govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-02061-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
ASHLEY DIXON, 
 
 
  Plaintiff,   
 v.        CIVIL ACTION NO. 
       1:24-CV-02061-JPB 
CITY OF ATLANTA, et al., 
 
 
 
  Defendants.  
 
ORDER  
 
This matter is before the Court on the City of Atlanta’s (“the City”) Motion 
to Dismiss [Doc. 11].  This Court finds as follows:  
BACKGROUND1 
 On May 14, 2022, Ashley Dixon (“Plaintiff”) attended and took part in a 
peaceful protest called the “March for the Future of Atlanta.”  [Doc. 1, p. 5].  From 
6:30 to 7:30 PM, a group of about 150 people marched from Freedom Park to 
Inman Park with signs, drums and tree branches.  Id. at 5–6.  Plaintiff contends that 
upon reaching Inman Park, “the police surrounded the Park and began arresting 
individuals in the Park” pursuant to an order issued by Officer Matthew Gordon.  
 
1 Because this case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the facts are presented as 
alleged in the Complaint.   
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Id. at 6.  According to Plaintiff, Officer Gordon’s order was “to arrest everyone 
who participated in the protest.”  Id.   
 Plaintiff was among those arrested.  Plaintiff asserts that despite doing 
nothing wrong and breaking no laws, Officer Jeff Cantin arrested her for pedestrian 
in the roadway.  Id. at 7, 15.  The charges against Plaintiff were ultimately 
dismissed.  Id. at 8. 
 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed suit against the City, Officer Gordon 
and Officer Cantin asserting the following causes of action:  (1) unlawful seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) malicious prosecution in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment; (3) municipal liability; (4) malicious prosecution in violation 
of Georgia law; and (5) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.  As to the 
municipal liability claim, which is the only cause of action pending against the 
City, Plaintiff contends that the alleged constitutional violations were (1) the result 
of the City’s failure to properly train its officers in protecting citizens’ First 
Amendment rights; and (2) done at the direction of Officer Gordon— a final 
policymaker for the City.    
 The City filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on August 5, 2024.  [Doc. 11].  
The motion is now ripe for review.    
 
 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
 In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), the court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and 
constru[es] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Traylor v. P’ship 
Title Co., 491 F. App’x 988, 989 (11th Cir. 2012).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Although detailed factual 
allegations are not necessarily required, the pleading must contain more than 
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  A complaint is insufficient 
if it only tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.  
Id.  Importantly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  
At bottom, the complaint must contain more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” id., and must “plead[] factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Traylor, 491 F. App’x at 990 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678).  While all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and construed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th 
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Cir. 2011), a court need not accept as true the plaintiff’s legal conclusions, 
including those couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
Accordingly, evaluation of a motion to dismiss requires two steps:  (1) a 
co
urt must eliminate any allegations in the pleading that are merely legal 
conclusions, and (2) where there are remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, a 
court must “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.  
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff asserts a single claim for municipal liability against the City.  As a 
general rule, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its 
employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).  Instead, a municipality incurs liability only 
when the execution of its policy or custom constitutes the “moving force” that 
inflicts injury upon an individual in violation of her constitutional rights.  Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  As such, a successful Monell
claim hinges upon a plaintiff’s ability to show that a deprivation of constitutional 
rights occurred because of an official government policy or custom.  Davis v. City 
of Apopka, 734 F. App’x 616, 619 (11th Cir. 2018).  An official government 
policy that subjects a municipality to liability under § 1983 “can be a decision by a 
municipality’s lawmaking body, an act by a policymaking official, or a municipal 
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custom— that is, a ‘practice[ ] so persistent and widespread as to practically have 
the force of law.’”  Sosa v. Martin County, 13 F.4th 1254, 1277 (11th Cir. 2021) 
(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).  In addition to these 
things, an official government policy may also be “a municipality’s decision not to 
train employees on their legal duty not to violate citizens’ rights.”  Id.  
 The City asserts that Plaintiff fails to state a viable Monell claim.  
Specifically, the City contends that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient factual 
matter to establish liability under either a failure-to-train or final policymaker 
theory.  
1. Whether Plaintiff Pleads a Plausible Monell Claim Against the 
City Based on a Failure-to-Train Theory 
 
 Plaintiff asserts that the City is liable under the Monell doctrine due to its 
failure to provide proper training.  As stated previously, a municipality’s decision 
not to train employees on their legal duty not to violate citizens’ rights can 
constitute an official government policy subjecting the municipality to liability 
under § 1983.  Importantly, to qualify as a policy, “the municipality’s failure to 
train must ‘evidence[ ] a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants.’”  
Id. (quoting Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 
2009)).  A plaintiff must therefore “present some evidence that the municipality 
knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and . . . made a 
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deliberate choice not to take any action.”  Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293.  This notice 
requirement may be satisfied by alleging “a pattern of similar constitutional 
violations by untrained employees.”2  Sosa, 13 F.4th at 1277. 
 In this case, Plaintiff asserts that “the City has a long history of not 
adequately training its officers when it comes to protecting and respecting citizens’ 
First Amendment rights.”  [Doc. 1, p. 12].  Plaintiff supports this allegation by 
describing three different instances where protestors have been arrested under the 
pretext of violating the pedestrian in the roadway law:  (1) a January 2021 protest 
in Atlanta that resulted in an arrest of nineteen protestors; (2) a September 2021 
protest where a dozen protestors were arrested; and (3) a September 2020 protest 
where at least one protestor was arrested.  Without any specificity, Plaintiff also 
asserts that many other protestors have been arrested under similar circumstances.   
 In its Motion to Dismiss, the City argues that because no other court has 
found that the City inadequately or negligently trained its officers as to citizens’ 
First Amendment rights, Plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference in this case.  
The Court disagrees that Plaintiff must show that another court made a finding of 
 
2 The notice requirement may also be satisfied “by showing that the need for training was 
so obvious that a municipality’s failure to train its employees would result in a 
constitutional violation.”  Mingo v. City of Mobile, 592 F. App’x 793, 799–800 (11th 
Cir. 2014).  Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the need to train police officers not to 
violate citizens’ First Amendment rights was “so obvious.”   
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inadequate training.  Rather, a plaintiff must only show that a defendant had notice 
by alleging a pattern of similar constitutional violations.  By referencing these 
other instances where protestors have been arrested, the Court finds that Plaintiff 
has done enough to allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained 
employees.  See Williams v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 181 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1122 
(N.D. Ga. 2016) (holding that “one or two incidents . . . is generally insufficient to 
indicate a pattern,” but on a motion to dismiss, “allegations of anything more than 
that are generally sufficient”).  Ultimately, because Plaintiff alleges facts which 
demonstrate that the City was on notice of a need to train its officers on how to 
deal with peaceful protestors, Plaintiff’s failure-to-train claim can proceed.  To the 
extent that the City argues otherwise, the motion is DENIED. 
2. Whether Plaintiff Pleads a Plausible Monell Claim Through the
Acts of Officer Gordon as a Final Policymaker for the City
In add
ition to her failure-to-train theory, Plaintiff also alleges that the City is 
liable under a final-policymaker theory.  Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Officer 
Gordon, a final policymaker, gave an order to arrest all protestors.  A municipality 
may be liable for a single decision made by a municipal official when the official 
“is the final policymaker for the municipality with respect to the subject matter in 
question.”  Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 1989).  An official is the 
final policymaker on a given subject matter when “his decisions have legal effect 
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without further action by the governing body” and “the governing body lacks the 
power to reverse the [official’s] decision.”  Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 
370 F.3d 1252, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004).  Courts determine whether an official is a 
final policymaker for the municipality by examining “the relevant positive law, 
including ordinances, rules and regulations” as well as “customs and practices 
having the force of law.”  Mandel, 888 F.2d at 793.   
 The Court recognizes that not all theories of municipal liability require a 
single final policymaker.  Indeed, a lesser official’s decision may also subject a 
municipality to liability in two circumstances:  delegation and ratification.  As to 
delegation, a municipal officer who is not a final policymaker may nevertheless 
bind the municipality through a single act when that official was delegated the 
authority to make the decision by a final policymaker.  Ratlieff v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, No. 22-CV-61029, 2023 WL 3750581, at *16 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2023).  
Notably, “the mere delegation of authority to a subordinate to exercise discretion is 
not sufficient to give the subordinate policymaking authority.  Rather, the 
delegation must be such that the subordinate’s discretionary decisions are not 
constrained by official policies and are not subject to review.”  Mandel, 888 F.2d at 
792.  Ratification occurs “when a subordinate public official makes an 
unconstitutional decision and when that decision is then adopted by someone who 
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does have final policymaking authority.”  Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 
1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016).  
 T he City argues that dismissal is required because Officer Gordon was not a 
final policymaker.  The Court is not persuaded.  In the Eleventh Circuit, to survive 
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only “allege a policy, practice, or custom of 
the City” which caused the unconstitutional arrest.  Id. at 1279.  Importantly, 
“identifying and proving that a final policymaker acted on behalf of a municipality 
is ‘an evidentiary standard, and not a pleading requirement.’”  Id. at 1280. 
 Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that a policy, practice or custom of 
the City led to her arrest, which is all that is required at this stage of the 
proceedings.  Indeed, Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that the City “routinely 
arrests protestors under the pretext of violating pedestrian in the roadway laws.”
3  
[Doc. 1, p. 12].  Because Plaintiff plausibly set forth a policy, practice or custom 
that led to her arrest, dismissal is inappropriate at this time.  See Gadomski v. City 
of Atlanta, No. 1:23-CV-4036, 2024 WL 3070182, at *3 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2024) 
(determining that almost identical allegations survived a motion to dismiss).  As 
such, to the extent that the City argues that dismissal is required because Plaintiff 
 
3 This allegation is supported by specific instances where other protestors were arrested 
under similar circumstances.   
 
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failed to show that Officer Gordon is a final policymaker, the motion is DENIED.4  
See Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2023) (rejecting 
argument that dismissal was required where the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege 
that a particular police officer was a final policymaker).   
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the City’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 11] is 
DENIED.     
Local Rule 16.2 requires parties to submit a Joint Preliminary Report and 
Discovery Plan.  The parties are HEREBY ORDERED to file the Joint 
Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan no later than fourteen days from the date of 
this Order.  The parties are notified that a failure to comply with this Order may 
result in sanctions, including dismissal.  In the event a Joint Preliminary Report 
and Discovery Plan is not filed, the Clerk is DIRECTED to submit the case at the 
expiration of the applicable time period.  
SO ORDERED this 16th day of December, 2024. 
4 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint withstands a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court notes that 
Plaintiff will likely have to identify (and provide proof concerning) a single final 
policymaker in order to survive summary judgment or prevail at trial.   
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