govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_23-cv-01304-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
IRA ALSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
 
 v.  
 
TOBY RUTKOWSKI et al., 
 Defendants. 
No. 3:23-cv-1304 (JAM) 
 
INITIAL ORDER REVIEW PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C § 1915A 
 
Plaintiff Ira Alston is a prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut Department of 
Correction (“DOC”). He has filed this complaint pro se and in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging that various law enforcement officers, prison officials, and an assistant state’s 
attorney violated his constitutional rights. Based on my initial review, I will allow Alston’s 
fabrication of evidence claims to proceed against two of the defendants but will dismiss all other 
claims and defendants. 
BACKGROUND 
Alston’s complaint names the following defendants: State Trooper Toby Rutkowski, 
Assistant State’s Attorney Maurilio R. Amorim, Lieutenant Seth Laprey, Correctional Officer 
Matthew Loos, Correctional Officer Jimmy Beaz, and Correctional Officer Zachary Brysgel. I 
draw the following facts from the allegations in Alston’s complaint, accepting them as true only 
for the purposes of this ruling. 
On or around June 27, 2022, Laprey and Loos falsely reported to DOC officials that they 
found a nine-inch piece of sharpened metal inside Alston’s cell.1 On the same day, Laprey also 
falsely told Rutkowski about the piece of metal, who then reported to DOC to investigate 
 
1 Doc. # 1 at 5 (¶ 1). 
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Laprey’s allegation.2 
On or around December 22, 2022, Rutkowski created an arrest warrant affidavit accusing 
Alston of illegal possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument inside a correctional facility, in 
violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-174a(a).3 He did so despite not having observed 
the metal inside Alston’s cell or any photographs or video of the metal and without having 
spoken to Loos.4 According to the complaint, the affidavit intentionally and/or recklessly falsely 
stated that Loos informed Rutkowski he had found a nine-inch piece of sharpened metal in 
Alston’s cell and that DOC video footage showed Alston tampering with the recreation yard 
fence, where a piece of metal was later found missing.5  
 On January 23, 2023, based on Rutkowski’s arrest warrant and affidavit, Assistant State’s 
Attorney Maurilio R. Amorim charged Alston with possession of a dangerous instrument inside a 
correctional facility by an inmate.6 But there was no probable cause for the charge.7 
The case was tried before a jury in June 2023.8 Alston alleges that Amorim “knowingly 
presented the false and substantially misleading testimony” of Loos, Laprey, Rutkowski, Beaz, 
and Brysgel.9 He also notes that the DOC video footage presented at trial “clearly disputed the 
State’s theory of the case,” and that “despite the video footage,” Amorim prosecuted him “with 
malicious intent.”10  
The jury returned a not-guilty verdict, and the charges were dismissed with prejudice.11 
 
2 Id. at 5 (¶ 2). 
3 Id. at 6 (¶ 4). 
4 Id. at 5-6 (¶ 4). 
5 Id. at 6 (¶ 5). 
6 Id. at 6 (¶¶ 6, 8). 
7 Id. at 6 (¶ 8). 
8 Id. at 6 (¶ 9). 
9 Id. at 6 (¶ 10). 
10 Id. at 6 (¶¶ 12-13). 
11 Id. at 7 (¶ 15). 
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Alston seeks injunctive relief compelling disciplinary proceedings against “all [DOC] 
employees” for providing false testimony in a court of law, declaratory relief against the DOC 
defendants and ASA Amorim, punitive damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.12 
DISCUSSION 
The Court is required by law to review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion 
of such complaints that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must construe the allegations 
liberally, interpreting them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Meadows v. United 
Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).13 However, a pro se complaint must 
still allege enough facts—as distinct from legal conclusions —to establish plausible grounds for 
relief. See ibid. 
Claims against Amorim 
Alston alleges a claim for malicious prosecution against Amorim. But this claim is 
foreclosed by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity: “acts by a prosecutor that are 
‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process’ are shielded by absolute 
immunity.” McCray v. Patrolman N.A. Caparco, 761 F. App’x 27, 32 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Prosecutorial immunity covers “virtually all 
acts, regardless of motivation, associated with the prosecutor’s function as an advocate.” Giraldo 
v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012).  
All of the prosecutorial conduct that Alston alleges falls within the coverage of 
 
12 Id. at 7 (¶¶ 1-6). 
13 Unless otherwise indicated, this ruling omits internal quotation marks, alterations, citations, and footnotes in text 
quoted from court decisions. 
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prosecutorial immunity. “The decision to initiate prosecution, what charges to bring, and how to 
perfect and consolidate those charges is a quintessential prosecutorial function” protected by 
absolute immunity. Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2019); see Ying Jing Gan 
v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] prosecutor has absolute immunity 
for his decision as to what offenses are and are not to be charged.”).  
Likewise, “[i]mmunity even extends to . . . ‘the knowing use of perjured testimony.’” 
Buari v. City of New York, 530 F. Supp. 3d 356, 378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Imbler, 424 
U.S. at 431 n.34)); see also Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 
prosecutor is also entitled to absolute immunity despite allegations of his knowing using of 
perjured testimony.”). Accordingly, Alston has failed to state a claim against Amorim for 
malicious prosecution under § 1983. 
Nor has Alston stated a claim for declaratory relief. Although not barred by prosecutorial 
immunity, declaratory relief requires a plaintiff to show “a sufficient likelihood that he or she 
will again be wronged in a similar way.” Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 103 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)). Alston does not 
allege facts to suggest that he will be prosecuted again for this incident. 
Accordingly, Alston has not alleged plausible grounds for relief against Amorim. 
Therefore, I will dismiss his claims against Amorim. 
False arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Rutkowski, Laprey, and Loos 
 
Alston alleges Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution 
against Rutkowski, Laprey, and Loos. To prevail on a constitutional claim for false arrest or 
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show “some deprivation of liberty consistent with the 
concept of seizure [under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution].” James v. City of Albany, 
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833 F. App’x 346, 347 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). But “[c]ase law is clear that if, at the time of his or her arrest and prosecution, a 
plaintiff is already in custody or incarcerated on other criminal charges, he or she cannot state a 
claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution under section 1983 because there is no deprivation 
of his or her liberty interest.” Figueroa v. Town of North Haven, 2017 WL 6045421, at *5 (D. 
Conn. 2017) (collecting cases). 
Alston has remained in DOC custody since December 1999 on a manslaughter charge.14 
Thus, he would have already been incarcerated at the time of his trial on the charge giving rise to 
this suit, and he remains incarcerated after his acquittal. Accordingly, I will dismiss Alston’s 
claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution because he cannot show that he was deprived of 
liberty as a result of the actions of Rutkowski, Laprey, and Loos. 
Fabrication of evidence claims against Rutkowski, Laprey, and Loos 
 
A plaintiff may bring a due process claim for denial of his fair trial rights when an officer 
fabricates evidence against him. See Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 126 (2d Cir. 
2023). To prevail on such a claim for fabrication of evidence, a plaintiff must show that an 
investigating official fabricated information that would likely influence a jury’s verdict and 
forwarded that information to prosecutors, and that the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property as a result. Id. at 128.  
Alston has alleged a plausible claim for fabrication of evidence against Laprey. He was 
an investigating officer who allegedly falsely reported finding a weapon in Alston’s cell. 
 
14 The Court may judicially notice a fact “that is not subject to reasonable dispute” and “can be accurately and 
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 
Accordingly, I take notice of records on the Connecticut DOC website indicating that Alston was last admitted to the 
custody of DOC on December 14, 1999, for a charge of first-degree manslaughter and is located at the MacDougall-
Walker Correctional Institution. http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/detailsupv.asp?id_inmt_num=275666 (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2024). 
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Evidence that could influence a decision to prosecute satisfies the requirement that evidence be 
likely to influence a jury’s verdict. See Frost v. City of New York Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 
250 (2d Cir. 2020). Alston has alleged facts showing the fabrication influenced a decision to 
prosecute because he has alleged that Laprey’s report was included in Rutkowski’s arrest 
warrant—which in turn was the basis for Amorim’s decision to charge. This is sufficient, 
because an officer need not directly forward evidence to a prosecutor for a plaintiff to state a 
fabrication of evidence claim. See Ozzborn v. Cornell, 2021 WL 2227829, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. 
2021).   
In addition, Alston has pled the requisite deprivation of liberty. Unlike false arrest or 
malicious prosecution claims, which arise from the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unlawful seizure, fabrication of evidence claims do not require a plaintiff to show additional 
resulting custody or restraint. Under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, prosecution itself constitutes a deprivation of liberty because “being framed and 
falsely charged damages an individual’s reputation, requires that individual to mount a defense, 
and places him in the power of a court of law.” Barnes, 68 F.4th at 130 (quoting Garnett v. 
Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir. 2016)); see also Ricciuti v. NYC Transit 
Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (When an officer “creates false information likely to 
influence a jury’s decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the 
accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial, and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable 
action is redressable in an action for damages.”). Accordingly, I will permit Alston’s claim for 
fabrication of evidence to proceed against Laprey. 
Alston has also stated a plausible claim for fabrication of evidence against Rutkowski. He 
alleges that Rutkowski falsely stated in the arrest warrant affidavit that Loos directly informed 
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him of a weapon discovered in Alston’s cell, and that there existed video evidence that suggested 
Alston had removed a piece of the metal from the recreational yard fence. He forwarded this 
information to Amorim, and it formed the basis of Amorim’s decision to prosecute Alston.  
Although Rutkowski was not operating in an investigative capacity when he allegedly 
fabricated the evidence—having based his arrest warrant on Laprey’s report —a ny official can be 
held liable under § 1983 if he fabricates evidence that is forwarded to a prosecutor. See DiPippo 
v. Cnty. of Putnam, 2019 WL 1004152, at *18 (S.D.N.Y 2019) (holding that a corrections officer 
who falsely claimed that an inmate had confessed was liable for fabrication of evidence). Here, 
Rutkowski allegedly lied to Amorim about the basis for his warrant and represented that certain 
evidence existed supporting arrest. Thus, Alston has plausibly alleged a fabrication of evidence 
claim against Rutkowski, and I will allow this claim to proceed. 
By contrast, the complaint does not allege facts to support a claim for fabrication of 
evidence against Loos. Although Loos reported the piece of metal to DOC officials, it was 
Laprey—in Alston’s telling —who informed Rutkowski, and Rutkowski who informed the 
prosecutor. Alston explicitly notes that Rutkowski never spoke to Loos or heard from Loos. 
Under the facts alleged, there is no indication that Loos’ report to DOC played a role in 
Amorim’s decision to prosecute or that Loos forwarded his information to the prosecutor. 
Accordingly, there is no causal relationship between the alleged falsehoods and Alston’s 
prosecution-related deprivation of liberty. “[T]he manufacture of false evidence, in and of itself, 
does not impair anyone’s liberty.” Milner v. City of Bristol, 2019 WL 3945525, at *3 (D. Conn. 
2019).  
In short, I will allow Alston to proceed with his fabrication of evidence claims against 
Laprey and Rutkowski. On the other hand, I will dismiss his fabrication of evidence claim 
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against Loos. 
False trial testimony  
Alston alleges that defendants Beaz, Brysgel, Laprey, Loos, and Rutkowski falsely 
testified at trial that Loos found the piece of metal in Alston’s cell. But statements made during 
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. See Alaimo v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2008 WL 
4695026, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Accordingly, “[l]aw enforcement officers are absolutely 
immune from claims arising from their trial testimony,” even if that testimony is false. Lettieri v. 
Dep’t of Just., 2023 WL 7553868, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 
325, 335-36 (1983)). Therefore, I will dismiss all of Alston’s claims against any defendant that is 
based on the defendant’s allegedly false trial testimony. 
Request for order requiring discipline of prison employees 
Alston also seeks injunctive relief “compelling” DOC to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against DOC employees who provide false or misleading testimony in a court of law. Such an 
order would exceed the bounds of the Court’s role. Courts adjudicate legal cases and 
controversies; they do not thrust themselves into prison administration, and instead “permit[] 
prison administrators to exercise wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional 
requirements.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 363 (1996); see U.S.
 CONST., art. III, § 2. 
Moreover, Alston has no constitutional right to have any DOC defendants disciplined. Joyce v. 
Hanney, 2009 WL 563633, at *9 (D. Conn. 2009) (granting summary judgment for a state 
trooper because discipline or prosecution against him is not a cognizable remedy). Accordingly, I 
will dismiss Alston’s claim for injunctive relief related to prison discipline. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Alston may proceed with his due process claims for the 
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fabrication of evidence against the defendants Lieutenant Seth Laprey and Trooper Toby 
Rutkowski in their individual capacities for money damages. The Court otherwise DISMISSES 
all of Alston’s remaining claims. 
(1) The Clerk shall verify the current work address for Laprey and Rutkowksi with the 
DOC Office of Legal Affairs, mail a waiver of service of process request packet containing the 
complaint to that defendant at the confirmed address within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, 
and report to the Court on the status of the waiver request by no later than the thirty-fifth (35) 
day after mailing. If defendants fail to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall arrange for in-
person service by the U.S. Marshals Service on that defendant, and they shall be required to pay 
the costs of such service in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 
(2) Laprey and Rutkowski shall file a response to the complaint, either an answer or 
motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date that the notice of lawsuit and waiver of 
service of summons forms are mailed to him. 
(3) The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the complaint and this Order to the DOC 
Office of Legal Affairs. 
(4) The discovery deadline is extended to six months (180 days) from the date of this 
Order. The parties must comply with the District of Connecticut “Standing Order Re: Initial 
Discovery Disclosures” which the Clerk must send to plaintiff with a copy of this order. The 
order also can be found at http://ctd.uscourts.gov/district-connecticut-public-standing-orders. 
Note that discovery requests should not be filed with the Court. In the event of a dispute over 
discovery, the parties should make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute amongst themselves; 
then, the parties should file the appropriate motion to compel on the docket. 
(5) The deadline for summary judgment motions is extended to seven months (210 days) 
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from the date of this Order. 
(6) Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to a dispositive 
motion (i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment) within twenty-one (21) 
days of the date the motion was filed. If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the 
Court may grant the dispositive motion without further proceedings. 
(7) If plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local 
Court Rule 83.1(d)1 provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in the 
dismissal of the case. Plaintiff must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. He 
should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to just put the 
new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If Plaintiff has more than one 
pending case, he must indicate all of the case numbers in the notification of change of address. 
Plaintiff must also notify the defendant or defense counsel of his new address. 
(8) Plaintiff shall utilize the Prisoner E-Filing Program when filing documents with the 
Court. Plaintiff is advised that the Program may be used only to file documents with the Court. 
As discovery requests are not filed with the Court, the parties must serve discovery requests on 
each other by regular mail. 
It is so ordered.  
Dated at New Haven this 2d day of August 2024. 
       /s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer  
       Jeffrey Alker Meyer 
       United States District Judge 
 
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