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govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_24-cv-00357-3
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DAVID A. THOMPSON,
CDCR #AU-9252,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES S. HILL, RJDCF Warden;
L. SCHOBELOCK, R.N.; R. BARENCHI,
CME, S. GATES, Chief Health Care
Correspondence; JOHN/JANE DOE,
Appeals Coordinator; J. MOECKLY,
Reviewing Authority; A. REYES, ADA
Coordinator; Dr. HODGES, Chief
Physician and Surgeon; R. BLANDING,
Custody Appeals Representative;
B. CAMPBELL, Health Care Compliance
Analyst; V. ANDERSON, Health Care
Grievance Representative; Dr.
KAUFFMAN, Clinical Psychologist;
B. MILLIUM, Educator; GARDNER,
Correctional Officer; CASTRO,
Correctional Officer; JOHN DOE, ADA
Sergeant; STATE OF CALIFORNIA;
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION,
Defendants.
Case No.: 24-cv-00357-MMA (DDL)
ORDER:
(1) SCREENING AMENDED
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)
(2) DENYING MOTION TO
REQUEST STATUS UPDATE
AS MOOT; AND
(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO
EFFECT SERVICE OF AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
AND Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)
[Doc. Nos. 14, 17]
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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the Court and subject to initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), is Plaintiff David A. Thompson’s Amended Complaint filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a motion requesting a status update. See Doc. No. 14
(“FAC”); Doc No. 17. Plaintiff is now incarcerated at the Substance Abuse Treatment
Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran, but his FAC seeks damages and injunctive relief against
the State of California, its Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and
various prison officials who are alleged to have denial his request for a permanent single-
cell housing assignment while he was incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional
Facility (“RJD”) in 2023.
The Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but dismissed his original complaint sua sponte for
failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). See Doc.
No. 8. Specifically, the Court found Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to:
(1) support any individualized claim for relief against Defendants Hill, Schobelock,
Barenchi, Gates, Moeckly, and John/Jane Doe, Appeals Coordinator, id. at 9‒11; (2) hold
Defendants Reyes, Hodges, Blanding, Campbell, Anderson, Kauffman, or Millum liable
for violating his Eighth Amendment rights with respect to his eligibility for permanent
single-cell housing, id. at 11‒14; and (3) support a plausible claim for relief as to any
individual Defendant under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id. at 14‒16.
For the reasons explained, the Court now screens Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a), finds it states plausible Eighth Amendment and
ADA claims upon which relief may be granted, DENIES his motion to request a status
update as moot in light of this Order, and DIRECTS the U.S. Marshal to effect service of
process on his behalf.
//
//
//
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II. SCREENING
A. Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC, like his
original complaint, requires a preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP
complaint, or any portion found frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim, or seeking
damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621
F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
“The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the ‘same as the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.’” Long v.
Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted)); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113,
1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the
familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 12(b)(6) together
require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s FAC differs from his original in several critical ways. First, he adds
specific allegations and a sworn declaration from a former RJD cellmate that plausibly
show Correctional Officers Gardner and Castro were aware his incontinence caused
multiple fights with his cellmate but refused to move him. See FAC at 3‒4; 9, Ex. 1,
Doc. No. 14-1 at 2‒3. Second, he now claims both the Defendants who comprised his
Reasonable Accommodation Panel (“RAP”) (Reyes, Hodges, Blanding, Campbell,
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Anderson, Kauffman, and Millum), and the medical and appeals officials who reviewed
and denied his September 19, 2023 CDCR Health Care 602 appeal and ADA Reasonable
Accommodation Request CDCR 1824 Form (Schobelock, Barenchi, Gates, John Doe
ADA Sergeant, and Moeckly), were all “aware [he] and his prior cellmate had multiple
fist fights due to [his] disability,” and either falsified documents indicating he had no
safety concerns, never interviewed him regarding safety concerns, or knowingly relied on
“false[] claims” that he was not at risk of injury when they denied his requests for a
permanent single-cell housing accommodation based on his disability. See FAC at 5, 6‒
8, 11. Finally, Plaintiff adds Defendants State of California and CDCR as the public
entities responsible for failing to provide him with a permanent single-cell housing
accommodation due to the vulnerability of attack posed by his disability. Id. at 9‒12.
C. Unnamed Parties
First, in conducting its screening of Plaintiff’s FAC, the Court notes that unlike his
original complaint, his FAC no longer seeks relief against RJD’s Warden James S. Hill,
or John/Jane Doe, an unidentified RJD Appeals Coordinator. Therefore, the Court
DISMISSES these Defendants as parties to this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to state
any claim for relief against them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b)(1). See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner &
Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the
original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that
claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading
may be “considered waived if not repled”).
D. Eighth Amendment Claims
Second, as he did in his original pleading, Plaintiff’s FAC continues to assert
violations of his “civil rights,” but this time he identifies the Eighth Amendment as the
constitutional basis for his failure to protect claims. See FAC at 3, 9. “[Section] 1983 ‘is
not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989)
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(citation omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
color of State law.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir.
2021) (citing Long v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Specifically, Plaintiff now alleges Officers Gardner and Castro expressly refused
his requests for a cell move due to “multiple fights” with his cellmate cause by his
incontinence, see FAC at 3‒4, 9, “didn’t care” and stated: “[Y]ou are both alive so it must
not be that serious.” See Ex. 1, Doc. No. 14-1 at 2. He further alleges the RAP
Defendants, as well as Defendants Schobelock, Barenchi, Gates, and Moeckly, all knew
“he and his cellmate had gotten into fist fights over [his] disability,” because his
September 19, 2023 Health Care CDCR 602, his CDCR 1824 Reasonable
Accommodation Request Form, and subsequent CDCR 602 grievances he filed
referenced those fights and the physical safety concerns posed by his fecal incontinence.
See FAC at 5‒9, Doc. No. 14-1 at 4‒37, Exs. 2‒ 9. In fact, Plaintiff contends the RAP’s
Final Response to his single-cell request noting his height and weight suggests that while
these Defendants knew his incontinence made him vulnerable to in-cell attacks, they
nevertheless left him to “defend himself.” See FAC at 9, Ex. 9, Doc. No. 14-1 at 20.
While double-celling is not constitutionally impermissible, see Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981), “every inmate, from the scrawniest to the brawniest,
has the right to have his jailers not be deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of
serious harm to him.” Mooring v. San Francisco Sheriff’s Dep’t, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1110,
1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (“Being
violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay
for their offenses against society.’”)). Therefore, the Eighth Amendment requires prison
officials to take reasonable measures to protect inmates from known risks of violence.
See Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).
Where, as here, prison officials are specifically alleged to have known that a housing
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assignment created substantial risk to Plaintiff’s inmate’s safety in the past, and to have
further acted with deliberate indifference to the risk that Plaintiff would face serious harm
in the future unless that risk was abated, the Eighth Amendment may be violated. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (deliberate indifference may be established if Plaintiff alleges
facts sufficient to “infer[ ] from circumstantial evidence” that “the risk was obvious”).
“[D]eliberate indifference can be predicated upon knowledge of a victim’s particular
vulnerability (though the identity of the ultimate assailant not known in advance of
attack)[.]” Clark v. California, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005)). In fact, if a prisoner alleges to face a
substantial risk of serious harm, he need not wait until he actually suffers an attack before
asserting a deliberate indifference or threat-to-safety claim. See Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to
inmates is not a novel proposition.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC sufficient to support a plausible
claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
E. ADA Claims
Finally, because Plaintiff’s factual allegations also focus on the denial of his
September 2023 request for permanent single-cell housing due to his fecal incontinence,1
and he alleges he was denied the benefit of an accommodation and discriminated against
“because of his disability,” see FAC at 11‒12, the Court also liberally construes his
claims for relief as to the public entity Defendants only (State of California and CDCR)
as arising under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885
F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting court’s “obligation where the petitioner is pro se,
1 Title II defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of [an] individual.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “[A] major life activity
. . . includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the
immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the
petitioner the benefit of any doubt”) (citations omitted); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152,
1157–58 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional
source of the claim raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”).
Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102, prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability. Lowell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II applies to
inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
210 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). “[T]here
is no question that defendant CDCR, as a ‘department [or] agency . . . of a State’ is a
‘public entity’ for purposes of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).” Jones v. Scotland, 2015
WL 461633, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015
WL 1347412 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2015).
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege: (1) he is an
individual with a disability, (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the
benefit of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, (3) he was either excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity, and (4) such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Vos v.
City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2018); O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr.
Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).
As amended, Plaintiff’s FAC includes sufficient factual allegations to plausibly
show his incontinence qualifies as a disability, see Leishner v. Coeur d’Alene Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., No. 2:24-CV-00395-BLW, 2024 WL 5246516, at *5 (D. Idaho Dec. 30,
2024) (citing Shaw v. Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Shaw’s confinement
to a wheelchair and incontinence render him disabled within the meaning[] of the
ADA.”)), that disability substantially limits his ability to safely sleep while housed with
another inmate, see FAC at 3; 10; Granados v. J.R. Simplot Co., 266 F. App’x 547, 549
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[S]leeping is a major life activity” under the ADA), he is otherwise
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entitled to housing that does not pose a substantial risk to his health or safety, see Harper
v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 1:18-CV-00562 LJO SKO, 2018 WL 5880786, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2018) (finding prisoner’s allegation of being denied “reasonably safe housing at
the jail” was facially adequate for purposes of pleading the denial of a public service
under the ADA); and that he was denied the benefit of that service “because of his
disability.” See FAC at 10‒12. Thus, taken together, the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC
are sufficient to support a plausible claim for relief against the public entity Defendants
under the ADA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold any of the individual Defendants liable under
the ADA, however, he fails to state a claim. See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 610 (2015) (“Only public entities are subject to Title II[.]”);
Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (A “plaintiff cannot bring an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to
vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA.”).
F. Summary
As liberally construed, the Court finds the FAC’s remaining Eighth Amendment
individual capacity claims2 seeking damages3 against Defendants Schobelock, Barenchi,
Gates, Reyes, Hodges, Blanding, Campbell, Anderson, Kauffman, Millum, Moeckly,
Gardner, Castro, and ADA Sergeant John Doe, as well as the ADA reasonable
accommodation discrimination claims as alleged against Defendants State of California
2 To the extent Plaintiff’s FAC seeks damages against these Defendants in their “official capacity”
however, see FAC at 2, his claims may not proceed as they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for
damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.”).
3 Plaintiff’s transfer from RJD to SATF has rendered moot his claims for injunctive relief with respect to
the RJD Defendants. An inmate’s transfer generally moots a claim for injunctive relief relating to his
former prison’s practices or policies, unless the suit is certified as a class action or there is evidence the
prisoner will be transferred back. See Endsley v. Luna, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(citing Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995)); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03
(1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
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and CDCR meet the “low threshold” set for sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and thus are “sufficient to warrant . . . an answer.”
Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123.
A ccordingly, the Court will order the U.S. Marshal to effect service of process
upon these named Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP]
cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United
States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court:
(1) DISMISSES Defendants JAMES S. HILL, RJDCF Warden, and
JOHN/JANE DOE, Appeals Coordinator, and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to
terminate them as parties to this matter based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against
them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
4 While the Court finds the individual capacity Eighth Amendment allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC
seeking damages against John Doe, ADA Sergeant are sufficiently pleaded to survive initial screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), he must first identify this person, submit an
amended pleading and/or file a motion to substitute the Sergeant’s true name, and request U.S. Marshal
service upon this individual as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 before any claim alleged
against this Defendant may proceed. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1995)
(Doe defendants must be identified and served within [90] days of the commencement of the action
against them); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m). Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored, Gillespie v.
Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980), and in most instances it is impossible for the United States
Marshal to serve a party identified only as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.
1994) (in order to properly effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to “furnish
the information necessary to identify the defendant.”); Finefeuiaki v. Maui Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Staff &
Affiliates, 2018 WL 3580764, at *6 (D. Haw. July 25, 2018) (noting that “[a]s a practical matter, the
United States Marshal cannot serve a summons and complaint on an anonymous defendant.”).
However, where the identity of parties is not known prior to filing of an action, Ninth Circuit authority
permits Plaintiff the opportunity to pursue appropriate discovery to identify unknown Does, unless it is
clear that discovery would not uncover their identities, or his pleading requires dismissal for other
reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at
642).
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(2) DISMISSES pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) all official
capacity claims for damages as alleged against Defendants SCHOBELOCK,
BARENCHI, GATES, MOECKLY, REYES, HODGES, BLANDING, CAMPBELL,
ANDERSON, KAUFFMAN, MILLUM, GARDNER, CASTRO and JOHN DOE, ADA
Sergeant as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
(3) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief as to Defendants
SCHOBELOCK, BARENCHI, GATES, MOECKLY, REYES, HODGES, BLANDING,
CAMPBELL, ANDERSON, KAUFFMAN, MILLUM, GARDNER, CASTRO and
JOHN DOE, ADA Sergeant as moot in light of his transfer from RJD to SATF.
(4) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Status Update (Doc. No. 17) as moot
in light of this screening Order.
(5) DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint upon Defendants SCHOBELOCK, BARENCHI, GATES, MOECKLY,
REYES, HODGES, BLANDING, CAMPBELL, ANDERSON, KAUFFMAN,
MILLUM, GARDNER, CASTRO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, and forward it to him
along with fifteen blank U.S. Marshal Form 285s. In addition, the Clerk will provide
Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, its Order Granting IFP (Doc. No. 8), certified
copies of his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 14), and the summons so that he may serve
these named Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete
the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where each
named Defendant may be found and/or subject to service, and return them to the United
States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter
accompanying his IFP package.
(6) ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint and summons upon Defendants SCHOBELOCK, BARENCHI, GATES,
MOECKLY, REYES, HODGES, BLANDING, CAMPBELL, ANDERSON,
KAUFFMAN, MILLUM, GARDNER, CASTRO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and
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CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION at the
addresses provided by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided, and to file executed
waivers of personal service upon these Defendants with the Clerk of Court as soon as
possible after their return. Should Defendants fail to return the U.S. Marshal’s requests
for waiver of personal service within 90 days, the U.S. Marshal must instead file the
completed Form USM 285 Process Receipt and Returns with the Clerk of Court, include
the date the summons, Amended Complaint, and requests for waiver were mailed to each
Defendant, and indicate why service remains unexecuted. All costs of service will be
advanced by the United States; however, if any Defendant located within the United
States fails without good cause to sign and return the waivers requested by the Marshal
on Plaintiff’s behalf, the Court will impose upon that Defendant any expenses later
incurred in making personal service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
(7) ORDERS Defendants SCHOBELOCK, BARENCHI, GATES, MOECKLY,
REYES, HODGES, BLANDING, CAMPBELL, ANDERSON, KAUFFMAN,
MILLUM, GARDNER, CASTRO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, once served, to reply
to the claims found sufficient to survive screening in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and
any subsequent pleading Plaintiff may file in this matter naming them as parties, within
the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)
and 15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be
permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has
conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b),
and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face of the pleading alone
that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendant is
required to respond); and
(8) ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to
serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’
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counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the
Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every
original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the
manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on
Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any
document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or
which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the Defendants, or their counsel, may
be disregarded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 27, 2025
_____________________________
HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO
United States District Judge
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