Left Fork Min. Co. v. 
Hooker, 775 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 2014).  This Court accepts as true all factual 
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allegations made by Bannister in his Compla int and construes them in the light most 
favorable to Bannister as the non-moving party.  Left Fork Min. Co. v. Hooker , 775 F.3d 
768, 773 (6th Cir. 2014).  
B. Bivens Claim  
Bannister seeks to assert a claim against all three defendants under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of F ederal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  The 
Supreme Court has developed a two-step test to determine whether a claim under Bivens 
is viable.  First, this Court must ask whet her Bannister’s case presents a new context 
under Bivens.  See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (citing Correctional 
Services Corp. v. Malesko , 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)).   If it does present a new context, 
which most cases will, then t he Court must consider whet her there are any “special 
factors” that weigh in favor of recognizing the new context.  Id.  This is an “exacting” test 
that will “almost always” result in th e court declining to recognize a new Bivens action.  
Elhady v. Unidentified CBP Agents, 18 F.4th 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2021).   
1. Bannister’s case presents a ne w context not currently supported 
by Bivens. 
 
The Supreme Court has carved out three possible causes of action under Bivens: 
(1) a Fourth amendment claim for unlawful a rrest and search against federal agents, (2) 
a Fifth Amendment sex discrimination claim agai nst a former congressional staffer, and 
(3) a federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendm ent claim for inadequate medical care. Egbert v. 
Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1802 (2022) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397); Davis v. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)).  The Supreme Court has 
not implied any additional causes of action, and in fact has since urged that recognizing 
any additional causes of action under Bivens is “a disfavored judicial activity.”  Egbert, 
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142 S. Ct. at 1803 (quoting Hernández, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742-43 (2020) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
Bannister argues that hi s case is not a new Bivens context because it is not 
meaningfully different than Carlson v. Green.  (Docs. # 28 at 4, 29 at 4, and 32 at 4).  The 
Court disagrees.  For the purposes of a Bivens analysis, a difference is considered 
“meaningful” if it “involves a different constitutional right, a different category of officers as 
defendants, a difference in the specificity of  agency actions at issue, a difference in 
institutional expertise, or differi ng risks of judicial intrusion.” Brown v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, No. 6: 22-097-DCR, 2023 WL 3934674, at *3  (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2023) (citing 
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1860).  This case involves a different constitutional right, a different 
category of officers as defendants, and a difference in agency actions that are at issue. 
 In Carlson, the plaintiff was given improper medical care by prison physicians and 
nurses.  581 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).  He had an 
underlying medical condition that prison officials were aware of.  Id.  He was being treated 
for this condition when the drugs administered by the prison ultimately caused his death.  
Id.  In comparison, Bannister’s alleged injuries arose from excessive force used by prison 
officers, not improper medical care by the hospital staff.  Additionally, Bannister’s Eighth 
Amendment medical indifference claim is incidental to his Eighth Amendment excessive 
force claim.  The Sixth Cir cuit has declined to extend Bivens to alleged harassment, 
threats, and abuse by prison officials bec ause this would be a new context.  See Hower 
v. Damron, No. 21-5996, 2022 WL 16578864, at *3  (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022); see also  
Brown, 2023 WL 3934674, at *3 (District Court tr eated case as an excessive force case 
even where following an alleged assault, plaintiff requested but was denied timely medical 
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care).  Bannister’s allegations that he was left bleeding in his cell for several hours until 
an officer from the next shift took him to get medical treatment, (Doc. # 1 at 3), are 
insufficient to state a Bivens claim under the same context as Carlson.  The fact that the 
claims in Carlson and the present case both arise from the same constitutional provision 
is not enough to warrant finding an implied cause of action.  See Elhady, 18 F.4th at 885 
(“[A] case may present a new context even if the claim involves one of the constitutional 
provisions from the original trilogy.”) (citing Hernandez II, 140 S. Ct. at 743).    
While the differences between these cases may seem trivial, the Supreme Court 
has instructed that “even a modest extension [of Bivens] is still an extension .”  Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, 582 U.S. 129, 147 (2017).  In Malesko, where the facts closely tracked Carlson 
except for the fact that the case arose in a privately-run prison, the Supreme Court still 
declined to find an implied cause of action.  See Ziglar , 582 U.S. at 138-39 (citing 
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 64 (2001)).  Although the claims in 
Ziglar also involved alleged prisoner mistreatment, the Supreme Court again declined to 
extend Bivens, stating that “[t]he differences between this claim and the one in Carlson  
are perhaps small . . . [but] [g]iven this Court's expressed caution about extending the 
Bivens remedy, however, the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied.”  Id. at 149.  
2. Special factors weigh agains t recognizing the new context. 
The Court must next consider  whether special factors weigh against recognizing 
the new context proposed by Bannister.  This Court finds that they do.  These “special 
factors” include “‘whether alte rnative processes exist for protecting the right,’ ‘whether 
existing legislation covers the area,’ and ‘separation-of-powers principles.’”  Hower, 2022 
WL 16578864, at *2 (quoting Callahan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 965 F.3d 520, 524 (6th 
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Cir. 2020)).  Federal courts ar e instructed not to create implied causes of action under 
Bivens if there is a “risk of interfering with the authority of the other branches.”  Callahan, 
965 F.3d at 524 (citing Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 743).  These special factors can be 
boiled down to a single question : “whether there is any reason to think that Congress 
might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.”  Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. 
Federal courts have consistently answere d this question in the affirmative by 
considering the lack of  statutory analog to Bivens , Congress’ retrenchment of prisoner 
litigation through the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), and the existence of an 
alternative remedial structure.  S ee, e.g., Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1865; Callahan, 965 F.3d 
at 524; Brown, 2023 WL 3934674, at *4.  Courts find it telling that Congress created a 
statutory cause of action against state actors for constitutional violations through 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 but did not do so for federal actors.  Brown, 2023 WL 3934674, at *4.  
Congress also did not include a damages remedy against federal actors when it passed 
the PLRA.  See Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1865.  This tends  to show that Congress did not 
intend for a damages remedy to exist in these cases, which “is itself a factor counseling 
hesitation” in creating a new context.  Id.   
The existence of a prison grievance process will weigh heavily against recognizing 
a new context because it provides an alternative remedial structure.  See Egbert, 142 S. 
Ct. 1793 at 1804.  In this case, Bannister ha d access to a grievance process, which he 
used when he filed his BP-8 and BP-9 forms.  (See Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 18, 28).  Bannister argues 
that the grievance process is not available because “prison officials fail[ed] to comply with 
their part of the process.”  (Doc. # 32 at 6) .  However, “the question whether a given 
remedy is adequate is a legislative determinati on that must be left to Congress, not the 
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federal courts.”  Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1807.  The Supr eme Court has urged “caution” 
when courts are asked to imply a Bivens cause of action.  Hernandez II, 140 S. Ct. at 
742.  The Court will exercise  that caution today and dec line to recognize a new Bivens 
context in this case.  Accordingly, Count 1 must be dismissed.   
C. Section 1985(3) Conspiracy Claim 
Bannister also raises a 42 U.S.C § 1985(3)  claim of Conspira cy to Interfere with 
Civil Rights against Defendants Pearce and Me lvin.  Under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must 
allege facts sufficient to show “(1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons (2) for the 
purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal 
protection of the laws and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy (4) which causes 
injury to a person or property, or  a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the 
United States.”  Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp. , 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 1994).  
The complaint must allege “both a cons piracy and some class-based discriminatory 
animus behind the conspirators' action.”  Pahssen v. Merrill Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 668 F.3d 
356, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).  This requires a showing that “the alleged 
conspirators shared a common discriminatory objective.”  Id. at 368 (emphasis in original).  
Conspiracy claims must be pled with specific ity and be supported by material facts.  Id. 
at 367-68 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir.1987)).  
Bannister has sufficiently alleged class-based discriminatory animus.  He alleges 
that Defendants Pearce and Melvin yelled racial slurs at him while they assaulted him.  
(Doc. # 1 ¶ 23).  He also all eges that he had previously been the subject of a racially 
charged assault by one of the co-conspirators.  (Doc. # 1 ¶ 15).  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat animus against Black Americans. 
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See United Bhd. of Car penters & Joiners of Am., Loc. 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott , 463 U.S. 
825, 836 (1983).  Bannister is within a prot ected class and the alleged behavior of 
Defendants Pearce and Melvin, namely their use of racial slurs, falls squarely into the 
purpose of the statute.  The allegations in the complaint make it plausible that Pearce and 
Melvin demonstrated class-based discriminatory animus against Bannister.  
Bannister has also sufficiently pled c onspiracy.  Defendant Pearce argues 
Bannister has not sufficiently pled cons piracy because he has not shown there was a 
“meeting of the minds.”  (Doc. # 21 at 6-7).  Defendant Melvin argues the same, in addition 
to arguing that the claim should be precluded under the “intercorporate conspiracy 
doctrine.”  (Doc. # 27 at 11).   Both arguments fail. 
An analysis of a “meeting of the minds” requires a showing that “there was a single 
plan” and facts that “actually link De fendants together as conspirators.”  See Meyers v. 
Mitrovich, No. 1:14CV1604, 2015 WL 413804, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2015).   
Conspiracy claims will be dismissed if they  include only concluso ry statements and are 
“void of factual allegations.”  Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 240 (6 th Cir. 1984).  Here, 
Bannister has alleged specific facts that could indicate a “meeting of the minds” between 
Pearce and Melvin.  Bannister alleges that on August 27, 2021, Defendants Pearce and 
Melvin came to his cell together.  ( See Doc. # 1 ¶ 21).  They then walked Bannister 
backwards to a restraint room with no surveill ance cameras.  (Doc. # 1 ¶ 22).  Once in 
the room, Bannister alleges  that Defendants Pearce and Melvin together beat and 
threatened him while yelling racial slurs at hi m.  (Doc. # 1 ¶ 23).  They both threatened 
Bannister’s life.  (Doc. # 1 ¶ 24).  Bannister has also alleged facts that similar abuse had 
previously been reported, and Pearce specifically has been indicted for unlawful assaults 
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while a Lieutenant at Big Sandy and writing false reports to cover up assaults (Doc. # 29 
at 10, Exhibit # 1).  Bannister also alleged that Pearce was involved in the April 20, 2021 
assault against him.  (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 9-17).  C ourts recognize that direct evidence of 
conspiracy is hard to come by, and therefore may infer conspiracy through circumstantial 
evidence.  See Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 528 (6th Cir. 2000).  Taking these facts 
in the light most favorable to  Bannister and drawing all inferences in his favor as is 
required at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court finds that Bannister has sufficiently pled 
a claim of conspiracy.  
The intercorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply here. The Sixth Circuit has 
carved out an exception to the intercorporat e conspiracy doctrine for conduct that falls 
outside Defendants’ scope of employment.  See Johnson, 40 F.3d at 841.  Defendants’ 
conduct in this case cannot be said to be within their scope of employment because the 
facts in the Complaint allege an assault th at was unprovoked and not for a legitimate 
purpose.  See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (explaining that use of force may 
be excessive when applied “maliciously and sadistically” rather than for a “good faith” 
reason).  In fact, Bannister has included an exhibit in the record that includes allegations 
of Pearce’s past conduct, including allegations t hat he has previously falsified reports of 
assaults at Big Sandy and unlawfully assault ed other inmates at Big Sandy.  (Doc. # 29 
at 10, Exhibit # 1); see Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (“When a court is pres ented with a Rule 12(b)(6) moti on, it may consider . . . 
items appearing in the record of the case . . .so long as they are referred to in the 
Complaint and are central to the claims cont ained therein.”).  The allegations in the 
attached indictment against Pearce and other of ficers tends to show that their behavior 
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is not sanctioned by the law or by the Bur eau of Prisons.  For the foregoing reasons, 
Bannister has sufficiently pled a claim of conspiracy under §1985(3).   
D. Statute of Limitations 
Defendant Pearce argues that Bannister’s conspiracy claim is time barred.  Under 
Kentucky state law, the statute of limitations for a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim is one year.  
McIlwain v. Dodd, No. 22-5219, 2022 WL 17169006, at *3  (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2022).  
Pearce argues that any conspiracy claims arising a year before the Complaint was filed 
are time barred.  (Doc. # 22 at 8).  However, the conspiracy claims arise from the August 
27, 2021 conduct and the Complaint was filed on August 26, 2022.  ( See Doc. # 1).  
Therefore, Bannister’s conspiracy claim was filed within the one-year statute of limitations 
and is not time barred. 
E. Qualified Immunity 
Defendant Melvin argues that the claims against him should be dismissed because 
he is entitled to qualified immunity.  (Doc. # 27 at 12).  Qualified immunity will be granted 
unless the plaintiff can show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, 
and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”  
Cunningham v. Shelby Cty., 994 F.3d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2021).  Both prongs of the test 
are met here.   
Melvin violated Bannister’s statutory rights under § 1985(3) as discussed in section 
C, supra, when he and Pearce allegedly conspir ed to conduct their racially charged 
assault.  Melvin also violated Bannister’s c onstitutional right to be free from excessive 
force under the Eighth Amendment becaus e the alleged assault was purely an 
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“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pai n” with no legitimate purpose.  Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)./g2 /g2 
It has been clearly established at least since 1980 that “the use of excessive 
force by correctional officers against pris oners violate[s] the pr isoners' right to due 
process of law.”  Thomas v. Haltom, 840 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1988).  The Sixth Circuit has 
reaffirmed that “assaults on subdued, restrained and nonresisting . . . convicted prisoners 
are impermissible.”  Coley v. Lucas Cty., 799 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir. 2015).  There is no 
evidence in the record that Defendants had any legitimate reason why they may have 
needed to use force on Bannister.  Rather, the facts allege an unprovoked assault by the 
Defendants against an incarcerated person who was restrained and nonresisting. ( See 
Doc. # 1 at 21-24)  
The Supreme Court has held that “qualified immunity [will] be defeated if an official 
‘knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official 
responsibility would violate the consti tutional rights of the [plaintiff].’”  Harlow, 457 U.S. 
800, 815 (1982) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  This Court finds it difficult to 
see how Melvin can argue that he was not aw are that beating an incarcerated person 
while using racial slurs could violate the constitutional rights of the incarcerated person in 
his care.  Qualified immunity  does not protect defendants when they “knowingly violate 
the law,” as Melvin did here.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 152 (2017) (citing Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).   
F. Supervisory Liability 
Defendant Joyner argues that the claims against him based on supervisory liability 
should be dismissed.  The Sixth Circuit has held that “the doctrine of respondeat superior 
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cannot provide the basis for liability in a Bivens action.”  Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App'x 
182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 
(1978)).  To assert a claim against Joyner, Bannister must allege that Joyner “condoned, 
encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in t he alleged unconstitutional misconduct.”  Id.  
Bannister generally states that  Joyner “took no action to pr otect prisoners” and that he 
was on notice of similar abuses based on reports from other persons incarcerated at Big 
Sandy.  (Doc. # 1 at 4).  Bu t these facts alleged by Bannister do not show that Joyner 
condoned or encouraged this specific behavior by Pearce and Melvin. Bannister needed 
to have alleged facts showing that Joyner had “’direct responsibility’ for the actions of the 
individual officers”. Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 873 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (1976)).   Allegations of “failure to act” even 
if the plaintiff can show a “statistical pattern ” of incidents, as Bannister attempts here, is 
insufficient. Id.  (quoting Rizzo 423 U.S. at 376).   Therefore, Bannister has not pled 
sufficient facts showing that Joyner di rectly condoned, encouraged, or knowingly 
acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional misconduct by Pearce and Melvin in this case. 
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
(1) Defendants Pearce and Melvin’s Motions to Dismiss the complaint (Docs. # 
22 and 27) are GRANTED with respect to Count 1 and DENIED with  
respect to Count 2;
(2) Defendant Joyner’s M otion to Dismiss the complaint (Doc. # 23) is 
GRANTED in full; and
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(3) Defendants Pearce and Melvin shall file Answers not later than twenty 
(20) days from the date of entry of this Order. 
 This 23rd day of August, 2023. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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