govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cr-00327-2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
PATRICIA BROWNE and CLIVE 
ANTHONY CONNELL, JR., 
 
 Defendants.  
 
 
 
 Criminal Action No. 
 1:24-cr-327-VMC-JKL 
 
ORDER 
 This matter is before the Court on the Final Report & Recommendation 
(“R&R”) issued by Magistrate Judge  John K. Larkins III on December 31, 2025.  
(Doc. 116). Defendants Patricia Browne and Clive Anthony Connell, Jr. filed timely 
Objections (Docs. 120, 129) to the R&R. 
I. Legal Standard 
 When reviewing an R&R , the district court “shall make a de novo 
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party 
objecting to a n R&R “must specifically identify those findings objected to. 
Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district 
court.” Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988). If neither party 
objects, the district judge need only review th e R&R for clear error and “may 
Case 1:24-cr-00327-VMC-JKL     Document 135     Filed 02/06/26     Page 1 of 6
2 
 
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 
made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 
II. Patricia Browne’s Objections 
A. Motion to Suppress Evidence  
First, Ms. Browne objects to the Magistrate Judge’s  statement that “a ‘one-
day lookout’ had been issued to inspect [the Defendants] luggage for contraband.” 
(Doc. 120 at 1–2). It appears that Ms. Browne objects to this statement because the 
officers who testified at the hearing did not recall the details o f the lookout with 
certainty. However, the Magistrate Judge noted that, “It is unknown who created 
the one-day lookout for Defendants, what it said, who was responsible for putting 
it into the computer sys tem, or whether the submitting officer verified any 
information about Defendants.” (Doc. 116 at 3 n.2). Therefore, this objection is 
overruled.  
Next, Ms. Browne objects to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that no degree 
of suspicion was required to search her luggage.  It is unclear what particular  
sentence Ms. Browne is objecting to, especially because the Magistrate Judge stated 
that “no reasonable suspicion was necessary” to search the Defendants’ luggage. 
(See Doc. 116 at 10). Perhaps Ms. Browne is referring to the following sentence: 
“The search of a person’s property during a border search, ‘however non-routine 
and intrusive,’ requires no leve l of suspicion.” (Doc. 116 at 11) (quoting United 
Case 1:24-cr-00327-VMC-JKL     Document 135     Filed 02/06/26     Page 2 of 6
3 
 
States v. Falzone, No. 8:23-CR -351, 2024 WL 4164723, at *3 (M.D. Fla July 29, 2024) 
(quoting United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018))). Based on 
Eleventh Circuit precedent,  it is correct to say that a general border search does 
not require any degree of suspicion. United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1548 
(11th Cir. 1988). This objection is overruled.   
Ms. Browne then objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the search of 
her luggage, which included a physical examination, x -raying, and then ripping 
and cutting it, did not require reasonable suspicion. This objection is overruled. 
The Magistrate Ju dge correctly explained that the physical examination and x -
raying of luggage are routine border searches that do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1232– 33 (“[A]t the border, routine pat -down 
searches or frisks and searches of a traveler’s luggage, incoming international mail, 
and vehicles are all reasonable without any level of suspicion.”) (citations and 
quotations omitted); United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1057 (11th Cir. 
1995) (“The initial search, which occurred when the customs agent removed the 
top of the transformer and then the drain plug, required no suspicion of illegality 
to be justified.”). Nor did the officers need reasonable suspicion before cutting the 
luggage. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judg e that once the officers found 
anomalies in between the linings of the suitcases and the x -rays indicated that 
there were objects in those areas, the officers had sufficient  suspicion to cut open 
Case 1:24-cr-00327-VMC-JKL     Document 135     Filed 02/06/26     Page 3 of 6
4 
 
the bags. See Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233 (“The Supreme Court has never required 
reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border, however non -routine 
and intrusive, and neither have we.”); Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d at 1057 (finding 
that insertion of a probe into transformers required only a small quantum of 
suspicion to be reasonable.).  
Finally, Ms. Browne objects to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that no 
degree of suspicion was required to refer her to secondary inspection. Although 
the Magistrate Judge only determined that reasonable suspicion was not required, 
the Eleventh Circuit has held that “general border searches, including secondary 
customs searches, do not require any suspicion of illegal activity.” Santiago, 837 
F.2d at 1548. This objection is overruled.  
B. Motion for Return of Seized Property 
Ms. Browne asserts two objections to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of her 
motion for return of property. First, she argues that the officers did not search her 
suitcases lawfully. For the reasons given above, that objection is overruled. Next, 
she argues t hat the Government should return her personal items because they 
can use photographs rather than the actual items for evidentiary purposes. The 
Court overrules this objection. The Government has asserted that the items seized 
from the luggage can assist with proving its case. Without a greater showing from 
Ms. Browne, and while this case is still pending, the Court cannot say that the 
Case 1:24-cr-00327-VMC-JKL     Document 135     Filed 02/06/26     Page 4 of 6
5 
 
Government’s need to retain the actual property outweighs Ms. Browne’s interest 
in having it returned to her. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Ms. 
Browne has not met her burden of showing that she is entitled to the property.  
C. Second Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Ms. Browne objects to the Magistrate Judge’s assertion that no suspicion is 
required to conduct a forensic search of a phone at an international border. 
However, the Magistrate Judge accurately cited the holding in Touset that no 
suspicion is required. (See Doc. 116 at 17) (citing Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233–35). Th is 
objection is overruled. 
D. Third Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence  
Ms. Browne objects to a possible later search where two officers inventoried 
and photographed the contents of cardboard boxes that contained the contents of 
her luggage. However, as the Magistrate Judge found, the initial search of Ms. 
Browne’s luggage was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, 
without a more specific argument, the Court cannot find that this subsequent 
search was unreasonable.  
III. Clive Anthony Connell’s Objections 
The Court has reviewed Mr. Connell’s objections (Docs. 122, 129) and finds 
that they fail to specify what portion of the R&R he is objecting to. Therefore, they 
Case 1:24-cr-00327-VMC-JKL     Document 135     Filed 02/06/26     Page 5 of 6
6 
 
are improper, and the Court will not consider them to the extent they relate to the 
R&R. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES the Defendants’ 
objections and ADOPTS the Final Report & Recommendation (Doc. 116) to the 
extent it recommends that the  following motions  be DENIED: Mr. Connell’s 
Motion to Suppress (Doc. 63) and Ms. Browne’s Motion to Suppress Evidence 
(Doc. 65), Second Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 68), Third 
Preliminary Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 69), and Motion for Return of 
Seized Property (Doc. 70).  
The Government is REMINDED to respond to the following pending 
motions (Docs. 64, 67) in addition to the pending motions in limine (Docs. 121, 122) 
no later than one week before the pretrial conference on March 12, 2026. 
SO ORDERED this 6th day of February, 2026. 
       _______________________________ 
       Victoria Marie Calvert   
       United States District Judge 
Case 1:24-cr-00327-VMC-JKL     Document 135     Filed 02/06/26     Page 6 of 6

Passage view · GavelSight