govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-2_22-cv-02653-6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION  
 
STUDENT RESOURCE CENTER, LLC, :  
 : 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:22-cv-2653 
 : 
v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley  
 :  
EASTERN GATEWAY COMMUNITY : Magist rate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 
COLLEGE, : 
 :  
Defendant. : 
ORDER 
This matter is before this Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Writ of Prejudgment Attachment 
(ECF No. 106) and the Unopposed Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 114) filed by Defendant Board 
of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, Ohio (the “Board”) pursuant to Rule 24(a) and (b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Writ 
of Prejudgment Attachment (ECF No. 106) is GRANTED and the Board’s Unopposed Motion to 
Intervene (ECF No. 114) is DENIED as moot. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The full factual content of this case is set out in greater deta il in this Court’s August 15, 
2024 Opinion & Order (ECF No. 143). For the purpos es of this Opinion & Order, this Court 
focuses on the facts that gave rise to the Motion for Prejudgment Attachment. (ECF No. 106). 
This is a contract case brought by Student Resource Center (“SRC”), a private educational 
services company, against Eastern Gateway Co mmunity College (“EGCC”), a public two-year 
college based in Steubenville, Ohio. The pa rties entered a Collaboration Agreement (the 
“Agreement”) in June 2017, the purpose of which is “to develop, market, and offer online courses 
to members of unions and professional associatio ns,” provide academic and career counseling to 
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students, assist with enrollment and course regi stration, and recruit stud ents—which they have 
implemented via the Free College Benefit Program  (“the Program”). (ECF Nos. 2-3, Braithwaite 
aff., ¶ 8; 24 at 16). Through the Program, EGCC provides scholarships to more than 90,000 union-
affiliated students, (ECF No. 24, ¶ 7), through a “last-dollar” or “last-mile” model of free college 
in which a state or government institution will pay the remaining tuition balance after a student’s 
existing federal financial aid award has been exhausted. (Id., ¶ 8).  
On July 11, 2022, upon SRC’s motion, this Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining 
EGCC from: (1) terminating the Agreement purs uant to EGCC’s Notice of Breach; and (2) 
breaching the Agreement’s non-compete provision by starting and operating a competing business 
directly with the unions. (ECF No. 14 at 15–16). Shortly thereafte r, on July 18, 2022, the 
Department of Education (“DOE”) issued a Cease-and-Desist letter to EGCC stating that the Free 
College Benefit program violated Title IV’s prohibition against as sessing higher charges to Title 
IV scholarship recipients than those charges assessed to non-Title  IV recipients. (ECF No. 28, ¶ 
85). On August 23, 2022, this Court expanded th e preliminary injunction by requiring EGCC to 
pay SRC approximately $2.36 milli on of allegedly withheld prof it-sharing payments for the 
semesters prior to December 31, 2021. (Id., ¶ 71).  
On June 20, 2023, SRC filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint 
(“SAC”). (ECF No. 52). The Motion stated that SRC intended to: (1) allege that the Agreement 
had not terminated in October 2022 upon its filing of the FAC but remains in effect; and (2) amend 
the FAC with an additional breach of contract claim and unjust enrichment claim to cover alleged 
unpaid expenses from September 2022 to the present. (ECF No. 58 at 2). On September 25, 2023, 
this Court addressed multiple outstanding moti ons by: (1) denying in part EGCC’s Motion to 
Strike the FAC and Dismiss in Part SRC’s FAC (ECF No. 33); (2) granting in part and denying in 
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part SRC’s Motion to Dismiss EGCC’s Counterclaims (ECF No. 34), granting in part as it relates 
to Counterclaim III for unjust enrichment and Count erclaims I and II as it relates to breach of 
contract for § 8 of the Agreemen t and denying in part as it relate s to Counterclaims I and II for 
breach of contract pursuant to § 2.6 of the Agreement; (3) denying EGCC’s Motion to Vacate the 
Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 39); (4) denying SRC’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (ECF 
No. 45); and denying (5) SRC’s Motion for a Status Conference (ECF No. 48). 
On May 15, 2024, EGCC’s Board of Trustees voted to dissolve the school on October 31, 
2024, and to sell the school’s Pugliese Center, located at 110 John Scott Highway, in Steubenville, 
Ohio and all of the center’s assets, to Steubenville City Schools. (ECF No. 106 at 2). This decision 
gave rise to SRC’s present Motion, which now moves this Court to issue an order of prejudgment 
attachment as to the Pugliese Center property an d its assets, and the Steu benville campus and its 
assets, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a) and Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.01(A)(7) and (9). (ECF No. 106). 
EGCC responded properly to SRC’s Motion and reque sted a hearing on th e matter, which this 
Court held on June 20, 2024 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.043(A). (ECF No. 112 at 1). 
SRC seeks to attach the property before it ca n be sold or otherwis e reverted to Jefferson 
County. In 1967, the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, Ohio granted the 
property in question to EGCC’s predecessor, the Je fferson County Technical Institute. (ECF No. 
106 at 6). The deed conveying the property contains a reverter clause stating, “[T]his conveyance 
is made to the board of Trustees of the Jeff erson County Technical In stitute for educational 
purposes only … and if said premises are not used  for educational purposes or if said premises 
cease to be used for educational purposes, title shall revert to the County of Jefferson, Ohio.” (Id.). 
This clause vested a reversionary interest in the Board of County Commissioners, who were 
granted permission to intervene at the June 20, 2024 hearing. Despite the discussion at the hearing 
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of what effect a prejudgment attachment might have on the Board’s reve rsionary interest, the 
reverter clause has no effect on the matter before this Court. Indeed, its only purpose in this context 
might be to show EGCC’s ability to dispose of its assets – if th e campus property is not used for 
educational purposes, it will leave EGCC’s posse ssion and revert back to Jefferson County. The 
Jefferson County Auditor values the Pugliese Center land and improvements at $2,015,400. (ECF 
No. 106 at 2). EGCC claims that it intends to use the proceeds from the sale to pay operating 
expenses and outstanding debts. (Id.).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64(a) prov ides: “At the commencem ent of ... an action, 
every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for 
seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of a potential judgment.” Pursuant to Rule 64, 
in attachment proceedings, federal courts in Ohio apply Chapter 2715 of the Ohio Revised Code. 
See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Whiteford Sys., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 766, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
“Ohio permits attachment agains t a defendant’s property ‘in a ci vil action for the recovery of 
money, at or after its commenc ement,’ upon any of the grounds specified in O.R.C. § 2715.01.” 
Forefront Machining Techs., Inc. v. SARIX SA , No. 3:19-cv-383, 2020 WL  804858, at *3 (S.D. 
Ohio 2020). 
Under Ohio law, “[a] plaintiff in an action for the recovery of money, upon or at any time 
after the commencement of the action, may apply to the court by written motion for the attachment 
of property, other than personal earnings, of the defendant.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.03. In order 
to attach a defendant’s property, a plaintiff must  prove the existence of probable cause – in other 
words, that it is “likely that [the plaintiff] will obtain judgment against the defendant ... that entitles 
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the plaintiff to a money judgment that can be satisfied out of the property that is the subject of the 
motion.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.011(A). 
A motion for prejudgment attachme nt must include an affidavi t from the plaintiff or its 
agent or attorney setting forth the “nature and amount of the clai m; the facts that support at least 
one ground for an attachment contained in § 2715.01; a description of the property sought and its 
approximate value; the location of the property; and to the best of plaintiff’s knowledge, the use 
to which the defendant has put the property.” Enable Healthcare, Inc. v. Cleveland Quality 
Healthnet, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-2395, 2016 WL 6821980, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 2016); Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 2715.03. Prejudgment attachment under Ohio law also requires a plaintiff to establish probable 
cause that it is likely he or she will obtain a judgment against the defendant. See Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 2715.011(A); Miller v. Food Concepts International, LP, No. 2:13-cv-124, 2015 WL 12672728, 
at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2015). Probable cause is evidenced if “it is likely that [the] plaintiff ...will obtain 
judgment against the defendant.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.011(A). 
Regarding bond, Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.044 establishes that a plaintiff who filed a motion 
for attachment and received an order of attachment issued by a court, may be required to post bond 
to the defendant against whom the motion was filed. The statute states:  
An order of attachment issued by a court shall not be effective until the plaintiff 
that filed the motion for at tachment files with the c ourt a bond to the defendant 
against whom the motion was filed, executed by the plaintiff's surety, in an amount 
twice the approximate value of the property to be attached under the order, to the 
effect that, should judgment be issued against the plaintiff, the plaintiff will return 
the property taken or pay the value so assessed, at the election of the defendant, and 
also pay the damages suffe red by the defendant as a result of the taking and 
detention of, and any injury to, the prope rty and the costs of the action. If the 
plaintiff does not know the approximate value of the property sought to be attached 
under the order, or if the identity of the property to be attach ed is not known, the 
bond shall be in an amount twice that of th e plaintiff's claim, as indicated in the 
plaintiff's affidavit filed pursuant to section 2715.03 of the Revised Code.  
 
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In lieu of the bond, the plaintiff may deposit wi th the clerk of the court cash in an 
amount equal to twice the approximate value of the property or, if that value is not 
known or the identity of the property to be  attached is not known, equal to twice 
the amount of the claim of the plaintiff.  
 
Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.044. The statute also provides, however, that “[i]f the plaintiff is indigent, 
the court may, on motion of the plaintiff or on  its own motion, waive the bond required by this 
section or may set the bond in a lower amount, as fairness requires.” (Id.).  
III.  LAW & ANALYSIS  
As with the factual background, this Court notes at the outset of this Opinion & Order that 
it will only discuss relevant la w regarding the issue of prejudgm ent attachment. A discussion of 
the law underpinning damages and the broader breach  of contract claims may again be found in 
this Court’s August 15, 2024 Opinion & Order (ECF No. 143). 
SRC seeks prejudgment attachment to preserve  its ability to recover from the rapidly 
vanishing EGCC. See Cent. Nat. Bank v. Broadview Sav. & Loan Co. , 411 N.E. 2d 840, 843 (8th 
Dist. 1979) (“The basic purpose of allowing a prejudgment a ttachment is to pr otect the rights of 
creditors.”). (ECF No. 106 at 9). EGCC opposes the Motion on the basis that SRC’s supporting 
declaration is deficient, that SRC does not have a statutory basis for attachment under Ohio Rev. 
Code §§ 2715.01(A)(7) or 2715.01(A)(9) and that even if it did, it  cannot demonstrate probable 
cause for the extraordinary relief of prejudgment attachment under Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.043(B). 
Accordingly, this Court will examine each argument in turn. 
A. SRC’s Supporting Declaration 
EGCC first argues that SRC’s s upporting declaration is defici ent and therefore fails to 
support a finding of prejudgment attachment. (ECF  No. 112 at 3-4). EG CC argues that strict 
compliance with Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.01, et seq., is required for a prejudgment attachment order 
to be valid. ( Id.). It is true that under the statute, S RC must support its motion for prejudgment 
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attachment with an affidavit describing the nature and amount of its claim, the facts supporting at 
least one of the statutory grounds  for attachment, a description of the property sought and its 
approximate value, if known, the location of the property, the use to which the defendant has put 
the property, if known, a repres entation that the property is not  exempt from attachment or 
execution, and the name of any third person possessing the property. Ohio Rev. Code 
§ 2715.03(A)-(F). EGCC argues that the declaration s ubmitted by SRC fails to represent that the 
Pugliese Center and Steubenvi lle campus are not exempt from attachment or execution in 
compliance with Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.03(E). EGCC also takes issue with the “information and 
belief” language used in SRC’s affidavit, arguing that affidavits based on ‘information and belief,’ 
as opposed to facts the affiant knows to be true, are not proper. Giles v. Univ. of Toledo, 241 F.R.D. 
466, 469 (N.D. Ohio 2007).  
Regarding exemption, SRC argues that § 2715.03(E) requires the affidavit in support of a 
prejudgment attachment motion to  state, “[t]o the best of the plaintiff’s knowledge, after 
reasonable investigation, the use to which the defendant has put the property and that the property 
is not exempt from attachment  or execution.” (ECF No. 116 at  1-2). While EGCC argues that 
SRC’s affidavit fails to represent that the Pugliese Center and Steubenville campus are not exempt, 
EGCC also makes no argument that either property is actually exempt . Indeed, Ohio Rev. Code 
§§ 2329.63 – 2329.66 set forth exemptions for beneficiary funds and certain goods (such as regalia 
and insignia); property kept by municipal corporations for fire fighting; and certain property 
interests applicable to individuals. Yet, none of those exempti ons applies to the property at issue 
here: real property owned by a community college. SRC’s affidavit states that the property sought 
to be attached is real property owned by a community college used for educational purposes. (ECF 
No. 116 at 1-2). This statement is within th e bounds of § 2715.03(E), yet it identifies a property 
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not exempted by §§ 2329.63 – 2329.66. Accordingly, the af fidavit represents that the property is 
not exempt.  
Regarding the “information and belief” basis, EGCC argues that the affidavit fails because 
it is not based on “personal knowledge.” (ECF No. 112 at 5). “Personal knowledge is knowledge 
gained through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief based on what 
someone else has said … It is knowledge of factual truth which does not depend on outside 
information or hearsay” Curren v. City of Greenfield , 4th Dist. No. 11-CA-30, 2012-Ohio-4688, 
¶ 9. EGCC argues that SRC’s affidavit depends on outside news reporting and hearsay, not on any 
personal knowledge. SRC responds by arguing that  Ohio law does not re quire the affidavit 
submitted under § 2715.03 to be based on personal knowledge. (ECF No. 116 at 2). SRC points to 
State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp., an Ohio Court of Appeals case which held: 
The statute contains no language evincing a requirement that the affidavit be 
premised on “personal know ledge.” Furthermore, the language of three of the 
sections overtly belies any re quirement that the information set forth be based on 
personal knowledge. Specifically, R.C. 2715.03(C) requires th at the affidavit 
contain “[a] description of the property  sought and its appr oximate value, if 
known”; R.C. 2715.03(D) requires that the affi davit contain “[t]o the best of the 
plaintiff's knowledge, the location of the propert y”; and R.C. 2715.03(E) requires 
that the affidavit contain “[t]o the best of the plaintiff's knowledge, after reasonable 
investigation, the use to which the defe ndant has put the pr operty and that the 
property is not exempt from attachment or execution.” (Emphasis added.) There is 
no material difference between an affida vit premised on “inf ormation and belief” 
and an affidavit premised on “the best of  plaintiff's knowledge,” which is what is 
required by the statute. Thus, simply put, the plain language of the statute makes 
clear there is no requirement that the affidavit submitted in support of a motion for 
prejudgment attachment be based on personal knowledge. 
 
(emphasis added). 10th Dist.  Fran klin No. 21-AP-443, 2022-Ohio-3400, ¶ 19, rev’d on other 
grounds, 2024-Ohio-101, ¶ 19. Here, SRC’s affidavit need not be based on personal knowledge. 
Indeed, a modicum of inquiry would reveal to even a layperson that EGCC, a community college, 
uses its campus for education. EGCC’s final argument asserts that the news reports named in the 
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affidavit are not based on the declarant’s personal knowledge. Again, as held by FirstEnergy, there 
is no requirement that the affidavit be based on personal knowledge. Further still, this Court may 
take judicial notice of the contents of the news articles. See Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 
578 & n.9 (6th Cir. 2001). Fi nally, “[b]ecause R.C. 2715.01 et seq.  deals with prejudgment 
attachments, it would be inappropriate to requ ire a plaintiff to prove the grounds under R.C. 
2715.01 upon which he seeks attachment.” Swartz v. DiCarlo , No. 1:12-CV-3112, 2014 WL 
1493352, at *4 (N.D. Ohio 2014). Accordingly, SRC’s affidavit is sufficient. 
B. Statutory Grounds for Attachment 
This Court notes first that in  order to succeed on a motion for a prejudgment attachment, 
the plaintiff “must show the existence of at least one out of eleven statutory bases for attachment” 
in § 2715.01(A).1 FirstEnergy, 2024-Ohio-101 at ¶18. The statutor y grounds for attachment at 
issue in this case are Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.01(A)(7) and (9). Section 2715.01(A)(7) provides for 
attachment when the defendant “is about to convert property, in whole or part, into money, for the 
purpose of placing it beyond the reach of creditors.”  Section 2715.01(A)(9) meanwhile provides 
 
 
1 (A) An attachment against the property, other than personal earnings, of a defendant may be had in a civil action 
for the recovery of money, at or after its commencement, upon any one of the following grounds: 
(1) Excepting foreign corporations which by compliance with the law therefore are exempted from attachment as 
such, that the defendant or one of several defendants is a foreign corporation; 
(2) That the defendant is not a resident of this state; 
(3) That the defendant has absconded with the intent to defraud creditors; 
(4) That the defendant has left the county of the defendant's residence to avoid the service of a summons; 
(5) That the defendant so conceals self that a summons cannot be served upon the defendant; 
(6) That the defendant is about to remove property, in whole or part, out of the jurisdiction of the court, with the 
intent to defraud creditors; 
(7) That the defendant is about to convert property, in whole or part, into money, for the purpose of placing it 
beyond the reach of creditors; 
(8) That the defendant has property or rights in action, which the defendant conceals; 
(9) That the defendant has assigned, removed, disposed of, or is about to dispose of, property, in whole or part, with 
the intent to defraud creditors; 
(10) That the defendant has fraudulently or criminally contracted the debt, or incurred the obligations for which suit 
is about to be or has been brought; 
(11) That the claim is for work or labor. 
 
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for attachment when the defendant “has assigned, removed, disposed of, or is about to dispose of, 
property, in whole or part, with the intent to  defraud creditors.” Here, SRC seeks an order of 
attachment as to the Pugliese Center under § 2715.01(A)(7) and as to the Steubenville campus 
under § 2715.01(A)(9). (ECF No. 106 at 10). 
First regarding § 2715.01(A)(7), EGCC argues that its potential sale of the Pugliese Center 
property to Steubenville City Sc hools is not “for purposes of  placing it beyond the reach of 
creditors.” (ECF No. 112 at 2). EGCC notes that it is currently $29 million in debt and intends to 
use the proceeds of the sa le to pay its debts. ( Id.). This, EGCC argues, shows that there is no 
purpose or intent to place the Pugliese Center property “beyond the reach of creditors.” SRC argues 
that EGCC does intend to place the property beyond SRC’s reach. (ECF No. 106 at 5). SRC writes: 
After viewing the video of the EGCC boa rd of trustees May 15, 2024 meeting, 
SRC’s counsel wrote to EGCC’s counsel  on May 16th, expressing concern that 
“EGCC is attempting to liquidate and dissipa te its assets in an attempt to become 
judgment proof from SRC’s pending claims prior to the Court’s ruling,” and asking 
EGCC to “provide assurance to SRC that any proceeds from the sale of assets, 
including the real propert y located at 110 John Scott Highway and the Pugliese 
Training Center, shall be placed in escrow to prevent EGCC from irretrievably 
transferring assets away from EGCC’s creditors, including SRC.” (Folland Dec. ¶ 
15-17 & Attachment B, Email from J. Bartolozzi to A. Fuller et al., May 16, 2024.) 
The next day, counsel for EGCC wrote b ack: “Any proceeds EGCC realizes from 
the sale will be used to pay ongoing opera ting expenses and/or outstanding debts. 
If SRC would like to secure a place in lin e with EGCC’s creditors, it should make 
a reasonable settlement demand . . . .” 
 
(ECF No. 106 at 5). SRC’s argument here is that EGCC expressly admitted its intent to convert 
the Pugliese Center and its asse ts, and EGCC’s counsel’s email to SRC’s counsel indicates that 
EGCC plans to spend this money on operating expe nses and servicing old debt. (ECF No. 106 at 
11). EGCC argues that because it intends to sell the Pugliese Center property and use the proceeds 
to pay creditors, it is not placing it beyond the reach of creditors. Strictly speaking, EGCC is 
correct on this point. Chapter 2715, however, aims to protect the plaintiff in an action. Enable 
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Healthcare, 2016 WL 6821980 *2 (noting that the plaintiff failed to “aver that defendant would 
convert the Shared Savings Payment into money for the purpose of placing it beyond the reach of 
plaintiff”) (emphasis in original). Selling the Pug liese Center and telling SRC to “secure a place 
in line” behind other creditors would place the property beyond the reach of SRC as a plaintiff in 
this case. Because SRC correctly asserts its rights under § 2715.01(A)(7), it has shown a statutory 
basis for attachment. 
 Even if SRC’s arguments under § 2715.01(A)(7) failed, its arguments under 
§ 2715.01(A)(9) prevail in short order;  and it only needs to  show the existence of one out of the 
eleven statutory bases. FirstEnergy, 2024-Ohio-101 at ¶18. Regarding § 2715.01(A)(9), EGCC 
argues that its sale of the Steubenville campus property does not demonstrate an intent to dispose 
of the property with the intent to defraud creditors, nor does the Jefferson County Commissioners’ 
reported intent to take title to the Steubenville campus property under the reverter clause contained 
in the 1967 deed. (ECF No. 112 at 2). SRC argues that the Jefferson County Commissioners have 
vowed to “take every step to sh ield the [Steubenville campus] property from EGCC’s creditors” 
and that this vow demonstrates an intent to defraud creditors by EGCC. (ECF No. 112 at 6). The 
Commissioners’ intent, however, cannot be said to  be intertwined with EGCC’s intent. But the 
Ohio Court of Appeals ha s held that no overt act in furtherance of intent  is required to prove a 
basis for attachment under § 2715.01(A)(9). “[I]f the intent to dispose of property is proven[,] that 
is all that is necessary to bring the plaintiff within the provisions” of § 2715.01(A)(9). Calabret v. 
Vivacqua, 145 N.E. 2d 420, 421 (7th Dist. 1956). Here, SRC has plainly proven EGCC’s intent to 
dispose of the Steubenville campus property. A ccordingly, it meets the statutory grounds for 
attachment under § 2715.01(A)(9).  Having met both § 2715.01(A)(7) and (9), SRC has asserted 
adequate statutory grounds for attachment. 
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C. Probable Cause that SRC will Obtain Judgment 
Turning next to probable cause, prejudgment attachment under Ohio law requires a plaintiff 
to establish probable cause that it is likely he or she will obtain a judgment against the defendant. 
Ohio Rev. Code § 2715.011(A). Probable cause is evidenced if “it is likely that [the] plaintiff ...will 
obtain judgment against the defendant.” Id. Here, SRC argues that is has established the requisite 
probable cause. EGCC argues that it is “far from clear” whether SRC will obtain judgment because 
the Parties “contest several complex legal and factual issues and have offered conflicting evidence 
in support of their arguments.” (E CF No. 112 at 8). EGCC relies on Zeeb Holdings, L.L.C. 
v. Johnson, which found that it was “far from clear” that the plaintiffs would prevail on the 
underlying claims where the claims were “sharply  contested” and “conflicting evidence” existed 
with respect to the claims. 552 F. Supp. 3d 709, 714 (N.D. Ohio 2021). The flaw in EGCC’s 
argument, however, is twofold: first, none of  EGCC’s cited cases, all of which are from the 
Northern District of Ohio, relies on any Ohio authority supporting the application of this “sharply 
contested” and “conflicting ev idence” standard; second, the Zeeb Court denied the motion for 
prejudgment attachment before reaching the question of probable cause because the plaintiff filed 
no praecipe and the property was located outside of Ohio, making it unattachable. Zeeb, 552 F. 
Supp. 3d at 713. Zeeb did not reject the motion merely because the claims were “sharply contested” 
and “conflicting evidence” existed. Id. 
In response, SRC argues that it s claims make it likely to ob tain judgment in  this matter. 
First, SRC alleges that EGCC has refused to ma ke profit-sharing payments it owes to SRC under 
the Agreement. (ECF No. 106 at 13). Second, S RC alleges that EGCC owes SRC expectation 
damages for the above breaches of the Agreement and for EGCC’s violation of Title IV and the 
Agreement’s non-competition clause. ( Id.). Both claims may serve to  underpin a finding that a 
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plaintiff is likely to prevail in an action. Stifel Fin. Corp. v. Iannarino , No. 2:18-CV-1223, 2018 
WL 6288020, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2018).  
In Stifel Fin. Corp., the Court found probable cause where the plaintiff alleged claims that 
would entitle it to a money judgment and where the alleged cl aims actually caused money to be 
due to the plaintiff. Id. The defendant in Stifel Fin. Corp. had his employment terminated, which 
caused the underlying note to  be immediately due. Id. He then refused to pay the remaining 
principal and interest, which led the Court to find that it was likely plaintiff would obtain a 
judgment which “entitles the plaintiff to a money judgment that can be satisfied out of the property 
that is the subject of the motion.” Id. Similar circumstances are pr esent here: EGCC’s refusal to 
make the appropriate profit-sharing payments to SRC have caused those payments to become due. 
It is therefore likely that SRC will obtain a ju dgment which “entitles the plaintiff to a money 
judgment that can be satisfied out of the property that is the subject of the motion.”  
SRC also argues that prior proceedings in this case show that it is likely to obtain judgment. 
SRC first points to this Court’s July 11, 2022 preliminary injunction, finding that SRC was likely 
to succeed on its claim that EGCC violated the Agreement’s noncompetition clause. (ECF No. 14). 
SRC then highlights this Court’s August 23, 2022 Order expanding the preliminary injunction to 
include SRC’s claim for withheld profit-sharing payments, finding that “SRC is likely to show the 
College breached its contract by withholding these profit-sharing payments many months past the 
due date.” (ECF No. 23, PAGE ID # 690). In Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, probable cause 
was found where plaintiffs had survived motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. No. 2:06-
CV-292, 2012 WL 13118448, at *6 (S.D. Ohio 2012). 
Additionally, review of thes e proceedings shows that Plaintiffs’ claims have 
survived motions to dismiss and for summary judgment … The distance that 
Plaintiffs have traveled th rough this proceeding with th eir claims still intact … 
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strongly supports a finding that Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits and/or 
that it is probable that Plaintiffs will obtain a judgment against Defendants. 
 
Id. Here, Plaintiff has survived a partial motion to dismiss and was twi ce granted preliminary 
injunction orders in its favor. At this stage in  the proceedings, over two years since the first 
preliminary injunction, it would be difficult not to find probable cause that Plaintiff will obtain 
judgment. As in Williamson, the distance that Plaintiff has trav eled through this proceeding with 
its claims intact strongly supports a finding of probable cause. While this Court agrees with EGCC 
that it is not clear that Plaintiff will prevai l, clarity is not the sta ndard. Prejudgment attachment 
under Ohio law requires probable cause that it is likely a plaintiff will prevail. Such a likelihood is 
present here. 
D. Nominal Bond 
Turning briefly to the matter of bond, Ohio  Rev. Code § 2715.044 stipulates that “[a]n 
order of attachment issued by a court shall not be effective until the plaintiff that filed the motion 
for attachment files with  the court a bond to the defendant ag ainst whom the motion was filed, 
executed by the plaintiff’s surety.” The amount of  the bond is to be set “in an amount twice the 
approximate value of the property to be attached under the order.” Id. Based on the appraised 
values identified in SRC’s decl aration, the amount e qual to “twice the approximate value of the 
property to be attached” would be $29,364,420.2 (Id.). Attachment bond premiums range between 
1% and 10% of the bond amount. Brooklyn Ventures, LLC, Plaintiff’s Attachment Bonds (August 
13, 2024), https://www.suretybonds.com/court/plaintiff-attachment-bond. Levying the 1% figure 
here would set the cost of the bond to $293,644.20. EGCC argues that SRC should pay the full 
bond amount at the 10% figure, $2.9 36 million. (ECF No. 133 at 8). SRC stipulates that it has 
 
 
2 2 x ($12,666,810 + $2,015,400). 
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more than $1.39 million in cash on hand. (ECF No. 125 at 7). Or dinarily, SRC could and would 
pay the lower bond amount. The Sixth Circuit, however, has held that a $500 nominal bond is 
“eminently reasonable” when the property to be  attached remains in the possession of the 
defendant. Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 731 F.3d 608, 628-29 (6th Cir. 2013) (concerning 
a long-lost shipment of gold coins worth $1.2 – $2.5 million, the district court left the crates in the 
possession of defendants and issued  a nominal $500 bond). Here, as in Williamson, SRC is not 
taking possession of either the Pugliese Center  property or the Steubenville campus property, 
EGCC is retaining possession of both properties. As such, a nominal bond will suffice. While an 
order of attachment is not “effective” until the plaintiff files a bond, § 2715.044 “does not require 
that this bond be executed at the time an order is sought.” Enable Healthcare, 2016 WL 6821980 
*2. This Order will therefore become effective upon SRC’s filing of the $500 bond. 
E. Motion to Intervene 
The Board of County Commissioners of Jeffer son County, Ohio seeks leave to intervene 
in order to appear at the hear ing scheduled on June 20, 2024 and prot ect its interest  in the real 
property at issue in Plaintif f’s Motion for Prejudgment Attach ment (ECF No. 106). Neither 
Plaintiff nor co-Defendant opposed the motion. At the hearing, the Board was granted permission 
to appear and participated in post-hearing briefing. Because the hearing in which the Board seeks 
to intervene has already happened, the Motion is DENIED as moot.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Writ of Prejudgment Attachment (ECF 
No. 106) is GRANTED and the Board’s Unopposed Motion to  Intervene (ECF No. 114) is 
DENIED as moot. Defendant Eastern Gateway Community College shall not transfer, move, sell, 
or encumber the Pugliese Center, located at 110 John Scott Highway, in Steubenville, Ohio, or the 
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Steubenville campus property, loca ted at 4000 Sunset Blvd., in St eubenville, Ohio, until further 
order of the Court. This Order shall not beco me effective until Plaint iff has submitted a $500.00 
bond to the Clerk of Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
________________________________________ 
ALGENON L. MARBLEY 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
DATED: August 20, 2024 
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