govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_23-cv-02456-2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
 
JANICE M. CRAWFORD, 
 
Plaintiff, 
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v. ) No. 23-cv-02456-SHM-atc 
 ) 
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PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, 
  
Defendant. 
 
 
  
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff Janice M. Crawford sues Defendant Pamela Bondi, 
Attorney General of the United States of America, alleging a 
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a).  Before the Court is Defendant Pamela Bondi’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75.) For the reasons below, 
the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion. 
 
I. Background1 
 In July 2017, Plaintiff Janice M. Crawford applied for a 
job as an administrative officer (“AO”) with the United States 
 
1 In her response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts in 
support of Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 
submits no facts of her own. She only disputes some of Defendant’s 
facts. (ECF No. 83-2.) The Court’s narrative relies on Defendant’s 
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Marshals Service (“USMS”) in Seattle, Washington (the “Seattle 
Position”). (ECF Nos. 75 at 2 & ECF No. 83 at 2.) Plaintiff 
interviewed for the Seattle Position with three people: Jacob 
Green, the Selecting Official and Chief Deputy United States 
Marshal; Charles Daniels, the Assistant Chief in the Office of 
Compliance; and Grace McGrath, an Administrative Officer in 
California. (Id.)  
 On September 11, 2017, Plaintiff was informed that she had 
not received the Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83- 2 at ¶ 50.) 
Another applicant, Wilma Thompson, had been selected. (ECF Nos. 
75 at 1 & 83 at 2.) In December 2018, Plaintiff filed an Equal 
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claim after she was not selected 
for a different, unrelated Property Management Specialist 
position with the USMS. (ECF Nos . 83 at 2-3 & 83 -2 at ¶ 59.) 
While reviewing the Report of Investigation about that claim in 
August 2019, Plaintiff represents that she, for the first time, 
read an affidavit in which a USMS employee, Steven Moody, said  
that Jacob Green learned of Plaintiff’s prior, unrelated EEO 
claims and did not hire Plaintiff for the Seattle Position 
because he “didn’t want to deal with that.” (the “Moody 
Affidavit”) (ECF No. 83 at 3.)  
 
statement of undisputed facts and on documents Plaintiff cites in 
the record.  
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 On September 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed an EEO claim alleging 
retaliation by the USMS for protected activity under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) for failing to select her 
for the Seattle Position. (ECF Nos. 75 at 11-12 & 83 at 10.) 
Plaintiff represents that filing that claim “start[ed] the [EEO] 
process.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s EEO claim was adjudicated by the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), which 
made its Final Agency Decision on March 30, 2023. (ECF No. 1-3.) 
In that decision, the EEOC rejected Plaintiff’s claim and 
concluded that management had offered legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring decision. (ECF No. 1-2 
at 2.)  
 Plaintiff filed this case on July 31, 2023, in accordance 
with the EEOC’s Final Agency Decision, which granted Plaintiff 
the right to sue in the appropriate U.S. District Court. (ECF 
No. 1.) On May 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss (the “May 29 Order”). (ECF No. 17.) In its May 29 Order, 
the Court equitably tolled the deadline for Plaintiff to initiate 
contact with an EEO counselor based on the allegations in the 
Complaint and determined that Plaintiff had adequately alleged 
retaliation. (Id.) 
 Since the May 29 Order, the parties have conducted discovery 
for more than a year.  On August 20, 2025, Defendant filed the 
pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75.) Defendant 
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argues that the record now shows that Plaintiff is not entitled 
to equitable tolling, and that, even if she were, no reasonable 
jury could conclude that Plaintiff was retaliated against for 
protected activity when she was not hired for the Seattle 
Position. (ECF No. 75.) Plaintiff responds that she remains 
entitled to equitable tolling based on the record and that the 
case should go to trial. (ECF No. 83.)  
 
II. Jurisdiction 
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Plaintiff brings a 
claim under Title VII. (ECF No. 1.) The Court has original 
federal question jurisdiction over that claim. 
 
III. Standard of Review 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court must 
grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a). The moving party must show that the nonmoving party, 
having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, lacks evidence 
to support an essential element of its case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(1); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th 
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Cir. 2018).  All inferences must be drawn in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant. Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of 
Dirs., 42 F.4th 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2022). 
“The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of 
a genuine issue of material fact as to at least one essential 
element of the non-moving party's case.”  Kurtz v. Sec'y of Army, 
No. 3:06-1209, 2009 WL 5066901, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 21, 2009), 
aff'd sub nom. Kurtz v. McHugh, 423 F. App'x 572 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).  Once 
the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to 
the non-moving party to set forth “specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Guptill v. City of 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, 160 F.4th 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2025) 
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e))).   
The Court “is not required to speculate on which portion of 
the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to 
wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts 
that might support the nonmoving party's claim.” InterRoyal Corp. 
v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). 
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is 
‘an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action’ rather than a ‘disfavored 
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procedural shortcut.’” F.D.I.C. v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 
289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327).   
 
IV. Analysis: Equitable Tolling 
A. Standard 
Defendant argues that this case is time-barred because 
Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights by timely 
initiating contact with the EEOC.  Plaintiff waited two years 
after she learned she had not been hired for the Seattle Position 
to initiate the EEO process by filing her EEO claim alleging 
retaliation. (ECF No. 75 at 3-12 .) Plaintiff does not dispute 
Defendant’s timeline, but argues that she is entitled to 
equitable tolling to allow her claim to proceed. (ECF No. 83 at 
10-11.)  
 “A plaintiff who alleges that a federal agency has engaged 
in race discrimination must initiate contact with an EEO 
counselor within forty-five days of the date of the alleged 
discriminatory act.”  Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 330 (6th 
Cir. 2007).  This forty-five-day limitation is a prerequisite to 
filing suit, but “it is subject to equitable tolling, waiver, 
and estoppel.” Id. 
 As the Court noted in its May 29 Order denying Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, the forty-five-day clock began to run when 
Plaintiff learned of the USMS’s decision not to hire her, not 
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when Plaintiff learned the decision might have been 
discriminatorily motivated. (ECF No. 17 at 9.) Plaintiff learned 
of the hiring decision on September 11, 2017, and did not 
initiate contact until September 6, 2019, when she filed her EEO 
claim to start the EEO process. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5  & 83-2 at ¶ 
50.) The Court must equitably toll Plaintiff’s deadline if the 
case is to proceed. 
“Equitable tolling is an issue of law suitable for 
disposition on summary judgment.”  Kurtz, 2009 WL 5066901, at *6 
(citing Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 494 (6th Cir.2009)).  
At the summary judgment stage, the decision to equitably toll 
the limitation period for filing a charge of discrimination is 
“within the discretion of the district court and should be made 
on a case-by-base basis.”  Black v. Columbus Pub. Schs., 211 F. 
Supp. 2d 975, 981 (S.D. Ohio 2002), aff'd, 79 F. App'x 735 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
Title VII and subsequent amendments are the exclusive 
judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal 
employment.  Steiner v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 434 (6th Cir. 
2003). In allowing federal employees to sue under Title VII, 
“Congress conditioned the government's waiver of sovereign 
immunity upon a plaintiff's satisfaction of rigorous 
administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations.”  
Steiner, 354 F.3d at 434–35 (citing McFarland v. Henderson, 307 
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F.3d 402, 406 (6th Cir.2002)).  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that tolling in a Title VII case should be allowed “only 
sparingly.”  Steiner, 354 F.3d at 435 (citing Irwin v. Dep't of 
Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).  The “procedural 
requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the 
federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague 
sympathy for particular litigants.”  Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. 
v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984). 
Courts consider the following five nonexhaustive factors 
when determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate in a 
Title VII case: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement; 
(2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; 
(3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice 
to the defendant; and (5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in 
remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement.  Dixon, 
481 F.3d at 331.  
B. Application 
1. Factors One, Two, and Five 
Factors one, two, and five favor Defendant.  Plaintiff has 
nowhere argued that she lacked notice, knowledge, or constructive 
knowledge of the filing or legal requirements for Title VII 
claims in general or for this claim in particular. (ECF Nos. 1 
& 83.) She timely initiated EOO counseling as a federal employee 
in at least three other cases alleging Title VII violations 
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before this one. See Crawford v. Skinner, 35 F.3d 565, 1994 WL 
443453 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1994) Crawford v. Winter, No. 08-2105 
(W.D. Tenn.), (ECF No. 12-8); and Crawford v. Carter, No. 13-
2439 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 12-9).  Prior experience with the EEO 
process is sufficient to infer a plaintiff’s knowledge of the 
relevant procedural requirements.  Kurtz, 2009 WL 5066901, at *6 
(“plaintiff therefore had experience with the EEO process and 
direct contact with an EEO Officer before any of the alleged 
incidents of retaliation took place. Because of this, it is 
unreasonable that Plaintiff remained ignorant of the procedural 
requirements of the EEO Office…and therefore the magistrate did 
not err in refusing to apply equitable tolling of the filing 
requirement”).  Based on Plaintiff’s experience in prior cases, 
the Court attributes relevant knowledge of the EEO process to 
Plaintiff. 
2. Factor Three 
The parties’ arguments center on factors three and four.  
Factor three addresses whether Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing 
her rights.  Plaintiff argues that she was diligent because she 
“had no reason to believe that she [w]as [sic] the victim of 
discrimination or reprisal at the time of her nonselection in 
2017.” (ECF No. 83 at 10.) Plaintiff filed an EEO claim to begin 
the EEO process about the Seattle Position a few days after she 
read the Moody Affidavit. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that she 
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diligently pursued her rights. (Id. at 10-11.) The Court agreed 
with Plaintiff when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and 
equitably tolled the filing deadline. (ECF No. 17.) 
Defendant argues that the record, as it has developed since 
the dismissal stage, should change the Court’s prior conclusion. 
(ECF No. 75 at 6-7.) First, Defendant shows that Plaintiff was 
generally suspicious about potential retaliation as of April 25, 
2017, when Plaintiff told the union president that Plaintiff  
“may be getting retaliated against” based on a desk audit. (ECF 
No. 83-2 ¶ 49.) That occurred three months before Plaintiff 
interviewed for the Seattle Position (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Second, 
Defendant shows that, when Plaintiff “did her interview, she 
thought she did well, and she was being told that she did well, 
but was not selected,” as Plaintiff stated to the EEO 
investigator later on. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.) Defendant also 
shows that two or three weeks after Plaintiff’s interview, 
another employee told Plaintiff  that he gave her a “good 
recommendation” for the Seattle Position.2 (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 
51.) Defendant shows that a different employee said he was  
 
2 Plaintiff appears to dispute whether that employee, Brian Sanders, 
actually gave Plaintiff a positive recommendation. (ECF No. 83-2 at 
21.) Any such objection is not relevant here, because whether 
Sanders gave a positive recommendation and whether Green considered 
it does not change what Sanders told Plaintiff. The Court does not 
consider Sanders’ statement for the truth of the matter asserted, 
but for its effect on the listener, Plaintiff.   
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“shocked” when Plaintiff was not selected. (ECF No. 75-34 at 1.)3 
None of that evidence was in the record or otherwise before the 
Court for consideration at the dismissal stage.  
Defendant argues that many things have emerged in the record 
that should have alerted Plaintiff to the possibility that she 
was being retaliated against before she learned of the Moody 
Affidavit.  Defendant argues that these new facts show that 
Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights. 
The Court said in its May 29 O rder denying Defendant’s 
motion to dismiss that there were two questions to consider in 
deciding Plaintiff’s diligence: whether Plaintiff diligently 
sought the information necessary to learn whether she should 
consider an EEO action and whether Plaintiff diligently initiated 
contact with an EEO employee after being put on notice that she 
had a potential claim. (ECF No. 17 at 13) (citing Amini v. 
Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2001)).   
Here, Plaintiff did not seek information about the Seattle 
AO employment decision until after she had read the Moody 
Affidavit, nearly two years after she learned she had not been 
 
3 Defendant also cites other evidence in the record surrounding a 
different EEO complaint Plaintiff was considering filing about a 
different position. (ECF No. 75 at 8-9.) Although that evidence 
might show a generally litigious disposition on the part of 
Plaintiff, it does not necessarily show that she could or should 
have suspected retaliation when she was not selected for the Seattle 
Position. 
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hired for the Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83 at 10.) In its May 
29 Order, the Court, considering  a motion to dismiss, reasoned 
that “it is difficult to determine how Plaintiff could have 
surmised that her non-selection was retaliatory.” (ECF No. 17 at 
15.) The evidence that has emerged in the record now shows that 
Plaintiff was or should have been on notice that there was the 
possibility she was subject to retaliation.  Plaintiff testified 
that “she thought she did well, and she was being told that she 
did well, but was not selected.” (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.) Two or 
three weeks after her interview—and well within the 45-day period 
to initiate contact with an EEO counselor—another employee told 
Plaintiff that he had given her a good recommendation for the 
Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 51.) Other employees were 
“shocked” that Plaintiff had not been selected. (ECF No. 75-34 
at 1.) These facts combine to show that Plaintiff could have 
surmised that her non-selection was retaliatory and that she was 
not diligent in pursuing her rights.  Although Plaintiff later 
discovered additional evidence of potential discrimination, that 
information was not critical to initiating the EEO process in 
the initial 45-day period.  “A plaintiff need not know all the 
facts of [her] case in order to comply with Title VII's 
administrative exhaustion requirement.”  Tenenbaum v. Caldera, 
45 F. App'x 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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Other courts have equitably tolled the deadline for a Title 
VII claim when the plaintiff has lacked information critical to 
her case. See Dixon, 481 F.3d at  330 and Seay v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 469 (6th Cir.2003). In those cases, however, 
“the defendant withheld information or provided misleading 
information that plaintiff needed to raise a suspicion that the 
defendant's actions were motivated by discrimination or 
retaliation.”  Taylor v. Donahoe, 452 F. App'x 614, 618 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (describing Dixon and Seay).  There, “the period was 
tolled, but only until [plaintiff] was aware of the possibility 
that he had suffered an adverse employment action because of 
illegal discrimination.”  Taylor, 452 F. App'x at  618.  Dixon 
and Seay are inapplicable here, where there is no allegation of 
employer wrongdoing in withholding information or providing 
misleading information.   
“To successfully raise a claim of equitable tolling, a party 
must show either fraudulent concealment of the critical facts 
that would lead one to know that [she] can sue, or a 
misrepresentation of those facts—whether made in good faith or 
not—that was calculated to induce a plaintiff to forego the right 
to sue.”  Tenenbaum, 45 F. App'x at 421 (cleaned up).  Plaintiff 
does not argue that she was prevented or hindered from inquiring 
or accessing evidence about her case.  Although it was possible 
that concealment or misrepresentation would emerge in the record 
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during discovery after the dismissal stage, the record does not 
contain any such evidence.   
Because Plaintiff was aware of the possibility that she had 
suffered an adverse employment action motivated by illegal 
discrimination when she learned she had not been hired for the 
Seattle Position, and because there is no evidence or allegation 
of employer concealment or misrepresentation that prevented 
Plaintiff from pursuing her rights, Dixon and Seay are 
distinguishable.  Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights.  
As the Sixth Circuit held in Amini, courts “will not, absent 
other circumstances weighing in favor of equitable tolling, 
suspend the running of the statute of limitations in a 
discrimination action until the plaintiff learns sufficient 
facts that would lead [her] to suspect that the defendant acted 
with discriminatory intent.”  259 F.3d at 502.  There are no  
such circumstances here.  Factor three favors Defendant.  
3. Factor Four 
Factor four addresses prejudice to the defendant.  “The 
Supreme Court has held that the absence of prejudice to the 
defendant employer ‘is not an independent basis for invoking the 
doctrine and sanctioning deviations from established 
procedures.’” Steiner, 354 F.3d at 437 (citing Baldwin Cnty. 
Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 152.  “Although absence of prejudice 
is a factor to be considered in determining whether the doctrine 
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of equitable tolling should apply once a factor that might 
justify tolling is identified, it is not an independent basis 
for invoking the doctrine.”  Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks 
Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir.1988)).  “Prejudice 
may only be considered if other factors of the test are met [by 
the plaintiff] and therefore can only weigh in [the defendant’s] 
favor.”  3799 Mill Run Partners, LLC v. City of Hilliard, Ohio, 
839 F. App'x 948, 951 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Townsend v. Soc. 
Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 2007)).   
“Prejudice for purposes of the doctrine of equitable tolling 
means the disposal of evidence and the inaccessibility of 
witnesses, the dimming of recollections and other disadvantages 
incident to the lapse of time.” Monnheimer v. Nielsen, No. 
1:08CV356, 2008 WL 5333808, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2008) 
(citing Salins v. City of Dayton, 624 F.Supp. 632, 634 (S.D.Ohio 
1985)). 
The Court need not consider prejudice to Defendant because 
no other factor favors Plaintiff.  Courts have denied requests 
for equitable tolling even when no prejudice to the defendant 
had been shown. See, e.g. Steiner, 354 F.3d at 437; Graham-
Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 562; Garrett v. Structured Cabling Sys., 
Inc., No. CIV. 10-55-DLB, 2010 WL 3862994, at *12 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 
28, 2010); and Amini, 259 F.3d at 502 
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Nevertheless, factor four favors Defendant.  At the 
dismissal stage, Defendant did not show and made no argument 
attempting to show that she would be prejudiced by the Court’s 
equitably tolling Plaintiff’s deadline to initiate the EEO 
process. (ECF No. 17 at 15.) Defendant argues now that she was 
prejudiced by Plaintiff’s delay in two ways.  First, Defendant 
argues that her access to witnesses was hindered, because three 
employee witnesses had left the USMS by January 2020, four months 
after Plaintiff first sought EEO counseling in September 2019. 
(ECF Nos. 75 at 11 & 83-2 at ¶ 60.) Plaintiff does not address 
this argument.4  The two-year delay in initiating the EEO process 
meant that Defendant had more difficulty accessing witnesses. 
Second, Defendant cites witnesses’ memory loss caused by 
the two-year delay. (ECF No. 75 at 11-12.) Defendant accurately 
cites the deposition testimony of Jacob Green, Eddie Laster, and 
Steve Moody that shows a failure of memory about certain events 
and details. (ECF No. 75 at 11-12.) Green ascribed his difficulty 
recalling events to the passage of time. (ECF No. 75-2 at 29). 
Moody testified that the fact he was deposed after his June 2022 
retirement affected his ability to recall key events.
5 (ECF No. 
 
4 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that “the only prejudice the 
Defendant can point to deals with witness recollection.” (ECF No. 83 
at 11.) 
5 Moody’s subsequent declaration, submitted by Plaintiff in her 
response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, clarifies some, 
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75-7 at 5.) Laster, at his deposition, also implied that the 
passage of time had hindered his ability to recall events. (ECF 
No. 75-18 at 33-34.)  
Memory naturally fades with time, and it is impossible to 
say definitively whether a witness’s memory would be better 
absent Plaintiff’s two-year delay.  A witness’s faded memory 
might also be due in part to the fact that the case had to 
proceed through an administrative process before reaching this 
Court. (ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff argues that these lapses in 
memory occurred in response to questions that strategically favor 
Defendant. (ECF No. 83 at 11-13).  However, the Court must 
consider the fact that three key witnesses attributed their lack 
of memory to the passage of time, potentially prejudicing 
Defendant and hindering the case, given Plaintiff’s two-year 
delay in initiating the EEO process.   
The heightened difficulty of accessing witnesses and the 
fading memory of other witnesses prejudice Defendant.  
4. There Are No Extenuating Circumstances  
All of the factors weigh against equitable tolling in this 
case.  Plaintiff knew the procedures for initiating the EEO 
process, she suspected or should have suspected she was 
potentially being retaliated against when she was not selected 
 
but not all, of the gaps Defendant cites in Moody’s memory during 
his deposition. (ECF No. 83-1.)  
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for the Seattle Position, and Defendant would be prejudiced by 
Plaintiff’s two-year delay in initiating the process.  Even in 
the absence of prejudice to Defendant, equitable tolling would 
be inappropriate.  
Because the Dixon factors are “not exhaustive, and equitable 
tolling is decided on a case-by- case basis, this inquiry must 
consider any additional, relevant factors.”  Garrett, 2010 WL 
3862994 at *12.  The parties have cited no additional factors, 
and the Court finds none relevant here. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.  After 
full consideration of the record, the Court finds that all of 
the Dixon factors weigh against equitably tolling Plaintiff’s 
filing deadline.  Because Plaintiff did not initiate the EEO 
process within forty-five days after learning she had not been 
hired for the Seattle Position,  the retaliation and reprisal 
claim is time-barred and dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.  
 
So ordered this 11th day of February, 2026. 
 
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.  
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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