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govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_04-cr-00232-3

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · 2024-12-27

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  * 
  
v. * 
  Crim. No. CCB-04-232 
SOLOTHAL THOMAS, *   
   
Defendant. * 
  
  
MEMORANDUM 
Solothal Thomas is currently serving two concurrent life sentences for his involvement in 
a murder for hire conspiracy which resulted in the death of Jesse Williams.1  
Represented by appointed counsel, in 2023 Mr. Thomas filed a motion for compassionate 
release. (ECF 371). He seeks a sentence reduction based on a combination of factors, including 
(1) the disparity of the length of his sentence with the average sentence for murder; (2) the 
disparity of his sentence with his codefendants’ sentences; (3) his age; (4) his mental health and 
repeated suicide attempts; and (5) his rehabilitation . The government has opposed the motion 
(ECF 383), and Mr. Thomas has replied (ECF  386) No oral argument is necessary. For the 
reasons that follow, Mr. Thomas’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part. His 
sentences will be reduced to 35 years. 
Evaluating a motion for compassionate release involves a two- step analysis. U nited 
States v. Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024). First, the defendant must show that 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant his release. Id . (quoting United States v. 
Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2022)); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). If that burden is 
met, the court must then evaluate the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a). 
 
1 The court recently denied in part and granted in part Mr. Thomas’s motion to vacate under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  
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Centeno-Morales, 90 F.4th at 279. The burden is on the defendant to show that those factors 
support release. Id.  
I. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
Mr. Thomas raises several factors to show that extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warrant his release. While none of the factors, standing alone, would justify release, the c ourt 
finds that in the aggregate, Mr. Thomas has met his burden to show extraordinary and 
compelling reasons.  
First, the disparity between Mr. Thomas’s sentence and the average sentence for murder 
in this district weighs in Mr. Thomas’s favor . A sentencing disparity may, in some 
circumstances, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant compassionate release. 
See United States v. Payton , PJM -06-341, 2021 WL 927631, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2021) 
(granting compassionate release because of sentence reduction of defendant’s more culpable 
coconspirator). Mr. Thomas was convicted of two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), murder for 
hire. Section 1958(a) mandates a sentence of life imprisonment if death results from the murder 
for hire. The statute imposed a mandatory life sentence when Mr. Thomas was sentenced in 
2004, and it continues to impose a mandatory life sentence today. But nothing in § 3582 prevents 
its application to mandatory life sentences. See United States v. Johnson, Case No. 1:97- cr-314-
AJT, 2023 WL 5049267, at *15 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2023) (“ [W]hile the Government centrally 
contends that no reduction is appropriate in light of the still applicable mandatory life sentence . . 
. Congress did not exempt mandatory life sentences from (a) relief under the original language in 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) or (b) the modifications to the exhaustion requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A).”); 
see also United States v. Perez, Crim. No. JBA-02-0007, 2021 WL 837425, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 
4, 2021) (“ Although his life sentences are mandatory, the mandatory component does not bar 
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relief under the First Step Act. . . . Although Mr. Perez was convicted of a most serious 
offense—procuring the murder of another —the gravity of the offense does not categorically 
preclude the Court from reducing his sentence.”) 
And as Mr. Thomas explains, the average sentence for murder is significantly shorter 
than Mr. Thomas’s sentence, both nationwide and within this district. See ECF 471 in United 
States v. Linton, No. JKB -98-258, at *5–*8 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2021) (discussing the disparity 
between defendant’s life sentence for murder in aid of racketeering compared to the average 
sentence for murder in Maryland in 2021). According to the United States Sentencing 
Commission, the nationwide mean sentence for murder for fiscal year 2023 was 285 months, and 
the median sentence was  276 months. See United States Sentencing Commission, Interactive 
Data Analyzer: Distribution of Sentence Length, Fiscal Year 2023, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 
https://ida.ussc.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard (last visited Dec. 20, 2024). Within this district, 
the mean sentence for murder for fiscal year 2023 was 310 months, and the median sentence was 
300 months. See id. Considering that Mr. Thomas was sentenced when he was thirty years old, 
Mr. Thomas is likely to serve far longer than either mean sentence.  This exceptionally long 
sentence counsels toward relief. See U nited States v. Johnson, No. ELH- 99-352, 2023 WL 
7130950, at *1, *14 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2023) (reducing life sentence to 35 years in case involving 
drug trafficking and murder); see also ECF 661 in United States v. Holland, No. GLR 96-399 (D. 
Md. Aug. 18, 2021) (reducing life sentence to 35 years) ; Brown v. United States, No. ELH-00-
100, 2020 WL 1248950, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2020)  (reducing life sentence to 40 years) ; 
United States v. Williams , No. CCB -07-402, 2021 WL 3725435, at *3  (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2021)  
(reducing life sentence to 30 years). 
Second, the disparity between Mr. Thomas’s sentence and those of his codefendants is 
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compelling. While Mr. Thomas and his codefendant, Eduado Countess, were both sentenced to 
mandatory life sentences, the sentences of their other coconspirators were dramatically shorter. 
Mr. Thomas points to the sentences of his brother, Danta Thomas, and their acquaintance, 
Linwood Smith. Danta drove Mr. Thomas and Countess to Williams’s home, where they shot 
him. Danta’s sentence was 77 months  of imprisonment . Smith was supposed to drive Mr. 
Thomas and Countess to Williams’s home that morning, but he overslept. Smith’s sentence was 
64 months of imprisonment. Unlike Mr. Thomas, they did not pull the trigger and  kill Williams 
directly. They also pleaded guilty. Danta testified for the prosecution at trial. See Thomas v. 
United States, No. CCB -09-2461, 2013 WL 331337, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2013) (describing 
Danta’s testimony). Danta and Smith’s minor roles in the conspiracy and their acceptance of 
responsibility justify some sentencing disparity. See United States v. Morales-Vega, No. PJM 08-
0051, 2021 WL 4864450, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 19, 2021) (finding disparity between sentences of 
defendant and codefendants was warranted because she was a “manager or supervisor” within 
the drug conspiracy, did not accept responsibility early, and possessed a weapon and 
ammunition, while the codefendants played minor roles, accepted responsibility, and did not 
possess weapons). 
The court finds that the more apt comparison is to the sentences of Tyree Stewart, who 
issued the contract for Mr. Williams’s murder, and Corey Smith, who brokered the contract and 
hired Mr. Thomas and Mr. Countess for $10,000. Stewart was sentenced to 83 months of 
imprisonment, and Smith was sentenced to 97 months. Like Danta and Smith, Stewart and Corey 
also pleaded guilty. They were also cooperating witnesses. See Thomas, 2013 WL 331337, at *1 
(describing Stewart and Corey as cooperating witnesses). Stil l, Mr. Thomas has already served 
over twenty years of his sentence —more than three times Stewart’s sentence. Though some 
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disparity in the sentences is no doubt justified, the disparity between Stewart’s 83- month 
sentence and the life sentence that Mr. Thomas is now serving is disproportionate. Stewart was 
the mastermind behind the scheme. He planned and directed it. Though Mr. Thomas and 
Countess executed the scheme, Stewart has similar culpability.  The court finds that the sentence 
disparity weighs toward extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. 
Next, the c ourt considers Mr. Thomas’s young age when he committed the offense. Mr. 
Thomas was twenty -five years old when he killed Williams. As one Fourth Circuit judge has 
explained, “modern research . . . instructs that the prefrontal co rtex, the part of the brain that 
makes it possible to exercise good judgment when presented with difficult life situations, does 
not finish maturing until age 25.” Hirschfeld  v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco & 
Explosives, 5 F.4th 407, 476 (4th Cir. 2021), as amended (July 15, 2021), vacated  as moot, 14 
F.4th 322 (4th Cir. 2021) (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also ECF 471 in Linton, No. JKB-98-258, at 
*7 (“[C]ourts have become more cautious about resorting to the ‘bluntness of mandatory life 
sentences’ with respect to youthful defendants.”). Mr. Thomas was a young adult whose 
childhood, as explained below, was racked by instability and violence. The c ourt finds his young 
age is another factor that supports a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.  
Mr. Thomas also relies on his mental health issues , his very difficult childhood, which is 
well documented in a social worker’s report (ECF 371 Ex. O)
2, and his rehabilitation during his 
term of incarceration.  While rehabilitation alone cannot constitute an extraordinary and 
compelling reason, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d), it may be considered in combination with other 
circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a reduction in the defendant’s term of 
 
2 That the circumstances of Mr. Thomas’s upbringing may have been known at the time of 
sentencing does not preclude consideration of his abusive childhood in connection with a motion 
for compassionate release. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 
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imprisonment is warranted . See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 286 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(affirming grants of compassionate release and noting that “each defendant had established 
exceptional institutional records and taken substantial steps toward rehabilitation”).  
Mr. Thomas has obtained his GED, completed approximately 1500 hours of additional 
programming, and started a Stop Bullying program in prison (ECF 371, Exs. E, L, P, Q). Further, 
Mr. Thomas earned his GED and completed much of this programming before the passage of the 
First Step Act, when he was serving a mandatory life sentence. In the court’s view, this signifies 
that Mr. Thomas was motivated not by the possibility of early release, but because of his genuine 
desire for rehabilitation and self -improvement. His last disciplinary infraction was in 2020, and 
none of his infrac tions involved violence against others ( ECF 371,  Exs. N, R ). Most of his 
(limited) infractions are for relatively minor violations, including failure to appear for count or 
making a three-way phone call. In Mr. Thomas’s most severe infraction, possession of a weapon 
in 2018, Mr. Thomas immediately admitted culpability at his disciplinary hearing (ECF 371, Ex. 
N). Mr. Thomas has also recognized the evil of his offense and expressed remorse for his 
commission of Mr. Williams’s murder (ECF 371, Ex. O, at 11–12). 
Mr. Thomas’s rehabilitation is especially impressive considering the extreme hardship he 
has overcome. Mr. Thomas’s mother gave birth to him when she was only five and a half months 
pregnant. His upbringing was plagued by violence, poverty, and instability. Mr. Thomas grew up 
in the Murphy Homes, a public housing project where, as Mr. Thomas recounted, he saw people 
shot in front of him and dead bodies on the ground. That trauma was further compounded by his 
parents’ drug addictions. Mr. Thomas was “subjected [to] repeated domestic violence incidents 
that took place between his drug- addicted parents when they would openly fight over illicit 
substances in front of him.” ( ECF 371, Ex. O , at 4) . Both of Mr. Thomas’s parents died from 
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AIDS. Mr. Thomas was often neglected, left without food, and subject to physical abuse. These 
horrific circumstances of Mr. Thomas’s upbringing make his subsequent rehabilitation, maturity, 
and personal growth even more noteworthy. See Johnson, 2023 WL 5049267, at *6 (reducing 
life sentence in part because of defendant’s rehabilitation and noting significance of his 
rehabilitation in light of his traumatic upbringing). 
Finally, the court considers Mr. Thomas’s mental health challenges. Mr. Thomas’s social 
work report shares that Mr. Thomas has attempted suicide several times (ECF 371, Ex. O, at 6–
7). While the exact nature of his mental health issues is hard to evaluate, given his decision not to 
seek help from the Bureau of Prisons, those issues  will not be entirely discounted. Considering 
all his circumstances together, the court is satisfied that he has shown an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for release. And considering Mr. Thomas’s rehabilitation, lack of signification 
disciplinary infractions while incarcerated, and family and community support, the c ourt finds 
that he is not a danger to the community under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
II. Section 3553(a) Factors 
Demonstrating such a reason, however, does not entitle a defendant to early release . The 
court must consider the factors under 18 USC 3553(a) and, as noted, the burden is on the 
defendant to show that the 3553(a) factors support release. Mr. Thomas’s crime was extremely 
serious. He committed a cold -blooded murder for pay, and he had at least one previous serious 
conviction for assault.  The need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to provide deterrence 
and just punishment, and to promote respect for the law argue against too great a reduction in his 
sentence. On the other hand, Mr . Thomas is now 50 years old, with few if any significant 
infractions on his record. He has the promise of employment and family and community support 
(ECF 371 Exs. B, C, K, M, S ), all of which reduces the risk of recidivism. The court finds that 
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Mr. Thomas has met his burden to show that the 3553(a) factors support release. 
III. Conclusion 
After consideration of all the relevant factors, Mr. Thomas’s sentence will be reduced to 
35 years . Specifically, his sentences on Counts Two and Three  will each be reduced to 420 
months, concurrent, followed by concurrent terms of five years of supervised release. 
A separate Order follows. 
 
Date:  December 27, 2024    BY THE COURT: 
 
       /S/ CATHERINE C. BLAKE 
Catherine C. Blake 
 United States District Judge 
 
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