govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cr-00223-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
      
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA        * 
       *      
       
 *  
 v.      * 1:25-CR-00223-ELR-CMS 
       * 
MICHAEL SUMLIN,     * 
       * 
  Defendant.       * 
       *  
_________ 
 
O R D E R 
_________ 
 
This matter  is before the Court for consideration of the Report and 
Recommendation (“R&R”) [Doc. 35] of Magistrate Judge John K. Larkins, III that 
Defendant Michael Sumlin’s Motion to Suppress Evidence [Doc. 11] and Motion to 
Dismiss Indictment Under the Second Amendment [Doc. 32-1] be denied.
1  In the 
time-period allotted for the parties to object to the R&R, Defendant, by and through 
counsel, filed objections. [Doc 40.]  For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS 
the R&R and OVERRULES Defendant’s objections.  
 
1 In his Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 32-1], Defendant challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), preserving his raised issues for appeal , but acknowledging that the motion must be 
denied in light of binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. See generally United States v. Dubois, 139 
F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025). 
 
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I.  Standard of Review 
The district court reviewing an R&R “shall make a de novo  determination of 
those portions of the report or specified proposed finings or recommendations to 
which objection is made.”  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  If neither party objects, the district 
judge need only review the R&R for clear error and “may accept, reject, or modify, 
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 
Id.  A party objecting to an R&R “must specifically identify those findings objected 
to.  Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district 
court.” United States v. Schultz , 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11 th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11 th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted.).  If there are no specific objections made to factual findings made by the 
magistrate judge, there is no requirement that those findings be reviewed de novo. 
Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n. 9 (11 th Cir. 1993).  Absent objection, the 
district court judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 
recommendations made by the magistrate [judge],” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and 
may accept the recommendation if it is not clearly erroneous or contrary to the law.   
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and Rule 59 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court has conducted a de novo review of 
those portions of the R&R to which Defendant objects and has reviewed the remainder 
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of the R&R for plain error. See United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 
1983).  
II.  Discussion 
Defendant refers to his objection as an issue of first impression, specifically the 
question of “whether the Fourth Amendment categorically allows all law enforcement 
officers to conduct warrant checks as a part of any pedestrian stop (i.e., not a traffic 
stop).”  [Doc. 35 at 1. (emphasis in original. )] However, the undersigned does not 
interpret the R&R as making such a sweeping ruling. On the contrary, the Magistrate 
Judge cited specific facts in this case to support why under the specific circumstances 
presented here, the officer’s detention of Defendant was lawful. As Defendant 
acknowledges, he takes no issue with the factual recitation presented in the R&R (see 
Doc. 40 at note 2), so the Court will not repeat those facts here. 
As an initial point, the undersigned agrees with the Magistrate Judge that 
base
d on evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, including Officer White’s 
testimony and his bodycam footage, Officer White had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that Defendant was consuming alcohol in public from the moment he 
approached him. [Doc. 35 at 13.]  As Judge Larkins found, based on Officer White’s 
vast experience in writing alcohol citations, which entails his familiarity with the 
appearance of cans , including canned margaritas like the one Defendant had, 
coupled with Defendant’s physical agitation observed by the officer when he 
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approached him, Officer White’s initial encounter with Defendant did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. [Doc. 35 at 3- 4.]  Instead, as the Magistrate Judge  correctly 
found, Officer White had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had an open container 
of alcohol, which allowed him to conduct an investigatory detention.   
 Then, during Defendant’s physical agitation, he turned his body, such that 
while surrendering the can, Officer White observed a bulge in his right side hip area, 
which the officer recognized as a butt of a gun. [Id. at 4.] At this point, Officer White 
wrote a citation for the open container of alcohol, telling Defendant he was “almost 
finished,” but that he first wanted to make sure Defendant had no outstanding 
warrants. [Id. at 5.] Once he discovered that Defendant did in fact have outstanding 
warrants, Officer White placed Defendant under arrest. [ Id. at 6.] The undersigned 
finds that n one of these steps undertaken by Officer White violated Defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search or seizure. 
Having established that Officer White’s contact with, detention of , and  citation of 
Defendant were lawful, the Court next considers whether the stop was prolonged as 
the officer checked for any outstanding warrants before arresting Defendant. Based 
on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the undersigned agrees with 
the Magistrate Judge that the time the officer took to check Defendant’s warrant 
status did not unreasonably delay or prolong his detention of Defendant, who 
seemingly posits that any amount of delay was too long because this was only a 
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pedestrian and not a traffic stop. Defendant argues that traffic stops should be treated 
differently than pedestrian stops for Fourth Amendment purposes because the 
purpose of a traffic stop is to ensure that vehicles are operated safely and 
responsibly— considerations, t hat according to Defendant, are not present in the 
context of a pedestrian encounter. [ Id. citing Doc. 34 at 4- 6; 8-12.]  However, this 
Court rejects that argument and finds that Officer White was permitted to briefly 
check, for his own safety and for that of others,  to see if Defendant had any 
outstanding warrants, was legally prohibited from carrying a gun, or whether the gun 
was stolen. The Court finds that the brief time of less than ten minutes taken by 
Officer White to do this was not unreasonable. [See Doc. 35 at 6 finding that, [t]he 
entire encounter— that is, between (1) when Officer White first observed Mr. Sumlin 
and (2) his subsequent arrest—lasted around ten minutes.]  
Specifically, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that running 
a warrant check was within the mission of the stop and that Officer White did not 
prolong the stop beyond what was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 
See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (internal citation omitted). 
III. Conclusion 
After conducting a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which 
Defendant objects and reviewing the remainder of the R&R for plain error, this Court 
finds that the Magistrate Judge’s factual and legal conclusions are correct.   
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Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s Objections [Doc. 40], 
ADOPTS the R&R [Doc. 35] as the Opinion  and Order  of this Court ; DENIES 
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence [Doc  11]; and DENIES Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss Indictment Under the Second Amendment. [Doc. 32-1.]  
Defendant is DIRECTED to announce within twenty-one (21) days of the 
date this Order is entered, whether he intends to enter a plea or wishes to proceed to 
trial in this case. 
SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2026. 
                        
    _ _____________________ 
      Eleanor L. Ross 
      United States District Judge 
      Northern District of Georgia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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