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govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_24-cv-00357-5
-1- 24-cv-0357-MMA-DDL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DAVID A. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
RJD CF WARDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-0357-MMA-DDL
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
[Doc. No. 38]
On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff David A. Thompson (“Plaintiff”), currently
incarcerated at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran,
California, and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed an emergency motion for a
temporary restraining order and motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. No. 38.
Defendants State of California, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
L. Schobelock, R. Barenchi, S. Gates, J. Moeckly, A. Reyes, Dr. Hodges, R. Blanding, B.
Campell, V. Anderson, Dr. Kauffman, B. Millum, Gardner, Castro, and John Doe, ADA
Coordinator, (collectively “Defendants”) have not yet appeared in the action and
therefore have not responded to the instant motion.
1 For the reasons below, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion without prejudice to refiling.
1 Waivers of service for the Defendants State of California, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, V. Anderson, J. Moeckly, R. Barenchi, B. Millum, Hodges, R. Blanding, B. Campbell,
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 22, 2024. Doc. No. 1. The Court
dismissed his complaint, sua sponte, for failing to file the required filing fee or moving to
proceed in forma pauperis on February 27, 2025. Doc. No. 3. Plaintiff subsequently
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court granted while dismissing
his complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. No. 8. Plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint (“FAC”) on December 23, 2024, bringing claims against Defendants,
construed as alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and his
Eighth Amendment rights. Doc. Nos. 14 (“FAC”), 18. Plaintiff claims more than a dozen
RJDCF custody, health care, and inmate appeals officials violated his rights by denying
his September 2023 request for permanent single-cell housing. See id. at 1‒11.
The Court summarized his claims in its May 27, 2025 screening order:
[Plaintiff’s] FAC seeks damages and injunctive relief against the
State of California, its Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and various prison officials who are
alleged to have denial his request for a permanent single -cell
housing assignment while he was incarcerated at Richard J.
Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in 2023.
Doc. No. 18 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that, in sum, he was repeatedly assaulted by his RJD
cellmate due to his fecal incontinence. FAC at 3–4; Doc. No. 14-1 at 2. He additionally
alleges that he sought disability accommodations due to his fecal incontinence— namely
that he sought transfer to a single cell. FAC at 5. His requests, in his telling, were
wrongfully denied, though RJD staff knew of his incontinence, its effects, and the
assaults. Id. at 5–9. Thus, Defendants did not take adequate action to protect him. Id.
and A. Reyes were returned executed on July 15, 2025. Doc. Nos. 23–32. Waivers for Defendants L.
Schobelock, Kauffman, Gardner, and S. Gates were returned executed on August 11, 2025. Doc. Nos.
35–37, 39.
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Plaintiff continues that “[s]ince September 16, 2023, [he] has refused to take
anyone as a cellmate to protect himself even though CO’s have threatened to write an
RVR 113 if [he] did not take a cellmate.” Id. at 11. “Thankfully they have only been
threats . . . .” Id. A declaration from his former cellmate likewise asserts that Plaintiff
“had spinal fusion surgery on Sept. 13, 2023, and when he came back from the hospital
he was moved to a cell . . . by himself.” Doc. No. 14-1 at 2. On January 5, 2025,
Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address, informing the Court of his transfer from RJD
to SATF; thus, Plaintiff is no longer housed at RJD. Doc. No. 15.
Relevant to this motion, in its May 27, 2025 order, the Court: (1) dismissed
Defendants James S. Hill, RJDCF Warden, and John/Jane Doe, Appeals Coordinator,
based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against them; (2) dismissed all official
capacity claims for damages against Defendants Schobelock, Barenchi, Gates, Moeckly,
Reyes, Hodges, Blanding, Campbell, Anderson, Kauffman, Millum, Gardner, Castro, and
John Doe, ADA Sergeant as barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief as to Defendants Schobelock, Barenchi, Gates,
Moeckly, Reyes, Hodges, Blanding, Campbell, Anderson, Kauffman, Millum, Gardner,
Castro, and John Doe, ADA Sergeant as moot in light of his transfer from RJD to SATF.
Doc. No. 18 at 9–10.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The authority for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions can be
found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Generally, notice to the adverse party is
required before the court may issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), (b)(1). Rule 65(b) provides, however, that the Court may
issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the nonmoving party if: (A) the
movant sets forth specifics facts by way of an affidavit or verified complaint clearly
showing that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney
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certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be
required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)–(B).
The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending
the complete briefing and thorough consideration contemplated by full proceedings
pursuant to a preliminary injunction. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415
U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974) (temporary restraining orders “should be restricted to serving
their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just
so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.”). A temporary restraining order
as a form of preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that is “never
granted as of right,” and the movant has the burden to prove such a remedy is proper.
Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 24 (2008); see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
In general, the same showing is required for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240
F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). The party requesting preliminary injunctive relief
must show that “[1] he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20;
see also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2009).
There are two types of injunctions: mandatory and prohibitory. “A mandatory
injunction orders a responsible party to take action, while a prohibitory injunction
prohibits a party from taking action and preserves the status quo pending a final
resolution on the merits.” Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th
Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A mandatory injunction goes well
beyond simply maintaining the status quo and is particularly disfavored. Anderson v.
United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979). Mandatory preliminary relief should
not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party. Id.
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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff here seeks what amounts to a prohibitory injunction, requiring that
Defendant CDCR “house [him] in a permanent single cell for the duration of this
litigation[,]” as he is presently. Doc. No. 38 at 1. Plaintiff asserts through declaration
that he “suffer[s] from chronic mental health needs, including anxiety and PTSD
symptoms, which are exacerbated by forced double-cell housing.” Doc. No. 38 at 5. Due
to this, he argues that he has “experienced humiliation, threats, discomfort . . . and
assault” Id. though he “has requested single-cell accommodations,” he states those
requests have been “denied or ignored.” Id. Thus, he claims he “fear[s] ongoing
retaliation and harm if forced to remain in a cell with others.” Id. at 6
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff’s motion does not strictly include Rule 65’s
required language as to notice to the opposing party. See generally Doc. No 38. As
further discussed below, the Court sees no imminent harm that would likely result before
Defendants could receive notice and respond—though Plaintiff filed this case in February
2024, he waited over one year to request a temporary restraining order and provides no
indication that the harm he complains of has worsened or become more imminent in that
period. To the contrary, Plaintiff is no longer housed at RJD, where the conduct alleged
in the FAC occurred. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff is currently incarcerated and proceeding
pro se, the Court turns to the factors for preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff must first illustrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits. “To
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, [Plaintiff] must show ‘a fair
chance of success.’” In re Focus Media Inc., 387 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc)). First, in its May 27, 2025 order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for similar
injunctive relief as to the RJD Defendants due to his transfer to SATF. Doc. No. 18. As
it noted then, “[a]n inmate’s transfer generally moots a claim for injunctive relief relating
to his former prison’s practices or policies, unless the suit is certified as a class action or
there is evidence the prisoner will be transferred back.” Id. at 8 n.3 (citing Endsley v.
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Luna, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,
402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)).
Plaintiff alleges nothing in his motion to indicate a renewed likelihood of success as these
claims for injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s stated rationale for requesting a single cell is fear
of his past cellmate, but he alleges no facts to indicate he currently has reason to fear
violence or harm at SATF, that he is currently double-celled or will be soon, that he faces
imminent likelihood of being transferred back to his old cellmate at RJD, or that there is a
likelihood he will be transferred to RJD at all. Thus, these injunctive claims remain
mooted. See, e.g., Endsley, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 1109–10; Brown v. Reilly, No.
220CV1709WBSACP, 2022 WL 2496077 *2 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2022), R&R adopted,
No. 220CV1709WBSACP, 2022 WL 4451196 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2022).
Relevantly, “the fact that the named Plaintiffs have standing to seek damages does
not mean that they automatically have standing to seek injunctive relief.” DZ Rsrv. v.
Meta Platforms, Inc., 96 F.4th 1223, 1240 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1051
(2025). “Past exposure to harmful or illegal conduct does not necessarily confer standing
to seek injunctive relief if the plaintiff does not continue to suffer adverse effects.” Id.
(quoting Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010)). “Nor does
speculation or ‘subjective apprehension’ about future harm support standing.” Id.
(quoting Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 970). Thus, though he still maintains claims for damages,
he is unlikely to succeed on his claims for injunctive relief because those claims arise
from fear of double-celling and particularly with a past cellmate—situations he provides
no evidence are likely to repeat again, particularly as he is no longer at RJD. Cf. Rouser
v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065–66 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Because the inquiry here is
whether plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim for an injunction, the court
need only address whether he is likely to show sufficient causation for injunctive
relief.”); Pietrangelo v. Sununu, No. 2021 DNH 067, 2021 WL 1254560 *5 (D.N.H. Apr.
5, 2021) (“[A] party who seeks a preliminary injunction must show a substantial
likelihood of standing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Even were Plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of ultimately prevailing, he fails to
demonstrate imminent harm. As discussed, is no longer at RJD or housed with the
cellmate that allegedly assaulted him. Doc. No. 15. According to his operative
pleadings, Plaintiff has not shared a cell with the cellmate in question since September
2023. FAC at 11. As further discussed, he asserts no imminent likelihood of transfer
back. Likewise, he expresses no specific concerns of imminent assault from others, but
instead a generalized fear of “retaliation and harm if forced to remain in a cell with
others.” Doc. No. 38 at 6. To issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, there must be more than a mere possibility of irreparable injury—“plaintiffs
seeking preliminary relief [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the
absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (emphasis original). The facts here do
not demonstrate that likelihood sufficient to justify an “extraordinary remedy” like that
requested here.
As to the balancing of the equities, Plaintiff summarily argues that “the risk of
future harm to Plaintiff outweighs any administrative burden CDCR may face in placing
him in a single cell.” Doc. No 38. at 4. The Court disagrees. Though Defendants have
not yet appeared in this action, and thus not responded to the FAC or Plaintiff’s motion,
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate likelihood of injury absent an injunction. Assuming even a
minimal burden on Defendants, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the equities fall in his
favor.
As to the final factor, “[w]hen the reach of an injunction is narrow, limited only to
the parties, and has no impact on non-parties, the public interest will be at most a neutral
factor in the analysis rather than one that favor[s] [granting or] denying the preliminary
injunction.” Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1138–39 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If,
however, the impact of an injunction reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a
potential for public consequences, the public interest will be relevant to whether the
district court grants the preliminary injunction.” Id. at 1139. The Court “will not grant a
preliminary injunction . . . unless . . . public interests [in issuing it] outweigh other public
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interests that cut in favor of not issuing [it].” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). The movant bears the burden of showing the injunction
is in the public interest. Stormans, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1139. Plaintiff offers only a
conclusory sentence asserting a public interest in ensuring constitutionally adequate
mental and medical health conditions in prison. Doc. No. 38 at 4. However, the benefit
of this injunction— other than as a general interest in promoting civil and statutory
rights—affects only Plaintiff’s conditions. Thus, he has not met his burden as to this
factor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff’s motion, at each factor, facially lacks sufficient support for a
temporary or preliminary injunction, the Court DENIES the motion without prejudice.
For that reason, the Court also determines that a hearing on this motion is not necessary.
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Barreca, 720 F. App’x 877, 878 (9th Cir. 2018).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 15, 2025 _____________________________
HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO
United States District Judge
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