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govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_22-cr-00091-3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
CRIMINAL CASE NO.
1:22-CR-00091-2-SCJ
ORDER
This matter appears before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) filed by the Honorable Linda T. Walker, now-retired United States
Magistrate Judge. Doc. No. [304]. 1 In the R&R, Judge Walker recommends that
Defendant Antwun Johnson’s Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. No. [120]) and
Motion to Suppress Statements (Doc. No. [121]) be denied.
The facts and procedural histor y are found in the R&R and are
incorporated by reference with some modification to address Defendant’s
objections. Doc. No. [304].
1 All citations are to the electronic docket unless otherwise noted, and all page numbers
are those imprinted by the Court’s docketing software.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTWUN JOHNSON,
Defendant.
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2
A s s t a t e d i n t h e R & R , i n J u n e 2 0 21, Captain Greg Sparacio of the
Cartersville Police Department was a ssigned to a Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) Task Force that was conducting a long-term wire-tap
investigation of drug activity in the me tropolitan Atlanta area. Doc. No. [272],
Jan. 6, 2025, Hrg. Tr., 12–13. 2 During the investigation, Sparacio identified
Kevin Bolton as an individu al involved in the distribu tion of narcotics in the
area,3 and he obtained a wiretap of Bolton’s cellphone. Id. at 13–15.
Between June 19 and June 23, 2021 , Sparacio’s team intercepted (by
wiretap) several calls between Bolton an d an unknown male la ter identified as
Defendant Antwun Johnson, who the ag ents determined was a supplier for
Bolton. Id. at 15. Bolton indicated in thos e calls that he wanted to purchase two
kilograms of cocaine (what Bolton re ferred to in coded language as a
“two-piece”) from the supplier for appr oximately $35,000 per kilogram in a
transaction planned for the morning of June 24, 2021, at the supplier’s apartment
on Buffington Road. Id. at 19–24, 26–27. Th e team devised a plan to use a pole
2 These page number citations are to the ac tual transcript pages, not the imprinted
numbers on CM/ECF.
3 Sparacio also testified in the affirmative th at an investigation revealed that it was
Bolton who had supplied narcotics to co-defendants, Deidra Anderson and
Guy Blackshear. Doc. No. [272], Hrg. Tr. 14:12–15:6.
Case 1:22-cr-00091-SCJ-CCB Document 322 Filed 02/11/26 Page 2 of 29
3
camera near Bolton’s house combined with physical and electronic surveillance
to follow Bolton to the suspected meet-up with the supplier. Id. at 15–19, 28, 30.
Based on information obtained in the intercepted calls, the team believed Bolton
was going to bring his aunt, Pamela Give ns, an individual agents knew from
previous investigation was a drug tester, to the transaction. Id. at 26, 31–32.
Implementing the above plan, the team set up a pole camera near Bolton’s
home that agents and officers could ac cess on their cell phones for real time
surveillance, while continuing to moni tor Bolton’s phone calls through the
wiretap. Id. at 30, 32, 73 . Team members also created a WhatsApp group chat
called “Kevin Bolton Search Warrant” to communicate about the operation, share
information learned through the wiretap and pole camera, and assist in their plan
to obtain and execute a search warrant on Bolton’s home. Id. at 73–74, 127. The
WhatsApp group included members of the Georgia State Patrol (“GSP”) who
were recruited to stop the vehicles of the suspects in the investigation. Id. at 60,
75. In addition to using the WhatsApp chat, DEA agents and GSP officers
involved in the operation communicated by telephone and mobile radio. Id. at
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4
33. The officers in communication that day included Motor Carrier Officer
Micahiah Swain4 and GSP Lieutenant Charles Chapeau. Id. at 33–34, 60.
On the morning of June 24, 2021, DEA agents conducted electronic
surveillance on Bolton as he picked up Givens. Id. at 31–32. GSP Officer
Tiffany Hayes Chambers, who was part of the group conducting the operation,
subsequently messaged the WhatsApp chat group that Bolton, accompanied by
Givens, was leaving his home in a van with an image of a bumblebee on its side.
Id. at 79, 85–86, 94. Upon receipt of this information, Sparacio followed Bolton’s
van to an apartment complex off Buffington Road in Union City. Id. at 34.
Although he temporarily lost sight of Bolton’s van as it entered and drove deeper
into the complex, Sparacio eventually located the van in the complex parking lot,
parked in front of one of the apartment buildings. Id. at 35–36, 38–39. Sparacio
parked his own vehicle around the corner from Bolton’s van where he could
observe the surrounding apartments. Id. at 35, 38, 87. From this vantage point,
Sparacio saw that Givens was on the ba lcony of one of the apartments in the
building. Id. at 39. Sparacio testified that the three in dividuals were inside the
4 Officer Swain clarified that while he is not a Georgia State Trooper, he is a “state officer”
and works for a division of the Georgia Dep artment of Public Safety. Doc. No. [272],
Tr. 154:17–24.
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5
apartment for approximately forty-five mi nutes, after which Bolton and Givens
emerged with Givens wearing a fanny pack or backpack purse. Id. at 94, 106–08.
At some point during his surveillance , Sparacio saw Bolton, Givens, and
Johnson meet at Bolton’s van in the parking lot. Id. at 53. Bolton and Givens then
left the complex in Bolton’s van, and th e a g e n t s s p l i t u p s o t h a t s o m e a g e n t s
followed Bolton’s van while Sparacio and other agents continued to surveil the
apartment Bolton and Givens had been seen leaving. Id. at 57–58. “[W]ithin 30 to
45 minutes, an hour at most,” Sparacio saw Johnson leave the apartment carrying
a small black duffle bag, enter a black Lexu s, and exit the complex. Id. at 58–59,
97. 5 Sparacio followed the Lexus while also contacting and requesting
Officer Swain to stop the vehicle. Id. at 98–99.
According to Sparacio, the plan for the operation was to have DEA agents
follow the Lexus until GSP troopers could catch up and initiate a traffic stop. Id.
at 61. Sparacio testified that “we needed the state patrol to ultimately stop the
vehicle and see if there was more narcot ics or if that was the money from our
5 The magistrate judge’s original finding of fact has been modified to address
Defendant’s objection to use of the word “s hortly” to describe the timeframe at issue.
Doc. No. [306], 8. Even with this change and after de novo review, the magistrate judge’s
probable cause finding remains correct.
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6
drug transaction.” Id. at 61. 6 When asked why he would have the Georgia State
Patrol come in and conduct the stop, Sparacio testified that it is because the
Georgia State Patrol have state-wide jurisdiction “so if we were to go through
multiple jurisdictions, then our surveillance are able to stay with us. And . . . we
don’t have to worry about different agency policies.” Id. He also testified that the
reason for the State Patrol is also that “[i]f someone were to run, the Georgia State
Patrol would handle it or however it fits their policy.” Id. Sparacio also testified
in the affirmative when asked” if as part of your operation, was the goal to effect
a traffic stop if traffic infractions were observed?” Id. a 61–62. When asked why,
Sparacio testified that “we were confident that a narcotics transaction had taken
place. And, one, we wanted to confirm the driver’s identity just to be a hundred
percent sure because someone could look like somebody . . . .” Id.
6 The magistrate judge’s original finding of fact has been modified to address
Defendant’s objection to the magistrate judge’s characterization of “the plan for
stopping Mr. Johnson’s vehicle as being for safety and to maintain the secrecy of the
investigation.” Doc. No. [306], 8. The Court is unable to uphold Defendant’s argument
that the change to the facts to show that the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was to be based
on a traffic violation “contradicts the Magistrate’s finding that Swain and Chapeau had
probable cause to effect the traffic stop based on collective knowledge of the drug
investigation.” Doc. No. [306], 9. This is because both reasons for probable cause can be
true. There can be probable cause based on collective knowledge and a second basis for
probable cause based on a traffic violation.
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7
Swain, who at the time was staged nearby with Chapeau awaiting further
instructions, was given a description of the Lexus, a license plate number, and
the direction the vehicle was traveling, and he was told there was a black duffle
bag in the vehicle. Id. at 164–65.
After following the Lexus for a shor t time, Swain caught up with the
vehicle and initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 130. Swain testified that he observed two
traffic infractions while following the Lexus: a window tint violation and failure
to maintain lane. Id. With his dashboard camera activated, Swain pulled behind
the Lexus, which safely pulled over to the side of the road. Id. at 131. The stop
occurred on West Lake Driv e in Fayette County. Doc. No. [296], June 27, 2025
Hrg. Tr. at 33. In addition to Swain, Chapeau was present at the traffic stop in his
own patrol car. Doc. No. [272], 136. 7 Video from Chapeau’s dashcam shows
Swain approach Johnson’s vehicle from the passenger side and ask him several
questions through the passenger window, including where he was coming from,
where he worked, and where he was going. Id. at 177. During the questioning,
Swain observed the black duffle bag inside the vehicle. Id. at 134. Swain asked
7 A third officer, Lieutenant Matthews, also subsequently arrived. Doc. Nos. [272],
Tr. 159:22–23; [296], Tr. 40:12–16.
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8
Johnson to exit the vehicle so he co uld write him a warning for the traffic
violations he observed, and Johnson complied. Id. at 135, 178.
Chapeau then walked up and, afte r noticing a bulge in Johnson’s
waistband, asked if Johnson had a firearm. Id. at 136–37, 182. Johnson answered
in the affirmative, and he was handcuffed and detained while the officers
removed his firearm and searched and further questioned him. Id. at 182, 185.
The officers questioned Johnson for approximately five minutes, asking about his
itinerary for the previous few days, among other things. Id. at 186.
About seven minutes into the stop, Swain asked if there was anything
illegal inside his vehicle and requested and obtained Johnson’s consent to search
the vehicle. Id. at 141–42. Swain went to his patrol car to print out a search consent
form, but when he emerged from the car, Johnson asked what would happen if
he did not consent to the search. Id. at 192. Swain, a trained K-9 handler,
responded that he would run his trained drug-sniffing dog around the car. Id.
Johnson subsequently revoked his consent to the search, and Swain had his dog,
Ozon, perform an open-air sniff of the Lexus. Id. at 143–44, 146, 193. The dog
alerted to the presence of narcotics near the front passenger seat of Johnson’s
vehicle. Id. at 146. Meanwhile, Chapeau deployed his tint meter on the windows
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9
of the Lexus and determined that the tint was darker than the legal limit. Id. at
144, 191.
Following the open-air sniff, Swain informed Johnson that there was a
positive indication of narcotics in the ve hicle and, as a result , that he was going
to search the Lexus. Id. at 147. Johnson denied there were narcotics in the vehicle,
but responded upon being questioned by Swain that he had some money in the
vehicle and did not know where the money had been, meaning it could have been
around narcotics. Id. The officers subseq uently searched the vehicle and seized
the duffel bag from the front pass enger floorboard, which contained
approximately $69,000 in cash. Id. at 1 53. Chapeau notified DEA agents about
what the officers discovered, and the agen ts responded with a request to detain
Johnson. Id. at 148, 153. Prior to the arrest, Swain did not smell alcohol or
marijuana on Johnson or in the vehicle or notice any indicia of impairment, and
he did not receive any information indicating that the car was stolen or that there
were any warrants or holds on Johnson. Id. at 178–79.8
8 There was also testimony that at 10:37 a.m., it was relayed to the team that an
intercepted call showed that Bolton had confirmed receipt of two kilos of cocaine to
another associate. Doc. No. [272], 111; however, there was only a proffer by the
Government that this phone call took place prior to the search of Defendant’s vehicle.
Id. at 109. There is also some evidence which indicates possible contemporaneousness.
See, e.g., Doc. No. [296], 55 (testimony in response to questing concerning 10:44:53 chat
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10
In March 2022, a federal grand jury indicted John son and six others on
drug distribution conspiracy charges related to the trafficking of narcotics in and
around the Atlanta metropolitan area. Do c. No. [1]. After his arraignment and
detention, Johnson filed motions to suppress evidence collected and statements
he made during the June 24, 2021 tr affic stop. Doc. Nos. [120]; [121]. The
magistrate judge held evid entiary hearings on the motions on January 6, 2025
and June 27, 2025. 9 See January 6, 2025 Docket Entry and June 27, 2025 Docket
Entry. The Parties then submitted exhibits and post-hearing briefs. Docs. Nos.
[299], [300], [301], [302].
On September 25, 2025, the magistrate judge entered a R&R
recommending denial of the pending motions to suppress. Doc. No. [304].
about money found). The magistrate judge did not use this evidence in the probable
cause analysis. The Court will do likewise and focus on the remaining facts.
9 The Court has also carefully reviewed th e transcript of the hearings before the
magistrate judge (Doc. Nos. [272]; [296]), exhi bits, as well as the briefing and the full
record. See United States v. Elsoffer, 644 F.2d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(holding that the district judge must also “read the transcript of the hearing before a
magistrate on a motion to suppress, before adopting the magistrate’s
recommendation.”); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), (adopting as binding precedent all decisions rendered prior to the close of
business on September 30, 1981 by the United States Cour t of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit).
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Defendant thereafter filed objectio ns to the R&R. Doc. No. [306].
Defendant’s objections to the R&R are: (1) there was no probable cause for the
stop of his vehicle as the magistrate judg e’s findings were inconsistent with the
record and the collective knowledge doctrine did not provide probable cause;
(2) law enforcement exceeded the scope of the traffic stop; and (3) all of
Defendant’s statements from the point that he was in handcuffs are inadmissible
at trial. Id.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
This Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which” a party
objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Co urt “may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” Id. And this Court may “receive further evidence or recommit the matter
to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
The Court now considers Defendant’s objections in turn.
II. OBJECTION 1
As stated above, Defendant’s first objection is that there was no probable
cause for the stop of his vehicle as the magistrate judge’s findings were
inconsistent with the record and the collective knowledge doctrine did not
Case 1:22-cr-00091-SCJ-CCB Document 322 Filed 02/11/26 Page 11 of 29
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provide probable cause. Doc. No. [306]. Defendant also st ates that “[t]he events
leading up to the stop of [him] do not indicate that law enforcement had probable
cause for [Motor Carrier Officer Swain] to believe that [Defendant] had just
completed and possessed proceeds from an unlawful drug transaction.” Id. at 6.
As recently stated by the Eleventh Circuit, “[p]robable cause renders a
seizure pursuant to legal process reas onable under the Fourth Amendment.”
Harris v. Hixon, 102 F.4th 1120, 1126 (11th Cir. 2024 ) (quoting Washington v.
Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 ( 11th Cir. 2022)). “Probable cause exists if the totality
of the circumstances could persuade a reasonable officer that there is a
‘substantial chance of criminal activity by the person who is arrested.’” Id.
(citations omitted). “A substantial chance is all that is required, not an actual
showing of such activity.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “Probable cause
is not a high bar.” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57
(2018). In addition, “[b]ecause behavior may seem innocent to the untrained eye,
courts must also consider the officer’ s observations and experience.” United
States v. Warren, 459 F. App’x 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2012).
After de novo review, the Court upholds the magistrate judge’s probable
cause determination (based on the drug-related criminal activity and collective
knowledge of all the officers involved in the stop) as correct in fact and law. The
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13
Court is unable to uphold Defendant’s “bare suspicion of criminal activity”
arguments, based inter alia on the absence of observation of Bolton or Givens
leaving their respective residences with a large amount of currency. The Court’s
independent research yields authority showing that probable cause can be found
even if a Defendant is not observed handling the contraband. Cf. United States v.
Irurzun, 631 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1980) 10 (“[A]lthough agents did not see
[defendant] handling cocaine, we find that probable cause existed for his arrest.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”); see also United
States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 662–63 (2d Cir. 1962) (“[Seller] set up a rendezvous
between his source of supply and agent . . . at 131st Street and Seventh Avenue.
Appellant turned up at the appointed place at the appointed time. This fact alone
is an important factor in determining probable cause.”). 11 And while Defendant
is correct that no one observed Bolton or Givens leaving with kilograms of
suspected cocaine, they did observe Give ns leaving with a small fanny pack or
backpack purse and the Defendant leaving with a small duffle bag. To the extent
10 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions rendered prior to the close
of business on September 30, 1981 by the Unit ed States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
11 The Court recognizes that this case is non-binding, persuasive authority.
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14
that Defendant’s argument ignores th ese aspects of the totality of the
circumstances, the objection is overruled.
As for the remainder of Defendant’s objection, while not entirely clear, it
appears that Defendant’s statement in his objection that the magistrate
“unquestionably accepted as fact” Spar acio’s testimony and arguments about
contradictions and discrepancies in Sparacio’s testimony, goes to the
magistrate judge’s credibility determinations. Doc. No. [306], 7,
By the way the magistrate judge wrote the factual section of the R&R, it
can be implied that the magistrate judg e accepted Sparacio’s testimony despite
Defense Counsel’s attempts to show inconsistent statements through a
comparison of the hearing testimony an d the testimony at a Fayette County
magistrate court/state-le vel hearing. And while Defendant did point to
contradictions/discrepancies in Sparac io’s testimony (i.e., concerning whether
the surveillance officers saw Bolton an d Givens walk into the building and
whether Defendant was under arrest at the time Sparac io went to the scene),
there was nothing to indicate intentional deception as even the Eleventh Circuit
recognizes in its pattern jury charge concerning impeachment of witnesses due
to inconsistent statements that “a simple mistake doesn’t mean a witness wasn’t
telling the truth as he or she remember s it.” Eleventh Cir. Pattern Jury
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15
Instructions (Criminal Cases) Instructio n No. B6.1 (2025); cf. Sims v. United
States, No. 1:08-CR-0209-CC-JSA, 2013 WL 1773817, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2013),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:08-CR-0209-2-CC, 2013 WL 1773726
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2013) (“[A]ll Petitioner points to as proof of perjury are [the
witness’s] prior allegedly inconsistent statements. But these statements do not
mean that [the witness’s] trial testimony was false . . . .”).12 The fact that Sparacio
also attempted to make an explanation of possible misunderstanding (Doc. No.
[272], 103:20) is also taken into account. Cf. Palmer v. Robbins, No. 4:19-CV-167,
2023 WL 113049, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-10433, 2023 WL 5786381
(11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) (“While [witness’s] inconsistent statements certainly
would be a basis for the jury to question his credibility, it is entirely within the
jury’s discretion to accept [the witnes s’s] explanation at trial for his earlier
conflicting statements and find him credible.”).
“‘[T]o adequately determine the credibility of a witness . . . the fact finder
must observe the witness.’” United States v. Powell, 628 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.
2010) (citing Louis v. Blac kburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 11 10 (5th Cir. 1980)). “This
12 The Court recognizes that “this Circuit’ s pattern instructions, while a valuable
resource, are not binding law.” United St ates v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1324 (11th Cir.
2015).
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requirement is satisfied ‘either by the di strict judge accepting the determination
of the magistrate after reading the record, or by rejecting the magistrate’s decision
and coming to an independent decision after hearing the testimony and viewing
the witnesses.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the Court has read the record 13 and after reading the record, the
magistrate judge’s credibility determinations (as implied by the way the
background facts were written) are accepted. 14 The Court is not required to
rehear the testimony on which the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations are based to make an independent evaluation of credibility.
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980). 15
13 “The statutory obligation of the district co urt to give independent consideration to
those portions of the R&R to which objection is made does require the court to consider
the actual testimony relevant to the objections, and not merely the R&R.” United States
v. Dorvilus, 357 F. App’x 239, 245 (11th Cir. 2009).
14 In making this determination, the Court draws guidance from the case of Thompson
v. Wainwright, 784 F.2d 1103, 1105 (11th Ci r. 1986) in which the Eleventh Circuit
appeared to reject a litigant’s request fo r remand because the magistrate judge’s R&R
did not contain “specific credibility choices.” In Thompson, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
“[a]lthough it is true the magistrate did not articulate detailed findings on every
disputed fact, the Report and Recommendation clearly states his findings, supported by
record references . . . .” Id. Similarly, here, the R&R’s findings are supported by record
references.
15 While the Court recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 636 provides the option of recommitting
this matter to the magistrate judge for direct credibility findings, such is not an option,
here, due to the retirement of the formerly assigned magistrate judge. See also Louis v.
Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1109 (5th Cir.1980) (“[T ]he district judge should not enter an
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17
Further even if the credibility arguments were sustained (which this Court
does not do), the Court finds that the Go vernment’s arguments (Doc. No. [300],
9–11) regarding an alternative basis for probable cause for the stop of Defendant’s
vehicle are correct. The Court finds that there was probable cause to stop
Defendant’s vehicle based on the tw o traffic violations observed by
Officer Swain: weaving/failure to maintain lane and window tint in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1. 16 Georgia courts have held under Georgia law that
order inconsistent with the credibility choices made by the magistrate without
personally hearing the live testimony of the witnesses whose testimony is
determinative.”).
16 The Eleventh Circuit has recently clarified that only reasonable suspicion is needed
for a traffic stop as follows:
A traffic stop is a seizure with in the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10,
116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). And to comply
with the Fourth Amendment , an officer must have
reasonable suspicion. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54,
60, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (“All parties
agree that to justify [a traffic stop], officers need only
reasonable suspicion[.]” (quo tation omitted)). In other
words, an officer making a stop must have “a particularized
and objective basis for suspec ting the person stopped of
criminal activity.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396,
134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (alteration
adopted) (quotations omitted). Even minor traffic violations
qualify as criminal activity.
United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 880 ( 11th Cir. 2022); see also id. n.15 (“But the
Supreme Court has since made clear that reason able suspicion is all that is required.”)
(citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)).
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18
“weaving within a lane may be justificat ion for a traffic stop because it could
indicate that the driver is under the infl uence of alcohol.” State v. Durr, 274 Ga.
App. 438, 439, 618 S.E.2d 117, 119 (2005) ; see also United States v. Cooper, 133
F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[L ]aw enforcement ‘may stop a vehicle when
there is probable cause to believe that the driver is violating any one of the
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations relating to the
operation of motor vehicles.’”) (citing Unit ed States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937,
940 (11th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the district court did not err in finding traffic stop for weaving
valid).
Next, the Defendant asserts that it was only a suspicion on the part of law
enforcement and “never proven as fact” that the telephone conversation between
Bolton and at the time, an unknown individual, was for the purpose of arranging
a purchase of cocaine and that “two-pie ce” clearly meant a purchase of cocaine
or that Givens was a drug tester. Doc. No. [306], 7.
A review of the record shows that Sparacio was asked, in his capacity as a
DEA Task Force officer, to testify to what he found relevant from the phone calls
that used coded language. Doc. No. [272 ], Tr. 19. The Eleventh Circuit has held
that even if an officer “had testified regarding the meaning of specific code words
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19
in the intercepted calls, his testimony would have been proper lay testimony
under our case law.” United States v. Jones, 657 F. App’x 938, 946 (11th Cir.
2016).17 The Eleventh Circuit has also held that “an officer’s investigation can
provide sufficient foundation for an opinion that would otherwise require
technical expertise.” United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir.
2017).
In light of this authority, Defendant’s objections to Sparacio’s testimony
concerning the coded language and Givens as a tester are OVERRULED.
III. OBJECTION 2
As stated above, Defendant’s second objection is that law enforcement
exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. Doc. No. [306].
“Even if the police have re asonable suspicion to ma ke a traffic stop, they
do not have unfettered authority to detain a person indefinitely.” United States
v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 881 (11th Cir. 2022). “The detention is ‘limited in scope
and duration.’” Id. (citation omitted). “And officers cannot unlawfully prolong a
17 The Court recognizes that at least one cour t has held that Eleventh Circuit opinions
have been mixed. See United States v. Jefferson, No. 6:18-CR-59-ORL-31GJK, 2018 WL
6249848, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2018), aff’d, 824 F. App’x 634 (11th Cir. 2020). That
said, the Court accepts the above-stated unpublished opinion for purposes of the
pending motion to suppress and INSTRUCTS the Parties to provide additional briefing
during the motions in limine stage of the case for purposes of trial objections and rulings.
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20
stop.” Id. “Unrelated inquiries are permitted so long as they do not add time to
the stop.” Id. at 882. Since a dog sniff is aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing, “using a dog to sear ch for contraband is not related” to a
stop’s purpose. Id. “[C]ourts must look at what an officer actually does: if he can
complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time
reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.” 18 Id. (citation modified,
citations omitted, quotations omitted). And “a traffic stop prolonged beyond that
point is unlawful.” Id. (citation omitte d). And the length of time a stop is
prolonged is immaterial. Id. at 884.19
“The proper standard for addressing an unlawfully prolonged stop, then,
is this: a stop is unlawfully prolonge d when an officer, without reasonable
suspicion, diverts from the stop’s purpose and adds time to the stop in order to
investigate other crimes.” Id. “In other words, to unlawfully prolong, the officer
must (1) conduct an unrelated inquiry aimed at investigating other crimes (2) that
adds time to the stop (3) without reasonable suspicion.” Id.
18 “The mission of a traffic stop is ‘to addr ess the traffic violation that warranted the
stop and attend to related safety concerns [.]’” Campbell, 26 F.4th at 882 (citation
omitted).
19 In light of this authority, it is unclear if the United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1146
(11th Cir. 2004) opinion primarily relied upon by the Government contains the correct
legal standard for purposes of this case.
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21
In his objection, Defendant appears to challenge the following actions by
the officers as unreasonably prolonging the stop: the search for weapons; the
attempt to get Defendant to consent to a search of the vehicle; testing of the
window tint thirteen minutes into the st op; and conducting an open-air search
with the dog. Doc. No. [306].20
After review, the Court aligns with a recent unpublished Eleventh Circuit
opinion which recognizes that a stop ca n have two purposes when there is an
extensive law enforcement investigatio n of drug activities (including
surveillance and intercepted calls) and a stop for a traffic violation pursuant to
an arrangement with a local officer with a drug sniffing dog. See United States v.
Martin, No. 24-11258, 2025 WL 1122683, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025) (“It is clear
in this case that the officer’s purpose in conducting the stop was twofold: first, to
investigate the officer’s reasonable susp icion of a window tint violation, and
second, to investigate the officer’s reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was
transporting illegal drugs.”). Similarly, here, the circumstances show that the
20 Defendant also asserts that “[i]t was not obvious from the dashcam video of the stop
if Swain ever checked Mr. Johnson’s driver’s license or checked for active warrants or
inspected his registration and proof of insurance.” Doc. No. [306], 13. However,
Officer Swain’s testimony provided confirmati on that he used his computer to check
license, registration, warrants, and insurance status. Doc. No. [272], Tr. 190, 199.
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22
stop at issue had two purposes: (1) to investigate the officer’s reasonable
suspicion for weaving within the lane an d a window tint violation and (2) to
investigate the officers’ reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity.21
During the stop at issue, it was permissible for Officer Swain to ask routine
questions about Defendant’s itinerary, locate Defendant Johnson outside the car,
and to search for weapons. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 885 (11th
Cir. 2022) (“Generally speaking, questions about travel plans are ordinary
inquiries incident to a traffic stop.”); United States v. Chandler, No. 24-10660,
2025 WL 85338, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (“The lawful duration of a valid
traffic stop is initially determined by the stop’s ‘mission,’ which is to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.
And ‘officers conducting a traffic stop may take such steps as are reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety.’ Ensuring officer safety ‘stems from the
mission of the stop itself.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza,
981 F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Drug dealing is known to be extremely
violent, and [patting a defendant down after he exited his truck] was a reasonable
way for the agents to protect themselv es from a possible concealed weapon.”);
21 The Court finds that there was reasonable suspicion even without considering the
two challenged statements of Captain Sparacio.
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23
Martin, 2025 WL 1122683, at *3 (“We hold that the officer permissibly stopped
[the defendant’s] car on the basis of his reasonable suspicion of a window tint
violation, and permissibly asked routine questions related thereto for more than
5 minutes during which time he had relocated [the defendant] out of the car and
into a location less risky to the safety of the officer.”); Chandler, 2025 WL 85338,
at *3 (“Given the danger to officers inhe rent in traffic stops, [the officer] was
permitted as part of his mi ssion in the stop to take the ‘negligibly burdensome
precaution’ of asking [the defendant] to exit the car so that he could address [the
defendant’s] traffic violation.”) (citations omitted).
22
Officer Swain’s testimony that Defendant Johnson was giving
inconsistent/conflicting answers was also a reasonable basis for further
investigation. Cf. United States v. Ha rris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Paul, 565 F. App’x 780, 783 (11th Cir. 2014).
After having observed the bag on Defendant’s front seat (that was the
subject of prior surveillance communicated on the group chat), Officer Swain also
permissibly extended the duration of the stop to investigate a reasonable
22 The Court also notes that some of the extended time was based on Defendant’s
conduct of agreeing to a search and later revoking it, after Officer Swain returned to his
car to print the form.
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24
suspicion that Defendant Johnson was involved in drug related activity. Martin,
2025 WL 1122683, at *3 (holding that where the circumstances showed that
consent to search was declined and a K-9 was used to conduct a free air sniff of
the car, “the officer permissibly extended the duration of the stop to investigate
his reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was transporting illegal drugs.”).
“And of course, when the K-9 alerted, there obviously was probable cause
to arrest [the Defendant] and search his vehicle.” Martin, 2025 WL 1122683, at *3.
After de novo review, the Court concludes that the R&R is correct in law
and fact. To the extent that the alternative probable cause finding controls, based
on the traffic violations, the Court al so finds that law enforcement did not
unlawfully prolong or otherwise exceed the permissible scope of the traffic stop.
IV. OBJECTION 3
As stated above, Defendant’s third obje ction is that all of his statements
from the point that he was in handcuffs are inadmissible at trial. Doc. No. [306].
More specifically, Defendan t asserts that “[f]rom th e point where Mr. Johnson
was first handcuffed during the stop and forward, he was in custody and
deprived of his freedom of action under the totality of the circumstances as he
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25
was not free to end the encounter and leave.” Doc. No. [306], 14. 23Defendant
states that “[t]his is because a reasonable person associates with handcuffing with
formal arrest.” Id.
The Government did not brief the issue, but the transcript shows that at
the January 2025 hearing, the Government acknowledged that “at some point
during this police encounter, it goes from [the defendant] being
detained . . . because he had a weapon . . . [and] there is an argument
that . . . that the detention went to an arrest, a formal arrest.” Doc. No. [272], 5–6.
The Government acknowledges that th e Court will not hear Miranda on the
video evidence. Id. at 6. “[T]he Government concedes that from the time that [the
Defendant] was arrested, any custodial in terrogation, any of those statements,
the Government does not plan to use an y of those statements [for which] no
Miranda was provided.” Id. at 6. The Government did indicate that it planned to
use the pre-custody statements, however. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[n]o brightline test separates an
investigatory stop from an arrest.” United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576
23 The R&R states that the Defendant only raised “fruit of the poisonous tree”
arguments before the magistrate judge. Do c. No. [304], 14. However, because Miranda
was raised at the hearing (Doc. No. [272], Tr. 6), the Court will proceed with
consideration of the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) arguments.
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26
(11th Cir. 1995). “Instead, whether a seizure has become too intrusive to be an
investigatory stop and must be considered an arrest depends on the degree of
intrusion, considering all the circumst ances.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has
“concentrated on the public interest served by the seizure, the nature and scope
of the intrusion, and the objective facts relied upon by the officers.” Id. 24 “[A]n
investigatory stop is not an arrest despite the fact that a reasonable person would
not believe he was free to leave.” Id. (emphasis omitted). “In addition, this Court
has said the fact that police handcuff the person or draw their weapons does not,
as a matter of course, transform an investigatory stop into an arrest.” Id.
24 In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit described the standard for traffic
stops as follows:
Ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes
of Miranda, unless the stopped motorist is subjected to
treatment during the traffic stop that amounts to a restriction
of freedom to a degree associated with a formal arrest.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150,
82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). In determining whether a defendant’s
freedom was curtailed “to a degree associated with formal
arrest,” we consider the totali ty of the circumstances,
including whether the office rs brandished weapons or
touched the defendant, whether the officers used a language
or tone indicating that compliance with their orders could
be compelled, and the location and length of the detention.
United States v. Luna–Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th
Cir.2010).
United States v. Ubaldo-Viezca, 398 F. App’x 573, 579 (11th Cir. 2010).
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After review, the Court is unable to agree with Defendant’s argument that
the first time that he was placed in ha ndcuffs to remove the weapon from his
person, he was in custody so as to require the warning of his constitutional rights
under Miranda.25 As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, “[a]lthough a person would
not feel free to ignore the directive to pu ll over or leave a tr affic stop, ordinary
traffic stops are more like Terry stops, which are not subject to Miranda, than
formal arrests.” United Stat es v. Tercero, 859 F. App’x 506, 508 (11th Cir. 2021)
(citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 4 20, 436-40 (1984)); cf. United States v.
Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The investigatory stop did
not become an arrest merely because the agents . . . patted [the defendant] down
after he exited his truck . . . .”).
In addition, as stated above, the Elev enth Circuit “has said the fact that
police handcuff the person or draw their weapons does not, as a matter of course,
transform an investigatory stop into an arrest.” Blackman, 66 F.3d at 1576.
Especially in light of the video showing th at the officers told Defendant that he
was just being detained until they could get the gun off of him. See Gov’t Ex. 14.
25 “[T]he central principle established by [Miran da is]: if the police take a suspect into
custody and then ask him questions without informing him of the rights enumerated
above, his responses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his guilt.”
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
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The Court finds that the nature of th e traffic stop changed after the K-9
alerted, Defendant’s vehicle was sear ched, and the bag subject to prior
surveillance was opened. There was probable cause to arrest Defendant for a
drug crime and Defendant was handcuffed a second time with three officers on
scene. These circumstances were sufficien tly coercible to render Defendant in
custody for Miranda purposes. See United States v. Johnson, No. 24-14083, 2026
WL 84476, at *6 (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (“Traffic stops may evolve, however, and
the protections of Miranda must be observ ed ‘as soon as a suspect’s freedom of
action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’”) (citation omitted);
United States v. Vanderlinde, 140 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1290 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (“[T]he
encounter between the defendant and law enforcement was a Terry stop that did
not ripen into an arrest until some point after cocaine was discovered on his
person, at which time probable cause existed to support an arrest.”). Any
statements made after the second handcu ffing (post-search of the vehicle) are
suppressed. United States v. Taylor, 9 35 F.3d 1279, 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2019), as
corrected (Sept. 4, 2019) (“The ‘exclusi onary rule’. . . operates to bar the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
After de novo review, the R&R (Doc. No. [304]) is ADOPTED with
modification as indicated herein as the Order of the Court as correct in law and
fact. Defendant’s objections (Doc. No. [306]) are OVERRULED in part and
SUSTAINED IN PART. The Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. No. [120]) is
DENIED. The Motion to Suppress Statements (Doc. No. [121]) is DENIED IN
PART AND GRANTED IN PART. All statements of Defendant made after the
second handcuffing (post-search) are suppressed. The statements occurring prior
to such time are not suppressed as the evidence shows that said statements were
voluntarily made.
A trial date will be scheduled at a later time by the Courtroom Deputy
Clerk.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of February, 2026.
___________________________________
HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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