govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-00302-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
JACQUELINE JACKSON,  
 
Plaintiff,  
   
v.  
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 25-302 (EGS) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 Plaintiff Jacqueline Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) worked as an 
educational aid/paraprofessional at Marie Reed Elementary School 
(“Marie Reed), a District of Columbia Public School. See Compl., 
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 11, 20, 22. Ms. Jackson brings this suit against 
the District of Columbia (“the District”), Katie Lundgren (“Ms. 
Lungren”), the Principal of Marie Reed; and Doris Peña (“Ms. 
Peña”), a colleague at Marie Reed (collectively, “Defendants”). 
Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the 
individual defendants in their official capacities, their 
individual capacities, or both. See generally id. Ms. Jackson 
brings the following Counts: (1) Sexual Harassment in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) et seq.; (2) Disability Harassment in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et 
seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (3) Reprisal Harassment 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132, 
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et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et 
seq.; (4) Racial Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a), et seq.; (5) Disability Discrimination in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C. 
Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (6) Reprisal based on prior EEO 
Activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-
507, et seq.; (7) Wrongful discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 794, 
et seq., D.C. Code Ann. § 32-503, et seq.; (8) Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress; (10) Negligence; and (11) Violation of Hate 
Crime Statute, D.C. Code § 22-3704. Id. at 15-36. 
 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. See Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“MPSJ”), ECF 
No. 14. Defendants seek partial summary judgment as to Ms. 
Jackson’s claims under District of Columbia Law; specifically 
Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11 on the ground that they are barred by 
Ms. Jackson’s failure to comply with the notice requirements set 
forth in D.C. Code § 12-309. Defendants state that Section 12-
309 also bars these Counts as to Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña, to 
the extent Ms. Jackson sues them in their official capacities. 
Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Rather, in her Motion for Extension of Time to Respond 
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to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. Extension of Time”), she 
states the following:  “Plaintiff will not be offering any 
opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiff’s tort claims against the Defendants for Claims 8-11. 
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff has a police report that she believes 
would satisfy the notice provision of D.C. Code § 12-309.” Mot. 
Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1 n.1. 
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” F
ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The 
nonmoving party must utilize affirmative evidence and “come 
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.’” Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).  
Relevant to the claims in this case, D.C. Code § 12–309(a) 
provides that: 
an action may not be maintained against the District of 
Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property 
unless, within six months after the injury or damage was 
sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has 
given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of 
Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and 
circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in 
writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in 
regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under 
this section. 
 
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“Th[is] notice requirement is a prerequisite to a suit 
against the District of Columbia ‘because it represents a waiver 
of sovereign immunity.’” Blocker-Burnette v. District of 
Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Faison 
v. District of Columbia, 664 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, id.; and   
“‘is to be strictly construed[.]’” Barnhardt v. District of 
Columbia, 601 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Gwinn 
v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981)).  
 Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts accompanying 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment states as follows:  
1. The District of Columbia Office of Risk 
Management (ORM) is responsible for 
receiving, processing, and maintaining 
records of claim notices served pursuant to 
D.C. Code § 12-309. Declaration of Lana 
Craven ¶ 3, attached as Exhibit 1.  
 
2. ORM receives written notices of claims from 
the Mayor’s Office or directly from 
claimants and records them in its claims 
management system. Id. ¶ 4.  
 
3. ORM conducted a diligent search of its 
records for any written claim notices 
received from or on behalf of Plaintiff 
regarding any claims against the District. 
Id. ¶ 6.  
 
4. This search did not reveal any letters or 
notices from or on behalf of Plaintiff. Id. 
¶ 7.  
 
5. When ORM receives a claim notice, it issues 
an acknowledgment letter to the sender and 
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assigns a claim number for tracking and 
investigation. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
 
6. ORM’s search did not identify an 
acknowledgment letter, claim number, or any 
record of a notice from or on behalf of 
Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10-11.  
 
7. ORM’s established practice is to store all 
claim notices in a searchable system. The 
absence of any record for Jacqueline 
Jackson confirms that she did not serve 
notice of her claims pursuant to D.C. Code 
§ 12-309. 
 
Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 14-1 at 
1-2. Ms. Jackson did not respond to the Defendants’ Statement of 
Undisputed Facts. See Mot. Extension of Time, ECF No. 15 at 1 
n.1; see generally Dkt. for Civil Action No. 25-302. 
Accordingly, the Court considers the statement of facts 
undisputed for the purpose of this motion. See F
ED. R. CIV. P. 
65(e)(2).  
 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Jackson failed to 
comply with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-
309. Accordingly, Ms. Jackson’s claims in Counts 8, 9, 10, and 
11 against the District are barred. See District of Columbia v. 
Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1362 (D.C. 1995). 
 Ms. Jackson does not state whether she sues the individual 
defendants in their official capacities, their individual 
capacities, or both. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. To the 
extent she sues them in their official capacities, her suit is 
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treated as a suit against the District and so her failure to 
comply with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-
309 also bars her claims against the individual defendants sued 
in their official capacities. See Crockett v. District of 
Columbia, Civil Action No. 16-1357, 2020 WL 1821121, at *7 
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2020).  
 For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS 
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14.  
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan 
United States District Judge  
  February 23, 2026 
  
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