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govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01096-0
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AKSHAR PATEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-01096 (ACR)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 1772, a (future) Founding Father born in St. Kitts and Nevis arrived in the thirteen
colonies and proceeded to study on a scholarship at King’s College in New York City.1 In the
two-and-a-half centuries since, countless foreigners have studied at our country’s institutions of
higher learning. Our country is richer—figuratively and literally—for their attendance: they
have enriched our campus cultures, contributed billions to our economy, and helped shape our
government and industries.2
Plaintiff Akshar Patel, an Indian national who studied Information Systems at the
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee (UWM), is such a student. In April 2025, one last exam
stood between Patel and graduation. One last exam, that is, and Defendant U.S. Immigration
1 His name is Alexander Hamilton. For more information on how he grew up to be a hero and a
scholar, the Court commends to the reader Lin-Manuel Miranda, Hamilton: An American
Musical (Richard Rodgers Theater) and Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (2004).
2 During the 2024 to 2025 academic year alone, foreign higher-education students in the United
States “contributed $42.9 billion . . . to the U.S. economy” and “supported 355,736” jobs.
NAFSA: Association of International Educators, NAFSA International Student Economic Value
Tool, https://www.nafsa.org/policy-and-advocacy/policy-resources/nafsa-international-student-
economic-value-tool-v2 [https://perma.cc/Q37Y-VDBM].
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 1 of 18
2
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). That spring, as part of its newly minted “Student Criminal
Alien Initiative,” ICE ran the names of approximately 1.3 million student immigrants through
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). ICE then switched the student entry for any
NCIC hit from “active” to “terminated” in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS)—purportedly, as in Patel’s case, for “failing to maintain status.” Dkt. 2-5
(cleaned up).
This was no small change. Terminating a foreign student’s SEVIS record obligates the
individual to discontinue his education and leave the country post haste. But in purging the
SEVIS records, ICE overlooked a key fact: the NCIC includes hits for foreign students who do
not have criminal convictions and thus had not failed to maintain status. Patel, for example,
appears in the database because of a reckless-driving arrest (for speeding) even though the
prosecution dropped charges. See Dkt. 17 at 25; Dkt. 2-4. Ignoring that context, ICE treated
Patel’s entry as a “positive criminality hit[]” and terminated Patel’s SEVIS record—without any
notice to Patel. Dkt. 18 at 5; see also Dkt. 2-5 (record of Patel’s SEVIS termination citing that
he was “identified in [a] criminal records check”). Hundreds (potentially thousands) of other
foreign students faced the same abrupt SEVIS termination.
In response, scores of foreign students filed suits across the country to reactivate their
SEVIS records. Here, Patel filed an Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
contending that ICE’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and seeking an injunction to compel his SEVIS record
restored to “active status.” The Court granted the motion and entered a TRO. Dkt. 11. Rather
than defend itself further, ICE restored Plaintiff’s record to “active” status and represented that
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 2 of 18
3
it planned for Patel’s record to “remain active in SEVIS” absent new information. Dkt. 18 at
39.
The Government has since moved to dismiss the case as moot. It claims, in effect, no
harm, no foul—Patel wanted his SEVIS record reactivated, it is reactivated. End of story. But
Plaintiff is not reassured. He highlights that ICE can change its mind anytime and so again
terminate his status without notice. Concerned that past is prologue, he has moved the Court to
rule on summary judgment that ICE violated the APA and Due Process Clause and to enjoin it
from doing so again.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. ICE has not carried its burden, under the voluntary-
cessation doctrine, of demonstrating that this case is moot. Further, the termination of
Plaintiff’s SEVIS record was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Accordingly, the
Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 26; and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Dkt. 28. It enters an injunction in the Order accompanying this
Memorandum Opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. F-1 Nonimmigrant Status and SEVIS
The relevant events occurred during Plaintiff’s final undergraduate semester at UWM.3
Dkt. 18 at 43–44. Plaintiff studied there under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
3 Home of the beloved Buckingham U. Badger, or Bucky Badger for short. The name “Bucky”
apparently comes from song lyrics that encouraged the football team to “buck right through that
line.” Bucky Badger—A Historical Look Back, Univ. of Wis.,
https://uwbadgers.com/sports/2019/2/14/bucky-badger-a-historical-look-back
[https://perma.cc/6FJN-6TQA]. Wisconsin gained the nickname “the Badger State” not from the
industrious animal, but from its association with lead miners in the 1820s. Id. Without shelter in
the winter, the miners “lived like Badgers” in tunnels burrowed into hillsides. Id.
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 3 of 18
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ch. 12, which permits foreign nationals to enroll in approved universities as “F-1” status-
holding “nonimmigrant[s]”—so called because they retain a permanent “residence in a foreign
country which” they have “no intention of abandoning,” id. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). Thus, F-1
students may only remain “temporarily” in the United States while (1) “pursu[ing] a full course
of study” at a certified educational institution, id.; or (2) “engaging in authorized practical
training following completion of studies,” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i).4
SEVIS is “the definitive record” of “status and visa eligibility” for F-1 status-holders like
Plaintiff. 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 402.5-4(B); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1). Universities
make periodic reports within SEVIS of foreign students’ relevant biographical information and
academic progress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 214.3(g)(2)(iii). These updates
aid the Government in taking “appropriate enforcement” action against student “status violators,”
including by terminating their F-1 status pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.1.5
An individual may lose F-1 status before the completion of his studies for reasons set
forth in 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d)–(g). The reasons fall into two categories: because the student fails
to maintain status or because the Government initiates a termination of status. An F-1 student
fails to maintain his status if, among other reasons, he commits a “crime of violence for which a
sentence of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed.” Id. § 214.1(g). Government-
initiated terminations, meanwhile, may proceed as follows: (1) “by the revocation of a
4 This case does not implicate a closely related concept—a student visa. A visa is the document
that permits entry into the United States. Plaintiff, as an F-1 status-holder, may remain in the
country even though his visa has expired. See Dkt. 18 at 17–18. But without a valid visa, he
cannot reenter the United States if he departs. See U.S. Customs & Immigr. Enf’t, Students and
Employment, https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/students-and-exchange-
visitors/students-and-employment [https://perma.cc/F5N3-3FA8].
5 U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Student and Exchange Visitor Program,
https://www.ice.gov/sevis [https://perma.cc/TZ2R-9VGZ].
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 4 of 18
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[statutory] waiver”; (2) “by the introduction of a private bill to confer permanent resident status
on” the non-citizen; or (3) “pursuant to notification in the Federal Register, on the basis of
national security, diplomatic, or public safety reasons.” Id. § 214.1(d). Here, it is undisputed
that Patel did not fall into the first category, id. § 214.1(g), and that ICE did not follow any of
the mechanisms set forth in the second, id. § 214.1(d).
B. Plaintiff’s Immigration Status
Plaintiff first arrived in the United States on an H-4 visa issued to him in 2017 as a
dependent of an individual with an H-1B visa.6 See Dkt. 13-2 at 2. In 2018, he matriculated to
UWM, where he began pursuing a bachelor’s degree in Information Science. Dkt. 2-3 ¶ 3.
In November 2018, police in Montgomery, Texas, arrested Plaintiff for speeding, a
reckless-driving offense in Texas. See id. ¶ 10; Dkt. 2-4. The district attorney dismissed the case
in February 2019, and he was never tried or convicted of any crime. See Dkt. 2-4. In June 2019,
Plaintiff disclosed his arrest when applying for an H-4 extension. Dkt. 2-3 ¶ 13. The
Government took note, asking him to provide all relevant documentation concerning the
incident. Id. After Plaintiff did so, the Government granted his H-4 extension. Id. In April
2021, on a return trip from India, Plaintiff faced no difficulty entering the United States on a B
visa. Id. ¶ 14. And in 2022, the Government accepted Plaintiff’s application to change his status
to F-1, notwithstanding his arrest record. Id. ¶ 15. Except for the period in which ICE
6 The United States issues H-1B visas to certain individuals “perform[ing] services in a specialty
occupation, services of exceptional merit and ability relating to a Department of Defense (DOD)
cooperative research and development project, or services as a fashion model of distinguished
merit or ability.” U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., H-1B Specialty Occupations,
https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/h-1b-specialty-occupations
[https://perma.cc/JM6S-LB8S].
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 5 of 18
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terminated his SEVIS record, see infra pp. 8–9, Plaintiff has held F-1 status continuously since
June 2022, see Dkt 13-2 at 1.7
In spring 2025, following the restoration of his SEVIS record, Plaintiff graduated from
UWM. He currently remains in the United States under the post-graduate Optional Practical
Training program, during which time he remains an F-1 status-holder. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(f)(5)(i), (f)(10)(ii)(C); Dkt. 37. As a result, he continues to appear in the SEVIS
database.8
C. ICE Terminates SEVIS Records En Masse
In spring 2025, ICE’s leadership commenced its so-called Student Criminal Alien
Initiative by running the name of every foreign student—approximately 1.3 million
individuals—through the National Crime Information Center. Dkt. 18 at 3–5, 9. Despite its
name, the NCIC includes persons without any criminal convictions. Id. at 6. It includes, for
example, persons who have been arrested, but not tried or convicted and, inter alia, missing
persons. Id. For that reason, the Assistant Director of the National Security Division for
Homeland Security Investigations within ICE has conceded that it is inappropriate to terminate
SEVIS records based on an NCIC hit alone. Id. at 7.
After running its search, ICE culled from the NCIC database a list of 6,400 students with
supposed “positive criminality hits.” Id. at 5, 12–13. The Administrative Record of what
happened next comprises three emails. See Dkt. 17. ICE emailed the list it had created, in
batches, to the U.S. Department of State (State Department or State). See Dkt. 18 at 11–13.
7 ICE has since represented that its restoration of Plaintiff’s SEVIS record to “active”
“is . . . retroactive to the date of its initial termination such that there is no gap in [Plaintiff’s]
SEVIS record.” Dkt. 26-2 ¶ 7.
8 Foreign vocational students and exchange visitors also have SEVIS records. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1372(a)(1).
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 6 of 18
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Plaintiff appeared in one such batch—in a spreadsheet containing the names of approximately
700 students with, per ICE’s email, “positive NCIC hits.” Dkt. 17 at 4, 25. ICE included
Plaintiff even though that same spreadsheet confirmed that a judge had “dismissed” his speeding
charge on February 21, 2019. Id. at 25 (cleaned up); see Dkt. 2-4 (Texas court’s dismissal order
on local district attorney’s motion).
The next day, the State Department reported that it had “run the . . . data against [its]
systems.” Dkt. 17 at 26. It returned the entire batch of names back to ICE for SEVIS
termination. Id.; Dkt. 18 at 14–23. Within fifteen minutes of receiving State’s correspondence,
an ICE official gave the “terminat[ion]” order for “all” these students’ SEVIS records. Dkt. 17 at
26.
Shoddy analysis breeds shoddy results, and ICE’s Initiative was no exception. It
ensnared numerous students, including Plaintiff, who had no criminal history. With no warning,
these students were suddenly “unable to continue their classes, research programs, and/or Ph.D.
programs,” and some “los[t] . . . scholarships traceable to” ICE’s termination decision. Doe 1 v.
Bondi, 785 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1285–86 (N.D. Ga. 2025). Later, the Government conceded that
thousands of students on its list were legally in status and could lawfully remain in this country.
Dkt. 18 at 27.
D. Students Sue and ICE Changes Course
Hundreds of impacted students sued in federal courts across the country. See Dkt. 18 at
36. Courts quickly began enjoining ICE to reactive the students’ SEVIS accounts pending
further litigation. Soon thereafter, ICE began “rescrubbing” the lists because some “nuances
[came] about” regarding the NCIC records. Dkt. 38 at 26. State also began “reexamining
various cases in a quality control measure.” Id.
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 7 of 18
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Then, on April 26, 2025, after these students had incurred (presumably hefty) legal
expenses and faced academic uncertainty, ICE changed course. It internally circulated a
Broadcast Message to clarify the reasons that permit ICE to terminate a nonimmigrant’s SEVIS
records. See Dkt. 16-1. ICE did not list appearing in the NCIC alone as a basis for termination.
Soon thereafter, ICE began voluntarily restoring wrongfully terminated SEVIS records. See,
e.g., Doe v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 2025), modified on other grounds, No.
25-CV-03140-JSW, 2025 WL 3295383 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025); Du v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 3:25-CV-644 (OAW), 2025 WL 1549098, at *5 (D. Conn. May 31, 2025).
E. Plaintiff Sues to Reactivate His SEVIS Record
Plaintiff was one of the many students ensnared in ICE’s dragnet. On April 3, 2025,
UWM notified Plaintiff that the Government had terminated his SEVIS record that day. The
SEVIS portal reflected his purported “failure to maintain status” because of a “criminal records
check.” Dkt. 12-1 at 7 (cleaned up). The check, recall, was nothing more than his appearance in
the NCIC.
Plaintiff sued, and, after an emergency hearing, the Court granted his Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order. Apr. 16, 2025, Min. Order. In a later Order memorializing the
decision, the Court noted that ICE had “represent[ed] that it has returned Plaintiff’s [SEVIS]
record . . . to the ‘active’ status.” Dkt. 11 at 1. The Temporary Restraining Order expired on
May 1, 2025.
At a subsequent preliminary-injunction hearing, ICE’s counsel stated that the termination
reasons in its Broadcast Message “do not apply to Mr. Patel” and that therefore, “based on the
information currently available to ICE at this time, [his SEVIS record] would not be terminated
absent a court order.” Dkt. 18 at 37, 43. Plaintiff, however, insisted that he remains subject to
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 8 of 18
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termination under the Broadcast Message. Id. at 42. Given the dispute, the Court requested that
the parties propose language for a consent decree memorializing ICE’s agreement to refrain from
again terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS records for reasons not based in statute or regulation. Id. at
44.
The parties, however, could not agree on the substance of a consent decree. See Dkt. 21
at 1. Instead, ICE moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the case is moot.
Plaintiff, meanwhile, requested summary judgment on his claims. The Court heard argument on
these motions on July 22, 2025.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Where, as here, the Court considers APA claims on summary judgment, it sits as an
“appellate tribunal.” Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The APA requires courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious,” “or otherwise
not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This standard of review is “narrow.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Courts may not “substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency.” Id.
Rather, courts set aside agency action only where, as relevant here, the agency has
“relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider” or failed to “articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.” Id. (cleaned up). But ICE’s decision survives this scrutiny even if it is
“of less than ideal clarity” so long as a court can “reasonably . . . discern[]” “the agency’s path.”
Finberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 6 F.4th 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 9 of 18
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III. ANALYSIS
The Court first discusses its reasons for rejecting ICE’s arguments that the APA’s finality
provision, the Privacy Act of 1974, and Article III mootness each prevent the Court from
reaching the merits. The Court next sets forth its reasons for agreeing with Plaintiff that ICE’s
actions violated the APA.
A. Termination of Plaintiff’s SEVIS Record Constitutes Final Agency Action
The Court joins every other federal district court to have passed on the question in
concluding that the termination of a SEVIS record constitutes “final agency action” triggering
APA review. 5 U.S.C. § 704.9
First, termination of Plaintiff’s SEVIS record “mark[s] the consummation of the
agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (cleaned up).
ICE has claimed in related litigation that foreign students “cannot challenge the termination”
decisions. Isserdasani v. Noem, No. 25-CV-283-WMC, 2025 WL 1330188, at *7 (W.D. Wis.
May 7, 2025). And so, “there is no further agency action” for Plaintiff “to invoke or to
exhaust.” Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Azar, 943 F.3d 953, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2019). To be
sure, Plaintiff could request reinstatement of his status. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(ii). But
neither statute nor regulation requires him to request reinstatement—and abide by the
9 Cases in which courts have reached a similar conclusion include Doe 1, 785 F. Supp. 3d at
1282; Doe, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1311–12; Du, 2025 WL 1549098, at *8; Roe v. Noem, No. CV 25-
40-BU-DLC, 2025 WL 1382930, at *5 (D. Mont. May 13, 2025); Doe #1 v. Trump, No. 25 C
4188, 2025 WL 1341711, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2025); Vyas v. Noem, No. CV 3:25-0261, 2025
WL 1351537, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. May 8, 2025); Parra Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-616
(SRU), 2025 WL 1284722, at *7 (D. Conn. May 1, 2025); Doe No. 1 v. Noem, No. CV 25-1962,
2025 WL 1224783, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2025). The Court is not presently aware that any
court has reached an opposite conclusion.
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 10 of 18
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unappealable decision made on such a request—to exhaust his administrative remedies.10 The
termination is therefore not “of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at
178; cf. Jie Fang v. Dir. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 935 F.3d 172, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2019).
Second, the termination determined Plaintiff’s “rights or obligations.” Bennett, 520
U.S. at 178. ICE’s contrary assertion that it never terminated Plaintiff’s F-1 status at all, see
Dkt. 31 at 8–9, is a head-scratcher. ICE concededly terminated Plaintiff’s SEVIS record for
“fail[ure] to maintain status.” Dkt. 12-1 at 7 (cleaned up). And the Government’s own Foreign
Affairs Manual—which bills itself the “authoritative source” on the State Department’s and
other agencies’ policies11—confirms that SEVIS represents “the definitive record of student . . .
status.” 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 402.5-4(B).12
So, too, do various “legal consequences” plainly “flow” from ICE’s action. Bennett,
520 U.S. at 178. Termination of a SEVIS record for failure to maintain status obligates a
student to depart from the country post haste. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(iv).
And the Department of Homeland Security’s website advises that after the termination of a
SEVIS record for failure to maintain status, ICE may investigate the student to confirm
departure and the student loses employment authorization.13
10 In addition, the regulation governing reinstatement appears to contemplate the student’s having
incurred a “violation of status,” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(16)(i)(F), which does not match the fact
pattern in this case.
11 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (2025), https://fam.state.gov
[https://perma.cc/9K8U-SSL9].
12 ICE also asserts that termination of a SEVIS record for failure to maintain status does not
necessarily connote an actual loss of F-1 status, because ICE and school officials may terminate
SEVIS records for other, routine reasons. See Dkt. 31 at 9. That contention belies the explicit
reason listed in Plaintiff’s SEVIS record for termination here. See Dkt. 12-1 at 7.
13 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Terminate a Student (May 19, 2025),
https://studyinthestates.dhs.gov/sevis-help-hub/student-records/completions-and-
terminations/terminate-a-student [https://perma.cc/2TLM-9385].
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For all these reasons, ICE’s decision constitutes final agency action under the APA.
B. The Privacy Act Does Not Preclude This Action
ICE next contends that the Privacy Act supplies an “adequate remedial mechanism” and
therefore forecloses Plaintiff’s APA claim. Dkt. 31 at 9–13. It is hard to see how. The Privacy
Act allows certain individuals who appear in an agency’s “system of records” to request
amendment of such records. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)–(3). Only U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
residents, and citizens of certain designated countries may sue under the Act. Id. § 552a(a)(2) &
statutory note. Plaintiff, an Indian national, may not. See id.; 82 Fed. Reg. 7860 (Jan. 23, 2017).
Thus, the Privacy Act cannot afford Plaintiff any remedial mechanism, much less an adequate
one.
Skirting this inconvenient fact, ICE analogizes to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Liff v.
Office of Inspector General, 881 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2018). There, the Circuit held that the
Privacy Act supplies an “adequate” enough “remedial mechanism[]” to preclude a Bivens action,
even though the Act did not afford the plaintiff “a complete remedy” for his alleged injuries. Id.
at 918, 923. But Liff springs from the “disfavor[]” of judicial implication of new constitutional
causes of action against federal officers. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017). And
so, the “adequate remedial mechanism[]” analysis attaches to Bivens jurisprudence because of
the unique separation-of-powers concerns such cases raise. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492,
501 (2022). No similar constitutional issue plagues judicial review under the congressionally
enacted APA.
Further, the Privacy Act does not generally “displace” operation of other statutes. Dep’t
of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024). So, for example, a
plaintiff may seek similar redress for inaccurate agency records under either the Privacy Act or
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 12 of 18
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the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Id. And there are no indications, as required for displacement,
that Congress “intended” the Privacy Act’s remedy “to be exclusive.” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-
Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 216 (2012). So, following Kirtz’s
reasoning, the Privacy Act must also complement, rather than supplant, the APA. Accord All. for
Retired Ams. v. Bessent, 770 F. Supp. 3d 79, 105 (D.D.C. 2025).
Plaintiff can challenge termination of his SEVIS record under the APA.
C. This Action Is Not Moot
This case continues to present a justiciable controversy, despite ICE’s restoration of
Plaintiff’s SEVIS record and its averments that it does not plan to terminate that record based
on his 2018 arrest.
1. ICE Bears the Burden of Proving Mootness
The Constitution empowers federal courts to decide only live “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A court must dismiss a case as moot where a litigant
has obtained “outside of litigation all the relief he might have won in it.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S.
234, 240 (2024). Conversely, however, a defendant may not “‘automatically moot a case’ by
the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued.” Id. at 241 (quoting
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)).
ICE, as the party asserting mootness here, bears a “heavy burden.” Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Its voluntary cessation of the
challenged conduct does not moot this case “unless subsequent events make it absolutely clear
that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007) (cleaned up)
(emphasis added). The inquiry thus hinges on the reasonableness of ICE’s assertion that the
Case 1:25-cv-01096-ACR Document 39 Filed 02/27/26 Page 13 of 18
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challenged behavior will not recur. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189; cf. Pub. Citizen,
Inc. v. FERC, 92 F.4th 1124, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
2. ICE Has Not Met Its Burden of Proving Mootness
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, is instructive. There, the
Government had placed the plaintiff on the No Fly List for refusing to serve as an FBI informant
against his own religious community. Id. at 238. Shortly after Fikre filed suit, the Government
removed him from the No Fly List. Id. at 239. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
reversal of the decision to dismiss Fikre’s case as moot. It explained that even though the
Government had represented that it would not relist the plaintiff “based on ‘currently available
information,’” it had not “sp[oken] to whether the government might relist him if he does the
same or similar things in the future—say, attend a particular mosque or refuse renewed overtures
to serve as an informant.” Id. at 242; see id. at 243 (clarifying that the case was also not moot
because “some years” had passed since Fikre’s “delisting”). So too here.
ICE has not provided adequate assurances that it will not again terminate Plaintiff’s
SEVIS record based on currently available information. In support of its Motion to Dismiss it
has attached a letter and declaration, but neither suffices. ICE hedged, in a May 13, 2025, letter
to Plaintiff, that the April 3, 2025, termination of his SEVIS record “will not, by itself, be used as
a basis for denial of future immigration benefits or a determination that you did not maintain
your nonimmigrant status during th[e] [termination] period.” Dkt. 26-3 at 1 (emphasis added).
And the agency qualified even that statement as merely “ICE’s position.” Id. Similarly, the May
6, 2025, declaration of an Assistant Director of the National Security Division for Homeland
Security Investigations within ICE states only that “ICE has no plans under its new SEVIS
policy to re-terminate the plaintiff(s)[’] SEVIS record based solely on the NCIC record that led
to its initial termination.” See Dkt. 26-2 ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
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Nothing in these materials prevents ICE from altering its “position” or “plans”
tomorrow—or terminating Plaintiff’s SEVIS record based on his 2018 arrest alongside other
inadequate factors. Thus, these submissions do not make “absolutely clear” that termination of
Plaintiff’s SEVIS record because of his dismissed speeding charge or something similarly
inadequate “could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 719.
In addition, the relief ICE has purported to guarantee Plaintiff does not represent “all the
relief he might have won in” this litigation. Fikre, 601 U.S. at 240. Plaintiff asks the Court to
enjoin termination of his record not only based on his 2018 arrest, but also for any other reason
“in violation of the [relevant] statute or regulations.” Dkt. 28 at 9; see Dkt. 1 at 10. ICE has—at
most—made representations only to the former. See supra pp. 14–15. It has not, however,
asserted that a comparable future event, such as another non-criminal event that causes him to
appear in the NCIC, would not again trigger such impermissible termination.
Neither has its April 26, 2025, Broadcast Message disavowed termination on such bases.
Instead, that policy explicitly notes that the Student and Exchange Visitor Program, a division of
ICE, “can terminate records” for, among other things, “evidence of a failure to comply with the
terms of nonimmigrant status.” Dkt. 16-1 at 2 (altered capitalization). That is how ICE
characterized Plaintiff’s appearance in the NCIC database—even though his 2018 arrest did not
actually place him out of compliance. Moreover, the Broadcast Message explicitly disclaims any
student’s ability to “rel[y] upon” it “to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law.” Id. at 3. Altogether, these submissions do not make “absolutely clear” that
ICE will not again terminate Plaintiff’s record for reasons equally unmoored from statute or
regulation as his 2018 arrest. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 719.
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Plaintiff also submitted a social-media post from White House Deputy Chief of Staff
Stephen Miller on the X platform from April 2025. Miller stated, “Foreign students whose
temporary visas have been terminated—and are thus here illegally—get months of ‘due process’
merely to be sent back home. . . . The corrupt system exists to serve everyone but Americans.”
Stephen Miller (@StephenM), X (Apr. 25, 2025, at 9:55 a.m. ET); see Dkt. 27 at 5. The email is
not in the Administrative Record or necessary to the Court’s decision, so the Court will not
consider it to adjudicate the merits. That noted, this case belies Miller’s unsupported assertions.
Had the Government pursued a coherent process from the get-go, countless lawsuits would have
been avoided. Foreign students were not sent home, they continued their educations and
remained, as they had been, in the U.S. legally. And, today, Americans continue to benefit from
their presence. See supra note 2.
3. Moharam Does Not Alter the Court’s Analysis
Moharam v. TSA, 134 F.4th 598 (D.C. Cir. 2025), another No Fly List case, does not
compel the Court to find this case moot. ICE contends that the D.C. Circuit held there that the
possibility of repeated injurious conduct generally constitutes a “distinct legal wrong” for which
a plaintiff must bring a fresh suit. Dkt. 26-1 at 18 (quoting Moharam, 134 F.4th at 608).
ICE’s reliance on Moharam is misplaced. The plaintiff in Moharam, after his removal
from the No Fly List, “expressly disclaimed seeking . . . declaratory or injunctive relief” and
requested only “a classic advisory opinion.” 134 F.4th at 605. That is, Moharam asked for “a
judicial decision setting aside” only “the reasoning that animated” TSA’s previous action. Id. In
contrast, Plaintiff here asks the Court to enjoin ICE’s termination decision. See supra p. 15. In
addition, ICE has not shown the challenged agency action here is unlikely to recur. Compare
supra pp. 14–16, with Moharam, 134 F.4th at 607–10. And while the Circuit explained in
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Moharam that “in the national security context,” a plaintiff’s repeated conduct might well
“constitute new intelligence” warranting legitimate, renewed agency action, 134 F.4th at 605–06
(cleaned up), here, ICE is not empowered to undertake the challenged conduct (termination of
SEVIS records for reasons outside those listed in 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d)–(g)).
Moharam, in short, is not as expansive as ICE contends. Indeed, if a plaintiff could not
challenge any ceased conduct before it recurs, the voluntary-cessation exception to mootness
would have no force. And the Fikre Court admonished that a case is not moot where ICE has
desisted from illicit conduct only temporarily. See 601 U.S. at 242. Litigants who are
“otherwise entitled to . . . injunctive relief remain entitled to such relief where [they] ‘remain
under a constant threat’ that government officials will use their power to reinstate the
challenged” action. Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 63 (2021) (cleaned up).
D. The Termination Decision Was Arbitrary or Capricious
On the merits, the Court has no trouble concluding that the disputed agency action
violated the APA.
The record ICE had before it when it terminated Plaintiff’s SEVIS record
unambiguously contradicted its stated reasoning. ICE interpreted Plaintiff’s appearance in the
NCIC database as a failure to maintain his F-1 status. See supra pp. 6–8. But ICE reached that
conclusion notwithstanding that the spreadsheet that the State Department and it reviewed
acknowledges that a judge “dismissed” Plaintiff’s speeding charge on February 21, 2019. Dkt.
17 at 25 (cleaned up). A dismissed speeding charge is far from a “crime[] of violence” that
would place Plaintiff out of compliance with the requirements for maintaining his status. 8
C.F.R. § 214.1(g). ICE’s action was therefore arbitrary or capricious, because it failed to
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articulate “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463
U.S. at 43.
No other regulation authorizes termination of his SEVIS record because of his 2018
traffic violation either. As discussed supra p. 4, the Government may initiate termination of
status through specified pathways. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(d). In addition, a nonimmigrant student
can fail to maintain status after, for example, engaging in unauthorized employment or
providing false information to the Government, id. § 214.1(e)–(f). Those circumstances do not
apply to the present facts. Accordingly, ICE impermissibly “relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider” in violation of the APA. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
Because this determination fully disposes this case, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s
alternative ultra vires and constitutional claims. See Qassim v. Trump, 927 F.3d 522, 530 (D.C.
Cir. 2019).
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, (1) ICE’s termination of Plaintiff’s SEVIS record for reasons not set forth in
statute and regulation was final agency action; (2) the Privacy Act does not preclude this suit;
(3) ICE has not satisfactorily established mootness under the voluntary-cessation doctrine; and
(4) ICE’s termination decision was arbitrary or capricious. A separate Order will issue.
Date: February 27, 2026 ____________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge
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