govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-02061-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
ASHLEY DIXON, 
 
 
  Plaintiff,  
 v.        CIVIL ACTION NO.: 
       1:24-CV-02061-JPB 
CITY OF ATLANTA, et al.,  
  Defendants.  
 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on the City of Atlanta and Jeff Cantin’s 
(collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 46].  This Court 
finds as follows: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Ashley Dixon and Melanie Silverstein (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit 
against Defendants in May 2024, and asserted the following causes of action, all of 
which relate to their arrest during a protest:  (1) unlawful seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment; (2) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment; (3) municipal liability; (4) malicious prosecution in violation of 
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Georgia law; (5) and First Amendment retaliation.1  [Doc. 1].  Defendants filed the 
instant Motion for Summary Judgment on August 6, 2025.  [Doc. 46].  The motion 
is now ripe for review.   
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Court derives the facts of this case from Defendants’ Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts [Doc. 46-8], Plaintiffs’ Statement of Additional 
Material Facts [Doc. 49-3] and the responses filed thereto [Doc. 49-2]; [Doc. 52-
1].  The Court also conducted its own review of the record.   
On May 14, 2022, Plaintiffs participated in a “Stop Cop City” protest with 
approximately 150 other people.2  [Doc. 49-2, pp. 1–2].  Protesters marched from 
Freedom Park to Inman Park carrying signs, tree branches and drums.  Id.  
Plaintiffs described the protest as “peaceful,” while Cantin reported it as “a mix [of 
peaceful and violent].”  [Doc. 1, p. 5]; [Doc. 46-3, p. 133].  It is undisputed that 
protesters, including Plaintiffs, marched both in the streets and on sidewalks.  
 
1 Dixon and Silverstein brought two separate suits.  The Court consolidated the actions on 
December 20, 2024.   
 
2 The protesters were rallying against the development of a Public Safety Training Center 
for police officers.   
 
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Video evidence shows that protesters blocked traffic, at least at times, during their 
march through the streets.  [Doc. 46-4].     
Cantin, a police officer employed by the City of Atlanta, led the protest 
response.3  [Doc. 49-3, p. 7].  Upon learning from other officers that the protesters 
were marching in the streets (instead of staying at Freedom Park), Cantin called for 
additional officers to assist him.  [Doc. 46-3, p. 61].  Once Cantin had the officers 
that he needed in place, he issued an order to arrest all the protesters for being in 
the roadway.4  [Doc. 49-3, p. 11]. 
Shortly after the protest was over, Cantin arrested Plaintiffs, who were on a 
sidewalk, for pedestrian on or along roadway in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-96.  
[Doc. 49-2, p. 6]; [Doc. 49-3, p. 18].  Section § 40-6-96(b) states that “[w]here a 
sidewalk is provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to stand or stride along 
and upon an adjacent roadway unless there is no motor vehicle traveling within 
1,000 feet of such pedestrian on such roadway.”  According to Cantin, he arrested 
 
3 On the day in question, Cantin was head of the Strategic Response Section, which 
covered protest activity, the Public Safety Training Center, the drone unit, movies, movie 
permits and filming.  [Doc. 49-3, p. 3].   
 
4 Sometimes a “dispersal order” is given before protesters are arrested.  A dispersal order 
gives protesters the opportunity to leave the roadway within a certain amount of time to 
avoid arrest.  Although a dispersal order was discussed in this case, it is unclear whether 
one was given.  [Doc. 49-3, p. 10].  
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Plaintiffs, in part, because they crossed the street right in front of him.  [Doc. 49-3, 
p. 7].  In fact, Cantin claimed in his deposition that Plaintiffs were so close to his 
car that he had to hit his brakes to avoid hitting them.  Id. at 7–8.  Plaintiffs 
provided a differing account, however.  Although Plaintiffs admitted that they had 
been in the roadway at some points during the protest, Silverstein testified in her 
deposition that she never crossed the street with Dixon.  Id. at 17.  Moreover, 
Dixon provided testimony that when she was arrested, she was on the sidewalk and 
had been on the sidewalk “for a really long time.”  [Doc. 46-1, p. 17].  
Cantin also asserted in his deposition that he arrested Plaintiffs because they 
were part of the protest that had blocked the road.  [Doc. 46-3, p. 120].  
Specifically, when asked whether he would have arrested Plaintiffs if they were 
just residents that lived in the area that happened to be in the roadway, Cantin 
seemingly implied that he would not have and explained that he “was looking for 
people that were in the roadway blocking Moreland. . . .  I was more worried about 
the fact that they blocked Ponce de Leon and Moreland Avenue during rush hour 
on a Saturday night.”  Id. at 103.  Cantin admitted that at no time before arresting 
Plaintiffs did he ever personally observe Plaintiffs or get any information from 
undercover officers or the police helicopter about their specific behavior during the 
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protest.  [Doc. 49-3, p. 9].  He did, however, have information that the group of 
protesters had been in the street.   
LEGAL STANDARD 
 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  A material fact is 
any fact that “is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law 
which might affect the outcome of the case.”  Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 
642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).  A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  Ultimately, “[t]he basic issue 
before the court on a motion for summary judgment is ‘whether the evidence 
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is 
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”  Allen, 121 F.3d at 
646 (citation omitted). 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing 
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, “and in deciding whether the 
movant has met this burden[,] the court must view the movant’s evidence and all 
factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
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party.”  Id.  After the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmovant bears the 
burden of showing specific facts that indicate summary judgment is improper 
because a material issue of fact does exist.  Id.  However, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of 
evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be 
enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.”  Walker v. 
Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).  If the record taken 
as a whole cannot lead “a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, 
there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). 
DISCUSSION 
 Defendants move for summary judgment on all causes of action.  In the 
analysis below, the Court first addresses whether summary judgment is warranted 
as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.     
I. Federal Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Defendants argue that Cantin is entitled to qualified immunity as to the 
federal claims.  “Qualified immunity protects public officers from undue 
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”  
Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).  As a 
result, qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary 
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functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”  Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2019).  Importantly, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.”  Id.      
 “[T]o establish qualified immunity, a defendant first must show that [he] 
was acting within the scope of [his] discretionary authority at the time of the 
alleged misconduct.”  Paez, 915 F.3d at 1284.  Once that burden is met,5 “the 
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.”6  
Id.  To do that, the plaintiff must show:  (1) that the defendant violated a 
constitutional right; and (2) that the violated right was clearly established at the 
time of the incident.  Id.  Crucially, “both elements of this test must be present for 
an official to lose qualified immunity.”  Rivera v. Carvajal, 777 F. App’x 434, 437 
(11th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).   
 
 
5 No dispute exists that Cantin was acting within his discretionary authority when he 
arrested Plaintiffs.   
 
6 Although Plaintiffs bear the burden in a qualified immunity analysis, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that defendants must “specifically and clearly” present 
their theories of qualified immunity to the district court.  WBY, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 
695 F. App’x 486, 491–92 (11th Cir. 2017). 
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A.      Unlawful Seizure and Malicious Prosecution 
 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful seizure and 
malicious prosecution fail because Cantin had probable cause to arrest them.  It is 
well settled that “the Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense.”  Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).  The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held: 
[p]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of 
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.  Probable 
cause is not a high bar.  Far from requir[ing] convincing proof that 
[an] offense was committed, probable cause is a flexible and fluid 
concept, that looks instead to the totality of the circumstances to 
determine the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that a crime has 
been committed.  Accordingly, [t]he test for probable cause is not 
reducible to precise definition or quantification, and [f]inely tuned 
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable-
cause] decision. 
 
Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Probable cause “requires less than a preponderance of the 
evidence,” and therefore it “does not require that it be more likely than not the 
person arrested for a crime is actually guilty of it.”  Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 
F.4th 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2023).  Indeed, “[p]robable cause exists where the 
facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, derived from 
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reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable 
caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”  Brown 
v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 Notably, where an officer has asserted qualified immunity, “an officer need 
not have actual probable cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.”  Grider v. 
City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010).  “Arguable probable cause 
exists where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the 
same knowledge as [the defendant] could have believed that probable cause existed 
to arrest [the plaintiffs.]”  Id. (citation modified).  This is the rule because “it is 
inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but 
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and in such cases those 
officials should not be held personally liable.”  Id. 
 As stated previously, Cantin arrested Plaintiffs for pedestrian on or along 
roadway in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-96, which provides that “[w]here a 
sidewalk is provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to stand or stride along 
and upon an adjacent roadway unless there is no motor vehicle traveling within 
1,000 feet of such pedestrian on such roadway.”  [Doc. 49-2, p. 6].  Defendants 
contend that Cantin had probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to 
arrest Plaintiffs because he had information from other officers that the group of 
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protesters, not necessarily Plaintiffs specifically, were in the street marching and 
blocking traffic.7  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that probable cause was 
lacking because Cantin did not have any specific information about them from 
undercover officers, the helicopter or otherwise.  The Court notes that neither party 
supported their respective arguments with case law or any other authority.     
 Kampas v. City of St. Louis, a recent decision from the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, is instructive, though not binding.  157 F.4th 937 (8th Cir. 2025).  
There, the court considered challenges to a mass arrest that occurred during 
protests following the acquittal of a former police officer facing murder charges.  
Id. at 940.  At that protest, a group of protesters marched onto the interstate and 
blocked traffic.  Id.  Similar to what happened here, upon learning that the group 
was on the interstate, a police chief authorized the arrests of individuals that 
participated in the protest.  Id.  Officers effectuated the arrests by encircling the 
group once they exited the interstate highway.  Id.  Several “legal observers,” who 
were not part of the protest, were swept up in the arrest even though they “did not 
step foot onto” the interstate and “no officer saw them on the interstate.”  Id.   
 
7 Defendants also argue that Cantin had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs because they 
crossed the street right in front of his vehicle.  Because Plaintiffs provided evidence that 
they did not cross the street together, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to what 
Cantin saw.  Summary judgment is thus not appropriate on this basis.     
 
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 The legal observers sued and claimed that their arrests were not supported 
by probable cause.  Id. at 942.  Recognizing the “practical dilemma faced by 
officers responsible for reacting to large group activity,” the court disagreed.  Id. at 
943.  The court held that “a requirement that officers verify that each and every 
member of a crowd engaged in a specific riotous act would be practically 
impossible in any situation involving a large riot.”8  Id. (citation modified).  
Consequently, the court determined that “the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the 
officers have grounds to believe all arrested persons were a part of a unit observed 
violating the law.”  Id.  (citation modified).9   
 In this case, it was objectively reasonable for Cantin to conclude that the 
marching protesters acted as a unit.  The undisputed evidence shows that Cantin 
was informed by other officers that everybody was in the road marching.  [Doc. 
46-3, pp. 65–66].  More particularly, when Cantin was asked at his deposition 
 
8 No allegation exists in this case that the protesters were rioting.  Nevertheless, the case 
is instructive because it addresses probable cause when a large number of individuals 
conduct an activity together.     
 
9 The Court of the Appeals for the District of Columbia has articulated a similar rule.  
Carr v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  In that case, the court 
held that “[p]olice witnesses must only be able to form a reasonable belief that the entire 
crowd [acted as a unit]. . . .  A requirement that the officers verify that each and every 
member of a crowd engaged in a specific riotous act would be practically impossible in 
any situation involving a large riot, particularly when it is on the move.”  Id.   
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whether he had seen Plaintiffs in the roadway, he responded, “[w]hen they were 
part of the march, I was told repeatedly that they were all in the road.  And it’s 
recorded on radio with the helicopter, so I used collective knowledge that 
everybody was in the road.”  Id. at 72.         
 While this Court acknowledges that Cantin and no other officer specifically 
observed or identified Plaintiffs as being in the street, it was objectively reasonable 
for Cantin to believe that Plaintiffs were part of the group of protesters that were in 
the roadway and blocking traffic.  Indeed, Cantin’s belief that Plaintiffs acted as 
part of the unit was reasonable because Cantin witnessed Silverstein, who was 
talking to Dixon, carrying a “Stop Cop City” protest sign immediately after the 
protesters dispersed.  [Doc. 49-3, p. 12].  Like the officers in Kampas, Cantin was 
tasked with reacting to a “large group activity” in real time, rendering it 
unreasonable and impractical that he “verify that each and every” member of the 
group of protesters was one of the individuals in the roadway prior to effectuating 
the arrests for the unlawful activity.  Ultimately, the Court is satisfied that Cantin 
reasonably believed that Plaintiffs were part of the unit that engaged in the 
unlawful activity of being in the roadway, and therefore the Court finds that Cantin 
had, at a minimum, arguable probable cause at the time of arrest to believe that 
Plaintiffs had committed the offense of pedestrian in a roadway.  Therefore, to the 
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extent that Defendants seek summary judgment on the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for 
unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution, the motion is GRANTED. 
B.      First Amendment Retaliation 
Defendants also assert that Cantin is entitled to qualified immunity as to 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim wherein Plaintiffs argue that they 
were arrested— not for being in the roadway— but in retaliation for exercising their 
First Amendment rights.  “[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials 
from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected 
speech.”  Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (citation modified).  “To 
prevail on [a First Amendment retaliation] claim, a plaintiff must establish a 
‘causal connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and 
the plaintiff’s ‘subsequent injury.’”  Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 581 (11th 
Cir. 2023).  Notably, “[i]t is not enough to show that an official acted with a 
retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured— the motive must cause the 
injury.”  Nieves, 587 U.S. at 398.  Consequently, a plaintiff must show that, absent 
the retaliatory motive, she would not have been arrested.  Id. at 399.  Even where 
probable cause is present, a plaintiff can satisfy this burden by presenting 
“objective evidence that [she] was arrested when otherwise similarly situated 
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individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.”10  
Turner, 65 F.4th at 586.   
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert that Cantin is 
entitled to qualified immunity because “Plaintiffs have failed to show even a 
scintilla of evidence demonstrating ‘retaliatory animus.’”  [Doc. 46, p. 8].  
Specifically, Defendants claim that “Plaintiffs have pointed out no evidence that 
[Cantin] regularly or routinely arrested protesters for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-
96.”  Id. at 8.  The Court disagrees that Plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence. 
In the Court’s view, Plaintiffs provided objective evidence that similarly 
situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech—speech 
against the Public Safety Training Center—had not been arrested.  Specifically, 
Cantin testified during his deposition that just a few days after the protest in 
question, he assisted with a Roe v. Wade protest.  [Doc. 52-1, p. 6].  Notably, no 
protesters, even though they were marching in the street like Plaintiffs, were 
arrested at the event.11  Id.  Given this objective evidence of similarly situated 
 
10 In Nieves, the Supreme Court of the United States used jaywalking as an example.  The 
Court explained that even where probable cause exists to support an arrest for 
jaywalking, arresting only those individuals who complain about police conduct may 
support a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.  587 U.S. at 407.   
 
11 In their reply brief, Defendants argue that the Court cannot consider the lack of arrests 
at the Roe v. Wade protest because no evidence was presented that the protesters there 
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individuals that had not been arrested, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
as to the First Amendment retaliation claim is DENIED.12 
II. Malicious Prosecution under Georgia Law
Defendants contend that Cantin is entitled to official immunity as to
Plaintiffs’ state-law malicious prosecution claim.  “[O]fficial immunity applies to 
claims brought against public officers and employees in their individual 
capacities.”  Mommies Props., LLC v. Semanson, 880 S.E.2d 376, 383 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2022).  Under this type of immunity, an official “may not be held liable for 
injuries caused through his performance of discretionary functions unless he acts 
‘with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury.’”  Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 
blocked the roadway with items, damaged property or became violent with officers.  As 
an initial matter, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the instant protest 
was peaceful or violent.  In any event, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not engage in 
any violent behavior or behavior that was any different from those protesting Roe v. 
Wade.  Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that the Roe v. Wade protest cannot be 
used for comparison purposes.   
12 Although the parties focus primarily on whether a constitutional violation occurred 
(i.e., First Amendment retaliation), the Court must still determine whether the right was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.  In light of Nieves, the Court finds 
that it was clearly established that an officer may not rely on probable cause to shield a 
retaliatory arrest where objective evidence shows that the offense is one for which 
individuals are ordinarily not arrested and that enforcement was triggered by protected 
speech.  587 U.S. at 407.  In short, Nieves squarely put officers on notice that such arrests 
violate the First Amendment.  
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F.3d 473, 485 (11th Cir. 2016).  Actual malice means “a deliberate intention to do
a wrongful act” or do harm.  Cunningham v. Cobb County, 141 F.4th 1201, 1212 
(11th Cir. 2025).  It does not include “the reckless disregard for the rights or safety 
of others.”  Bailey, 843 F.3d at 485–86.  Actual intent to cause injury “means an 
actual intent to cause harm to the plaintiff, not merely an intent to do the act 
purportedly resulting in the claimed injury.”  West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1073 
(11th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).     
Defendants argue that Cantin is entitled to official immunity because 
“Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of an intention to commit a wrongful act, ill 
will, or wicked motive.”  [Doc. 46, p. 10].  Defendants further claim that any 
evidence of ill will is negated because Cantin believes in First Amendment rights.  
Id.  Plaintiffs did not respond to this argument or address their malicious 
prosecution claim in any way.    
“A party’s failure to respond to any portion or claim in a motion indicates 
such portion, claim or defense is unopposed.”  Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., 564 F. 
App’x 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014).  Consequently, “[w]hen a party fails to respond 
to an argument or otherwise address a claim, the Court deems such argument or 
claim abandoned.”  Id.; see also Johns v. CSX Transp., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 
1373 (M.D. Ga. 2016) (holding that “[w]hen a non-moving party fails to address 
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particular claims [raised] in the moving party’s motion for summary judgment but 
responds to other arguments, the non-moving party abandons [those] claims”).  
Because Plaintiffs failed to respond, this Court finds that they abandoned their 
malicious prosecution claim.  See Clark v. City of Atlanta, 544 F. App’x 848, 855 
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding that the plaintiffs’ state law causes of action were 
abandoned because the plaintiffs failed to defend the claims in their response to the 
motion for summary judgment).  As such, to the extent that Defendants argue that 
Cantin is entitled to official immunity as to the malicious prosecution claim, the 
motion is GRANTED.  
III. Municipal Liability
In Count III of their respective complaints, Plaintiffs asserted that the City of
Atlant
a is “liable under the Monell doctrine due to its failure to provide proper 
training and because there was a decision by a final [policymaker] to arrest 
Plaintiff[s] or to conduct arrests in cases such” as Plaintiffs.  [Doc. 1, p. 11].  As to 
Plaintiffs’ assertion that the City of Atlanta is liable because there was a decision 
by a final policymaker, Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Officer Matthew Gordon 
made the decision to arrest the protesters in this case.
13  Indeed, Plaintiffs asserted 
13 Gordon was originally named as a defendant in this case but was dismissed through a 
stipulation of dismissal on July 8, 2025.     
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that Gordon made the decision to “arrest all members of the group” and that Cantin 
acted pursuant to Gordon’s instructions.  Id. at 19. 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because 
Gordon did not make any arrest decisions in this case.14  Although Plaintiffs admit 
this fact, Plaintiffs insist that summary judgment is not proper because “Cantin, 
Deputy Chief Carven Tyus and Chief Schierbaum all qualify as final 
[policymakers] and were all involved in setting policy that resulted in the arrest of 
Plaintiffs.”  [Doc. 49-1, p. 23].  Problematically for Plaintiffs, it is apparent to the 
Court that Plaintiffs have shifted their theory of liability for the City of Atlanta 
from Gordon acting as a final policymaker to a myriad of other individuals 
possibly acting as that person.  It is well settled that “a plaintiff cannot amend [her] 
complaint through argument made in [her] brief in opposition to the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.”  Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United 
14 In one sentence, Defendants also state that “Plaintiffs also fail to provide any evidence 
in support of . . . a failure to train.”  [Doc. 46, p. 16].  Because this argument is not 
supported either factually or legally, the Court does not have an obligation to consider it. 
Brewfab, LLC v. 3 Delta, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1208 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (holding 
that courts need not consider cursory arguments that are not supported); see also Maples 
v. Campbell, No. 5:03-CV-2399, 2006 WL 8438017, at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2006)
(finding that the court was not required to “consider unsupported and undeveloped
issues”).  Thus, to the extent that Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
failure to train claim, the motion is DENIED as unsupported.
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States, 716 F.3d 535, 559 (11th Cir. 2013).  “At the summary judgment stage, the 
proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim [or theory of liability] is to 
amend the complaint in accordance with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.]”  
Id. (citation modified).  Thus, in light of the allegations in the Complaint that 
Gordon was the final policymaker, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED to the extent Defendants seek summary judgment as to this portion of 
the Monell claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
[Doc. 46] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.  The parties are 
HEREBY ORDERED to file the Consolidated Pretrial Order required by Local 
Rule 16.4 within twenty-one days of entry of this Order.  The parties are notified 
that a failure to comply with this Order may result in sanctions, including dismissal 
of the case or entry of default judgment.  If a Consolidated Pretrial Order is not 
filed, the Clerk is DIRECTED to submit the case at the expiration of the twenty-
one-day period.    
The Court recognizes that the parties indicated in their Joint Preliminary 
Report and Discovery Plan that there was some possibility of settlement after 
discovery.  Now that discovery has ended and the dipositive motion decided, if the 
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parties would like a stay of this deadline to allow them to conduct mediation, they 
may file a motion to that effect.  The parties are reminded that the Court can refer 
this case to mediation before a Magistrate Judge at no cost.   
SO ORDERED this 4th day of February, 2026. 
 
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