govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02471-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT, et al., 
 
               Plaintiffs, 
                
v.  
 
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., 
 
               Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
         Case No. 25-cv-02471 (ACR) 
 
 
 
  
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
The Government moves to stay, pending judicial review, the Court’s Order staying the 
effective date of the Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 90 
Fed. Reg. 54733 (Nov. 28, 2025) (Termination).  See Dkt. 123 (Order); Dkt. 126 (Mot.).  The 
Government offers no new merits argument, however.  And it now bears the burden of 
establishing irreparable harm, a burden it cannot meet.  See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 
(2009).  The Court therefore DENIES the Government’s Motion to Stay the Court’s Order 
Granting Relief Under 5 U.S.C. § 705.   
Taking heed (finally) that “brevity is the soul of wit,”1 the Court does not regurgitate its 
Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. 124 (Mem. Op.).  The Court does, however, address two new 
assertions the Government makes and its claim of irreparable harm.   
* * * 
 Consultation.  The Government contends that the Court “demanded that the Secretary 
consult some other (unnamed) ‘appropriate’ agency in addition to the State Department.”  Miot v. 
 
1 William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 2, sc. 2. 
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Trump, No. 26-5050, at 8 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).  Not so.  To start, the Court did not demand 
anything, Congress did.  And the Court found that the Secretary did not consult any agency, 
including that it did not consult with the Department of State.  See Mem. Op. at 41–43.  To be 
sure, that Congress requires the Secretary to consult “agencies”—plural—confirms its intent that 
the consultation be meaningful.  See id. at 41–46.2  But the Court did not reach whether 
consulting only one other agency would meet the requirement that the Secretary “shall” consult 
“appropriate agencies.”  8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A).  It did not reach it because, again, the 
Secretary did not consult outside DHS at all.   
Pattern or Practice.  The Government lobs that “[t]he mere existence of multiple 
decisions in the same direction does not suggest dysfunction; otherwise, the fact that the Biden 
Administration renewed every TPS designation it reviewed,3 for four years, would be equally 
suggestive of failure to objectively follow the legal process.”  Mot. at 14.  This “he started it” 
grievance is a non-starter.  The Biden administration’s TPS decisions were not the subject of this 
or, to the Court’s knowledge, any other litigation.  If they had been, courts may well have 
considered those uniform designations to be a pattern or practice subject to APA scrutiny.  This 
Court, all else equal, assuredly would have.   
 
2 On a related note, the Court in its Memorandum Opinion cited definitions of “consultation” and 
to “consult” from 2024 and 2015, respectively.  See Mem. Op. at 43.  It would have done better 
also to consult (no pun intended) dictionaries from the time Congress enacted the TPS statute, 
1990.  It has now done so.  “Consultation” was then defined as the “[a]ct of consulting or 
conferring; e.g. patient with doctor; client with lawyer” and “[d]eliberation of persons on some 
subject.”  Consultation, Black’ s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).  To “consult” was then defined as 
“to have regard to” or “to ask the advice of opinion of (~a doctor).”  Consult, Merriam-Webster’ s 
Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1990).  These definitions mirror the later ones, see Mem. Op. at 
43, and so do not change the Court’s analysis.  
3 The Court assumes, for now, that the Government’s uncited assertion is true.   
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Irreparable Harm to the Government and the Public Interest/Balance of Equities.  At 
argument, the Government attempted to sidestep the irreparable harm analysis.  It stated: “I can 
make this very simple.  If Your Honor’s not going to rule for us on the likelihood of success on 
the merits, then that’s the end of the inquiry.”  Feb. 12 Hr’g Tr. at 14.  Fair enough, since the 
Government has no legitimate interest in enforcing a likely unlawful Termination.  But the 
irreparable harm standard exists and so the Court considers it.  
The Order preserves the status quo, which at least suggests that the Government will not 
face irreparable harm.  See Make the Rd. New York v. Noem, No. 25-5320, 2025 WL 3563313, at 
*32 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2025) (statement of Judges Millett & Childs).  Haitian TPS holders will 
maintain their TPS status pending litigation.  They will continue to work and maintain health 
insurance.  They will continue to pay federal, state, and local taxes.  They will continue to 
contribute to their communities.  And no additional Haitians will gain TPS.  Given this, the Court 
asked the Government to identify concrete examples of harm if the Termination remains stayed 
pending litigation.  It could not name one.  See Dkt. 129 (ICE Decl.); Dkt. 132 (Feb. 12 Hr’g Tr.) 
at 22–23. 
The Government cannot name a single concrete harm from maintaining the status quo.  
And so instead it argues that the Court’s decision is “‘an improper intrusion by a federal court 
into the workings of a coordinate branch of the Government’” Mot. at 14 (quoting INS v. 
Legalization Assistance Project, 510 U.S. 1301, 1305–06 (1993)).  The argument, taken to its 
logical conclusion, is that anytime a court stays government action, the Government is 
irreparably harmed.  That is not the standard. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision granting the Government’s motion 
for an emergency stay in Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025).  The Supreme 
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Court held that the Government was likely to succeed on the merits, but it did not then 
just call it a day.  It next explored the comparative irreparable harm as between the two 
parties: “the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed 
officer to continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully removed officer 
faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty.”  Id.   
Here, Plaintiffs and other Haitian TPS holders face a greater risk of harm from an 
order allowing the Government to remove them to a “perfect storm of suffering” than the 
Government faces from maintaining the status quo.  See Mem. Op. at 72–82 (discussing 
further the comparative harms).  The Supreme Court went on: “A stay is appropriate to 
avoid the disruptive effect of the repeated removal and reinstatement of officers during 
the pendency of this litigation.”  Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415.  Here, granting a stay would 
cause disruption.  Indeed, with almost 353,000 TPS holders having, then losing 
overnight, and then potentially regaining legal immigration status, it would cause chaos.   
* * * 
For the reasons stated in its Memorandum Opinion of February 2, 2026, and the reasons 
above, the Court DENIES the Government’s Motion to Stay the Court’s Order Granting Relief 
Under 5 U.S.C. § 705, Dkt. 126. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date: February 23, 2026     ____________________________
        ANA C. REYES 
        United States District Judge 
     
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