govinfo:USCOURTS-waed-2_25-cv-00022-2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 
JONATHAN MOODY, an individual, 
and KIRSTEN JONES, an individual,  
 
Plaintiffs,  
vs.  
GRANT COUNTY, et. al., 
Defendants. 
 
 No. 2:25-CV-00022-MKD 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
AK9’S 12(b)(6) MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
 
ECF Nos. 54, 61 
Before the Court is AK9’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 54, and its 
related Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. 61.  The Court has considered the 
motions and is fully informed.  For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies 
both motions. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Factual History  
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case.  Relevant here is that on 
August 19, 2022, witnesses reported seeing Plaintiff Jonathan Moody carrying 
FILED IN THE 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK  
Sep 30, 2026
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firearms in the parking lot of the Gorge Amphitheater.  ECF No. 42 at 7-11.  In 
response to those reports, event security guards, later determined to be employees 
of AK9, detained Mr. Moody until Grant County Sheriff Deputies arrived and 
placed Mr. Moody under arrest.1  ECF No. 42 at 11.  Plaintiffs allege AK9 is liable 
for assault and battery; false arrest and false imprisonment; and negligent 
supervision and training.  ECF No. 42 at 22. 
B. Procedural History  
On August 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Grant County 
Superior Court, alleging several tort claims against Defendants Live Nation and 
“DOES I through X.” 2  ECF No. 60-1 at 5-6.  Importantly, this complaint 
described the unnamed “DOES” as “business entities and/or individuals that 
provided private security … at the Columbia Gorge Amphitheater.”  Id.  at 6.  
Plaintiffs then filed a separate action against the Grant County Sheriff’s 
 
1 Moody’s sister, Kirsten Jones, had her car impounded for 48 hours as a result of 
Moody’s arrest.  She joins in cause of action six, alleging trespass to chattels.  ECF 
No. 42 at 21. 
2 The action against Live Nation was filed under cause number 24-2-01053-13.  
ECF No. 60-1 at 2. 
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Department and several of its employees on October 11, 2024.3   ECF No. 3-3 at 6.  
As this second action was solely against the Grant County Sheriff’s Department 
and its employees, the unnamed “DOES” were described as “employees of the 
Grant County Sheriff’s Department.”  ECF No. 3-3 at 8.    
 At some point, the two actions— one against Live Nation, and one against 
Grant County— were consolidated.4  See ECF No. 1 (notice of removal lists both 
Grant County and Live Nation as defendants).   
Once removed to this Court, Plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 3, 
2025, and again on August 10, 2025.  ECF No. 12; ECF No. 19.  Both amended 
complaints listed “DOES I through X” as defendants and described them as agents 
 
3 The action against Grant County Sheriff’s Department was filed under cause 
number 24-2-01255-13.  ECF No. 3-3 at 6. 
4 In their response to this motion, Plaintiffs contend their Third Amended 
Complaint explained “that the second amended complaint consolidated the 
complaints against Grant County and its law enforcement officers with the 
complaint against Live Nation Worldwide, Inc.”  But the Third Amended 
Complaint makes no mention of any consolidation.  See ECF No. 19.  The Second 
Amended Complaint does list both the Grant County Defendants and the Live 
Nation Defendant.  ECF No. 12 at 1.  
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of “either” Live Nation or Grant County.  Id. (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs allege 
they were made aware of AK9’s identity when former-Defendant Starplex 
Corporation filed its initial disclosures on November 14, 2025.  ECF No. 55 at 11.  
Finally, on May 7, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint, which 
named AK9 as the defendant that employed the security guards who initially 
detained Mr. Moody.  ECF No. 42 at 10. 
On July 17, 2026, Defendant AK9 moved to dismiss, ECF No. 54, and 
moved for sanctions on August 21, 2026, ECF No. 61.  The parties’ dispute 
whether Plaintiffs’ August 19, 2024, complaint identified the unnamed defendants 
with sufficient particularity to toll the statute of limitations until AK9 was named 
in the Fourth Amended Complaint.  ECF No. 54 at 8; ECF No. 55 at 13-14. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. 12(b)(6) Standard  
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to 
dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  A 12(b)(6) motion will be denied if the plaintiff alleges 
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “Threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
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suffice.”  Id.  In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
Court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable 
inference to be drawn from them, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same 
assumption of truth.  Id.  A complaint must contain either direct or inferential 
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under 
some viable legal theory.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.  “Factual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Id. at 555. 
“A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute 
is apparent on the face of the complaint.’”  Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of 
Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunyh v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)).  Additionally, a complaint 
can only be dismissed via 12(b)(6) motion on statute of limitations grounds when 
“it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 
establish the timeliness of the claim.”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Supermail 
Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)).  “A motion to 
dismiss for expiration of the statute of limitations may be granted over a plaintiff's 
tolling argument only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.”  Huntington v. Smoke 
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City for Less LLC, 2024 WL 1890279, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2024) (citation 
modified). 
“Because the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine often depends on 
matters outside the pleadings, it ‘is not generally amenable to resolution on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.’”  Supermail Cargo, 68 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Cervantes v. City 
of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)).  
B. Tolling Claims Against Unnamed Defendants   
Under the Erie Doctrine, a statute of limitations is considered substantive 
law and therefore the Court applies the forum state’s statute of limitations when 
sitting in diversity jurisdiction.  Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 
(1945).  A state’s tolling rules are part of the statute of limitations and “district 
courts must apply whatever tolling provisions are recognized under state law.”  
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 634 F.3d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Washington’s statute of limitations for assault and battery and false 
imprisonment is two years.  RCW 4.16.100.  The statute of limitations for 
negligent supervision and training is three years.  RCW 4.16.080(2); Mayer v. 
Huesner, 107 P.3d 152, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).  “Under RCW 4.16.170, 
service of process on one defendant tolls the statute of limitations as to unserved 
defendants.”  Powers v. W.B. Mobile Servs., Inc., 339 P.3d 173, 176 (Wash. 2014) 
(citing Sidis v. Brodie/Dohrmann, Inc., 815 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1991)).  Where 
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service of process against one defendant is accomplished, a plaintiff can toll the 
statute of limitations with respect to an unserved, unnamed defendant by 
identifying that defendant with “reasonable particularity.”  Id.  A plaintiff can 
establish “reasonable particularity” by showing: 
(1)(a) from the commencement of the statute of limitations, the 
plaintiff made a diligent effort to identify the actual defendant given 
the information reasonably available to the plaintiff and 
 
(b) the plaintiff provided information about the unnamed 
defendant in the complaint to the greatest extent possible, 
including describing the unnamed defendant’s acts and 
appearance and 
 
(2) the defendant had or should have received such notice of the 
action that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits at the time when the placeholder for the defendant, such as 
“John Doe” or “ABC Corporation,” is replaced with the defendant's 
actual name. 
 
Id.  In Powers, the Washington Supreme Court held language in a complaint 
describing the unnamed defendant as “the builder of the handicap access ramp 
where the incident occurred,” identified the subcontractor who built the ramp with 
sufficient reasonable particularity to toll the statute of limitations.  Id. at 177.   
DISCUSSION 
Considering the relevant 12(b)(6) standard together with Washington’s rules 
on tolling the statute of limitations, AK9 must prove that no set of facts exist under 
which Plaintiffs could satisfy the Powers “reasonable particularity” test.  Von 
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Saher, 592 F.3d at 969; Powers, 339 P.3d at 176; Huntington, 2024 WL 1890279, 
at *4.   
To begin, AK9 fails to address prongs (1)(a) and (2) of the Powers test 
entirely.  ECF 54 at n.3.  Therefore, AK9 has not met its burden of proving no set 
of facts exist that would show Plaintiffs “made a diligent effort to identify the 
actual defendant… .”  Powers, 339 P.3d at 176.  Nor has AK9 met its burden of 
proving no set of facts exist that would show the lack of prejudice under prong (2).  
Id.   
AK9 does, however, address prong 1(b) of the Powers test, arguing 
Plaintiffs did not provide information about AK9 to the greatest extent possible.  
ECF No. 54 at 9.  AK9 cites to the description of the unnamed “Doe” defendants 
contained in the Plaintiffs’ state court complaint against the Grant County 
defendants— not the complaint against Live Nation defendants.  ECF 54 at 9.  
According to AK9, Plaintiffs described the unnamed defendants as “employees 
and/or agents of Grant County Sheriff’s Department and acting within the scope of 
their employment.”  Id.  Based on this description, AK9 contends, the Plaintiffs 
failed the Powers “reasonable particularity” test.  Id.    
However, AK9’s own declaration in support of this motion, ECF No. 60, 
betrays this argument.  The first exhibit attached to this declaration is Plaintiffs’ 
August 19, 2024, state court complaint against Live Nation.  ECF No. 60-1 at 5.  
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As mentioned above, the description of the John Doe defendants in this complaint 
is different than the description in the complaint against the Grant County 
defendants.  In the Live Nation complaint, Plaintiffs listed the unnamed defendants 
as follows: “DOES I through X were business entities and/or individuals that 
provided private security nominally to protect licensees and invitees to the musical 
entertainment performances at the Columbia Gorge amphitheater.  DOES I through 
X were agents of LIVE ENTERTAINMENT5 INC…”  ECF No. 60-1 at 6.  
Plaintiffs’ complaint further described the actions of these unnamed Does in its 
statement of facts:  
As plaintiff JONATHAN MOODY was walking … he observed two 
people that were security officers and were working for defendant 
LIVE ENTERTAINMENT INC., (individuals noted as part of 
Defendant parties DOES I through X) yelling at him “ Don’t move! 
Don’t move!”  The two security officers, or two DOES I and II  [sic] 
then physically grabbed JONATHAN MOODY and detained him until 
Sheriff’s Deputies took custody of him. The two security guards that 
are employed by, or agents of defendant LIVE ENTERTAINMENT 
INC. (two of the DOES I through X) then yelled at the three law 
enforcement officers of  the Grant County Sheriff’s Department that 
they had detained the then suspect, plaintiff JONATHAN MOODY. 
 
 
5 The original complaint incorrectly named the defendant “Live Entertainment;” 
Plaintiffs corrected it to Live Nation in subsequent amended complaints.  See, e.g., 
ECF No. 19 at 4.  
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ECF No. 60-1 at 8.  This description is substantially different than the one cited by 
AK9.  And it is fatal to AK9’s argument because it shows that Plaintiffs potentially 
satisfied prong 1(b) of the Powers test, by “describing the unnamed defendant’s 
acts and appearances.”  Powers, 339 P.3d at 176.  On a Rule 12(6)(b) motion, 
Plaintiffs do not need to affirmatively prove their initial complaint identified AK9 
with reasonable particularity.  Huntington, 2024 WL 1890279, at *4.  Instead, AK9 
bears the burden of proving no set of facts exist that would establish Plaintiff’s 
satisfaction of the reasonable particularity standard.  Id.   
 On this record, there exists a conceivable set of facts that may indicate 
Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Powers test.  Therefore, the motion to dismiss is 
denied.  
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS  
 After filing its motion to dismiss, AK9 moved for sanctions under Rule 
11(b).  ECF No. 61.  AK9’s motion for sanctions relies on the same premise as the 
motion to dismiss— that Plaintiffs’ claims against AK9 were untimely.  ECF No. 
61 at 5-6.  Because the claims were untimely, AK9 argues, they are frivolous under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).  Id.  Because AK9 has not established that Plaintiffs’ claims 
are untimely, Plaintiffs’ claims are not necessarily frivolous.  The motion for 
sanctions is thus denied.  
 
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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Defendant AK9’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim ECF No. 54 is DENIED.  
2. Defendant AK9’s 11(b) Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. 61 is 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  The District Court Executive is directed to file this 
order and provide copies to counsel. 
DATED September 30, 2026. 
 
s/Mary K. Dimke 
MARY K. DIMKE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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