govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-3_21-cr-00080-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 
United States of America v. Jenna Lauren Noriega 
Case No. 3:21-cr-00080-01-TMB-MMS 
 
By:   THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. BURGESS 
PROCEEDINGS: ORDER FROM CHAMBERS 
Before the Court is Government's Expedited Motion to Stay Order and Conditions of Release (the 
“Motion”).1 In response, Noriega filed an Opposition to Motion for Stay (“Opposition”).2 For the 
following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and order s Noriega detained pending the 
resolution of the Government’s Motion to Revoke Order and Conditions of Release  (“Motion to 
Revoke”).3 
A. Background  
On January 20, 2023, Noriega was sentenced by this Court to 30 months’ imprisonment followed 
three years of supervised release for Distribution of Controlled Substances in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).4 Noriega began her period of supervised release on March 19, 
2024.5 A few months later, a Petition for Warrant of Arrest was filed setting out the following 
violations of Noriega’s conditions of release: 1) admitting to using heroin and methamphetamine, 
2) changing her residence without informing  United States Probation and Pretrial Services 
(USPO), 3) failing to report for scheduled drug tests, and 4) being terminated from her job and 
failing to inform USPO.6 A warrant for her arrest  was issued on  September 11, 2024, and  was 
executed on November 21, 2025.7 Noriega remained at large for over a year. 8 On November 25, 
2025, five days after her arrest , Noriega was discovered  to have “concealed on her person  8.17 
grams of fentanyl powder and approximately 40 Suboxone strips.”9 Additionally, while on pretrial 
release in this case in 2022 , Noriega was discharged from the Akeela House (“Akeela”), an 
inpatient drug treatment center, for bringing heroin and methamphetamine into the facility.10 After 
hearing argument in a bail review hearing conducted on February 10, 2026, the Magistrate Judge 
 
1 Dkt. 202 (Government’s Expedited Motion).  
2 Dkt. 205 (Defendant’s Opposition).  
3 Dkt. 204 (Motion to Revoke Order and Conditions of Release). 
4 Dkt. 149 (Judgment) at 1–3. 
5 Dkt. 178 (Petition for Warrant of Arrest) at 1.  
6 Id. at 1–2. 
7 Dkt. 179 (Order on Petition for Arrest Warrant); Dkt. 180 (Arrest Warrant Returned). 
8 Dkt. 204 at 2. 
9 Id.; see also Dkt. 204-4 (Department of Corrections Incident Report). 
10 Dkt. 204 at 2; see also Dkt. 128 (Final Presentence Report) at 8. 
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granted Noriega’s release.11 The release order required Noriega to be released to a representative 
of Akeela to begin treatment.12  
B. Legal Standard 
Courts consider four factors when evaluating a request for a stay : “(1) whether the stay applicant 
has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will 
be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” 13  The first two 
factors of the standard are the “most critical.”14 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. §  3145(a)(1), the Government may move for the district court with original 
jurisdiction to revoke an order of release by a magistrate judge.15 The district court shall determine 
a motion for revocation of a release order promptly. 16 This Court reviews a magistrate judge’s 
pretrial release order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) de novo.17 
 
The Bail Reform Act requires that a defendant shall be released pending trial unless a judicial 
officer determines that the defendant’s release “will not reasonably assure the appearance of the 
defendant as required or will endanger the safety of any other  person or the community.” 18 If the 
judicial officer determines that no condition or combination of conditions can “reasonably assure” 
the defendant’s appearance or the safety of the community, the defendant shall be detained before 
trial.19  
C. Discussion 
 
The Government argues that the weight of the four factors outlined above supports granting a stay 
pending resolution of the Motion to Revoke.  
 
First, the Government contends that it has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the 
merits referencing the Motion to Revoke that was filed concurrently with the present Motion. 20 
The record, the Government contends, shows that Noriega “has a long history of failing to comply 
with court orders and engaging in drug trafficking .”21 The Government notes, in particular, that 
Noriega was only on Supervised Release for several months in this case before the Court issued a 
 
11 Dkt. 199 (Minute Entry for Bail Review Hearing ); Dkt. 2 00 (Order Setting Conditions of 
Release); Dkt. 201 (Release Order).  
12 Dkt. 201 (Release Order).  
13 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (applying “traditional” standard for stay in reviewing 
decision on petition for review of removal order).  
14 Id. at 434.  
15 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1). 
16 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). 
17 United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1191–93 (1990) (holding that district courts must engage 
in de novo review of magistrate orders granting or denying defendants’ pretrial release).  
18 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). 
19 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).  
20 Dkt. 202 at 2.  
21 Id.  
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warrant for violations of conditions of release, and Noriega subsequently remained at large for 
over a year.22  
 
In response, Noriega contends that the Government has not made a strong showing that it is likely 
to succeed on the merits, arguing that the present allegations of “failure to report to [USPO] and 
personal use/possession of controlled substances do not necessarily amount to a risk of flight or 
danger to another person in the community.”23 Additionally, Noriega argues that the Government’s 
concerns are addressed by the release plan, which directs that she be released to a residential dual 
diagnosis program where she will receive “constant oversight” along with mental health and 
substance abuse treatment to address her underlying issues.24 Moreover, Noriega argues that “[t]he 
allegation[ ] in the instant matter of failure to report to [USPO] . . . [does] not necessarily amount 
to a risk of flight[.]”25  
 
“The first two factors of the traditional standard are the  most critical. It is not enough that the 
chance of success  on the merits be ‘better than negligible. ’”26  With that in mind, the Court 
observes that Noriega was at large for over a year in this case after admitting to “relapsing and 
using heroin and methamphetamine.”27 USPO reported that Noriega’s “responsiveness decreased 
and stopped altogether when she failed to respond to multiple calls, voicemails, and text messages 
from the probation officer throughout August ” 2024. 28  The Court finds that, on balance, this  
critical factor weighs in favor of implementing a brief stay. 
 
Second, the Government argues that both the Government and the community will be irreparably 
injured absent a stay due to the “extreme risk that [Noriega] will flee and/or possess drugs when 
she is released to Akeela.” 29 Noriega argues that even if she violates, the Government is not 
“irreparably injured” because bail revocation procedures are set forth by statute and further, 
Noriega’s release does not hinder the Government’s ability to proceed with regards to  the 
supervised release petition.30  
 
The Government’s argument that the community would be irreparably injured absent a stay due to 
the risk of drug trafficking by Noriega is supported by Noriega’s long history of drug trafficking 
going back to 2010.31 Moreover, the Court finds that the Government would be irreparably injured 
absent a stay given the risk that Noriega may again abscond for  a lengthy period.  The Court 
therefore finds that this factor weighs in favor of implementing a brief stay.   
 
 
22 Id. 
23 Dkt. 205 at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
24 Id. at 2−3. 
25 Id. at 2 (citing United States v. White, No. 3:21-MJ-04070, 2021 WL 2155441, at *10 (M.D. 
Tenn. May 27, 2021) (“‘[F]light risk’ is . . . different from ‘risk of non-appearance.’”)). 
26 Nken at 434 (quoting Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
27 Dkt. 178 at 2; Dkt. 202 at 2. 
28 Dkt. 178 at 2. 
29 Dkt. 202 at 2.  
30 Dkt. 205 at 3.  
31 Dkt. 204 at 8. 
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Third, the Government contends that even if a stay results in jeopardizing Noriega’s placement at 
Akeela or otherwise causes a delay in her  treatment, that potential harm does not outweigh the 
other factors in favor of a stay .32 To that point, the Government argues that Noriega has already 
delayed her own treatment by choosing to abscond from supervised release for over a year. 33 In 
response, Noriega contends that she will be substantially injured if a stay is granted because she 
will lose her place in the treatment program best suited for her .34 The Motion to Revoke is 
predicated on Noriega’s previous history of absconding while in treatment and on supervision ; 
Noriega previously was discharged from inpatient drug treatment for bringing controlled 
substances into the same facility to which she is now scheduled to be released. 35 As a result, she 
has already delayed  and jeopardized  her own treatment. This factor also weighs in favor of 
implementing a brief stay. 
 
Fourth, the Government argues that the public interest is served by a brief stay due to the great risk 
of harm drug trafficking poses to the community.36 Specifically, the Government posits that there 
is a “special risk” that Noriega will “possess drugs and harm other residents of Akeela if she is 
released there[,]” arguing that Noriega has already been convicted of drug trafficking and her 
recent conduct shows she is determined to continue to engage in that conduct. 37 Noriega argues 
that the public interest lies in the current plan to release her to treatment at Akeela.38 She contends 
that the “community’s interest in a few extra months of jail time is far less compelling than its 
interest in ensuring [she] receives appropriate interventional treatment before she enters the 
community.”39 Further, Noriega argues that her behavior while in treatment will impact whether 
she will face additional time in jail at the disposition of this case.40 Though important, the public’s 
interest in Noriega receiving appropriate interventional treatment, does not out weigh the risk to 
the public if she absconds and continues to engage in drug trafficking, as she has chosen to do 
previously. The Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of implementing a brief stay. 
 
/ /  
 
/ /  
 
/ /  
 
/ / 
 
 
 
 
32 Dkt. 202 at 2.  
33 Id. 
34 Dkt. 205 at 3.  
35 Dkt. 204 at 2. 
36 Dkt. 202 at 3.  
37 Id.  
38 Dkt. 205 at 3.  
39 Id. at 3−4 (emphasis in original).  
40 Id. at 4.  
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D. Conclusion  
 
For the foregoing reasons, t he Government’s Expedited Motion to Stay Order and Conditions of 
Release at Docket 202 and Motion to Expedite Motion to Stay at Docket 203  are GRANTED.  
The release order and conditions of release entered by the Magistrate Judge on February 10, 2026 
are STAYED pending further order of this Court. Defendant’s response to the Motion to Revoke 
is due on or before  5:00 pm, February 13, 2026. A Hearing on the Motion to Revoke is set 
for February 19, 2026 at 10:30 AM in Anchorage Courtroom 1 before Judge Timothy M. 
Burgess. 
 
Entered at the direction of the Honorable Timothy M. Burgess, United States District Judge. 
 
DATE:  February 11, 2026.  
 
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