govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-2_24-cv-00074-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
(at Covington) 
 
ASHLEY FERREIRAS,  
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
V. 
 
CITY OF COVINGTON, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
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Civil Action No. 2: 24-074-DCR 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
   
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Plaintiff Ashley Ferreiras was arrested and subsequently convicted at trial for  third-
degree assault, third degree criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and obstructing an emergency 
responder. Thereafter, she sued  Defendants City of Covington and Douglas Ullrich  and 
Anthony Fritsch for actions taken during the plaintiff’s arrest.  The defendants have moved for 
partial judgment on the pleadings regarding  Counts II, IV, and V of Ferreiras’s Complaint 
which allege false arrest, deprivation of due process, and conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s 
civil rights.  [Record No. 18] The motion will be granted for the reasons that follow. 
I.  Background 
  The following facts are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  On the 
evening of May 4, 2023, the p laintiff was at her house on the 1500 block of Nancy Street in 
Covington, Kentucky, on physician ordered bedrest  following a recent surgery related to a 
broken ankle.  [Record No. 1, ¶ 15- 16]  Ferreiras required crutches during her recovery.  [ Id. 
at ¶ 16] Around 11:20 p.m., she noticed multiple police cars surrounding her boyfriend’s SUV.  
[Id. at ¶ 17]  Ferreiras called out to ask what was happening, but officers did not respond.  [Id. 
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at ¶ 18]  She them moved to the porch of her residence with the help of her brother, and again 
asked the officers what was going on.  Ag ain, they did not respond.  [ Id. at ¶ 20]  Ferreiras 
then approached the sidewalk where the officers had stopped her boyfriend’s SUV.  [Id. at ¶ 
21-22]   
 As she approached, Defendant Ullrich advised the plaintiff that if she stepped onto the 
sidewalk, she was “going to jail[.]”  [Id. at ¶ 24]  Ferreiras responded, asking the officer not to 
touch or disrespect her. [Id. at ¶ 26]  She then proceeded to the sidewalk, resulting in Ullrich 
grabbing her crutches and causing her to fall  to the ground.  [ Id. at ¶ 29]  While  arresting 
Ferreiras, Defendant Ullrich allegedly punched her head and repeatedly grabbed her breasts.  
[Id. at ¶ 30, 35]   
 The plaintiff was unable to move or comply with officers’ orders during her arrest due 
to her injured ankle.  [Id. at ¶ 29, 31, 34]  Defendants Ullrich and Fritsch then handcuffed the 
plaintiff and placed her face down in the backseat of a police vehicle.  [Id. at ¶ 33-34]  Ferreiras 
was then taken to St. Elizabeth Edgewood Emergency room where she was treated for acute 
ankle pain, right wrist pain, and a closed head injury.  The plaintiff contends that these injuries 
were sustained during her arrest.  [Id. at ¶ 36-43]   
 Ferreiras was later indicted for -- and convicted of -- third-degree assault, third-degree 
criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and obstructing an emergency responder.  
II.  Legal Standard 
 A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is evaluated using the same 
standard that applies to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)  of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC v. Howell Township, 103 F.4th 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 
2024) (citing Warrior Sports, Inc. v. NCAA , 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010)).  Thus, the 
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Court must determine whether the subject counts of the complaint alleges “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  The plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  Further, when reviewing a motion under Rule 
12(c), courts “generally may only review the pleadings, any attachments to those pleadings, 
and documents that are ‘referred to in the complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff's claim’ 
or are ‘matters of public record.’  Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995, 1002 (6th Cir. 2024) 
(quoting Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999).   
III.  Analysis 
A. Count II is barred. 
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), the Supreme Court established that a 
§ 1983 plaintiff  cannot proceed with claims that would implicitly invalidate his prior 
conviction or sentence unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed . . . expunged . . . 
declared invalid . . . or called into question by a federal court ’s issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus[.]”  Further, “permitting a § 1983 action to proceed where success in that action would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction ‘would essentially permit a collateral 
attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.’”  Richmond v. Mosley , No. 20-
11978, 2023 WL 3997947, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2023) (citing D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 
747 F.3d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 2014).   
“For Heck to bar a § 1983 claim, success on the claim must necessarily  imply the 
invalidity of the conviction.  Thus, both the § 1983 claim and the conviction must arise out of 
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the same events.”  Matheney v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 461 F. App’ x 427, 431 (6th Cir. 
2012) (citing Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2005).   
In this case, the plaintiff alleges she was falsely arrested without probable cause.  The 
constitutional right to “freedom from arrest in the absence of probable cause” is explicitly 
recognized in Wesley v. Campbell , 779 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2015).  But Ferreiras was 
convicted of assault, criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and obstructing an emergency 
responder and “the existence of probable cause for an arrest totally precludes any section 1983 
claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.” Watson v. City of 
Marysville, 518 F. App’x 390, 392 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mark v. Furay,  769 F.2d 1266, 
1269 (7th Cir. 1985).  Consequently, she cannot maintain an action for false arrest followi ng 
her jury conviction, which conclusively established probable cause.   
Ferreiras counters that Heck requires that the Court look “‘to the claims raised under § 
1983 and to the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.’” Schreiber v. 
Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 334 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 493 (6th 
Cir. 2006).  She  contends that, because Swiecicki rests on Ohio criminal statutes, it has no 
bearing here.  But that contention is incorrect.  Other claims of constitutional violations under 
§ 1983, such as excessive force, require closer examination regarding the state criminal statute 
to determine whether the specific claim would collaterally attack any specific convictions.  
Swiecicki, 463 F.3d at 494.  A criminal conviction validates probable cause.  A nd a § 1983 
claim for false arrest necessarily repudiates probable cause.  In any jurisdiction, a criminal 
conviction that required probable cause precludes a false arrest claim; therefore, it is irrelevant 
whether Swiecicki involved Ohio law. 
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The plaintiff’s argument regarding state collateral estoppel also fails.  The defendants 
moved for judgment based on Heck  not state collateral estoppel.  Thus, a collateral estoppel 
discussion is unwarranted.  Ferreiras  mistakenly cites the elements for collateral estoppel in 
Kentucky but Heck involves a completely separate inquiry.  Heck requires analyzing the 
criminal statute at issue and comparing it to the specific elements of the § 1983 claim asserted.  
It is unrelated to state law defensive collateral estoppel ; therefore, the plaintiff’s estoppel 
arguments are moot.  Count II is barred under the Heck doctrine. 
The Court also concludes that a stay of this action would be inappropriate.  The plaintiff 
requests a stay of Count II because she is appealing her criminal convictions.  But appeals do 
not warrant a stay.   “If the plaintiff's version of the facts implies the invalidity of the prior 
conviction, Heck means that the § 1983 claim is not ‘cognizable’ until the defendant overturns 
the conviction.”  Chaney-Snell v. Young, 98 F.4th 699, 710 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Heck , 512 
U.S. 477 at 483)).  Ferreiras must overturn her conviction to overcome the Heck doctrine.  She 
cites a case from th is district that discusses a stay of § 1983 actions during the pendency of 
state criminal actions.  See Feltha v. City of Newport, Civil Action No. 2: 20-128-WOB-CJS, 
2017 WL 583142, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2017) .  Feltha  mentions that a stay  can be 
appropriate during criminal proceedings, but it made no reference to appeals , and it 
specifically refers to the period before a defendant is convicted.  Id.  The Court thus declines 
to issue a stay. 
B. Count IV States No Claim Under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. 
Ferreiras’s Complaint raises claims sounding in false arrest , excessive force, and 
retaliation, which she “incorporates and realleges” in her Due Process claim.  [Record No. 1, 
p. 22] The defendants argue that the Court should dismiss these claims to the extent that 
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Ferreiras seeks to assert them independently under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, rather 
than under the First and Fourth Amendments.  [Record No. 18, p. 6] Because Ferreiras’s claims 
are governed by specific constitutional provisions, her Fourteenth Amendment claims will be 
dismissed.   
“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 
protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment not the more 
generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”  
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395 
(1989)).  A plaintiff must pursue relief under the appropriate constitutional guarantee, just as 
a court must apply the appropriate legal standard.  Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 
750 (6th Cir. 2006).  And when applied to state (rather than federal) actors, Due Process claims 
fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  Accordingly, 
resolution of Ferreiras’s claims depends on whether the Fifth Amendment, applied to state 
conduct through the Fourteenth Amendment , provides the appropriate constitutional 
protection. 
Ferreiras reasserts a claim for false arrest  under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  [Record No. 1, ¶ 99] However, when the gravamen of a complaint 
is for arrest or detention without probable cause, the claim cannot be pursued under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Jackson v. Cty. of Washtenaw , 310 F.App’x 6, 7–8 (6th Cir. 
2009) (noting that the plaintiff’s claim alleging detention without probable cause is not viable 
under the Fourteenth Amendment).  Instead, such a claim must be evaluated under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 7 (citing Gregory, 444 F.3d at 750).  See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 
266, 275 (1994) .  C onsequently, Ferreiras cannot recover under a Fourteenth Amendment 
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theory even accepting the C omplaint’s factual allegations as true .  Her  ability to do so is 
foreclosed by binding precedent.  See, e.g., Gregory, 444 F.3d at 748– 50.  Thus, Ferreiras’s 
false arrest claim under the Fourteenth Amendment in Count IV will be dismissed.  
Next, Ferreiras reasserts the excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
[Record No. 1, ¶ 99] The Sixth Circuit has established a bright -line rule for deciding whether 
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment standards govern the use of force in a given context.  Aldini 
v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 864–67 (6th Cir. 2010).  The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
standard governs from the time of arrest until the date of a probable cause hearing and not the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “shocks-the-conscience” standard.  Id.  W hen the facts suggest no 
excessive force outside the context of an arrest, Fourteenth Amendment claims are not facially 
plausible.  See also Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 419 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[a]ny force 
used ‘leading up to and including an arrest’ may be actionable under the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable seizures).   
Here, the alleged excessive  force occurred during the arrest, but not afterwards.  [See 
Record No. 1, ¶ 28-35.]  As a result, the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails because 
the excessive force alleged took place during her arrest.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864–67; see also 
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570).  Thus, the claim will be 
dismissed to the extent that Ferreiras  seeks to bring her  excessive force claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
Finally, Ferreiras asserts a freedom of speech retaliation claim under both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments .  [Record No. 1, ¶ 99 ] Within the  Sixth Circuit , any claim for 
violation of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to free speech “‘is 
duplicative of [a] First Amendment . . . claim.’”  Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 
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F.3d 531, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brandenburg v. Hous. Auth., 253 F.3d 891, 900 (6th 
Cir. 2001)).  To the extent that a plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment claim related to her 
free speech claim, it is foreclosed by controlling precedent.   Id.  Based on the foregoing, the 
plaintiff’s claim for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment is facially implausible.  To the 
extent that she seeks to assert a Fourteenth Amendment -based free speech claim, the claim is 
barred. Ferreiras’s substantive claims are already “covered by . . . specific constitutional 
provision[s]” thus those provisions govern her  claims, not the “rubric of substantive due 
process.”   United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).  Accordingly, her Count IV 
Due Process claims will be dismissed. 
C. Count V Fails to State a Valid § 1985(3) Civil Conspiracy Claim. 
To state a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish: 
(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purposes of depriving a person of class of persons equal protection 
of the laws of the United States (3) evidenced by an act in furtherance of the conspiracy 
whereby (4) they are injured or deprived of any right or privilege of a United States citizen.  
Griffin v. Breckenridge , 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971) .  Additionally, such a claim must be 
motivated by a class-based animus and must be “pled with some degree of specificity and that 
vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state 
such a claim under § 1983.”  See Ohio ex rel. Moore v. Brahma Inv. Grp., Inc., 723 F. App’x 
284, 288 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2000); see also 
Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 
1538 (6th Cir. 1987) ).  The plaintiff’ s § 1985(3) claim fails because it does not  allege the 
defendants’ actions were motivated by a class-based animus, and it fails to plead requisite facts 
with sufficient specificity.    
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The Complaint contains allegations that the defendants “directly or indirectly 
combined, conspired, and coordinated by force, intimidation, or threat to deprive Ms. Ferreiras 
of her rights arising under the United States Constitution . . . and the laws of the United States 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. §  1985(3).”  [Record No. 1, ¶ 104]  This boilerplate language does 
not discuss how, why, or specifically whether the defendants conspired, and is “vague and 
conclusory[.]”  Fieger, 524 F.3d at 776.  The plaintiff does not address either how a conspiracy 
was formed among the defendant officers, or how they conspired to deprive her of a right.   
Further, the bare, conclusory allegations of the Complaint do not allege that Ferreiras 
was targeted due to a class -based animus.  A total of three short paragraphs  are dedicated to 
the § 1985(3) claim  [id. at ¶ 10 3-105] and none contend that the defendant officers were 
motivated by an animus or even allege that Ferreiras is a member of a protected class .  She 
argues in her response that her claim is not barred solely because it does not allege racial 
animus, but this contention misconstrues § 1985(3).  Racial animus is not required to state a 
claim under the statute, but some variant of class-based animus is necessary.  See Ohio, 723 F. 
App’x at 288.  Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to state a valid § 1985(3) claim and Count 
V will be dismissed. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
 1. The defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings [Record No. 18] 
is GRANTED. 
 2.    Counts II, IV and V of  Plaintiff Ferreiras’s Complaint are DISMISSED, with 
prejudice.  
  
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Dated: December 3, 2024. 
 
 
 
 
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