Corpus: 543,223 opinions ·
3,177 judges ·
newest 2026-06-23 · expanding
Coverage ↗
Opinion
govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_22-cv-00686-3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ERIC WESTRY ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONNOR AHEARN, ADRIAN SANCHEZ,
ANTHONY ANDERSON, ANTHONY
QUICQUARO, JASON KRAUTER, and
RAYMOND ROSE,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22cv686(MPS)
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Eric Westry, proceeding pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Waterbury police officers Connor Ahearn, Adrian Sanchez, Anthony Anderson, Anthony
Quicquaro, Jason Krauter, and Raymond Rose. The operative claim alleges (1) a Fourteenth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Officers Quicquaro,
Sanchez, and Anderson; (2) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Officers Krauter
and Rose; and (3) a Fourth Amendment unlawful entry claim against O fficer Ahearn. ECF No.
20-1. The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 93. For the reasons
that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTS1
1 Local Rule 56(a)(1) requires a party moving for summary judgment to file “a concise statement of each material fact
as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(1). Local Rule
56(a)(2) requires the party opposing summary judgment to submit a Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement containing
separately numbered paragraphs corresponding to the Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement and indicating whether the
opposing party admits or denies the facts set forth by the moving party. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(2). Each denial in
the Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement must include a specific citation to an affidavit or other admissible evidence. D.
Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3). Although the defendants informed plaintiff of this requirement, see ECF No. 93-3, Westry’s
Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement, ECF No. 94 at 18 -41, does not comply . In several instances, his denials are
unaccompanied by a specific citation to admissible evidence. That the plaintiff “is unrepresented does not excuse him
from complying with the Court's procedural and substantive rules.” Rashid v. Kurtulus, 2024 WL 4111610, at *1 (D.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 1 of 19
2
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. The claims in this action
arise out of three separate incidents.
2019 Incident Involving Medication
On October 11, 2019, Westry was arrested and taken into custody by Waterbury police
officers. ECF No. 93 -2 ¶ 1. While being processed at the police department, he filled out
paperwork indicating that he had hypertension and gout and that he was taking medication for
these conditions. ECF No. 20 -1 ¶ 22; ECF No. 94 at 2, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 3.3 Westry gave the
completed paperwork to Sanchez. ECF No. 94 at 2, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 4. Westry indicated that he
had not taken his medication and that he needed to do so. Id. ¶ 5. He remained in custody at the
Waterbury Police Department from October 11, 2019 until October 15, 2019. ECF No. 93 -2 ¶ 2.
During this time, Westry asked Officers Anderson, Sanchez, and Quicquaro for his medication but
his requests were ignored and they did not provide assistance. ECF No. 20-1 ¶ 3. He “continued
to communicate [his] discomfort and request for medical attention to each officer that came near
[his] cell.” ECF No. 94 at 3, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 11. According to Westry, he saw a camera aimed
at his cell, and he pointed at his head and chest to convey that he was having discomfort and pain.
Id. ¶¶ 12-13. The video was deleted. Id. ¶ 14. According to Westry, Quicquaro said that Westry
Conn. Sept. 6, 2024). Thus, the facts contained in the defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement, ECF No. 93-2, where
supported by evidence of record, are deemed admitted where the plaintiff cites no admissible evidence in response.
See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)(3) (“Failure to provide specific citations to evidence in the record as required by this
Local Rule may result in the Court deeming admitted certain facts that are supported by the evidence in accordance
with Local Rule 56(a)1”) Because he is a pro se litigant, however, despite his failure to comply with the Local Rules,
I have considered all of his submissions in my review of the record to the extent they are supported by admissible
evidence.
2 The plaintiff’s verified complaint is treated as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes. See Colon v. Coughlin,
58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides, in relevant part, that an unsworn declaration has the same force as a sworn declaration
where the declarant attests to substantially the following: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).” 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2). In his “affirmation,” Westry attests:
“I affirm the foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge.” ECF No. 94 at 16 . While Westry does not
directly copy or cite 28 U.S.C. § 1746, his affirmation substantially complies with the statute ’s requirements , and
therefore I find it admissible to the extent his statements are based on personal knowledge.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 2 of 19
3
looked “okay” and that Quicquaro himself had not taken his own medication for five days and he
was fine. ECF No. 94 at 5, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 20.4
On October 15, 2019, Westry was taken by EMS personnel from the Waterbury Police
Department to St. Mary’s Hospital for complaints related to his blood pressure and blood pressure
medication. ECF No. 93 -2 ¶ 3. While in the emergency room, he was examined and treated by
Dr. Kyle Wesley. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Westry’s blood pressure was 163/115. ECF No. 93 at 12, Defs’ Ex.
2. He complained of a headache that began four days before. Id. at 11. Dr. Wesley concluded that
there was nothing from Westry’s history or exam to suggest hypertensive emergency or urgency.
ECF No. 93-2 ¶ 6. He assessed Westry as stable and appropriate for outpatient management of his
hypertension. Id. Westry was released back into the custody of the Waterbury police department
and taken to court, at which time his mother brought his blood pressure medication and gave it to
the marshals. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.
October 17, 2020 Arrest
On October 17, 2020, the plaintiff was arrested.5 According to the defendants, Officer Rose
was dispatched to 3250 East Main Street in Waterbury for a verbal dispute between Maria Westry
and Eric Westry. ECF No. 93-2 ¶ 9. The complainant Maria Westry said she had a verbal dispute
with her ex -husband, Eric Westry, about visitation time with their daughter. Id. ¶ 10. Westry
disputes this and maintains that he flagged Rose down while he was reporting a crime committed
by his ex-wife. ECF No. 94 at 7, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 28. According to Officer Rose’s case report,
Maria Westry stated that the argument got heated and she called the police for a peaceful escort.
4 According to Westry, he was escorted out of his cell and an EMS worker “took [his] blood pressure which alarmed
him such that he told the officer that they needed to take [Westry] to the emergency room.” ECF No. 94 ¶ 23. The
EMS worker’s statement is hearsay as is Westry’s report about the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay
as a declarant's out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement ).
Even if I considered it, however, it is not material and would not alter my conclusion.
5 The record does not specify the offense for which the plaintiff was arrested.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 3 of 19
4
ECF No. 93 at 43, Defs’ Ex. 8. Maria Westry stated that nothing physical happened between them
and no threatening comments were made. Id. Westry was compliant and did not resist officers
during his arrest. ECF No. 20-1 ¶ 5. He complied with the officers’ instructions to turn around
and upon doing so, Officers Krauter and Rose “ripped [his] arms down lateral rotationally and
back, tearing his supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons” in his left shoulder in the process. ECF
No. 94 at 11, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 35. Westry testified in his deposition that he told “the officer that
I was in pain and that he was hurting me.” ECF No. 93 at 37, Defs’ Ex. 7; see also ECF No. 94,
Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 36. He was transported to Waterbury police headquarters where he was
processed. ECF No. 93-2 ¶ 12. While in custody on October 17, 2020, he was taken to St. Mary’s
Hospital Emergency Room for medication regarding cardiovascular issues and blood pressure. Id.
¶ 16. While there, he did not indicate any complaints or issues with his left shoulder. Id. ¶ 17.
An MRI of the plaintiff’s left shoulder taken on February 2, 2021 showed a “[s]mall focal
full-thickness tear noted along the anterior distal supraspinatus tendon.” ECF No. 93 at 26, Defs’
Ex. 5. A subsequent MRI dated October 27, 2022 showed a “[f]ocal full-thickness insertional tear
in the supraspinatus tendon (rim rent tear) without significant change.” ECF No. 94 at 60, Pl’s Ex.
14.
October 31, 2020 Entry into Apartment
On October 31, 2020, Westry took his five year old daughter, “A.W.,” to St. Mary’s walk-
in clinic for complaints of “perineal pain.” ECF No. 20-1 ¶¶ 6, 9(i). She was diagnosed with a
urinary tract infection. ECF No. 20-1 ¶ 6. At approximately 12:30 p.m., Physician Assistant Dylan
Stemple called central dispatch of the police department to report what he believed was a sexual
assault of a minor child. ECF No. 93-2 ¶¶ 20-21. He also contacted the Department of Children
and Families. Id. ¶ 21. PA Stemple referred Westry and A.W. to the emergency room at St. Mary’s
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 4 of 19
5
for further investigation relating to his concerns of possible sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 22. At 5:53 p.m.,
Officer Ahearn was dispatched to St. Mary’s emergency room and spoke to Dr. Quatracilli, who
identified herself as the physician who was following up on the report of PA Stemple. Id. ¶ 23;
ECF No. 93 at 6, Defs’ Ex. 1, Ahearn Aff. ¶¶ 3, 7. Dr. Quatracilli was aware that PA Stemple had
contacted the police. ECF No. 93-2 ¶ 26. Dr. Quatracilli told Ahearn that Westry had brought his
daughter to the walk-in clinic because she was having pain when urinating and that Westry had
stated that A.W. often slept in the same bed as her mother and her mother’s husband, which Westry
felt was inappropriate. ECF No. 93 -2 ¶ 24. Dr. Quatracilli told Ahearn that she ha d spoken to
Westry and A.W. and had examined A.W. as well. Id. ¶ 28. Dr. Quatracilli told Ahearn that she
did not suspect any abuse to have taken place and that she had discharged A.W. from the hospital.
Id.
By the time Ahearn arrived at St. Mary’s, A.W. had been discharged and PA Stemple had
completed his shift for the day and was unavailable for Ahearn to speak to regarding his concerns.
Id. ¶ 27. 6 Even though he had spoken to Dr. Quatracilli, according to Ahearn he “remained
concerned as to [A.W.’s] well-being given PA Stemple’s concern, Eric Westry’s concerns [about
his child’s] sleeping arrangements, and her positive UTI test, all of which led [him] to believe that
immediate followup with [the child] was necessary.” ECF No. 93 at 7, Defs’ Ex. 1, Ahearn Aff. ¶
13.
Ahearn went to Westry’s apartment. ECF No. 93-2 ¶ 34. According to Ahearn, he knocked
on the door but no one answered despite the fact that he heard voices coming from inside the
apartment. ECF No. 93 at 8, Defs’ Ex. 1, Ahearn Aff. ¶ 15. Westry disputes this and maintains he
did not hear any knock. ECF No. 94 at 14, Pl’s Affirmation ¶ 51. It is undisputed, however, that
6 There is nothing in the record indicating that Ahearn attempted to call anyone– i.e., PA Stemple or A.W.’s parents –
for further information.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 5 of 19
6
Ahearn located a property manager. ECF No. 93 -2 ¶ 34. At Ahearn’s request, the manager
unlocked the door to Westry’s apartment and Ahearn entered Westry’s home. Id.; Pl’s Ex. 1, video.7
According to Westry, his daughter was in the shower at the time. ECF No. 94 at 14 , Pl’s
Affirmation ¶ 51. Ahearn averred that he “had the opportunity to observe [the child] and did not
feel she was in any danger at that time.” ECF No. 93 at 8, Defs’ Ex. 1, Ahearn Aff. ¶ 21.
II. Legal Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Tolan v. Cotton,
572 U.S. 650, 656 -57 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In reviewing the
summary judgment record, a court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the
movant.” Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 2013).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to any
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 -25 (1986). “A genuine dispute of
material fact exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in that party's favor.”
Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013). If the moving party carries
its burden, “the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d
Cir. 2011). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242 , 252 (1986). “At the summary
7 The video shows the hallway outside the apartment and Ahearn entering the apartment.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 6 of 19
7
judgment stage, a nonmoving party ‘must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the
events is not wholly fanciful.’” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting D'Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998)). Finally, where, as here, one
party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party's papers liberally and interprets them
“to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d
Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nonetheless, “unsupported allegations
do not create a material issue of fact” and cannot overcome a properly supported motion for
summary judgment. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Westry alleges that Officers Quicquaro, Sanchez, and Anderson were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
provide him with his blood pressure medication.8
“Typically, deliberate indifference claims arise from two types of scenarios: cases where
an inmate is deprived of all medical care and cases where the medical care is delayed or
interrupted.” Baltas v. Frenis , 2023 WL 5392168, at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2023) (citing
Benjamin v. Pillai, 794 F. App'x 8, 11 (2d Cir. 2019)). The latter applies here. A pretrial detainee’s
deliberate indifference claim requires proving both an objective element and a subjective element.
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
The objective element focuses on the medical need involved and, specifically, on the
“severity of the alleged deprivation. ” Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183 -84 (2d Cir. 200 3).
8 Because he was a pretrial detainee, the plaintiff ’s claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs are evaluated
under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Yancey v. Robertson, 828 F. App'x 801, 803
(2d Cir. 2020) (citing Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)).
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 7 of 19
8
When a pretrial detainee’s deliberate indifference claim is based on “a temporary delay or
interruption in the provision of otherwise adequate medical treatment,” the court focuses on the
“challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the prisoner's underlying medical
condition alone in analyzing whether the alleged deprivation is, in objective terms, sufficiently
serious to support an Eighth Amendment claim.” 9 Id. at 185 (citing Chance v. Armstrong , 143
F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)). “[A] serious medical need ‘exists where the failure to treat a
prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.’” Smith, 316 F.3d at 187 (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d
Cir. 2000)). Thus, in a case like this, “the serious medical need inquiry can properly take into
account the severity of the temporary deprivation alleged by the prisoner.” Smith, 316 F.3d at 186.
See Lombardo v. Graham, 807 F. App'x 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2020) (“In cases where a prisoner alleges
a delay in medical treatment, courts examine both the seriousness of the prisoner ’s medical
conditions and the harm caused by any unreasonable delay.”).
“The severity of the alleged denial of medical care should be analyzed with regard to all
relevant facts and circumstances.” Smith, 316 F.3d at 187. Relevant factors include the “absence
of adverse medical effects or demonstrable physical injury.” Id. (“the actual medical consequences
that flow from the alleged denial of care will be highly relevant to the question of whether the
denial of treatment subjected the prisoner to a significant risk of serious harm”). “Although a
delay in providing necessary medical care may in some cases constitute unconstitutional deliberate
indifference, such a classification is reserved for when officials deliberately delayed care as a form
of punishment; ignored a life -threatening and fast -degenerating condition for thre e days; or
delayed major surgery for over two years.” Sims v. City of New York, 788 F. App'x 62, 64 (2d Cir.
9 The objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim is the same under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 8 of 19
9
2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Both the Second Circuit and numerous
district courts within it have found that missing a single dose or even several doses of medicine is
generally not actionable.” Constantino v. DiStefano, 2020 WL 353094, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21,
2020).
Under the subjective prong, “[a] detainee must prove that an official acted intentionally or
recklessly, and not merely negligently.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36. The plaintiff must demonstrate
that “the defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment would pose
a substantial risk to [the detainee's] health or that the defendants should have known that failing to
provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to the detainee's health.”
Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original) (quoting Charles v.
Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Deliberate indifference requires, at a minimum,
culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act that evinces a conscious disregard of a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Darby, 14 F.4th at 128 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The defendants argue that Westry has failed to satisfy the objective prong, that is, that he
has failed to show the alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious. ECF No. 93 -1 at 10. The
defendants point to the October 15, 2019 hospital record from St. Mary’s emergency room in
which the examining physician concluded that “nothing from history or exam to suggest a
hypertensive emergency or urgency” and that Westry was “stable and appropriate for outpatient
management of hypertension at this time.” ECF No. 93-2 ¶ 6; ECF No. 93 at 13, Defs’ Ex. 2.
In response, Westry argues that the defendants’ conduct caused him “serious unforeseen
cardiovascular ramifications.” ECF No. 94 at 106, Pl’s Opp’n. In his opposition, he has submitted
an EKG reading that he describes as abnormal (ECF No. 94 at 53), the date of which is illegible;
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 9 of 19
10
a letter dated June 24, 2025 from his cardiologist stating that Westry presented with elevated blood
pressure readings in 2016 and that with antihypertensive medication, his blood pressure has been
adequately controlled but that “[i]n 2020, due to addition al stressful events in his life, it was
necessary for Mr. Westry’s medical regimen to be reevaluated and changed to keep his
hypertension under better control” (ECF No. 94 at 54, Pl’s Ex. 9); a 2025 stress test imaging report
(ECF No. 94 at 55, Pl’s Ex. 10); an excerpt from a medical record listing his high blood pressure
medications as of October 21, 2019 (ECF No. 94 at 56, Pl’s Ex. 12); and a 200 page compilation
of daily blood pressure readings from November 28, 2019 – January 19, 2026 (ECF No. 94 -1).10
Even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Westry and all permissible
inferences are drawn in his favor, the evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact that
the deprivation of his medication caused him injury or worsened his underlying condition.
Because the record fails to suggest that Westry incurred any substantial harm as a result of the
delay in receiving his medication, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that he sustained a
sufficiently serious medical deprivation to support a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 11
Summary judgment is granted in favor of Quicquaro, Sanchez, and Anderson.
B. Excessive Force Claim as to Krauter and Rose
Westry alleges that Krauter and Rose used excessive force during his arrest on October 17,
2020. Specifically, Westry claims that they “ripp[ed] [his] arm down and back, tearing his supra
spinatus and infra spinatus tendons.” ECF No. 20 -1 ¶ 5; ECF No. 94 at 10, Pl’s Affirmation ¶¶
32, 35.
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of unreasonable and therefore excessive force
by a police officer” in the course of an arrest. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2010)
10 The defendants do not challenge the admissibility of the plaintiff’s exhibits.
11 Because I conclude that Westry has not met the objective prong, I do not address the subjective prong.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 10 of 19
11
(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). “Not every push or shove, even if it may
later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge ’s chambers ... violates the Fourth Amendment .”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the
right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree
of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”) “Pushes and shoves, like other police conduct,
must be judged under the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 209 (2001). The “reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. ”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
When conducting that balancing in the context of police conduct with respect to a
plaintiff, we consider the following so -called Graham factors: (1) the nature and
severity of the crime leading to the arrest, (2) whether the suspect pose[d] an
immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and (3) whether the suspect
was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. . . . We are also
to consider the following so-called Figueroa factors: [4] the need for the application
of force, [5] the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was
used, [6] the extent of the injury inflicted, and [7] whether force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm. . . . If this balancing exercise supports a
conclusion that a reasonable jury could find that a defendant applied excessive force
in a manner that was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, after
drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has made
out a constitutional violation for purposes of surviving the defendant ’s motion for
summary judgment.
Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation s omitted).
“Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, granting summary judgment against a plaintiff on
an excessive force claim is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d
113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 11 of 19
12
The defendants argue that Westry has not presented any medical evidence that the “alleged
actions of these defendants during the handcuffing process were the cause of his rotator cuff tear.”
ECF No. 93 -1 at 15 (emphasis added). They point out that Westry has not “disclose[d] any
qualified healthcare individual to testify that he sustained the tendon tears to his left shoulder as a
result of the encounter with Krauter and Rose.” ECF No. 101 at 4.
Expert testimony is required when “the nexus between the injury and the alleged cause
would not be obvious to the lay juror.” Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp ., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir.
2004). See, e.g., Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 159–61 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming that expert
medical evidence, as opposed to layperson testimony, is usually required to prove causation of
medical injury).
The defendants posit that without evidence of the rotator cuff injury, Westry lacks “proof
of a serious or harmful injury" and therefore “has failed to prove that the force used was excessive.”
ECF No. 93 -1 at 18. I disagree. While Westry cannot establish that the rotator cuff tear
documented in his MRI was caused by the defendants’ actions, this does not foreclose his excessive
force claim. The “extent of injury” is a “relevant” but non -dispositive factor in evaluating an
excessive force claim. Abreu v. Nicholls, 368 F. App'x 191, 193 (2d Cir. 2010). “[I]f the force
used was unreasonable and excessive, the plaintiff may recover even if the injuries inflicted were
not permanent or severe.” Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1987). “[A] very minimal
injury” may be “sufficient to trigger potential liability for excessive force” under the right
circumstances. Castro v. County of Nassau , 739 F. Supp. 2d 153, 176 –77 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see
also Hayes v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't , 212 F. App'x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have permitted
claims to survive summary judgment where the only injury alleged is bruising.” (citing Maxwell
v. City of New York , 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004))); Gersbacher v. City of New York , 2017
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 12 of 19
13
WL 4402538, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017) (“the bar to show injury to survive summary
judgment on an excessive force claim is low”). “While a de minimis injury might be evidence that
an officer did not use excessive force, ... a de minimis injury does no t always defeat an excessive
force claim. An officer may still be liable for the use of excessive force if she gratuitously inflict[s]
pain in a manner that [is] not a reasonable response to the circumstances.” Murray v. City of New
York, 2017 WL 3309728, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Here, when the record is read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it shows that
the plaintiff was arrested after a verbal dispute with his ex -wife. The plaintiff was not violent or
physically threatening. He was compli ant and did not resist arrest. He had turned around at the
officers’ direction. The officers “ripped” his arms downward and backward, causing him pain and
emotional distress. ECF No. 93 at 37 ( “I expressed to the officer that I was in pain and he was
hurting me.”); ECF No. 20-1 at 6 (averring he suffered emotional distress as a result of the use of
excessive force). “The ‘core judicial inquiry’ is ‘not whether a certain quantum of injury was
sustained,’ but rather whether unreasonable force was applied given the circumstances.” Barcomb
v. Kraeger, Civ. No. 3:14 CV 1159 (JBA), 2016 WL 2644885, at *4 (D. Conn. May 5, 2016)
(quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)). On this record, a reasonable jury could find
the force used during Westry’s arrest objectively unreasonable.
The defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 93 -1 at
24. Specifically, they argue that there is no relevant precedent that “ripping the plaintiff’s arm
down and back” constitutes excessive force and “therefore was not a clearly defined right.” Id.
When an official raises qualified immunity as a defense, the court must consider whether:
(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established
at the time of the challenged conduct. Ricciuti v. Gyzenis, 834 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2016). As
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 13 of 19
14
to the second step, the focus is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “[E]xisting precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011).
In the Second Circuit, it was clearly established at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest that an
officer may not use gratuitous force during an arrest. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 99 n.5
(2d Cir. 2010); see also Lennox v. Miller, 968 F.3d 150 , 157 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of
qualified immunity on excessive force claim where reasonable jury could find handcuffed plaintiff
not resisting when force was used). Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it would be
objectively unreasonable for the defenda nts to believe that forcibly wrenching a compliant
arrestee’s arms back and down, causing him pain, did not violate the Constitution. Summary
judgment is denied on the excessive force claim.
C. Unlawful Entry
Westry alleges that Officer Ahearn entered Westry’s apartment in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Ahearn moves for summary judgment on the grounds that his entry was supported
by exigent circumstances. ECF No. 93 -1 at 29. Specifically, he argues that “the well-being of a
minor child ... justif[ied] his warrantless entry.” Id. According to Ahearn, his entry was lawful
because he was “presented with reliable evidence” that A.W. was a possible victim of sexual abuse
and that information “required him to follow up to make certain A.W. was safe and not in danger.”
ECF No. 93-1 at 32-33.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” “At the very core of that guarantee . . . stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 14 of 19
15
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Case v. Montana, 607 U.S.
___, No. 24 -624, 2026 WL 96690 at *4 (Jan. 14, 2026) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “When the intrusion is into that most private place, reasonableness usually means having
a warrant.” Id. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“It is a basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The warrant requirement,
however, is “subject to certain exceptions.” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021). One
exception “involv[es] the need to provide an occupant with emergency aid.” Case, 2026 WL
96690, at *4. “An officer may enter a home without a warrant if he has an objectively reasonable
basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.”
Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this exception to apply “emergency
conditions [are] indeed necessary.” Id. at *5. See Crespo v. City of New York, 781 F. Supp. 3d
125, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (a warrantless entry is unconstitutional when “there [is] no emergency”).
“The objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct . . . is evaluated by looking at the totality of
the circumstances.” Case, 2026 WL 96690, at *6. The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404. “[T]he police bear a heavy burden” in “justify[ing] a warrantless
entry on the basis of exigent circumstances[.]” Chamberlain Est. of Chamberlain v. City of White
Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2020).
Case, cited ab ove, illustrates the degree to which the officer must have ev idence of
imminent danger to an occupant. There, Case, who had been drinking and “sounded erratic”, told
his girlfriend, J.H., during “an alarming phone call” that he was going to kill himself and talked
about a suicide note. 2026 WL 96690, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) . J.H. heard a
“clicking” sound, like the “cock[ing of] a gun.” Id. Finally, J.H. heard “a pop” followed by
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 15 of 19
16
“nothing”--“just dead air.” Id. She “yelled [Case ’s] name a few times,” but got no response,
leading her to think he had “pulled the trigger.” Id. She called 9–1–1 to report the incident and
rushed to his home. Id. Three police officers, dispatched to do “a welfare check on a suicidal
male,” met her outside the house. Id. The officers were aware that Case had a history of alcohol
abuse and mental-health issues; that he had previously threatened suicide at the school where he
worked; and that he had once seemed to attempt “suicide -by-cop,” by confronting the police in a
way that was likely to provoke a lethal response. Id. The officers circled the house looking for
signs of injury or danger. Id. They knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window, but got
no response. Id. Shining their flashlights inside, they could make out empty beer cans, an empty
handgun holster, and a notepad with writing on it, which they took to be the suicide note Case had
mentioned to J.H. but they saw no sign of Case. Id. They decided to enter the house to “render
emergency aid” -- whether that was preventing an injury to Case or responding if Case had already
shot himself and needed medical care. Id. at *3. The officers equipped themselves with long-
barrel guns and a ballistic shield before entering. Id. On this record, the Supreme Court concluded
that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that their intervention was needed
to prevent serious harm. Id. at *6.
Exigent circumstances have also been found in situations of active domestic disputes where
the officer s had received a 9 -1-1 call about “physical domestic disturbance, ” learned from a
neighbor upon arrival that a male and female had been “screaming at each other ” and that the
neighbor was “concerned for [the woman’s] safety” and that of two children, received no response
to their knocking on the door, and heard a baby crying but then heard the baby go silent after they
announced their presence, see Morrison v. Strain , 2025 WL 2675832, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 18,
2025), where it seemed that there was a fire, United States v. Klump , 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 16 of 19
17
2008), and where there were gunshots, United States v. Laurent, 33 F.4th 63, 95 (2d Cir. 2022).
These cases show situations where a reasonable officer would believe that there was an urgent
need to render aid or to take action to protect someone from imminent harm.
This case is a far cry from those situations. The “totality of the circumstances” confronting
Ahearn did not indicate “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that [his] intervention was
needed to prevent serious harm.” Case, 2026 WL 96690, at *6.
P.A. Stemple had contacted the police department and DCF regarding his concern about
possible child abuse. But Ahearn did not speak to P.A. Stemple and spoke only with Dr. Quatricelli
before traveling to the home. Dr. Quatricelli told Ahearn that she had spoken to Westry, who stated
that A.W. often slept in the same bed as her mother and her mother’s husband. Dr. Quatricelli told
Ahearn that she had also spoken with and examined A.W. Based on her observations, she told
Ahearn that she did not suspect any child abuse to have taken place and had discharged A.W.
Ahearn was unable to speak with PA Stemple or A.W. at the hospital because both had left. He
went to Westry’s apartment and entered without consent.12
Ahearn did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that at the moment of entry,
A.W. was “seriously injured or imminently threatened with” injury. Case, 2026 WL 96690, at *4.
Nothing in the record suggests an “urgent need to render aid or take action.” United States v.
Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). A.W. had just been examined
and evaluated by Dr. Quatracilli, who dismissed concerns that A.W. had been sexually abused.
Ahearn spoke to no one else who had interacted with A.W. and had no evidence regarding A.W .
12 Ahearn avers that he “knocked on the door to the apartment but no one answered despite the fact that [he] clearly
heard voices coming from inside apartment.” ECF No. 93 at 8, Ahearn Aff. ¶ 15. This “heightened” his “concerns
for [A.W.’s] well-being.” Id. ¶ 16. But as noted, Westry denies hearing any knocking. ECF No. 94 at 14, Pl’s
Affirmation ¶ 51. And at the summary judgment stage, the Court must disregard all evidence supporting the moving
party that the jury would not be required to believe with regard to a disputed issue of fact. Local Rule 56(c). In any
event, under the circumstances, a knock with no answer would not have been enough to justify the warrantless entry.
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 17 of 19
18
that warranted disregarding Dr. Quatracilli’s report. Further, even if Ahearn believed , based on
the information he had received, that A.W. might have been sexually abused by her mother’s then-
husband and even if that belief was reasonable (which is at least questionable on this record), that
would not have provided a basis to believe that A.W. was in imminent danger at the time of his
entry into Westry’s home. Ahearn had no evidence that Westry, who had brought his daughter to
the hospital an d was the source of the suggestion about the mother ’s husb and, apparently
unfounded, himself presented any danger to A.W. In short, a s far as the record discloses , there
was no imminent threat to anyone at the time Ahearn entered the home. Based on the undisputed
facts and the entirety of the record, Ahearn has not established exigent circumstances justifying
his warrantless entry into the plaintiff's home.
Ahearn argues that even if his entry was unlawful, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
ECF No. 93-1 at 33. Qualified immunity protects a defendant if “(1) his conduct does not violate
a clearly established constitutional right, or (2) it was ‘objective ly reasonable’ for the officer to
believe his conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.” Hartline v. Gallo,
546 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity “is an affirmative defense,
[and] ‘the defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively
reasonable in light of the law existing at that time.’” Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 84 (2d Cir.
2000). Ahearn therefore is entitled to qualified immunity “if reasonable officers could disagree as
to whether exigent circumstances were present.” Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1287 (2d Cir.
2002). But a s set forth above, on this record, it was not objectively reasonable for Ahearn to
believe that exigent circumstances justified his warrantless entry into Westry’s home. As a result,
Ahearn is not entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Pal v. Cipolla, No. 20-4222-CV, 2022 WL
766417, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022)(denying qualified immunity where it was not objectively
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 18 of 19
19
reasonable for the defendants to believe that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless
entry); Azana v. City of West Haven, 2012 WL 264559, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2012) (finding on
defendants’ motion for summary judgment that defendant officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity for warrantless entry because “it was not objectively reasonable for [defendant] to
believe that exigent circumstances warranted his entry into the apartment”). Summary judgment
is thus not appropriate on this ground.
IV . Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on the
deliberate indifference claim as to Quicquaro, Sanchez, and Anderson. The Clerk is directed to
terminate them as defendants in this action. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED on
the excessive force claim as to Krauter and Rose and the unlawful entry claim as to Ahearn.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated: Hartford, Connecticut
March 4, 2026
Case 3:22-cv-00686-MPS Document 105 Filed 03/04/26 Page 19 of 19