Corpus: 543,223 opinions · 3,177 judges · newest 2026-06-23 · expanding Coverage ↗
Opinion

govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-3_23-cv-03476-1

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California · 2024-11-04

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:40:12

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SARAN NUTH and KEVIN O’NEILL, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
NEWREZ LLC, dba SHELLPOINT 
MORTGAGE SERVICING, 
TRANSUNION, LLC, EQUIFAX 
INFORMATION SERVICES LLC, and 
EXPERIAN INFORMATION 
SOLUTIONS, INC. 
Defendants. 
 
 
No.  23-03476 WHA    
 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' 
PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this FCRA and CCRAA action, both sides have filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.  To the extent stated herein, plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED and defendant Shellpoint’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART 
AND DENIED IN PART.  
STATEMENT 
This case arises out of plaintiffs’ former home in Santa Rosa in Sonoma County, 
California.  In April 2011, plaintiffs obtained a mortgage loan for their home in Santa Rosa, 
which was serviced by defendant NewRez LLC (“Shellpoint”).  In March 2020, plaintiffs 
suffered financial hardships and contacted Shellpoint for a payment accommodation.  
Shellpoint agreed and sent plaintiffs a letter to confirm that three monthly payments from April 
to June 2020 were deferred.  In May 2020, however, plaintiffs received a letter from Shellpoint 
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 1 of 9
 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
stating that they were late on their mortgage payments and that “failure to bring your loan 
current may result in fees and foreclosure—the loss of your home” (Compl. ¶ 18).   
That same month, Shellpoint provided a forbearance on the loan for eighteen months, 
from April 2020 through September 2021 (UMF 11).  Shellpoint mailed plaintiffs a letter to 
confirm that the temporary forbearance of eighteen months, which meant that they “would not 
be penalized with a late charge or with negative credit reporting if you miss a mortgage 
payment” (Dkt. No. 82-1 at 39).  That same letter also stated:  
 
If you can afford to make payments or even partial payments, you 
are strongly urged to do so. Your payment continues to come due 
on a monthly basis and these payments will be due at the end of the 
temporary forbearance period.  If you are unable to bring your 
mortgage loan current at the end of the forbearance period, we do 
have options available that can help. 
(ibid.).  The letter also provided:  
 
The terms of your mortgage remain unchanged.  As a result of not 
making any payments during the term of the Forbearance Plan, if 
you do not resume making timely monthly payments or make other 
arrangements with us you will become delinquent on your 
mortgage and your credit score may be impacted. 
(ibid.) (emphasis added).   
Both sides agree that the loan was current prior to entering the forbearance period, and 
plaintiffs did not make any payments during the forbearance agreement (UMF 2, 4).  
Moreover, the loan was reported as current to credit reporting agencies during the forbearance 
period (UMF 3).   
On August 31, 2021, Shellpoint mailed plaintiffs another letter in which they offered a 
trial period plan (“TPP”), for which plaintiffs would need to make payments for October, 
November, and December 2021 (UMF 5).  Plaintiffs made all three timely payments (UMF 6).   
Shellpoint reported the loan as thirty-days past due in October 2021 and sixty-days past 
due in November 2021 (UMF 7).  Shellpoint reported the loan as current in December 2021, 
and all subsequent months until the loan was paid off in July 2022 (UMF 9).  Plaintiffs 
 
1 Both sides have filed a jointly submitted list of stipulated, undisputed material facts (“UMF”).  
The full list can be found on Dkt. No. 79-2.   
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 2 of 9
 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
disputed the credit reporting of October 2021 and November 2021 with Shellpoint and three 
other defendants: Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union (UMF 8).  Plaintiffs allege that 
Shellpoint refused to correct its reporting (Dkt. No. 79 at 8).  
Plaintiffs filed suit in July 2023, against Shellpoint, Equifax Information Services, LLC, 
Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Trans Union, LLC, alleging violations of the 
CARES Act, CCRAA, FCRA, and the Rosenthal Act.  Plaintiffs have now filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment.  Likewise, Shellpoint has filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment.  Since the two instant motions were filed, Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union were 
dismissed from this action (Dkt. Nos. 72, 86, 88).    
This order follows full briefing and oral argument.   
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  FRCP 56(a).  A dispute is 
“genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-
moving party, and “material” only if the fact may affect the outcome of the case.  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–249 (1986).  Unsupported conjecture or conclusory 
statements, however, cannot defeat summary judgment.  Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 
F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (“CARES Act”) to address the economic hardships faced by many 
Americans.  The CARES Act is integrated into FCRA and requires furnishers to report 
borrowers who receive accommodation as “current” if their loan was not delinquent before the 
accommodation began.  15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(F).  In doing so, the CARES Act aims to 
protect consumer’s credit.  See CARES Act Legislative History, 166 Cong. Rec. E339-01 
(March 27, 2020) (“It also prohibits forced collections such as garnishment of wages, tax 
refunds, and Social Security benefits, and negative credit reporting during this time period.”) 
(emphasis added).     
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 3 of 9
 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Shortly thereafter, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) published 
directives to aid furnishers and credit reporting agencies in complying with the CARES Act.  
Consumer Reporting FAQs Related to the CARES Act and COVID-19 Pandemic, 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fcra_consumer-
reporting-faqs-covid-19_2020-06.pdf (last visited November 4, 2024).  
This action involves a furnisher, Shellpoint, assisting plaintiffs on their loan by first 
providing a forbearance for eighteen months (for which monthly payments were not required) 
and subsequently offering them a trial period plan (“TPP”) for which plaintiffs were required 
to make a reduced payment each month.   The essence of this order is to clarify how a furnisher 
must report the status of an account when a borrower follows the terms of one accommodation 
and then makes payments according to the terms of a second, subsequent accommodation.  To 
be clear, this order is issued in the absence of any binding authority from our court of appeals, 
and very little discussion on the subject in this district.   
Although both sides stipulate to several facts, both sides essentially differ as to (1) 
whether plaintiffs were delinquent on the loan when they entered the TPP and (2) whether 
Shellpoint should have reported plaintiffs’ loan as past due in October 2021 and November 
2021.  Plaintiffs seek a partial summary judgment finding that Shellpoint’s reporting plaintiffs’ 
loan as past due in October 2021 and November 2021 is “inaccurate as a matter of law,” under 
the CARES Act (Dkt. No. 79 at 8).  On the other hand, Shellpoint argues that while the loan 
was current before the forbearance, plaintiffs were delinquent at the end of the eighteen-month 
forbearance and were thus delinquent going into the TPP (Dkt. No. 81 at 8-9).  Moreover, 
Shellpoint moves for summary judgment on all claims.  
The CARES Act states that if a furnisher makes an accommodation with respect to one or 
more payments on a credit obligation, and the consumer “is not required to make [one] or more 
payments pursuant to the accommodation, the furnisher shall report the credit obligation or 
account as current,” unless the loan was delinquent before the accommodation.  15 U.S.C. § 
1681s-2(a)(1)(F)(ii).  What forms the crux of the instant action, however, is what the CARES 
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 4 of 9
 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Act requires in terms of reporting, when a furnisher, such as Shellpoint, grants a borrower two 
consecutive accommodations.   
This order disagrees with Shellpoint that plaintiffs were delinquent on the loan during 
October 2021 and November 2021.  Further, this order disagrees with Shellpoint’s construction 
of the CARES Act, which would essentially penalize plaintiffs for complying with the terms of 
an accommodation offered by Shellpoint. 
This order will provide a brief overview of Shellpoint’s argument that plaintiffs were 
delinquent on their loan prior to entering the TPP and why the CARES Act permitted them to 
report plaintiffs as past due.   First, Shellpoint argues that plaintiffs’ loan had accrued 
delinquency during the eighteen-month forbearance because payments became due each 
month, and plaintiffs did not make any monthly payments during those forborne months.  
Second, that at the end of the forbearance period, plaintiffs’ loan was “delinquent” on the 
balance of the forborne payments and were therefore delinquent entering the TPP.  Third, the 
TPP did not modify the terms of plaintiffs’ loan.  Fourth, because plaintiffs’ TPP payments 
were less than the monthly amount contractually required under the loan, plaintiffs were 
delinquent in the months of October 2021 and November 2021.  Fifth, because plaintiffs did 
not make their contractual mortgage payments in October and November 2021, Shellpoint was 
permitted under CARES Act to report them as past due.  To support its interpretation, 
Shellpoint cites to the following provision of the CARES Act: “if the credit obligation or 
account was delinquent before the accommodation” the furnisher must “maintain the 
delinquent status during the period in which the accommodation is in effect” or “if the 
consumer brings the credit accommodation or account current during the period described in 
item (aa), report the credit obligation or account as current.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(a)(1)(F)(ii)(II). 
This order is not convinced by Shellpoint’s construction of the CARES Act which would 
essentially penalize plaintiffs for following the terms of two consecutive accommodations 
offered by Shellpoint.  It is inconceivable that Congress intended for hardworking Americans 
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 5 of 9
 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
to be punished by following the instructions of a mortgage-servicer.  Rather, a more reasonable 
interpretation depends on the definition of “delinquent status.”   
In interpreting the definition of “delinquent status” this order “first looks to the language 
of the statute, giving effect to the word’s plain meaning; ‘[i]f the language is unambiguous, the 
plain meaning controls.’”  Gonzalez v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 650 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 52 Cal. 4th 499, 
519 (2011)).  “If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a 
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the 
statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other 
aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”  Coalition of 
Concerned Communities, Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 4th 733 737 (2004).  As stated 
above, Congress enacted the CARES Act in order to protect Americans from negative credit 
reporting. 
Therefore, a more reasonable interpretation of “delinquent status” is the reporting status 
of an account.  This would mean that a furnisher must maintain the reporting status of account 
going into the accommodation.  15. U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(F)(ii)(II)(aa).  So, if the account 
was reported as current prior to an accommodation, then the furnisher must continue to report 
the account as current during the accommodation.  Here, since plaintiffs’ account was reported 
as current prior to the second accommodation (i.e. the TPP), Shellpoint should have maintained 
the reporting status as current, as plaintiffs went into the TPP. 
Even if this order were to accept Shellpoint’s interpretation of the CARES Act, 
Shellpoint is still incorrect as a matter of law that that plaintiffs were delinquent on the loan in 
October and November 2021, because plaintiffs selected an accommodation provided by 
Shellpoint according to the terms of its forbearance letter.  Although payments became due 
each month during the forbearance period, Shellpoint stated that they would only become 
delinquent if they “do not resume making timely monthly payments or make other 
arrangements with us” (Dkt. 82-1 at 39) (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs argue that by agreeing to 
and complying with the terms of the TPP, they had agreed to another “arrangement” in order to 
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 6 of 9
 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
deal with the forborne balance (Dkt. No. 79).  Therefore, according to plaintiffs, Shellpoint’s 
own terms determined that they could not be delinquent.  This order agrees.   
This order finds that plaintiffs addressed the balance left after the forbearance period by 
making timely payments pursuant to the TPP—all in accordance with Shellpoint’s own terms.  
On August 31, 2021, plaintiffs received a letter entitled “Streamlined Modification Solicitation 
Letter” which contained vexing language such as “your time to act is running out,” and “time 
is of the essence.”  The same letter stated that in order to comply with the TPP, plaintiffs had to 
make a payment of $2,191.12 on the first days of October, November, and December 2021.  
Both sides agree that plaintiffs made each payment pursuant to the TPP.   
In fact, Shellpoint acknowledged that plaintiffs had successfully completed the TPP 
because Shellpoint permanently modified the terms of plaintiffs’ loan at the end of December 
2021.  By 2022, plaintiffs paid off the rest of their mortgage.  Shellpoint now argues that it was 
justified in reporting plaintiffs as past due in October 2021 and November 2021 because 
plaintiffs’ payments pursuant to the TPP were less than what was contractually due under the 
terms of their loan.  This order finds Shellpoint’s argument unpersuasive and further finds its 
own terms confusing at best. 
The only reasonable way to construe the forbearance letter and the TPP letter, is to find 
that the TPP is one of the “arrangements” offered by Shellpoint at the end of the forbearance 
period.  By making timely payments pursuant to the TPP, plaintiffs had complied with the 
terms of an “arrangement.”  Therefore, according to Shellpoint’s own terms, this order finds 
that plaintiffs could not have been delinquent because they had “made an arrangement” and 
complied with the terms of the TPP.  
Further, at no point in the TPP letter did Shellpoint state that by making payments 
pursuant to the TPP, they would receive negative credit reporting.  The only language which 
comes close to a warning is “[w]e will continue to report the delinquency status of your loan to 
credit reporting agencies as well as your entry into the Trial Period Plan in accordance with the 
requirements of the Federal Credit Reporting Act.”  This language, however, does not convey 
to the reader that, despite following Shellpoint’s accommodation, payments pursuant to the 
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 7 of 9
 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
TPP will result in reporting the loan as past due.  Even more troubling, the TPP letter contained 
the following confusing language: “your current loan documents remain in effect; however, 
you may make the trial period payment instead of the payment required under your loan 
documents.”  This order is concerned by the deceptive language of Shellpoint’s letters, which 
appears to aid plaintiffs but vaguely threatens to punish them as well.   
In effect, Shellpoint attempts to argue that plaintiffs should have simply made the 
contractually owed, monthly payment in order to escape negative reporting.  At no stage, 
however, did Shellpoint transparently convey this to plaintiffs.  Most of all, the difference 
between the contractually required payments and the TPP payments was about $120.  
Plaintiffs’ misfortune could have been prevented if they had simply paid roughly an additional 
$240—and they probably would have done so, were it not for Shellpoint’s lack of clarity.   
Credit is wrecked by misinformation propagated by credit reporting agencies.  Upon 
inquiring and investigating a borrower’s account, the credit reporting agencies almost 
invariably point fingers at furnishers who supply information on a massive and automated 
basis, the result of which ends up ruining the credit of good, hardworking Americans.  To be 
clear, plaintiffs Kevin O’Neill and Saran Nuth timely made every installment payment when 
asked by Shellpoint and yet were still reported as “delinquent” by the loan services to three 
national credit reporting agencies.  It is true that they would still need to be liable for future 
installment, as they fell due, but the irrefutable fact is that they timely made every installment 
payment as due.  In reporting them as delinquent, Shellpoint violated the CARES Act and their 
own agreement.  For these reasons, this order finds that Shellpoint’s reporting was inaccurate 
as a matter of law and plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
This order will now briefly address Shellpoint’s motion for summary judgment regarding 
plaintiffs’ Rosenthal, FCRA and CCRAA claims.  Plaintiffs allege that Shellpoint violated the 
Rosenthal Act by making misleading representations to collect payments on the loan that 
plaintiffs did not owe.  Shellpoint argues that this claim is barred by a one-year statute of 
limitations.  This order agrees.  Given that the loan was reported as past due only in October 
and November 2021, and this action was filed in July 2023, plaintiffs’ Rosenthal claim is time-
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 8 of 9
 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
barred.  Therefore, Shellpoint’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.   However, this 
order finds that Shellpoint has not demonstrated that summary judgment should be granted in 
its favor for plaintiffs’ FCRA or CCRAA claims.  Given that both claims turn on the 
reasonableness of a credit reporting investigation, these two claims should be left to a jury.  
Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1252-1253 (9th Cir. 2022).  As such, Shellpoint’s 
motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ FCRA and CCRAA claim is DENIED.  
 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED and Shellpoint’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 
IN PART.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  November 4, 2024.  
  
WILLIAM ALSUP 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Case 3:23-cv-03476-WHA     Document 96     Filed 11/04/24     Page 9 of 9

Passage view · GavelSight