govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_20-cv-03470-5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
LINDA CROSSLAND 
 
 CIVIL ACTION 
VERSUS 
 
 NO. 20-3470 
HUNTINGTON INGALLS, INC., ET 
AL 
 
 SECTION “R” (2) 
 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 
 Before the Court are defendant Wo odward Design & Build LLC’s 
(“Woodward”) motion for summary judgment
1 and motion in limine to 
exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Brent Staggs and Dr. Richard Kradin. 2  
Plaintiff and crossclaim-plaintiff Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (“Avondale”) both 
oppose Woodward’s motions.3  For the following reasons, the Court grants 
in part and denies in part Woodward’s motion for summary judgment,4 and 
denies Woodward’s motion in limine.5  
 
 
 
 
1  R. Doc. 311. 
2  R. Doc. 310. 
3  R. Docs. 323, 326, 328, & 329.   
4  R. Doc. 311. 
5  R. Doc. 310. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
This case arises from plaintiff’s alleged exposure to asbestos.  Plaintiff 
contends that she was exposed to asbestos from several different sources .   
She asserts that during her childhood, Burmaster Land & Development 
delivered asbestos-containing concrete to her home that was used for her 
driveway.6  Plaintiff alleges  that during the 1950s and 1960s, her father, 
uncle, and “potentially others” inadvertently brought asbestos fibers into the 
family home from their work at Avondale’s shipyards.7  She asserts that in 
the 1970s, her husband inadvertently carried  asbestos fibers into her home 
from his work at Avondale’s shipyards. 8  Finally, she contends that during 
the 1970s, 1980s, and potentially the 1990s, her husband inadvertently 
carried asbestos fibers into her home from his work on various worksites 
when he was employed by Woodward.9  She alleges that her exposure to 
asbestos dust caused her to develop mesothelioma, with which she was 
diagnosed in 2020.
10   
 
6  R. Doc. 227 ¶ 4. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id.  Plaintiff initially also brought claims based on exposures through 
her own work at Avondale and through asbestos fibers floating from 
Avondale into her neighborhood, but she voluntarily dismissed these 
claims.  R. Doc. 154. 
10  R. Doc. 1-2 ¶ 8.   
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Plaintiff filed a petition for damages in the Civil District Court for the 
Parish of Orleans against dozens of employers, premises owners, 
contractors, suppliers, manufacturers, and purported professional vendors 
that were allegedly involved with her asbestos exposures. 11  In her petition 
for damages, plaintiff alleged that defendants negligently failed to warn her 
husband about the hazards of asbestos and failed to provide him “with safe 
premises in order to protect [plaintiff’s] life, health, safety, and welfare.” 12  
She also brought premises liability claims against the defendants she 
classifies as employers, premises owners, and contractors,
13 as well as 
products liability claims against the defendants she classifies as suppliers, 
manufacturers, and professional vendors.
14  
Defendants Avondale and Albert L. Bossier, an executive  officer of 
Avondale, asserted crossclaims against numerous defendants in which 
Avondale and Bossier asserted  that in the event they are deemed  liable to 
 
11  Id. ¶ 2. 
12  R. Doc. 1-2 ¶ 12.   
13  Id. ¶¶ 16-20. 
14  Id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
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plaintiff, they are entitl ed to virile share contributions. 15  Avondale then  
removed the action to federal court.16   
Woodward is a design, engineering, and contractor company that 
employed plaintiff’s husband from 1974 until 2012.  Plaintiff alleges that 
when Mr. Crossland was employed by Woodward, he worked on multiple 
construction sites, including industrial worksites at Shell, Gulf Oil, and 
Monsanto.
17  Plaintiff brings claims for both negligence and strict liability 
against Woodward.18 
Woodward now brings two motions.  First, Woodward moves in limine 
to exclude the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Kradin, and 
Avondale’s expert witness, Dr. Staggs.
19  Both experts testify to general and 
specific causation.  Woodward contends that both experts’ specific causation 
opinions are unreliable because they are premised on unreliable facts.
20  
Second, Woodward moves for summary judgment on the grounds that 
plaintiff and Avondale (together, “claimants”) have failed to establish that 
 
15  On February 1, 2023, the Court dismissed Bossier’s crossclaims 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) because Bossier died and no party 
timely moved for substitution.  R. Doc. 333 at 7. 
16  R. Doc. 1. 
17  R. Doc. 227 at 2; R. Doc. 1-2 at 2. 
18  R. Doc. 1-2 at 6-7. 
19  R. Doc. 310. 
20  R. Doc. 310-1 at 1. 
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plaintiff’s husband was expos ed to asbestos while he was employed by 
Woodward and that Woodward’s conduct fell below the applicable standard 
of care. 21  Woodward also contends that claimants have failed to establish 
that Woodward is liable under a strict liability theory. 22  Claimants oppose 
both motions. 
 
II. WOODWARD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
A.  Legal Standard 
 
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).  “When assessing whether a 
dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence 
in the record but refrain[s] f rom making credibility determinations or 
weighing the evidence.”  Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness 
Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398 -99 (5th Cir. 2008).  All reasonable inferences are 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegation s or 
 
21  R. Doc. 311-1. 
22  Id. 
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affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ 
are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”  
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also  Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.  “No genuine dispute 
of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 
fact to find for the nonmoving party.”  EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 
481 (5th Cir. 2014). 
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence 
which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went 
uncontroverted at trial.’”  Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 
951 (D. Colo. 1991)).  “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by 
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a 
genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that the moving party’s 
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact -finder to 
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”  Id. at 1265. 
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by 
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pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an 
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim.  See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 
325.  The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by 
submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a 
genuine issue exists.  See id. at 324.  The nonmovant may not rest upon the 
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for 
resolution.  See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry 
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and u pon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial.’”  (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). 
 
B.  Discussion 
 
1.   Strict Liability 
 
“When a case involves long -latency occupational diseases like 
mesothelioma, the law in effect at the time of the exposure applies.”  Adams 
v. Ethyl Corp., 838 F. App’x 822, 829 (5th Cir. 2020).  Plaintiff asserts that 
her husband was exposed to asbestos  through his employment for 
Woodward in the 1970s, 1980s, and potentially also the 1990s.   
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Until 1996, Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 imposed strict liability for 
the damage that is caused by “things which we have in our custody.”  La. Civ. 
Code art. 2317.  To establish a claim for strict liability under this version of 
article 2317, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a thing which caused the damage 
was in the care, custody and control of the defendant; (2) the thing had a vice 
or defect which created an unreasonable risk of harm; and (3) the injuries 
were caused by this defect.”  Migliori v. Willows Apartments , 727 So. 2d 
1258, 1260 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1999).   
In 1996, the Louisiana legislature amended article 2317.  The amended 
statute provides that: 
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage 
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that 
he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known 
of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the 
damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable 
care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. 
La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1.   Pl aintiff does not specifically allege when in the 
1990s her husband’s employment with Woodward ended, so it is unclear 
whether the amended statute applies to any alleged exposures in this case.   
In any event, both versions of the law require  a showing that  the 
defendant had custody over the dangerous product.  See Fruge ex rel. Fruge 
v. Parker Drilling Co. , 337 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 2003)  (“The first 
requirement for custodial liability under Louisiana Code articles 2317 and 
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23217.1, is that the ‘thing’ th at caused the injury be in the custody of the 
defendant.”).  “Although the owner [of a dangerous product] is presumed to 
have custody, a non-owner defendant may have custody over the property if 
[it] exercises direction and control of the thing and derives some benefit from 
it.”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
In this case, it is undisputed that Woodward did not have custody or 
control of asbestos-containing products.  Claimants contend that during Mr. 
Crossland’s time working at various worksites for Woodward, Mr. Crossland 
was exposed to asbestos dust from two sources : joint compound and pipe 
insulation.  But claimants do not contend that Woodward had “the right of 
supervision, direction, and control” or “the right to benefit from” the 
asbestos-containing products .  Id .  R ather, Woodworth asserts, and 
claimants do not dispute, that Mr. Crossland’s exposure resulted from third-
party contractors’ construction activities involving those products at the 
same worksites as Woodward’s employees.
23   
The Court thus grants Woodward’s motion for summary judgment as 
to strict liability.   Cf.  id. at *6-7 (granting summary judgment to defendant 
as to plaintiff’s strict liability claim when insulation contractors, rather than 
 
23  R. Doc. 352 at 1-2. 
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defendant, exercised custody or control over asbestos-containing insulation 
at the time of plaintiff’s alleged exposure).   
 
2.   Negligence 
 
Plaintiff also brought a negligence claim against Woodward.  In 
support of her claim, plaintiff contends that Woodward failed to provide Mr. 
Crossland “with safe premises in order to protect the life, health, safety, and 
welfare of” plaintiff.24  Under Louisiana law, in an asbestos exposure case, a 
claimant must show that (1) “he had significant exposure to the product 
complained of,” and that (2) the exposure to the product “was a substantial 
factor in bringing about his injury.”  Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 16 So. 
3d 1065, 1091 (La. 2009) (quoting Asbestos v. Bordelon, Inc., 726 So. 2d 926, 
948 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998)).  The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on both 
elements.  Vodanovich v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc. , 869 So. 2d 930, 932 (La. 
App. 4 Cir. 2004).  The same is true of Avondale’s burden to prevail on its 
crossclaim.  See Adams v. Eagle, No. 21-694, 2022 WL 3347802, at *4 (E.D. 
La. Aug. 12, 2022).   
When there are multiple causes of injury, “a defendant’s conduct is a 
cause in fact if it is a substantial factor generating plaintiff’s harm.”  Adams 
 
24  R. Doc. 1-2 ¶ 12. 
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v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 923 So. 2d 118, 122 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2005) 
(citing Vodanovich, 969 So. 2d at 932).  “Because there is a medically 
demonstrated causal relationship between asbestos exposure and 
mesothelioma, every non- trivial exposure to asbestos contributes to and 
constitutes a cause of mesothelioma.”  Labarre v. Bienville Auto Parts, Inc., 
No. 21-89, 2022 WL 293250, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2022) (citing McAskill v. 
Am. Marine Holding Co., 9 So. 3d 264, 268 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2009)).  Thus, 
as the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[e]ven if the plaintiff was only exposed to 
asbestos for a ‘short period for an employer[,] and he had longer exposure 
working for others, it cannot be said the relatively short asbestos exposure 
was not a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.’”  Williams v. 
Boeing Co., 23 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rando , 16 So. 3d at 
1091).  To defeat an asbestos defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a 
claimant “need only show that a reasonable jury could conclude that it is 
more likely than not that [plaintiff] inhaled defendant’s asbestos fibers,  even 
if there were only ‘slight exposures.’”  Id. at 512 (citing Held v. Avondale 
Indus., Inc., 672 So. 2d 1106, 1109 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1996)).   
Woodward contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because 
(1) claimants cannot establish that Mr. Crossland was actually exposed to 
asbestos dust while he worked for Woodward, (2) there is no evidence that 
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Woodward breached the applicable standard of care, and (3) claimants lack 
admissible evidence on specific causation.25   
The Court finds that a  reasonable jury could conclude that it is more 
likely than not  that Ms. Crossland inhaled asbestos dust from Mr. 
Crossland’s clothes, and that Mr. Crossland was exposed to such asbestos 
dust during his work around joint compound and pipe insulation while he 
was employed by Woodward.   
As to joint compound, Mr. Crossland testified that he recalled working 
around Gold Bond joint compound that, when sanded down, would “get all 
over the floors.”
26  When the floors were later swept, it would generate “a lot 
of dust” that “would get all over [his] clothes.”27  Mr. Crossland testified that 
joint compound “was a constant encounter on every job that [he] went on,” 
and that he worked in proximity to joint compound “[p]retty much [from] 
when [he]  started with Carl Woodward”  in 1974.
28  Plaintiff’s industrial 
hygiene expert, Susan Raterman, testified that “until at least mid-1977, many 
brands of patching and joint compounds containing asbestos were available 
and widely used,” and that although Gold Bond stopped manufacturing joint 
 
25  R. Doc. 311-1 at 1. 
26  R. Doc. 311-6 at 6-7 (Jack Crossland Tr. 35:18-36:4).  
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 36:9-15. 
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compound with asbestos in 1975, it did not stop selling it until 1976, two 
years after Mr. Crossland started working for Woodward.29   
Woodward contends that Mr. Crossland testified that he  was not 
exposed to joint compound until he was a supervisor/foreman in the 1980s, 
by which time Gold Bond no longer manufactured joint compound with 
asbestos.30  But the testimony Woodward cites in support of this proposition 
does not establish that Mr. Crossland was never around joint compound 
before the 1980s.  Rather, Mr. Crossland testified that he personally mixed 
and applied joint compound when he was a supervisor,
31 and that before that 
time, he generally got out of the way of the subcontractors who were doing 
drywall work.
32  This testimony is not inconsistent with Mr. Crossland’s 
testimony that he was exposed to dust from drywall cleanup from the time 
he started work at Woodward in 1974.  Claimants have thus established a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. Crossland was exposed to 
asbestos dust from joint compound while he was employed with Woodward. 
Claimants have likewise  established a fact issue as to whether Mr. 
Crossland was exposed to asbestos dust from pipe insulation material.  One 
 
29  R. Doc. 326-10 at 195. 
30  R. Doc. 311-1 at 10. 
31  R. Doc. 311-6 at 66-67 (Jack Crossland Tr. 115:21-116:13). 
32  R. Doc. 311-6 at 51 (Jack Crossland Tr. 95:1-18). 
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worksite at which Mr. Crossland worked was Monsanto, in Luling, Louisiana.  
Mr. Crossland testified that the pathways he walked on to get  through the 
plant were five or ten feet away from workers removing insulation. 33   Mr. 
Crossland testified that he also got dust on his clothing from  insulation 
removal at the Gulf Oil, Monsanto, and Shell worksites while he was working 
for Woodward.  That insulation removal generated visible “white powdery-
looking stuff” that “was all over the ground.”34  Mr. Crossland testified that 
the insulation that was removed in his presence at the Gulf Oil, Monsanto, 
and Shell worksites looked just like the insulation he saw removed from pipes 
at Avondale, which no party contests contained asbestos.35 
Woodward contends that Mr. Crossland could not have been exposed 
to asbestos from pipe insulation because Monsanto had a policy that 
prohibited the installation of asbestos -containing insulation by the late 
1960s, and that by the 1970s, Monsanto implemented rigorous policies fo r 
working with asbestos -containing products. 36  It asserts that Gulf Oil and 
Shell stopped installing new asbestos insulation in 1972  and 193, 
respectively, and that both had strict controls for the removal of asbestos. 37  
 
33  R. Doc. 326-9 at 256 (Jack Crossland Tr. 253:1-19). 
34  R. Doc. 326-9 at 264-65 (Jack Crossland Tr. 261:19-262:20). 
35  R. Doc. 326-9 at 266 (Jack Crossland Tr. 263:3-15). 
36  R. Doc. 311-1 at 13. 
37  R. Doc. 311-1 at 12. 
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But whether asbestos-containing installation was installed around the time 
Mr. Crossland worked at the industrial sites  is immaterial, as his exposure 
allegedly resulted from the removal, not the installation, of asbestos-
containing insulation.  To the extent Woodward identifies t hese policies to 
suggest that the worksites no longer had old asbestos-containing insulation 
in their pipes when Mr. Crossland worked there, the Louisiana Department 
of Environmental Quality records show that as recently as 1985, one of 
Monsanto’s facilities was p lanning the removal of 50,000 linear feet of 
asbestos-containing insulation.
38  Further, despite Woodward’s 
representation that Monsanto had rigorous policies for working with 
asbestos in the 1970s, plaintiff points to the testimony of an insulator who 
worked at Monsanto from 1977 to 1983 that his insulation removal practices 
at Monsanto generated visible dust.
39  Finally, Avondale’s causation expert 
testified that it is more likely than not that old thermal pipe insulation would 
have contained asbestos at the time Mr. Crossland worked for Woodward.
40  
Claimants have thus identified an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Crossland 
was exposed to asbestos through pipe insulation during his time working for 
Woodward.  Accordingly, Woodward is not entitled to summa ry judgment 
 
38  R. Doc. 326-17 at 2.   
39  R. Doc. 326-14 at 99-102 (Randy Dufrene Tr. 98:23-101:10). 
40  R. Doc. 323-3 at 63 (Kradin Tr. 61:2-13). 
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on the issue of whether plaintiff was exposed to asbestos dust by virtue of her 
husband’s work for Woodward. 
Nor is Woodward entitled to summary judgment on the issue of 
whether it breached its duty to plaintiff.  Louisiana courts conduct “a duty-
risk analysis to determine whether [negligence] liability exists under the 
particular facts presented.”  Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 
765 (La. 1999).   “Under Louisiana law, the existence of a duty presents a 
question of law that ‘varies depending on the facts, circumstances, and 
context of each case and is limited by the particular risk, harm, and plaintiff 
involved.”  Burstajn v. United States, 367 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2003).  It 
is well-settled that employers owe a duty not just to their employees, but to 
their employees’ household family members, like plaintiff.  See Zimko v. 
American Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 483 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2005) (employers 
have a duty to “act reasonably in view of the forese eable risks of danger to 
household members of its employees resulting from exposure to asbestos 
fibers carried home on its employee’s clothing, person, or personal effects”).    
Woodward contends that claimants have failed to establish that 
Woodward breached its duty because there is no evidence that Woodward 
knew or should have known that asbestos  was present at Woodward’s 
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worksites.41  Woodward’s primary argument is that the owners of the 
premises on which Woodward’s employees worked never warned Woodward 
about the presence of asbestos. 
Plaintiff points to OSHA, which required employers to take asbestos -
related precautions, including air sampling, in industrial plants.  Fed. Reg. 
Vol. 37, No. 110 (1972).  Plaintiff also invokes Louisiana employment law, 
which requires employers to:  
furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, [to] adopt and use 
methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such 
employment and the place of employment safe in accordance 
with the accepted and approved practice in such or similar 
industry or places of employment considering the normal hazard 
of such employment, and [to] do every other thing reasonably 
necessary to protect the life, health, safety and welfare of such 
employees. 
La. Rev. Stat. § 23:13.  Plaintiff contends, and Woodward does not disp ute, 
that there is no evidence that Woodward abided by these laws, including by 
inquiring as to the presence of asbestos at worksites or providing protective 
gear or training to its workers. 
As to Woodward’s argument that it was never affirmatively warned of 
the presence of asbestos on construction sites, plaintiff contends that no such 
warning was necessary, as Mr. Crossland and others testified to the presence 
 
41  R. Doc. 311 at 14-15. 
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of visible dust i n the worksites where Woodward’s employees worked .42  
Plaintiff also notes that  in 1974, the National Safety Council — of which 
Woodward was a member 43— publicized recent studies showing “the 
presence of asbestos fibers in the lungs of persons having no industrial 
exposure— probably due to fiber presence in the atmosphere near 
construction sites.”44 
Further, plaintiff’s industrial hygiene expert opined that by the 1940s, 
it was well established in the industrial hygiene literature that people 
working with or around toxic materials, including asbestos, should not be 
permitted to take their clothes home to be laundered.
45  She testified that it 
was commonplace for some industrial plants to require workers to use 
separate lockers and work clothes, and to provide on -site showers for 
workers.
46  Finally, in 1951, the Walsh -Healey Act addressed the hazards of 
asbestos and required that employers provide a change of clothing to 
employees to prevent them from carrying asbestos home.  Although the 
Walsh-Healey Act applies exclusively to federal contractors, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court has found that the law evinces “a level of knowledge that 
 
42  See, e.g., R. Doc. 311-6 at 6-7 (Jack Crossland Tr. 35:18-36:4). 
43  R. Doc. 326-4. 
44  R. Doc. 326-3 at 2. 
45  R. Doc. 326-10 at 200. 
46  Id. 
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pervaded the industry” and shows “a growing understanding and awareness 
of a serious problem regarding asbestos.”  Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1086-87.   
At a minimum, plaintiff has identified an issue of fact as to  whether 
Woodward knew or should have known of the presence of asbestos on its 
worksites.  See Labarre , 2022 WL 29 3250, at *6 (denying summary 
judgment where there was an issue of fact as to whether defendant  knew or 
should have known of the presence of asbestos in its products).  
The final issue Woodward raises in its motion for summary judgment 
is whether claimants h ave admissible expert testimony as to specific 
causation.  As discussed in Section III. B, infra, claimants’ expert testimony 
is admissible.  Accordingly, the Court denies Woodward’s motion for 
summary judgment as to plaintiff’s negligence claim premised on  Mr. 
Crossland’s exposure to joint compound and pipe insulation during the 
course of his employment with Woodward.   
The Court grants Woodward’s motion as to all other products.  
Woodward asserts, and claimants do not dispute,  that there is no evidence 
that Mr. Crossland was exposed to asbestos through hardie board, gypcrete, 
rockwool or mineral wool, fire doors, ceiling tile, or zonolite  from his 
employment as Woodward.  Woodward’s motion is also granted as to 
plaintiff’s strict liability claim. 
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III. WOODWARD’S MOTION IN LIMINE 
 
A.  Legal Standard 
 
The district court has considerable discretion to admit or exclude 
expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997); Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 
F.3d 358, 371 (5th Cir. 2000).  Rule 702 provides that an expert witness 
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify” if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case. 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), the Supreme Court held that Rule 702 “requires the district court to 
act as a gatekeeper to ensure that ‘any and all scientific testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’” Metrejean v. REC Marine 
Logistics, LLC, No. 08- 5049, 2009 WL 3062622, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 
2009) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).  This gatekeeping function applies 
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to all forms of expert testimony.  See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137, 147 (1999). 
The Court’s gatekeeping function consists of a two- part inquiry into 
reliability and relevance.  First, th e Court must determine whether the 
proffered expert testimony is reliable.  The party offering the testimony bears 
the burden of establishing its reliability by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc. , 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1 998). The 
reliability inquiry requires the Court to assess whether the expert’s reasoning 
and methodology underlying the testimony are valid.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 593.  The aim is to exclude expert testimony based merely on subjective 
belief or unsupp orted speculation.  See id.  at 590. “[F]undamentally 
unsupported” opinions “offer[] no expert assistance to the [trier of fact]” and 
should be excluded.  Guile v. United States , 422 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 
2005).  The Court may consider several nonexclusive factors in determining 
reliability, including: (1) whether the technique has been tested, (2) whether 
the technique has been subject to peer review and publication, (3) the 
technique’s potential error rate, (4) the existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling the technique’s operation, and (5) whether the 
technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.  
Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004).  The 
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Supreme Court has emphasized that these factors “do not constitute a 
‘definitive checklist or test.’”  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150 (quoting Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 593).  Rather, courts “have considerable leeway in deciding in a 
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert 
testimony is reliable.”  Id. at 152. 
“The reliability analysis applies to all aspects of an expert’s testimony: 
the methodology, the facts underlying the expert’s opinion, the link between 
the facts and the conclusion, et alia.”  Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc. , 
482 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“Where the expert’s opinion is based on insufficient information, the analysis 
is unreliable.”  Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc. , 555 F.3d 383, 388 
(5th Cir. 2009).  Further, the Supreme Court has explained that “nothing in 
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to 
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert.”  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.  Rather, “[a] court may conclude 
that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered.”  Id.  
Second, the Court must determine whether the expert’s reasoning or 
methodology “fits” the facts of the case, and whether it will thereby assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence.  In other words, it must determine 
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whether it is relevant.  See Daubert , 509 U.S. at 591.  “Expert testimony 
which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-
helpful.”  Id. (quoting 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 
702[02] (1988)).   
A district court’s gatekeeper function does not replace the traditional 
adversary system or the role of the jury within this system.  See id. at 596.  As 
noted in Daubert , “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”  Id.  
Thus, in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the district court 
must accord the proper deference to “the jury’s role as the proper arbiter of 
disputes between conflicting opinions.”  United States v. 14.38 Acres of 
Land, More or Less Situated in Leflore Cnty., Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1077 (5th 
Cir. 1996).  
 
B.  Discussion 
 
Woodward’s motion in limine addresses the admissibility of plaintiff’s 
causation expert, Dr. Kradin, and Avondale’s causation expert, Dr. Staggs.  
Dr. Staggs is a pathologist,
47 and Dr. Kradin is a pulmonologist and 
 
47  R. Doc. 328-4 at 1. 
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pathologist who practiced for decades at Massachusetts General Hospital 
with a focus in asbestos diseases.48  He also taught at Harvard Medical School 
and has authorized hundreds of articles on asbestos diseases.49   
Each expert rendered opinions on general and specific causation.  
“General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular 
injury or condition in the general population, while specific causation is 
whether a substance caused a particular individual’s injury.”  Knight v. Kirby 
Inland Marine, Inc. , 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 200 7).  Both experts 
concluded that plaintiff’s mesotheli oma was caused by her cumulative 
bystander, para -occupational (domicile), and environmental exposures to 
asbestos, including her exposure to asbestos dust from her husband’s work 
at Woodward.50 
Woodward contends that both experts’ specific causation opinions are 
unreliable.  The thrust of Woodward’s argument is that rather than 
personally assessing whether  the products to which Mr. Crossland was 
exposed contained asbestos,  both experts assumed that he was exposed 
based on his testimony about the products he  worked with and the dust he 
 
48  R. Doc. 323-1. 
49  Id. 
50  R. Doc. 323-2 at 21 (Kradin Report); R. Doc. 328 -6 at 17 -18 (Staggs 
Report). 
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encountered.  Woodward contends that because there is no evidence that Mr. 
Crossland was exposed to asbestos while working for Woodward, the 
assumptions on which the experts rely are flawed, rendering their opinions 
unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.   
Under Rule 702, an expert may testify only if his “testimony is based 
on sufficient facts or data.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(b).  The facts, data, and sources 
used in an expert’s opinion are generally considered by the jury in weighing 
the evidence, but “in some cases the source upon which an expert’s opinion 
relies is of such little weight that the jury should not be permitted to receive 
that opinion.”  Jacked Up, LLC v. Sara Lee Corp., 807 F. App’x 344, 348 (5th 
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Generally, the fact-finder is 
entitled to hear an expert’s testimony and decide whether the predicate facts 
on which the expert relied are accurate.  At the same time, however, expert 
testimony that relies on completely unsubstantiated factual assertions i s 
inadmissible.”  Moore v. Int’l Paint, LLC , 547 F. App’x 513, 515 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
Here, neither expert relied on “completely unsubstantiated factual 
assertions.”  Id.  Rather, the experts based their opinions about the extent of 
plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos on the testimony of plaintiff, Mr. Crossland, 
and Mr. Crossland’s brothers in light of plaintiff’s medical history  and 
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medical literature regarding the presence of asbestos in certain products and 
the levels of exposure necessary to cause harm. 51  Experts are permitted to 
rely on testimony about exposures from fact witnesses.  See Curtis v. M&S 
Petrol., Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 671 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding admissibility of 
expert’s opinion that relied, among other things, on testimony about the 
work practices at the workplace at issue, including testimony that the 
witnesses became soaked in the relevant toxic materials when they 
performed certain tasks); see also Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co., No. 20-2389, 
R. Doc. 1173 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2022) (ho lding that expert report premised 
on, among other things, testimony from fact witnesses regarding exposures 
to asbestos admissible under Rule 702).   Indeed, experts may even rely on 
hypotheticals, so long as they are supported by the evidence.   U.S. Allian ce 
Grp., Inc. v. Cardtronics USA, Inc., 2022 WL 17622362, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 
13, 2022). 
Woodward contends that the testimony on which the experts relied is 
unreliable because it is contradicted by other evidence that suggests Mr. 
Crossland was not exposed to asbestos while he was employed by Woodward.  
In support of its argument, Woodward largely reiterates the arguments it 
 
51  See R. Doc. 323-2 at 10-15, 20-22 (Kradin Report); R. Doc. 232-3 at 61-
62 (Kradin Tr. 58:19- 59:6); R. Doc. 328-6 at 9 -10, 11- 17 (Staggs 
Report). 
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advances in its motion for summary judgment regarding the sufficiency of 
the evidence.  But the Court has already determined that claimants identified 
issues of fact as to Mr. Crossland’s exposure to asbestos through his 
employment at Woodward.  See Section II.B, supra.  At trial, Woodward may 
confront claimants’ experts with this evidence on cross -examination, from 
which the jury may w eigh the credibility of the experts’ opinions.  See 
Daubert, 709 U.S. at 596 (“[V]igorous cross -examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the 
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence.”); see also Garris v. Pelonis Appliances, Inc. , No. 10-1569, 2014 
WL 1330063 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2014) (“Jurors are quite capable of 
understanding how to weigh expert evidence that may be based on 
assumptions contrary to the other trial evidence presented to the jury.”).   
Woodward’s motion in limine is thus denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Woodward’s motion for summary judgment 
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  Woodward’s motion in 
limine is DENIED. 
 
 
 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of February, 2023. 
 
 
_____________________ 
SARAH S. VANCE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
17th
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