Corpus: 543,223 opinions · 3,177 judges · newest 2026-06-23 · expanding Coverage ↗
Opinion

govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-3_22-cv-07484-3

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California · 2024-11-26

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:40:12

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
AARON KING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, 
LLC, TRANS UNION, LLC, and 
EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
No.  22-07484 WHA    
 
 
 
ORDER RE DEFENDANT 
EQUIFAX’S MOTION FOR ENTRY 
OF JUDGMENT 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this pro se action regarding consumer reporting information, a former defendant has 
moved for judgment to be entered in its favor against plaintiff.  The motion is GRANTED. 
STATEMENT 
Pro se plaintiff Aaron King filed suit in 2022 against four consumer reporting agencies 
(“CRAs”): Equifax Information Services, Experian Information Solutions, Trans Union, LLC, 
and LexisNexis Risk Solutions.  As will be discussed below, the only remaining defendant in 
this action is Trans Union.  Given, however, that Equifax makes the instant motion, the 
following history will focus on Equifax.   
This action concerns defendants allegedly associating plaintiff’s consumer and credit 
information with that of another gentleman of the same name. This association began almost 
30 years ago, when a different Aaron King in Louisiana filed for bankruptcy in 1997.  Over the 
Case 3:22-cv-07484-WHA     Document 111     Filed 11/26/24     Page 1 of 4
 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
years, plaintiff was subject to debt collection efforts, allegedly due to defendants’ association 
of plaintiff’s information with that of the other King.   
A prior order dismissed all claims as to Equifax (Dkt. No. 45).  Plaintiff was also 
permitted to seek leave to amend his complaint, which he did.  In that motion, plaintiff 
reasserted claims for relief under FCRA Section 1681e, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. 
Section 200d, common law fraud, and that Equifax had breached a settlement between it and 
plaintiff from 2008.  That proposed amended complaint also added a defamation claim against 
Equifax.  Equifax opposed his motion for leave to amend.  A subsequent order denied all 
claims as to Equifax (Dkt. No. 68).  In fact, only a narrow set of claims in this action have 
survived, which are lodged against Trans Union only (ibid.).  Finally, an order denied 
plaintiff’s reconsideration of its previous order which denied plaintiff’s claims against Equifax 
(Dkt. 90).  
Equifax now moves for entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).  Plaintiff opposes the 
motion.  This order follows full briefing and finds the motion suitable for disposition on the 
papers under Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).  
ANALYSIS 
As stated above, a prior order denied reasserted and new claims against Equifax.  Rule 
54(b) provides, in relevant part:  
 
When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or 
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay.  
In determining whether final judgment should be entered under Rule 54(b), a district court 
must first determine whether there is, in essence, already a final judgment.  “It must be a 
‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be 
‘final’ in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course 
of a multiple claims action.”  Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980).   
Here, Equifax has shown that there is, in essence, final judgment.  First, a previous order 
dismissed the first amended complaint against Equifax in April 2023 (Dkt. No. 45).  Second, 
Case 3:22-cv-07484-WHA     Document 111     Filed 11/26/24     Page 2 of 4
 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
another order denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint insofar as 
the claims against Equifax were futile in November 2023 (Dkt. No. 68).  That order found that 
the reasserted FCRA claims, newly asserted FCRA claims, and reasserted non-FCRA claims 
were all futile.  As such, amendments with respect to Equifax were denied.  As noted by 
Equifax in its motion, “[b]etween the dismissal, the denial of leave to amend, and the denial of 
reconsideration, the judgment against Equifax is final,” (Dkt. No. 95).  This order agrees.  
This order now turns to the second inquiry: whether there is any reason to delay entering 
formal judgment.  For this, the district court must decide whether there is any just reason for 
delay by considering “judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved.”  
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1980).  Equifax argues that judicial 
administrative interests weigh in favor of granting the motion because plaintiff’s claims against 
Equifax are entirely distinguishable from the claims against Trans Union.  Further, Equifax 
argues that granting relief would not be inequitable because there are no pending claims 
against Equifax in this action.  This order agrees.  Simply put, a narrow set of claims remain in 
this action, but none of them involve Equifax.  Nor is there an equitable interest at risk for 
granting judgment in favor of Equifax.  For this reason, Equifax’s motion is GRANTED. 
Plaintiff uses his opposition brief to essentially argue that his second amended complaint, 
which lodges claims for relief against Equifax, should not have been denied.  According to 
plaintiff, there was evidence not available to him mid-April 2023 which “may have 
significantly changed the April 18, 2024, ruling of the Court,” (Dkt. No. 45) and he therefore 
plausibly pled claims against Equifax in his second amended complaint (Opp. 3, 6).  Instead of 
responding to Equifax’s arguments in its motion, plaintiff requests leave to file another motion 
for reconsideration of the November 2023 order.  This Court has already reviewed plaintiff’s 
second amended complaint, twice (Dkt. Nos. 68, 90).  Rehashing arguments in the opposition 
brief was both ineffective and inappropriate.  For this reason, any request to file another 
motion to reconsider is DENIED.   
 
 
Case 3:22-cv-07484-WHA     Document 111     Filed 11/26/24     Page 3 of 4
 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, Equifax’s motion for entry of judgment is GRANTED. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  November 26, 2024. 
 
  
WILLIAM ALSUP 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Case 3:22-cv-07484-WHA     Document 111     Filed 11/26/24     Page 4 of 4

Passage view · GavelSight