govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_26-cv-03192-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
 
 
JOSE DANIEL LAZOS,  
         
  Plaintiff,    
 
v.        CASE NO.  26-3192-JWL 
 
BUTLER COUNTY 
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMNET, et al., 
 
  Defendants.   
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the Court on three motions filed by Plaintiff.  In Plaintiff ’s Motion 
for Extension of Time (Doc. 10), he requests an additional 30 days to file an amended complaint 
responding to the Memorandum and Order to Show Cause (“MOSC”) (Doc. 6) entered by the 
Court on August 11, 2026.  The original deadline was September 10, 2026.  This is Plaintiff’s first 
request for an extension of time.  For good cause shown, the motion is granted. 
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 7).  He asserts that he 
needs appointed representation due to his learning deficiency, nervous system condition, and 
PTSD.   
The Court has considered Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel.  There is no 
constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a civil case.  Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 616 
(10th Cir. 1995).  “Rather, a court has discretion to request an attorney to represent a litigant who 
is proceeding in forma pauperis” in a civil case.  Johnson v. Johnson, 466 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)).  In other words, if this motion is 
granted, it means only that the Court will request that an attorney volunteer to be appointed to 
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represent Plaintiff at no cost to Plaintiff.  The Court cannot guarantee that an attorney will 
volunteer.  See Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 396 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Courts are not authorized to 
appoint counsel in § 1983 cases; instead, courts can only ‘request’ an attorney to take a case.”).   
The decision whether to appoint counsel —meaning to request counsel to provide 
representation at no cost to Plaintiff —in a civil matter lies in the discretion of the district court. 
Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991).  The burden is on the applicant to convince 
the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant appointment of counsel.  Steffey v. 
Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 
1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004)).  It is not enough “that having counsel appointed would have assisted 
[the prisoner] in presenting his strongest possible case, [as] the same could be said in any case.” 
Steffey, 461 F.3d at 1223 (citing Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995)).  
In deciding whether to request volunteer counsel for Plaintiff, the Court has considered 
“the merits of the prisoner’s claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, and 
the prisoner’s ability to investigate the facts and present his cl aims.”  Rucks, 57 F.3d at 979; Hill, 
393 F.3d at 1115.  T he Court concludes in this case that (1) it is not clear at this juncture that 
Plaintiff has asserted a colorable claim against a named defendant; (2) the issues are not overly 
complex; and (3) Plaintiff appears capable of adequately presenting facts and a rguments.  The 
Court denies the motion without prejudice to refiling the motion if Plaintiff’s Complaint survives 
screening. 
 Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Request for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 8).  Plaintiff 
asks the Court to order “[a]n expedited or emergency detention hearing at the United States Federal 
Courthouse of W ichita Kansas in which the stipulations and requirements of my pretrial release 
are to include but not limited to attendance to doctor appointments wi th a neurology specialist 
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clinic.”  Id. at 1.  Plaintiff further seeks to have his travel and transportation expenses paid by the 
defendants and to have additional access to the law library.  Id. at 2.  He states that he is willing to 
submit to GPS monitoring and reporting to a supervision specialist as often as necessary.  Id.    
 To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate four things: (1) a 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of the equities tip in the movant’s favor; and 
(4) that the injunction is in the public interest.  Little v. Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 
2010).  “[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction.”  Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 
356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish that injury is certain and not theoretical, or more than 
merely feared as liable to occur in the future.  “To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be 
certain, great, actual and not theoretical.”  Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1189 
(10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A preliminary injunction is only appropriate 
“to prevent existing or presently threatening injuries.  One will not be granted against something 
merely feared as liable to occur at so me indefinite time in the future.”  State of Connecticut v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931).      
 A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).  A preliminary injunction is appropriate only when the movant’s right 
to relief is clear and unequivocal.  Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005).  
Moreover, a federal court considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief affecting the 
conditions of a prisoner’s confinement must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on 
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public safety” and on prison operation.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).  The court must “consider the 
well-established law to the effect that prison management functions should be left to the broad 
discretion of prison administrators to enable them to manage prisons safely and effectively  . . .. 
Courts should grant preliminary injunctive relief involving the management of prisons only under 
exceptional and compelling circumstances.” Escobar v. Reid,  2008 WL 4877009, *3 (D.  Colo. 
Nov.12, 2008) (citations omitted).   Because preliminary injunctions are drastic remedies —“the 
exception rather than the rule —plaintiffs must show that they are clearly and unequivocally 
entitled to relief.”  Adrian v. Westar Energy, Inc. , No. 11-1265-KHV, 2011 WL 6026148, at *3 
(D. Kan. 2011) (citations omitted).  Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits such that his right to relief is clear and unequivocal. 
 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden to make a heightened showing that 
entry of a preliminary injunction is warranted.  Plaintiff’s motion is denied.   
 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 10) 
is granted.  The deadline for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint is October 13, 2026.   
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 
7) is denied without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 8) seeking a preliminary 
injunction is denied. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated September 29, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas. 
 
S/  John W. Lungstrum 
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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