govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_24-cv-02077-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
 
MARK T. STINSON, 
 
Plaintiff, 
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v. ) No. 2:24-cv-02077-SHM-tmp 
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JUDGE JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR., 
DAMON KEITH GRIFFIN, NATHAN 
PATRICK BROOKS, ARTHUR E. 
QUINN, PATRICK E. STEGALL, 
LARRY C. MILLER, CHANCELLOR 
JOEDAE L. JENKINS, RICKY E. 
WILKINS, ARCHIE SANDERS, 
BETTY WILLIAMS, AND NATHAN 
BURTON, 
  
Defendants. 
 
 
  
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISMISSING CASE 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE  
Before the Court are three Report and Recommendations issued 
by the Magistrate Judge (ECF Nos. 41, 50, 65) recommending that 
Plaintiff Mark T. Stinson’s Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) 
(ECF No. 16) be dismissed and that several Motions Plaintiff has 
filed (ECF Nos. 38, 48, 59-63) be denied. Also before the Court 
are Motions Plaintiff has filed since the last Report. (ECF Nos. 
66, 67, 69.) Plaintiff has only filed timely objections (ECF No. 
43) to the Report recommending that his Complaint be dismissed 
(ECF No. 41). 
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For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s objections to 
the Report recommending that his Complaint be dismissed are 
OVERRULED, and the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report are ADOPTED, as modified in this Order. This case 
is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.   
Plaintiff’s untimely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
Reports recommending that Plaintiff’s Motions (ECF Nos. 38, 48, 
59-63) be denied are deemed WAIVED, the Magistrate Judge’s Reports 
are ADOPTED, and the Motions are DENIED. Plaintiff’s remaining 
Motions (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69.) are DENIED AS MOOT.  
I. Background 
In December 2023, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed 
several complaints in the Southern District of Florida. (ECF No. 
14.) On January 11, 2024, U.S. District Judge Roy K. Altman 
ordered the cases consolidated and directed Plaintiff to file a 
single amended complaint.
1 (ECF No. 14.) On January 16, 2024, 
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (ECF. No 16.) On February 
5, 2024, Judge Altman found venue improper in the Southern 
District of Florida and ordered Plaintiff’s claims against the 
Tennessee Defendants severed and transferred to the Western 
District of Tennessee. (ECF No. 28.)  
 
1 Plaintiff paid the filing fee, at minimum, for the Southern District of 
Florida case into which his other cases in that District were consolidated. (ECF 
No. 5.)  
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Plaintiff’s instant Complaint is one of many filed in or 
transferred to the Western District of Tennessee addressing his 
2017 federal criminal trial for various tax crimes, which led to 
his conviction and a sentence of imprisonment, and a 
contemporaneous 2017 Shelby County Chancery Court proceeding
2 
affecting the business entity through which Plaintiff was found to 
have committed tax crimes in Plaintiff’s federal trial.3 See United 
States v. Mark Stinson, No. 2:16-cr-20247-001-JTF (ECF Nos. 83 & 
85).  
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, as he has previously, 
that many of the individuals in Plaintiff’s federal criminal trial 
 
2 The exact nature of the Chancery Court proceeding (CH-17-0002) is unclear from 
the instant Complaint. However, another case Plaintiff has filed suggests that 
the proceeding arose from a dispute between Plaintiff and a party from whom 
Plaintiff’s business had taken out a loan. The dispute turned on the proper 
recipient of the business’s accounts receivable from a client. The Chancellor 
ordered the client to pay the monies to the Chancery Court Clerk and Master 
until the dispute had been resolved. Ultimately, the Chancellor ordered the 
monies paid to the lender rather than to Plaintiff or his business. See 25-2195, 
ECF No. 1 at 4, 6,11, 36. 
3 Plaintiff’s other cases filed in or transferred to the Western District of 
Tennessee arising out of the same set of facts and asserting substantially the 
same claims against the same defendants include: (1) 19-2867 (§ 1983 claim 
against Defendants Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins); (2) 
20-2886 (§ 1983 claim against Defendants Wilkins and Sanders); (3) 21-2128 (§ 
1983 and Bivens claims against Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, 
Jenkins, and Miller); (4) 21-2148 (§ 1983 claim against Fowlkes, Griffin, 
Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins, consolidated with 21-2128); (5) 22-2538 
(unspecified civil rights claim against Williams); (6) 22-2576 (§ 1983 claim 
against Williams and Burton); (7) 22-2694 (§ 1983 claim and construed Bivens 
claim against Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, fMiller, Jenkins, 
Wilkins, and Sanders); (8) 22-2823 (§ 1983 claim against Williams and Burton, 
consolidated with 22-2576); (9) 24-2532 (§ 1983 claim against Fowlkes, Griffin, 
and Brooks); (10) 24-2533 (§ 1983 claim against Fowlkes and the Memphis U.S. 
Attorney’s Office); (11) 24-2870 (§ 1983 claim Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, 
Stegall, Miller, Jenkins, Wilkins, Sanders, Williams, and Burton); (12) 25-2292 
(§ 1983 claim against Brooks and Griffin). Plaintiff has collaterally challenged 
his conviction in the following § 2255 and § 2241 cases in the Western District 
of Tennessee: 18-2807 (§ 2255), 19-2035 (§ 2241), 21-2605 (§ 2255), 21-2526 (§ 
2255), and 22-2575 (§ 2255).  
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violated his federal constitutional and/or statutory rights. (ECF. 
No 16.) Plaintiff names as Defendants the federal judge who 
sentenced him, Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr.; the federal prosecutors 
who prosecuted him, Damon Keith Griffin and Nathan Patrick Brooks; 
the attorneys who represented him, Arthur E. Quinn, Patrick E. 
Stegall, and Larry C. Miller; and the witnesses who testified 
against him, Betty Williams and Nathan Burton. (ECF. No 16.)  
Plaintiff alleges, as he has previously, that individuals 
participating in the Chancery Court proceeding violated 
Plaintiff’s federal constitutional and/or statutory rights.
 (ECF. 
No 16.)  Plaintiff names as Defendants the Chancellor who presided 
over the Chancery Court proceedings, Chancellor Joedae L. Jenkins, 
and the attorneys who represented Plaintiff, Ricky E. Wilkins and 
Archie Sanders. (ECF. No 16.)  Plaintiff brings his claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971) against all Defendants in their official and 
individual capacities. (ECF No. 16.)  
On August 5, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued his first 
Report recommending that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 
41.)  Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report were due on 
August 19, 2025. Plaintiff filed timely objections on August 11, 
2025. (ECF No. 43.)   
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Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 19, 2025 
(ECF No. 38) and a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment on August 
28, 2025 (ECF No. 48). On September 4, 2025, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a second Report recommending that both Motions be denied. 
(ECF No. 50.) Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report were due 
on September 18, 2025. Plaintiff filed untimely objections on 
October 14, 2025 (ECF No. 56) and again on December 1, 2025 (ECF 
No. 62).  
Plaintiff then filed several Motions in November and December 
2025 (ECF Nos. 59-63). On December 19, 2025, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a third Report recommending that the Motions be denied. 
(ECF No. 65.) Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report were due 
on January 2, 2026. Plaintiff filed untimely objections on January 
5, 2025. (ECF No. 68.)   
Plaintiff filed several more Motions in December 2025 and 
January 2026 (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69).  
Plaintiff has filed timely objections (ECF No. 43) to the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 41) recommending that his 
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) be dismissed. Because Plaintiff’s 
objections (ECF Nos. 56, 62, 68) to the two Report and 
Recommendations (ECF Nos. 50, 65) recommending that Plaintiff’s 
Motions (ECF Nos. 38, 48, 59-63) be dismissed were untimely, those 
objections are deemed waived. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b)(2) 
(“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommend 
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disposition . . . a party may serve and file specific written 
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations . . . . 
Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s 
right to review.”) (emphasis added)).  
II. Standard of Review 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the 
federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district court 
duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 
598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 
858, 869–70 (1989)). For dispositive matters, “[t]he district 
judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 
disposition that has been properly objected to.” See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the evidence, 
the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate 
judge’s proposed findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1). The district court is not required to review—under a de 
novo or any other standard—those aspects of the report and 
recommendation to which no objection is made. See Thomas v. Arn, 
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court may simply adopt the 
magistrate judge’s findings and rulings to which no specific 
objection is filed. See id. at 151. 
Objections to any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition 
“must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern 
those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. 
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Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Each objection to the 
magistrate judge’s recommendation should include how the analysis 
is wrong, why it was wrong, and how de novo review will obtain a 
different result on that particular issue. See Howard v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A 
general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments 
previously presented and addressed by the magistrate judge, does 
not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the report and 
recommendation. Id. 
“Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal 
construction of their pleadings and filings.” Boswell v. Mayer, 
169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999). That liberal standard may 
require “active interpretation” in some cases. Franklin v. Rose, 
765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). However, pro se litigants must 
adhere to basic pleading standards, and courts are not required to 
develop allegations on litigants’ behalf. Martin v. Overton, 391 
F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004).  
III. Analysis 
The Magistrate Judge’s Report recommends that Plaintiff’s 
Complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), citing Apple 
v. Glenn. (ECF No. 41 at 1.) In Apple v. Glenn, the Sixth Circuit 
held that a district court is permitted to “sua sponte dismiss a 
[fee-paid] complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) . . .  when the allegations of a 
complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, 
frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” 
Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1198 (2000) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 
U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)).  
The Magistrate Judge finds that “[Plaintiff’s] complaint 
warrants sua sponte dismissal under Apple v. Glenn for at least 
two reasons.” (ECF No. 41 at 9.) First, “[Plaintiff’s] allegations 
of a broad conspiracy between federal and state court judges, 
federal prosecutors, and his attorneys to send him to jail so that 
they could steal his business plans for an online food delivery 
service are ‘totally implausible’ and thus deprives the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. Second, “[Plaintiff’s] complaint 
is no longer open to discussion because it is barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata.” Id.  
In his objections, Plaintiff clearly contests the Magistrate 
Judge’s determination that his Complaint is barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. (ECF No. 43 at 2.) Plaintiff does not appear to 
object specifically to the first ground the Report cites for sua 
sponte dismissal of the Complaint – that the factual allegations 
in the Complaint are so “totally implausible” that they deprive 
the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the Court 
liberally construes Plaintiff as objecting to the overarching 
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power of the Court to raise issues independently that would be 
grounds for dismissing his Complaint absent an appearance or 
response by Defendants and to dismiss his fee-paid Complaint on 
those grounds. (ECF No. 43 at 2.) (“The court is prejudicing 
Plaintiff because the Magistrate Judge is making the decisions for 
the Defendants which have been SERVE [sic] but have not appeared 
or responded.”)   
Construing Plaintiff’s objections liberally, they address the 
Report’s primary conclusion that the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint and that the Complaint 
must be dismissed sua sponte.    
A. The Court Has the Authority to Dismiss Sua Sponte Factually 
and Legally Frivolous Complaints Under 12(b)(1) 
Under Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, federal 
courts are not only empowered but obligated to dismiss cases sua 
sponte when they lack subject matter jurisdiction, irrespective of 
whether defendants have appeared, responded, or raised the issue. 
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess 
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 
(1994) (internal citations omitted). “For that reason, courts are 
‘obligated’ to assure themselves of subject matter jurisdiction 
sua sponte, whether a party raises the issue or not.” Lynch v. 
Tennessee, No. 3:16-cv-03034, 2017 WL 6462345, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 25, 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 
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U.S. 134, 141 (2012); see Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter 
jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua 
sponte.”). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the 
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(h)(3) (emphasis added).  
When subject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal 
question, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, rather than on diversity of 
citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Supreme Court has held 
that “‘it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal 
question should be presented.’” Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537 (quoting 
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31(1933)). “[F]ederal courts are 
without power to entertain claims otherwise within their 
jurisdiction” that present a “plainly unsubstantial” federal 
question. Id. at 536-37 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). “Constitutional insubstantiality for this purpose has 
been equated with such concepts as essentially fictitious, wholly 
insubstantial, obviously frivolous [,] and obviously without 
merit.” Id. at 537 (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
“[W]hen the allegations of a complaint are totally 
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of 
merit, or no longer open to discussion”, the Sixth Circuit has 
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held that “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Apple, 183 F.3d 
at 479 (citing Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–37).  
The Supreme Court has expanded on what it means for a 
complaint to be wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and 
devoid of merit warranting sua sponte dismissal.
4 Neitzke v. 
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “[A] complaint, containing as 
it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is 
frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 
fact.” Id.  
A claim that “lacks an arguable basis in law,” meriting sua 
sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is a 
“claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Claims of this type include “claims against which 
it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit . . . .” Id. 
at 327; see Odom v. Martin, No. 99-6208, 2000 WL 1176883, at *2 
(6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000)(“[T]he district court correctly dismissed 
[Plaintiff’s] action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . 
 
4 Although the Supreme Court has defined what it means for a complaint to be 
wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and devoid of merit in the context of 
sua sponte dismissals of in forma pauperis complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), 
the Sixth Circuit has routinely applied this definition in the context of Rule 
12(b)(1) Apple dismissals. See, e.g., Hassink v. Mottl, 47 F. App'x 753, 755 
(6th Cir. 2002) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint that “lacked an 
arguable basis in law” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1)) 
(citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325); Madkins v. City of Memphis, 20 F. App’x 335, 
337 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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. [Plaintiff’s] complaint is frivolous since all of the named 
defendants are immune from liability.”) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. 
at 327–28). 
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have found claims barred by claim 
preclusion and claims against private actors under § 1983 and 
Bivens to be legally frivolous, meriting sua sponte dismissal 
under 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Murphy v. United States, No. 05-2407-
B/P, 2005 WL 1923165, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2005) 
(“[Plaintiff’s] contentions are legally frivolous in this Court 
because they are based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ 
of seeking relief twice on the same claims or issues . . . they 
are inadequate to invoke this Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.”) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327); Liu v. Runyan, 
46 F. App’x 253, 254 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming Apple dismissal of 
§ 1983 claim against private actor not alleged to be a state actor 
because “[Plaintiff’s] allegations were not sufficient to invoke 
jurisdiction”). 
Claims that “lack an arguable basis in fact,” meriting sua 
sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, are 
“claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”
5 Neitzke, 
 
5 When evaluating a complaint for factual frivolousness, courts have “the 
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and 
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 
490 U.S. at 327. 
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490 U.S. at 325, 327. Claims of this type include “claims 
describing fantastic or delusional scenarios . . . .” Id. at 328.  
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have found allegations of “exotic 
torture methods,” government surveillance, and “nationwide 
conspiracies by federal officials, presidents, or public figures” 
to be “quintessential examples of fanciful allegations.” See 
Bardes v. Bush, No. 1:22-cv-290, 2023 WL 2364664, at **1, 8 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 6, 2023), affirmed as modified at 2023 WL 9318039 (6th 
Cir. Dec. 4, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 1061 (2024) (finding 
fanciful allegations where Plaintiff alleged that “President 
George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and others have used 
hypothermic torture . . . on him . . . [and] are in cahoots with 
Microsoft, Google, Apple, and the current or former CEOs of those 
companies to silence his research and writings, including through 
attempts to kill him.”); Bardes v. Cole, No. 1:24 CV 701, 2025 WL 
3628215, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025) (“Courts routinely 
dismiss frivolous complaints like this one, which allege 
nationwide conspiracies by federal officials, presidents, or 
public figures, but lack any coherent factual basis.”) 
Contrary to Plaintiff’s objections, there is considerable 
authority for federal courts to screen a fee-paid complaint such as 
this sua sponte to determine whether it is based on an indisputably 
meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contentions, 
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depriving the court of the subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the claims.  
B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed Sua Sponte Under 
12(b)(1) as Factually Frivolous  
The Magistrate Judge finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is 
factually frivolous, depriving the Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction, because “Plaintiff’s allegations of a broad 
conspiracy between federal and state court judges, federal 
prosecutors, and his attorneys to send him to jail so that they 
could steal his business plans for an online food delivery service 
are ‘totally implausible[.]’” (ECF No. 41 at 9) (quoting Apple, 
183 F.3d at 479).  
Plaintiff’s objections do not specifically contest this 
finding. In fact, Plaintiff appears to limit his objections to the 
finding that his Complaint is barred by claim preclusion. (ECF No. 
43 at 1.) (“[T]he Plaintiff . . . respectfully object[s] to the . 
. . Report and Recommendation (R&R) insofar as it concludes that 
the present complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”)  
The Court has liberally construed Plaintiff’s broader 
objection to the Court’s power to raise issues sua sponte that 
would constitute grounds for dismissing his Complaint in the 
absence of an appearance or response by Defendants as, in part, an 
objection to the Magistrate Judge’s factual finding. The Court has 
reviewed de novo a federal court’s authority to dismiss a 
complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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Plaintiff has made no other objection to dismissing his case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Apple as factually 
frivolous.  
The Court is not required to review those aspects of the 
report to which no objection is made and may simply adopt 
unobjected-to findings and conclusions. See Arn, 474 U.S. at 150. 
Therefore, the Court adopts the Report’s conclusion that the 
factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are so totally 
implausible as to deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction 
over the Complaint, warranting sua sponte dismissal of the 
Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and Apple.  
Because factual frivolousness is an independently sufficient 
ground for dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the Court need not reach the Report’s 
conclusions about the application of claim preclusion to 
Plaintiff’s Complaint or Plaintiff’s objections to those 
conclusions. For the sake of completeness, however, the Court will 
address the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s 
Complaint separately warrants sua sponte dismissal as legally 
frivolous and Plaintiff’s objections to that finding. 
C. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed Sua Sponte Under 
12(b)(1) as Legally Frivolous  
The Magistrate Judge concludes, in effect, that Plaintiff’s 
Complaint is legally frivolous, depriving the Court of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge concludes that 
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“[Plaintiff’s] complaint is no longer open to discussion because 
it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” (ECF No. 41 at 
9.) Plaintiff contests the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that his 
Complaint is barred by res judicata. (ECF No. 43 at 2.)  
On de novo review, the Court concludes that claim preclusion 
does not render Plaintiff’s Complaint legally frivolous in its 
entirety. Only one of Plaintiff’s prior cases has preclusive 
effect on Plaintiff’s current claims. That prior case does not 
preclude all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.  
All of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are nevertheless 
legally frivolous because they seek damages from (1) Defendants who 
are absolutely immune from civil liability or (2) private parties 
who do not act under the color of state or federal law as required 
for a § 1983 or Bivens claim. 
1. Claim Preclusion Does Not Render Plaintiff’s 
Complaint Legally Frivolous in its Entirety  
The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, provides 
that “[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the 
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or 
could have been raised in that action.” Federated Dept. Stores, 
Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).   
In the Sixth Circuit, a prior action precludes a subsequent 
action when four conditions are met: (1) the prior action resulted 
in a final judgment on the merits (“final judgment on the 
merits”); (2) the subsequent action is between the same parties or 
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their “privies” as the first action (“identity of the parties”); 
(3) the claim or issue in the subsequent action was actually 
litigated or should have been litigated in the prior action 
(“issue actually litigated”); and (4) the subsequent action 
involves the same causes of action or claims (“identity of the 
causes of action”). See Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771–73 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
The Magistrate Judge concludes that all four elements of 
claim preclusion are satisfied and that Plaintiff’s Complaint is 
barred in its entirety by Plaintiff’s prior actions. (ECF No. 41 
at 10–12.) Plaintiff objects to the conclusion that the “final 
decision on the merits” and “identify of claims” elements of claim 
preclusion are satisfied. (ECF No. 43 at 2, 4). In reviewing claim 
preclusion conclusions de novo, the Court need only address in 
detail the first element of claim preclusion: a final judgment on 
the merits.  
The Report states that “[Plaintiff] has filed several 
complaints in the Western District of Tennessee, all of which have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits” and cites specific 
cases that were “dismiss[ed] . . . on various grounds[.]”
6 (ECF No. 
 
6 The Report cites: (1) Stinson v. Fowlkes, No. 2:22-cv-02694-SHM-tmp, 2023 WL 
3938880, at *3-6 (W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s amended § 
1983 and Bivens claims against Judge Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, 
Miller, Wilkins, Sanders, and Chancellor Jenkins on various grounds), appeal 
dismissed, No. 23-5869, 2023 WL 9063672 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023); (2) Stinson v. 
Williams, No. 2:22-cv-02576-SHM-tmp, 2023 WL 146267, at *5-7 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 
10, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens claims against Williams and 
Burton on various grounds; appeal not filed). 
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41 at 10.) Plaintiff objects that “the R&R may have misapplied the 
‘final decision on the merits’ requirement,” although for 
inapplicable reasons.7 (ECF No. 43 at 4.)  
Only one of Plaintiff’s prior twelve actions8 – one that does 
include all the Defendants or claims in the instant case – 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits with preclusive effect 
on Plaintiff’s current Complaint.  
 Only One of Plaintiff’s Prior Cases Has Claim 
Preclusive Effect on Plaintiff’s Current Claims 
In eight of Plaintiff’s twelve prior cases in the Western 
District of Tennessee, including the two cases cited in the 
Report, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis 
(IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
9 In the instant case, 
Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. (ECF No. 5.) The distinction in 
paying status matters for application of claim preclusion. Under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), federal courts screen and sua sponte dismiss 
complaints filed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a) that are 
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B). Each of Plaintiff’s eight prior IFP cases was 
 
7 Plaintiff argues that the Report may have misapplied the “final decision on 
the merits” element because “a dismissal for lack of standing . . . is not a 
final decision on the merits for res judicata purposes.” (ECF No. 43 at 4.) None 
of Plaintiff’s prior cases was dismissed for lack of standing.   
8 See cases cited supra note 2.  
9 See 20-2886, ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 9, 2020); 21-2128, ECF No. 7 (W.D. 
Tenn. Apr. 19, 2021); 21-2148, ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2021); 22-2576, 
ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2022); 22-2694, ECF No. 7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 28, 
2022); 22-2823, ECF No. 35 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2023); 24-2870, ECF No. 8 (W.D. 
Tenn. Dec. 12, 2024); 25-2292, ECF No. 24 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2025). 
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dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).10 However, the dismissal of an action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “is not a dismissal on the merits, but 
rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under the in forma 
pauperis statute . . . [and] does not prejudice the filing of a 
paid complaint making the same allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 
504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)(emphasis added); see also Davis v. Butler 
Cty., Ohio, 658 F. App’x 208, 213 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Because the 
holding in Denton suggests that dismissal under § 1915(e) operates 
as an adjudication on the merits only as to future complaints 
filed in forma pauperis, . . ., we have reason to doubt the 
soundness of the district court's conclusion that Davis's second, 
paid complaint was barred by res judicata.”) Thus, under Denton, 
the IFP dismissals, including the two cases the Report cites, do 
not operate as final judgments on the merits with preclusive 
effect on the instant fee-paid Complaint, although the Complaint 
alleges substantially the same claims against substantially the 
same Defendants.  
Of the remaining four of Plaintiff’s twelve prior cases in 
the Western District of Tennessee, one was voluntarily dismissed 
 
10 See 20-2886, ECF No. 7 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2021); 21-2128 & 21-2148, ECF No. 
12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2021); 22-2576 & 22-2823, ECF No. 13 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 
10, 2023) (dismissing consolidated case with prejudice for failure to state a 
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); 22-2694, ECF No. 37 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 9, 2023); 24-2870, ECF No. 12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2025); 25-2292, 
ECF No. 30 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2025) (recommending dismissal for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 
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on Plaintiff’s motion under FRCP 41(a).11 The other three were 
involuntarily dismissed under FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute 
because Plaintiff had failed to comply with IFP requirements as 
ordered.12 An involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute under 
FRCP 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits” with 
preclusive effect unless the dismissal order states otherwise. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Bragg v. Flint Bd. Of Educ., 570 F.3d 
775, 777 (6th Cir. 2009) (“By its plain language, an involuntary 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) constitutes 
an adjudication on the merits and carries preclusive effect.”) The 
dismissal order in two of the three 41(b) dismissals expressly 
states that the dismissal was “without prejudice” and so has no 
preclusive effect on the current Complaint.
 13   
Only one of Plaintiff’s prior cases in the Western District 
of Tennessee constitutes a final adjudication on the merits with 
preclusive effect on the current Complaint: 19-2867, in which 
Plaintiff brought a § 1983 claims against Defendants Fowlkes, 
Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins in an unspecified 
capacity.  
 
11 See 22-2538, ECF No. 8 (W. D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2022) (dismissing case on 
Plaintiff’s Motion). 
12 See 19-2867, ECF No. 18 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2021) (dismissing case with 
prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with Court’s IFP order); 
24-2532, ECF No. 8 (Dec. 5, 2024) (dismissing case without prejudice pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with Court’s IFP order); 24-2533, ECF No. 9 
(Nov. 15, 2024) (dismissing case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) for 
failure to comply with Court’s IFP order) 
13 See supra note 12. 
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 Plaintiff’s Prior Case with Preclusive Effect 
Does Not Extend to All Defendants or Claims in 
the Current Case  
There are numerous obstacles to relying on Case No. 19-2867 
to bar the instant Complaint in its entirety.  
First, the instant Complaint includes claims against 
Defendants who were not parties to the first action and who cannot 
be regarded as in privity with parties to the first action. In the 
prior action, Plaintiff sued Defendants Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, 
Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins, all of whom Plaintiff names as 
Defendants in the instant action. In the instant action, however, 
Plaintiff also names Miller, Wilkins, Sanders, Williams, and 
Burton as Defendants. None of these newly-added parties – three 
private attorneys and two testifying witnesses (one a state 
employee, one a federal employee) – can be said to share one of 
the six narrow categories of privity recognized by the Supreme 
Court with the named Defendants in the first action – two judges 
(one federal judge, one county judge), two federal prosecutors, 
and two private attorneys. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 
893–95 (2008). The dismissal of the first action does not preclude 
any of Plaintiff’s claims against the newly-added Defendants in 
the instant action, Miller, Wilkins, Sanders, Williams, and 
Burton.   
Second, under “the rule of differing capacities,” the prior 
action does not preclude all of the claims brought against 
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Defendants in the current action who were parties to the first 
action. The rule of differing capacities provides that “[a] party 
appearing in an action in one capacity, individual or 
representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the 
benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in 
which he appears in another capacity.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 
F.3d 811, 823 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Restatement Second of 
Judgments § 36(2) (1982)); see also Leirer v. Ohio Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App'x 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“In essence, suing [a party] in her official capacity is not the 
same as suing her in her individual capacity.”).  
In the instant action, Plaintiff has sued Defendants Fowlkes, 
Griffin, Brooks, Quinn, Stegall, and Jenkins in both their 
individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 16 at 2-6.) In the 
prior action, Plaintiff did not specify the capacity in which he 
sued the same Defendants. See No. 19-2867, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Tenn. 
Dec. 17, 2019).  
Although it is preferable that a plaintiff state explicitly 
whether a defendant is sued in his or her “individual capacity,” 
the failure to do so is not fatal if the “course of proceedings” 
indicates that the defendant received sufficient notice that the 
intent was to hold the defendant personally liable. Moore v. City 
of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The 
Sixth Circuit has applied a “course of proceedings” test to 
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determine whether § 1983 defendants have received notice of the 
plaintiff’s intent to hold a defendant personally liable.  Id. at 
773; see Rashada v. Flegel, No. 23-1674, 2024 WL 1367436, at *3 
(6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 
159, 167 n. 14 (1985) (noting that the “course of proceedings” in 
unspecified capacity cases typically will indicate the nature of 
the liability sought to be imposed). The “course of proceedings” 
test considers such factors as the nature of the plaintiff’s 
claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, the nature 
of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, and whether 
subsequent filings put the defendant on notice of the capacity in 
which he or she is sued.  Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1 (citing Biggs 
v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)).  In Moore, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the “course of proceedings” test satisfied 
because the complaint “taken as a whole” likely provided 
sufficient notice to the defendants that they were being sued as 
individuals because the caption did not list the defendants’ 
titles, referred to the defendants throughout as the “individual 
defendants,” had language indicating the defendants were acting 
for themselves, and requested damages against “each of the 
defendants.” Id. at 773. The Court also found that the plaintiff's 
response to defendants’ motion to dismiss clarified that the 
plaintiff was suing the defendants in their individual capacities. 
Id. at 773. 
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Here, unlike Moore, the caption of the Complaint on the Pro 
Se Complaint Form in Case No. 19-2867, which only lists Judge 
Fowlkes, includes Judge Fowlkes’ official title. See No. 19-2867, 
ECF No. 1 at 1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2019). The allegations in the 
Complaint against Defendants Judge Fowlkes, Griffin, Brooks, and 
Chancellor Jenkins primarily or solely refer to them by the office 
they held or entity that employed them, not by name. Id. at 5-6. 
For example, the allegations against Judge Fowlkes and Chancellor 
Jenkins are made in terms of “the court did x.” Id. (“The court 
read the instruction wrong.”). The allegations against Griffin and 
Brooks are made in terms of “the government did x.” See, e.g., id. 
at 5 (“The government failed to summons the petitioner to the 
grand jury hearing.”). The allegations against Defendants Quinn 
and Stegall are primarily made in terms of the job title of 
“attorney,” rather than by name. See, e.g., id. (“The attorney 
failed to bring key witnesses to trial.”). The Complaint also 
“simply requests damages in general,” rather than against each 
individual defendant. Id. at 7-8; see Vittetoe v. Blount County, 
Tennessee, 861 F. App’x 843, 851 (6th Cir. 2021).  
Unlike Moore, Plaintiff’s subsequent pleadings in Case No. 
19-2867 would not have put Defendants on notice that they were 
being sued in their individual capacities. Plaintiff’s subsequent 
motions repeated the allegations of the complaint in a generalized 
format, e.g. “the court did x” and “the government did x.” See, 
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e.g., No. 19-2867, ECF Nos. 5 at 6, 13 at 1, 15 at 6-7. Plaintiff 
attempted to file an amended complaint in No. 19-2867 using an 
updated Pro Se Complaint Form that provided a check box stating 
whether Plaintiff was suing each defendant in his or her 
individual capacity and/or official capacity.
14 No. 19-2867, ECF 
No. 15 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2021). On that Form, Plaintiff checked 
only “official capacity” for the four Defendants the pro se 
complaint form was able to accommodate – Judge Fowlkes, Griffin, 
Brooks, and Quinn. Id. at 2-3. On his handwritten “Additional 
Defendant Sheet,” Plaintiff again did not specify the capacity in 
which he sued Chancellor Jenkins, Stegall, or Miller. Id. at 4. 
However, he re-attached the same typed-up pages of allegations 
from his initial complaint, which primarily identified Chanceller 
Jenkins as “the court” and Stegall and Miller as “the attorney,” 
rather than by name. Id. at 6-7.       
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Defendants in the 
original action were official capacity claims. The dismissal of 
those claims does not have preclusive effect on the individual 
capacity claims Plaintiff brings against the same Defendants in 
this action. See Leirer, 246 F. App'x at 374-75 (construing claims 
dismissed in first action as official capacity claims and 
 
14 The Clerk of the Court opened a new case under Case No. 21-2128 with 
the attempted Amended Complaint Plaintiff filed in No. 19-2867.  
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reversing dismissal on res judicata grounds of individual capacity 
claims against same defendants in second action).  
  Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot be dismissed in its entirety on 
res judicata grounds.  
2. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Absolutely Immune 
Defendants are Legally Frivolous 
Plaintiff sues Defendants who are entitled to absolute 
immunity from civil liability under well-settled Supreme Court 
precedent, including judges carrying out their judicial functions, 
prosecutors initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions, and 
witnesses testifying at grand juries and trials. Because 
Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are based on an 
“indisputably meritless legal theory,” they warrant sua sponte 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neitzke, 
490 U.S. at 325, 327.  
  a. Absolute Judicial Immunity: Fowlkes and Jenkins 
Plaintiff sues United States District Judge Fowlkes for 
alleged wrongdoing in presiding over Plaintiff’s 2017 criminal 
trial and sentencing.
15 Plaintiff also sues Shelby County 
 
15 Seeking $9,000,000 from Judge Fowlkes, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “the 
court” – whom this Court interprets to indicate Judge Fowlkes (all errors in 
original):  
(a) misread the jury instruction; (b) was given an email during trial but the 
email, was Not entered into the trial exhibits; (c) conspiracy; (d) agreed to an 
illegal superseded indictment and sealed it after trial; (e) abuse its statutory 
discretion; (f) failed to sua sponte a competency hearing; (g) prejudiced the 
petitioner; (h) violated the 6th Cir. P.R.1o1(a); (i) did nothing when the trial 
attorney told him that he was lying about the expert answer;(j) allowed the 
prosecutors two closing remarks and only one for the defense; (k) allowed the 
prosecutors to many picks for jurors; (l) misapprehending it statutory 
obligation under title 18 U.S.C. § 424(a); (m) failed to get an waiver from 
petitioner to satisfy his distraught and concerns; (n) denied the petitioner 
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Chancellor Jenkins for alleged wrongdoing in presiding over the 
Chancery Court proceeding affecting Plaintiff’s business.16  
Judges, in the performance of their judicial functions, are 
absolutely immune from civil liability. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 
U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363-64 
(1978). The “touchstone” of a judicial function is the 
“performance of the function of resolving disputes between 
parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” 
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1993) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Lucas v. 
Holland, No. 16-2309-JDT-cgc, 2017 WL 1088300, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 22, 2017), affirmed at 2017 WL 4764472 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 
2017) (“[A]ctions taken . . . during the course of criminal 
proceedings . . . clearly are within . . . the scope of the[] 
[judge’s] judicial function”). 
 
abrogated right to effectiveness of counsel, violated petitioner's due-process 
rights; (o) denied the petitioner a fair trial; and (p) denying access to 
exculpatory testimony. 
16 Seeking $2,500,000 from Chancellor Jenkins, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the 
following (all errors in original):  
(a) conspiracy to stop the plaintiff from hiring an experience tax attorney for 
the federal case (2:16-cr-2o247-JTF), buy issuing and illegally fiat to seizes 
seventy-three thousand dollars and eighty nine cents ($73,033.89), from the 
plaintiffs business account without cause (Case No. C-17-0002), (b) the Chancery 
Court Clerk and Master did not properly deposited the funds through 
interpleader, (c) intentionally fraudulent practices, in violation of Tenn. Code 
Ann. _ 40-33-204(c)(1); (d) the Court paid $19,000, to the special master 
without any  notice and without this matter being settled; (e) this was a 
government account; (f) Fifth Amendment Right, due process violation; (g) 
Chancery Court prejudiced the defendant; (h) violated T.C.A. _ 40-33-201; and 
(i) fraud. 
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A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action 
the judge took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in 
excess of the judge’s authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Absolute 
judicial immunity cannot be defeated by allegations of bribery or 
corruption. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1980) 
(affirming judicial immunity on allegations “that an official act 
of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy 
involving bribery of the judge”).  
Absolute judicial immunity is abrogated only for non-judicial 
acts and acts a judge takes in the complete absence of all 
jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (per 
curiam). “A judge acts in the complete absence of all jurisdiction 
only if the matter upon which the judge acts is clearly outside 
the subject matter of the court over which the judge presides.” 
Wellman v. PNC Bank, 508 F. App'x 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam).  
Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Fowlkes arise from 
actions that Judge Fowlkes took in his judicial capacity during 
Plaintiff’s criminal trial and sentencing. See Lucas, 2017 WL 
1088300, at *5. The Complaint contains no facts from which to 
infer that Judge Fowlkes lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 
trial or sentencing. Presiding over criminal proceedings is within 
the scope of Judge Fowlkes’ jurisdiction and is precisely the type 
of circumstance to which absolute judicial immunity applies. 
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Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that Judge Fowlkes 
committed errors during the criminal trial or engaged in 
“conspiracy” do not affect his judicial functions or his absolute 
immunity from civil liability.  
Plaintiff’s allegations against Chancellor Jenkins arise from 
actions that Chancellor Jenkins took in his judicial capacity 
during a proceeding in the Shelby County Chancery Court when 
allocating disputed accounts receivable for Plaintiff’s business. 
See Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435–36. The Complaint contains no facts 
from which to infer that Chancellor Jenkins lacked jurisdiction 
over the Chancery Court proceeding, and Plaintiff’s unsupported 
allegations that Chancellor Jenkins committed error, was engaged 
in a conspiracy, or engaged in illegal conduct do not abrogate the 
Chancellor’s absolute immunity from civil liability.    
 Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity: Griffin and 
Brooks 
Plaintiff sues the two prosecutors from his 2017 federal 
criminal trial: Griffin, who was an Assistant U.S. Attorney at the 
time of the trial, and Brooks who was a Trial Attorney at the 
Department of Justice’s Tax Division.
17 
 
17 Seeking $10,000,000 from lead prosecutor Griffin and $9,000,000 from Brooks, 
the Complaint alleges that “the prosecutors” engaged in the following wrongdoing 
(all errors in original):  
(a) did Not summons the petitioner to the grand jury hearing; (b) issued a bad 
indictment; (c) executed an illegal R.I.C.O.; (d) made too many picks for 
jurors; (e) witnesses lied under oath, with bogus evidence; f) witness tampering 
and intimidation; (g) Misconduct; (h) conspiracy; (i) fraud; (j)they heard the 
defense attorney tell the court that he was lying, and they said or did nothing; 
(k) superseded the indictment after trial; (l) gave testimony immunity to their 
witness but Not for the defense witness; (m) told defense attorney to mirandize 
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Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when initiating 
and pursuing criminal prosecutions in their role as advocates for 
the government. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-31 
(1976). In that role, “[p]rosecutors . . . are tasked with 
equipping judges and juries to accurately determine a defendant's 
guilt[,]” and “that task necessarily entails making judgment calls 
as to how pre-trial matters are handled, trials are conducted, 
witness are used, and evidence is presented.” Price v. Montgomery 
Cty., 72 F.4th 711, 719 (6th Cir. 2023). 
A prosecutor will not be deprived of immunity for 
“‘unquestionably illegal or improper conduct,’ including instances 
where a defendant is genuinely wronged.” Price, 72 F.4th at 719 
(quoting Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334, 340 (6th Cir. 2009)) 
(emphasis added); see. e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 413 (holding that 
a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at 
trial is protected by absolute immunity); Koubriti v. Convertino, 
593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[P]rosecutors have absolute 
immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of 
exculpatory information at trial.”). 
Prosecutorial immunity is abrogated only when prosecutors’ 
actions do not stem from the prosecutor’s “role as advocate for 
the State” and are not “intimately associated with the judicial 
 
defense witness; (n) brady violation; (o) admitted evidence that was totally 
without relevance; p) coerced witnesses to lie under oath; (q) made two closing 
remarks and only one for the defense; (r) interference of defendant's compulsory 
process rights; and (s) miscarriage of justice 
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phase of the criminal process.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 
259, 273 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 491 (1991). When 
prosecutors perform “administrative duties and those investigatory 
functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the 
initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings[,]” they 
are “not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 
(citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-96). 
Plaintiff’s allegations about Defendants Griffin and Brooks’ 
conduct relate to the prosecutors’ handling of evidence and 
witnesses, their advocacy before the grand jury to secure an 
indictment, and their prosecution of claims at trial to secure a 
conviction. All of the challenged conduct is “intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and 
closely related to the initiation and pursuit of Plaintiff’s 
criminal prosecution, for which the Defendants are shielded from 
liability by prosecutorial immunity.  
The Complaint does not allege any facts that negate Griffins 
and Brooks’ absolute immunity. Plaintiff does not allege conduct 
by Griffin and Brooks that was outside an “integral part of the 
judicial process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Plaintiff’s 
allegations of “misconduct”, “fraud” and “conspiracy” by Griffin 
and Brooks do not deprive them of absolute immunity from civil 
liability.    
 Absolute Witness Immunity: Williams and Burton 
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Plaintiff sues two of the prosecution witnesses from his 2017 
criminal trial: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent Betty 
Williams and State Department of Tennessee employee Nathan 
Burton.18 
Witnesses who testify at trial are entitled to absolute 
immunity from suit based on that testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 
U.S. 325, 330–34 (1983); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 
1001 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is well-settled that witnesses are 
granted absolute immunity from suit for all testimony provided in 
judicial proceedings.”). Government officials and employees who 
testify as part of their official duties are afforded absolute 
testimonial immunity like any private witness. See Briscoe, 460 
U.S. at 342-43.  
 
18 Seeking $8,000,000 from Williams, the Complaint alleges that Williams engaged 
in the following wrongdoing at the federal criminal trial (all errors in 
original):  
17. On or about December 4-8, 2017, during the Plaintiff Federal trial, 
(No.2:16-cr-24207MTF) Betty Williams, Revenue Agent a government witness from 
Internal Revenue Service, (IRS) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621 and 18 U.S.C. 
1001, when she gave false statement under oath. 
18. Williams told the court and the jury that the business was behind in 
business taxes and therefore didn't qualify for an offer in compromise (OIC) 
from IRS. 
19. Williams also had bogus evidence (941's forms) that had the Plaintiff 
signature on them but wasn't signed by the Plaintiff. The signatures were copied 
and pasted on those forms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
Seeking $6,000,000 from Burton, the Complaint alleges that Burton engaged in the 
following wrongdoing at the federal criminal trial (all errors in original):  
20. Nathan Burton, Tennessee State Department Employee also a government witness 
from Tennessee State Department, told the court and the jury that the Plaintiff 
applied for an LLC from the Tenn. State Dept. in 2007 and 2008, which was a 
false statement in violated of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 
21. Burton had LLC forms from 2007 and 2008 with the Plaintiff signature on them 
but the Plaintiff didn't sign them. The signatures were copied and pasted on 
those forms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
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A witness is “insulated from liability for any testimony that 
he provided at trial, no matter how egregious or perjurious that 
testimony [is] alleged to have been.” Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1001 
(affirming absolute immunity for law enforcement officer witness 
who gave false testimony at criminal trial); see also Briscoe, 460 
U.S. at 340, 345-46 (government official alleged to have falsely 
testified against criminal defendant leading to unjust conviction 
entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony). 
Absolute witness immunity is abrogated only for non-
testimonial acts. Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1004 (holding that 
“[defendant] is not entitled to absolute testimonial immunity for 
the alleged non-testimonial acts that occurred outside the 
judicial proceeding”).  
Plaintiff’s allegations against Williams and Burton are based 
on the testimony they gave at Plaintiff’s criminal trial for which 
they are absolutely immune as witnesses engaged in testimonial 
acts. The Complaint alleges no non-testimonial acts by the 
Defendants to which witness immunity would not extend. Plaintiff’s 
allegations that Williams and Burton made “false statements under 
oath” and gave “bogus evidence” on the stand do not abrogate their 
immunity.  
 
Even if Plaintiff were able to establish irrefutably that the 
judge, prosecutor, and witness Defendants he names in his 
Complaint violated federal constitutional and statutory rights 
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that could normally be vindicated under § 1983 or Bivens, 
Plaintiff still could not sue those Defendants for damages because 
they are absolutely immune from suit under well-settled Supreme 
Court precedent.  
All of Plaintiff’s claims against all the immune Defendants 
are legally frivolous. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
over them. See Odom, 2000 WL 1176883, at *2 (“[T]he district court 
correctly dismissed [Plaintiff’s] action for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction . . . [Plaintiff’s] complaint is frivolous 
since all of the named defendants are immune from liability.”) 
3. Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens Claims Against Private 
Parties are Legally Frivolous   
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are against the attorneys who 
represented him at the federal trial and associated proceedings 
(including an appeal and a habeas petition), Quinn, Stegall, and 
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Miller,19 and the attorneys who represented him in the Shelby 
County Chancery proceeding, Wilkins and Sanders.20 
 
19 Seeking $8,000,000 from Quinn, the Complaint alleges that Quinn (all errors in 
original):  
(a) was ineffective and a conflict of interest arose; (b) conspiracy; (c) fraud; 
(d) failed to argue PTSD at pre-trail; (e) failed to use subpoena power; (f) 
told the Court that he lied about the handwriting expert answer; (g) received 
funds to hire the expert but did Not hire him theft of government funds; (h) 
continue to say to defendant they are going to bury you and there is nothing we 
can do about it; (i) failed to call the U.S. Veteran Affairs Doctor to give 
testimony at trial; (j) did Not appeal the trial after he was instructed to by 
the petitioner several times; (k) failed to investigate, collect vital evidence, 
and interview vital witnesses; (l) knew government witnesses were lying under 
oath with bogus evidence and said nothing; (m) continue to hound defendant to 
accept plead deal and avoid trial; (n) knew defendant was innocent and wanted to 
maintain his innocence's; (o) he got upset when defendant refuse to accept a 
plea and begin to badger the defendant; (p) drove the defendant out of his mind 
with the harassment and pressure to take a plea deal; (q) did Not asks certain 
question of government witnesses after defendant begged him to; (r) failed to 
address government interference of defendant's compulsory process rights; (s) 
did Not know tax laws; (t) submitted documents to Sixth Circuit Appeals without 
defendant knowledge or approval; (u) knew about the illegal superseded 
indictment and said nothing; (v) did Not protect defendant's mental status; (w) 
prejudice the defendant; (x) breach of fiduciary duty; and (y) breach of 
contract. 
 
Seeking $7,000,000 from Stegall, the Complaint alleges that Stegall (all errors 
in original): 
(a) filed documents to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals without defendant 
knowledge nor his approval; (b) did Not give defendant copies of what was filed; 
(c) did Not return any of the defendant's phone calls, emails nor letter for 
months when the defendant was incarcerated; (d) was ineffective and a conflict 
of interest arose; (e) conspiracy; (f) submitted a brief to 6th Cir. that was 
Not fully developed; (g) also knew about the illegally superseded and sealed 
indictment; and (h) did Not give the defendant a copy of the indictment nor the 
conviction; (i) fraud, (j) breach of fiduciary duty; and (k) due process 
violation. 
 
Seeking $2,500,000 from Miller, the Complaint alleges that Miller (all errors in 
original):  
(a) submitted the § 2241 motion (wrong motion) but did Not give defendant copies 
of the complete file; (b) was ineffective, and a conflict of interest arose; (c) 
conspiracy; (d) did Not petition for an evidentiary hearing; (e) did Not perfect 
the appeal before withdrawal; (f) did Not give defendant copies of the 
indictment nor the conviction; (g) also knew about the illegal superseded and 
sealed indictment after trial, (h) fraud, (i) breach of fiduciary duty; (j) due 
process violation; and (k) breach of contract. 
20 Seeking $6,000,000 from Wilkins and $2,500,000 from Sanders, the Complaint 
makes the following identical allegations as to each Defendant (all errors in 
original):  
(a) conspiracy to stop the plaintiff from hiring an experience tax attorney for 
the federal case, (b) did Not try to stop the Chancery Court Judge from seizing 
the plaintiff funds, (c) did Not try to get the funds back after the special 
master report on June 15, 2017, (d) breach of contract, (e) breach of fiduciary 
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Plaintiff brings his claims against these Defendants under § 
1983 and Bivens. The Court need not address whether Plaintiff has 
successfully established that the attorney Defendants violated 
constitutional or federal statutory rights that might be 
vindicated through a damages suit under § 1983 or a Bivens claim. 
Private parties, including attorneys, do not act under the color 
of state or federal law, as required to sustain either cause of 
action. Plaintiff’s claims against the attorney Defendants, like 
Plaintiff’s claims against the absolutely immune Defendants, are 
based on an “indisputably meritless legal theory” and warrant sua 
sponte dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.  
 § 1983 Claims Against Private Parties 
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state and 
local officials for violations of federal constitutional and 
statutory rights. Under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the 
plaintiff’s rights were violated by a person “acting under color 
of state law.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 
(1970). 
“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes 
from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how 
discriminatory or wrongful [.]” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
 
duty, (f) ineffective assistance of counsel, (g) conflict of interest, (h) 
violation of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, (i) quantum meruit; (j) due 
process violation; and (k) fraud. 
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Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567 (6th Cir. 
1999) (“A § 1983 plaintiff may not sue purely private parties.”); 
Krukemyer v. Forcum, 475 F. App’x 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]here is no constitutional right to be free from harm 
inflicted by private actors.”).  
For purposes of § 1983, it is well-established that private 
attorneys are not state or local officials and that their actions 
in representing private clients in state and local courts do not 
constitute state action. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 
318 (1981) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of 
being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state 
law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”); Krukemyer, 475 F. App’x at 
566 (“It is well-settled that a lawyer representing a private 
client is not a state actor acting ‘under color of state law.’”). 
That attorneys are licensed by states does not transform them 
into government officials. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 319 n.9 (“Although 
lawyers are generally licensed by the States, ‘they are not 
officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.’”) (quoting In 
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973)). Attorneys who are court-
appointed or public defenders, rather than privately retained, are 
not transformed into state actors who act under the color of state 
law while performing their traditional function of representing a 
client. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325 (“[A] public defender does not 
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act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's 
traditional function as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding.”); Floyd v. Cnty. of Kent, 454 F. App'x 493, 497 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (“Defense attorneys, whether compensated by the State 
or retained by a client, do not act under color of state law when 
they perform a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to the 
accused in a criminal proceeding.”) 
Here, the attorney Defendants are private actors and their 
conduct – and their alleged misdeeds – in representing Plaintiff 
in federal and state court is private conduct for which Plaintiff 
may not sue them under § 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged that any 
of the attorney Defendants acted under the color of state law. 
Defendants Wilkins and Sanders represented Plaintiff in Shelby 
County Chancery Court. They are not transformed from private 
actors to state or local officials because they were licensed by 
the state or represented Plaintiff in state court. There is not 
even a remotely plausible case that Defendants Quinn, Stegall, and 
Miller, who represented Plaintiff in the federal court, acted 
under the color of state law. 
 Bivens Claims Against Private Parties  
For largely analogous reasons, Plaintiff may not sue any of 
the attorney Defendants under Bivens.  
A Bivens claim is a limited cause of action against 
individual federal officers or agents for violations of certain 
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constitutional rights. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 484-86 (1994); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 
66-70 (2001) (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual 
federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”). 
Under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that his rights were 
violated by a person “acting under color of federal law.” Left 
Fork Min. Co., Inc. v. Hooker, 775 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 2014). 
Just as a § 1983 claim is not intended to reach private conduct by 
private parties, a Bivens claim is not intended to reach private 
conduct by private parties.   
Just as a private attorney representing a client in state or 
local court does not act under the color of state law for purposes 
of a civil rights action under § 1983, “a private attorney 
[representing a client in federal court] . . .  do[es] not act 
under color of federal law for purposes of a Bivens action.” 
Bradford v. Shankman, No. 85-5150, 1985 WL 13659, at *1 (6th Cir. 
Aug. 12, 1985) (citation omitted); see Willhite v. Arrants, No. 
2:23-CV-95-TAV-JEM, 2023 WL 11915398, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 
2023) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the attorney defendants 
became federal actors by representing her in federal court). 
Just as an attorney appointed to represent a client in state 
or local court is not transformed into a state official for 
purposes of § 1983, “an attorney is not transformed into a federal 
official for purposes of a Bivens action merely because he is 
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appointed by a federal court pursuant to federal law.” Pagani-
Gallego v. Escobedo, No. 97-1640, 1998 WL 381562, at *1 (6th Cir. 
June 23, 1998); see Bradford 1985 WL 13659, at *1 (“[A] federal 
public defender do[es] not act under color of federal law for 
purposes of a Bivens action.”). 
As explained above, the attorney Defendants are private 
actors and their representation of Plaintiff is private conduct 
for which Plaintiff may not seek damages under Bivens. Plaintiff 
has not alleged – nor could he convincingly do so – that 
Defendants Quinn, Stegall, and Miller acted under color of federal 
law by representing Plaintiff in federal proceedings or, in the 
case of Quinn and Stegall, by being appointed to represent 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Wilkins and 
Sanders, who represented him in state court, acted under color of 
federal law, nor is there a remotely plausible case for doing so.  
Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens claims against the attorney 
Defendants, who are private parties and did not act under color of 
state or federal law, are legally frivolous and merit dismissal 
under 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Hall v. Board, No. 24-3797, 2025 WL 
2639656, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025) (“Because [attorney 
defendants] are not ‘state actors’ capable of being sued under § 
1983, [plaintiff’s] claims against these defendants are patently 
meritless and therefore subject to dismissal under Apple.”); Hamp 
v Craig, No. 89-6193, 1990 WL 47533, at *1 (6th Cir 1990) 
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(affirming dismissal of Bivens claim against attorney as lacking 
an arguable basis in law because there was no federal action).  
IV. Conclusion 
Plaintiff’s Complaint is both factually frivolous, relying on 
implausible factual allegations, and legally frivolous, comprising 
claims against judges, prosecutors, and witnesses who are 
absolutely immune from suit and claims against private parties who 
do not act under the color of state or federal law as required for 
a § 1983 or Bivens claim.  
The Complaint is so devoid of merit that it fails to invoke 
this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, must be 
dismissed under 12(b)(1). See Apple, 183 F.3d at 479–80.    
Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 43.) to the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 41) recommending that 
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 16) be dismissed are OVERRULED and 
the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report are 
ADOPTED, as modified in this Order. The Court DISMISSES this 
matter WITHOUT PREJUDICE.   
Plaintiff’s untimely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
Reports (ECF Nos. 50, 65) recommending that Plaintiff’s Motions (ECF 
Nos. 38, 48, 59-63) be denied are deemed WAIVED, the Magistrate 
Judge’s Reports are ADOPTED, and the Motions are DENIED. Plaintiff’s 
remaining Motions (ECF Nos. 66, 67, 69.) are DENIED AS MOOT. 
 
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SO ORDERED this   10th        day of February, 2026. 
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.Saays, Jr. 
          SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.  
          UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
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