govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-2_23-cv-03720-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
KAREN SUE MEYER, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK 
N.A.,  
 
Defendant. 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
Case No. 2:23-cv-3720 
Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison 
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Karen Sue Meyer worked for JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (“JPMC”) for over 
thirty years. After she tried to split a customer transaction into smaller amounts to 
bypass an internal banking system’s request for authentication, JPMC terminated 
her. Believing her termination was the result of her supervisor’s ageist animus, Ms. 
Meyer sued JPMC under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and 
Ohio law. JPMC moved for summary judgment. (Mot., ECF No. 49.) That Motion is 
ripe and, for the reasons below, is GRANTED. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Ms. Meyer’s Employment with JPMC 
Ms. Meyer began working at JPMC in 1988, working as a bank teller at the 
Delaware, Ohio branch for most of her career. (Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 37-1, PAGEID # 
154.) At some point, the teller role was converted to an “associate banker” position. 
An associate banker largely performs the same duties as a teller, but the position 
integrates the use of digital applications. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID # 156.)  
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In 2018, Marena Muzillo took over as the manager of the Delaware Branch. 
Ms. Muzillo and Ms. Meyer generally had no issues in their working relationship. 
(See ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID # 868.) Ms. Muzillo gave Ms. Meyer consistently 
positive annual performance evaluations, remarking that Ms. Meyer was a “strong” 
and “highly dependable” employee. (See ECF No. 38-1, PAGEID ## 664–71.) She 
also commended Ms. Meyer for her loyal client base and commitment to serving her 
clients. (Id., PAGEID ## 665–66.) Still, Ms. Muzillo used the annual reviews to 
highlight areas for improvement, including a need to embrace the evolving nature of 
the associate banker role. (Id., PAGEID # 670.) Ms. Muzillo worked with Ms. Meyer 
individually to improve her technology skills and to help her adapt to the 
integration of digital devices. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID # 240.)  
On a few occasions, Ms. Muzillo coached Ms. Meyer regarding her 
performance. For example, in 2019, Ms. Meyer violated company policy when she 
left the keys for the ATM vault in a customer-facing area; Ms. Muzillo gave her a 
verbal warning for this violation. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID ## 242, 244.) Ms. Muzillo also 
coached Ms. Meyer for violating company policy after she left the ATM vault 
unlocked and, on a separate occasion, after she walked away from a transaction line 
with her coin locker unsecured. (Id., PAGEID ## 243–45.) Beyond the verbal 
warning in 2019, Ms. Meyer received no other formal discipline before her 
termination.  
In December 2020, Ms. Muzillo reported concerns about Ms. Meyer’s 
performance to JPMC’s Employee Relations (“ER”) unit. According to Ms. Muzillo, 
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Ms. Meyer was a “great performer ‘on paper,’” but her “bad attitude” and 
“resistance” to the changes to the associate banker role were impacting her 
performance. (ECF No. 60-2, PAGEID ## 3234–35.) Specifically: 
[Ms. Meyer] has been in the role for a long time, and may not be adapting to 
the other Associate Banker responsibilities outside of quickly servicing the 
client. For example, the [associate bankers] are supposed to document a 
client’s account after the transaction which may result in a client waiting an 
additional time, and [Ms. Meyer] is so client centric focused that she doesn’t 
like to take these additional steps (which are procedure) as it delays servicing 
the next client. … [D]ue to [Ms. Meyer’s] antiquated way of viewing her role, 
there has [sic] been reports of her being perceived as negative, which has 
reduced branch morale. 
(Id., PAGEID # 3235.) Ms. Muzillo told ER that she did not want to take corrective 
action against Ms. Meyer because Ms. Meyer had improved through coaching and 
she believed that additional feedback would “be enough to turn the behavior 
around.” (Id.)  
B. Teller Express System 
This dispute centers primarily on Ms. Meyer’s use of JPMC’s internal 
banking system, the Teller Express (“TE”) System. Employees use the TE System to 
verify a customer’s identity. After initiating a transaction, the TE System prompts 
the employee for the appropriate form of identification to authenticate the 
customer. (Cheeseman Dep., ECF No. 42-1, PAGEID ## 1114–15; ECF No. 39-1, 
PAGEID # 762.) The required form of identification depends on the nature of the 
transaction. For example, withdrawals of over $2,000 require the customer to 
present a primary and secondary ID for authentication. (Authentication Policy, ECF 
No. 38-1, PAGEID # 616; see also Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID # 164.) JPMC’s policy 
enumerates the specific IDs that are sufficient to authenticate a customer for a 
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specific transaction. (Authentication Policy, PAGEID # 617.) As a general matter, 
employees use the TE System’s prompts for the form of authentication required, but 
they could also access JPMC’s authentication policies and procedures from their TE 
System terminal at any time for guidance. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID # 168; Cheeseman 
Dep., PAGEID # 1117; Guthrie Dep., ECF No. 50-1, PAGEID ## 2397–99.)  
For some transactions, the TE System requires the customer to present a 
debit card and use a PIN pad connected to the TE System for authentication. If a 
customer does not have his debit card, the employee should contact her branch 
manager for assistance or ask the customer to return with the debit card. (Guthrie 
Dep., PAGEID # 2399; Authentication Policy, PAGEID # 616.) Alternatively, the 
employee can authenticate the customer by sending a one-time passcode to the 
customer’s mobile device, though the only system capable of sending such a code at 
the Delaware Branch was located at the drive-through window. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID 
## 177–78, 190–91; Authentication Policy, PAGEID # 618.) If the PIN pad was not 
working, the employee could disconnect the PIN pad and authenticate the customer 
using a different method under the policy, or she could ask another associate to run 
the transaction. (Guthrie Dep., PAGEID # 2398; see also Authentication Policy, 
PAGEID # 618.)  
Sometimes, the TE System would not allow an employee to override a request 
for debit-card authorization when the customer did not have his card, but he 
otherwise had sufficient ID for authentication under the policy. (Cheeseman Dep., 
PAGEID ## 1119–20.) Jessica Cheeseman (whose role at the time was lead 
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associate operations) contacted JPMC’s banking support line regarding this issue 
and was instructed to unplug the PIN pad when it was not working properly as a 
“temporary solution.” (Id., PAGEID # 1120.) Ms. Cheeseman told the other branch 
employees about this PIN-pad workaround. (Id., PAGEID ## 1123–24; Guthrie 
Dep., PAGEID # 2398.)  
C. June 2021 Transaction and Investigation 
In June 2021, Ms. Meyer assisted a customer who wanted to withdraw money 
to buy a boat. (ECF No. 39-1, PAGEID # 750.) The customer asked to cash a check 
for $8,000, but he did not have sufficient funds in his account to cover that amount. 
(Id., PAGEID # 739.) He then deposited the check and asked to withdraw $5,000. 
When Ms. Meyer tried to complete the withdrawal, the TE System prompted her to 
authenticate the customer’s identity with his debit card. (Pl’s Dep., PAGEID # 172.) 
The customer did not have his debit card, so the TE System would not allow Ms. 
Meyer to complete the transaction. (Id., PAGEID ## 171–173.)  
Ms. Meyer then attempted to split the transaction into three separate 
withdrawals under $2,000. She believed that lower withdrawal amounts would not 
trigger the TE System’s prompt for additional authentication and would allow her 
to complete the transaction without the customer’s debit card. (Id., PAGEID ## 
172–73; 192.) Indeed, the customer had a photo ID and withdrawals under $2,000 
only require a primary ID for authentication. (Id., PAGEID ## 171–72; 
Authentication Policy, PAGEID # 616.) Still, the TE System denied the split 
transaction. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID ## 173, 175–76.) Ms. Meyer then spoke with Ms. 
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Muzillo, and Ms. Muzillo completed the entire $5,000 withdrawal after 
authenticating the customer through a one-time pass code sent to his cell phone.  
Ms. Muzillo reported the attempted split transaction to Global Security 
(“GS”), which investigates fraud-related misconduct, alleging that Ms. Meyer 
“manipulated” the TE System by splitting the transaction into three smaller 
withdrawals to avoid the prompted authentication method. (Courtade Dep., ECF 
No. 39-1, PAGEID # 694; ECF No. 39-1, PAGEID # 733.) And, when interviewed by 
GS, Ms. Meyer admitted that she had tried to split the withdrawal into lower 
amounts to avoid the required authentication; she said she was only trying to help 
the customer, who needed to complete the transaction quickly because the seller of 
the boat was with him in line. (ECF No. 39-1, PAGEID ## 738–39.) GS did not find 
that Ms. Meyer attempted to “manipulate the system,” but it determined that Ms. 
Meyer violated JMPC’s policy on maintaining accurate records. (Id., PAGEID # 745; 
Courtade Dep., PAGEID ## 708–09.)  
ER then reviewed GS’s findings. The initial ER investigator recommended 
coaching for Ms. Meyer. (ECF No. 38-1, PAGEID # 678.) However, after reviewing 
the initial investigation and speaking with Ms. Muzillo, ER Team Manager Pamela 
Mayer recommended that Ms. Meyer be issued a written warning because she 
admitted to a “serious” violation. (ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID # 859; Mayer Dep., 
PAGEID # 817.)  
Ms. Muzillo believed that a written warning was insufficient to hold Ms. 
Meyer accountable, so she consulted with Ms. Mayer, Jeremy Young (her 
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supervisor), and Eddie Kasang (ER Partner) regarding potential termination. 
(Muzillo Dep., PAGEID ## 498–501, 504.) Although Ms. Meyer’s past performance 
issues were considered, Ms. Muzillo determined, and the others agreed, that 
splitting a transaction to avoid triggering authentication prompts put customers 
and the bank at “significant risk” and warranted termination. (Mayer Dep., 
PAGEID ## 821–27; Muzillo Dep., PAGEID ## 491-92; ECF No. 39-1, PAGEID # 
766.) They also believed that her lengthy tenure at the bank made her conduct more 
egregious, because her experience and knowledge meant that she should have 
known better but she chose to circumvent company procedures anyway. (Muzillo 
Dep., PAGEID # 501; see also Mayer Dep., PAGEID # 829.)  
JPMC terminated Ms. Meyer for unsatisfactory performance. (ECF No. 39-1, 
PAGEID # 766; Muzillo Dep., PAGEID ## 506–07.) 
D. Subsequent Investigations 
Ms. Meyer contested her termination and asked to be reinstated. (Pl.’s Dep., 
PAGEID ## 211–12; ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID ## 873–79.) After reviewing the 
decision and speaking with Mmes. Meyer and Muzillo, a different ER investigator 
found that termination was appropriate because Ms. Meyer admitted to conduct 
that violated company policy. (ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID # 874.) When the ER 
investigator told Ms. Meyer that her termination would stand, she said that she felt 
like she was being “targeted” and “discriminated against because of [her] age.” (Id.)  
Ms. Meyer’s age-discrimination complaint prompted an additional ER 
investigation. This investigator asked Ms. Meyer if anyone at JPMC said something 
that made her believe her termination was because of her age; Ms. Meyer said no. 
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(ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID # 868.) Instead, she reported that she felt “discriminated 
against” because she knew “others who try to go around the system and they are 
still employed[.]” (Id., PAGEID # 861.) The investigator concluded that Ms. Meyer’s 
discrimination complaint was unsupported and closed the case. (Id., PAGEID # 
872.)  
Ms. Meyer then initiated this lawsuit, asserting age-discrimination claims 
against JPMC under the ADEA and Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine 
issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving 
party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 
12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving 
party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 
A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present “significant 
probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as 
to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir. 
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1993). In other words, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that 
summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact 
to find for the non-moving party). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Age-discrimination claims under the ADEA and Ohio law are analytically 
similar, so the Court analyzes them together. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 357 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Under Ohio law, the elements and 
burden of proof in a state age-discrimination claim parallel the ADEA analysis.”). 
To succeed on an age-discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show that age was the 
“but-for” cause of an adverse employment decision. McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 
Ohio, 117 F.4th 887, 894 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).  
When, such as here, the plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence of age 
discrimination, courts evaluate the claims using the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 887 (6th 
Cir. 2020). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 
Id. To do so, she must demonstrate that she (1) was older than forty years old; (2) 
suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was qualified for her position; and (4) 
was replaced by a younger employee or similarly situated younger employees were 
treated more favorably. McNeal, 117 F.4th at 895. If the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. The burden then shifts back to 
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the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason is pretext for age 
discrimination. Id. To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject the employer’s 
explanation for terminating her and infer that discrimination was the but-for cause 
of her termination. Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc., 952 F.3d 795, 810 (6th Cir. 
2020) (citations omitted). The guiding question is “did the employer fire the 
employee for the stated reason or not?” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 
n.4 (6th Cir. 2009). 
A. Ms. Meyer has established her prima facie case. 
JPMC concedes that Ms. Meyer has established the first two elements of her 
prima facie case, but it argues that she has failed to establish the third and fourth 
elements. As for the third element, it argues that her termination for unsatisfactory 
performance shows that she was not qualified for her position. (Mot., PAGEID # 
2376–77.) JPMC’s argument on this point is misplaced because “a court may not 
consider the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse 
employment action when analyzing the prima facie case.” Wexler v. White’s Fine 
Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2003). The third element relates to a 
plaintiff’s objective qualifications for her position, such as her “education, 
experience in the relevant industry, and demonstrated possession of the required 
general skills.” Id. at 576. JPMC does not argue that Ms. Meyer did not possess the 
objective qualifications for the job she held for more than 30 years. Ms. Meyer has 
satisfied the third element.  
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As to the fourth element, JPMC argues that Ms. Meyer cannot show that 
younger, similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. But a plaintiff 
may satisfy the fourth element by showing that she was replaced by someone at 
least ten years younger. Alberty v. Columbus Twp., 730 F. App’x 352, 360 (6th Cir. 
2018). Ms. Meyer has done so here: she was 60 years old when terminated and she 
was replaced by Sakshi Dave, who was 40 years old. (ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID # 871.) 
She has met her burden to establish a prima facie case.  
B. Ms. Meyer fails to raise a genuine dispute regarding whether 
JPMC’s stated reason for her termination was pretext for 
discrimination.  
Ms. Meyer does not dispute that JPMC has met its burden to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. Indeed, terminating an 
employee for unsatisfactory performance is legitimate grounds for termination. See 
Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 546 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Poor 
performance is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a person’s 
employment[.]”). Thus, the burden shifts back to Ms. Meyer to produce sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject JPMC’s explanation for its 
decision and infer that its stated reason was pretext for discrimination. See Seeger 
v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted).  
A plaintiff typically shows pretext by demonstrating that the proffered 
reasons (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s action, 
or (3) were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action. Miles, 946 F.3d at 888. 
However, a plaintiff is not limited to these three categories and may put forth other 
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“evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason is 
actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc., 
952 F.3d 795, 807 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Ms. Meyer offers arguments 
under the second and third categories, in addition to other evidence of pretext. The 
Court addresses each in turn.  
1. Ms. Meyer fails to show that her infraction did not 
actually motivate her termination.  
To show that the employer’s explanation did not actually motivate the 
challenged decision, a plaintiff must point to evidence that tends “to prove an illegal 
motivation was more likely” than the reason offered by the employer. Smith v. 
Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000). In other words, the plaintiff 
argues that the “sheer weight of the circumstantial evidence of discrimination 
makes it more likely than not” that the employer’s explanation is a “coverup” for 
unlawful discrimination. Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 399 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  
a. ER’s Investigation and Recommendation 
Ms. Meyer first argues that the June 2021 transaction did not motivate her 
termination because neither ER nor GS found that she “manipulated” the TE 
System, and ER originally recommended a coaching and a written warning, not 
termination. (Resp., PAGEID # 3216.)  
While Ms. Meyer is correct that GS found that the allegation that she 
manipulated the TE System was unsubstantiated, it also found that she violated 
JPMC’s policy regarding accurate record keeping. She admitted to splitting a 
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transaction to bypass the authorization prompt and ER determined that such 
conduct was improper and warranted discipline. (ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID # 859.) 
That Ms. Muzillo’s initial complaint to GS was unsubstantiated on one ground does 
not call into question JPCM’s motive for terminating her.  
Nor does the fact that ER’s initial recommendations were to coach Ms. Meyer 
and issue a written warning create a genuine issue as to whether JPMC’s stated 
reason for terminating Ms. Meyer was pretextual. True, “an employer’s failure to 
follow its own internal disciplinary procedures may be probative evidence,” but 
“more is required to create a genuine fact question on pretext.” Bailey v. Oakwood 
Healthcare, Inc., 732 F. App’x 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). When the 
employer’s policy reasonably supports its decision, failing to take a less drastic 
course of action does not create an inference that the employer’s stated reasons 
were pretextual. See Ploscowe v. Kadant, 121 F. App’x 67, 76 (6th Cir. 2005); see 
also Quintana-Dieppa v. Dep’t of Army, 130 F.4th 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2025) (“Simply 
stressing that the [defendant] took a more punitive action than the one 
recommended … is the type of argument that merely suggests that the [defendant] 
could have reached a different conclusion. And that type of submission cannot show 
pretext.”).  
Ms. Meyer has not shown that JPMC deviated from its disciplinary 
procedures by rejecting ER’s recommendation of more lenient discipline. Indeed, 
JPMC’s corrective-action policy states that its guidelines are discretionary and that 
“misconduct, breach of trust, dishonesty,” or other policy violations “may call for 
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alternate or abbreviated corrective action or immediate employment-termination” if, 
“in the manager’s judgment, the situation calls for such action.” (ECF No. 40-1, 
PAGEID # 848.) In her manager’s judgment, termination was more appropriate 
here because Ms. Meyer admitted to serious and unethical misconduct.1 Ms. Meyer 
has not put forth any evidence suggesting that the decision to terminate her rather 
than coach her or issue a written warning was “so unreasonable as to be disbelieved 
by a reasonable jury.” Bailey, 732 F. App’x at 366. 
b. Lack of Policy Violation 
Ms. Meyer next argues that the June 2021 transaction could not have 
motivated her termination because JPMC does not have a policy against “splitting 
transactions” and the Delaware Branch employees had a “practice” of working 
“around the TE System prompt for a debit card[.]” (Resp., PAGEID ## 3219–20.) 
But these arguments fail to address the reason for her termination. JPMC did not 
terminate her for splitting a transaction or for using a workaround to process a 
transaction for a customer without a debit card. JPMC terminated her because she 
 
1 Ms. Mayer told Ms. Muzillo that termination was “risky,” but Ms. Meyer 
overstates the relevance of this evidence. (Resp., PAGEID # 3216–17.) Ms. Mayer 
testified that “[w]henever a manager is skipping a step within the corrective action 
process … I would explain to the manager … there’s some risk involved there, 
because you’re skipping a step in the corrective action process.” (Mayer Dep., 
PAGEID # 824.) Such generalized advisement does not mean that Ms. Mayer 
thought that terminating Ms. Meyer was “risky” apart from the risk posed by 
immediately terminating any employee, nor does it suggest that Ms. Mayer thought 
termination was unwarranted. 
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tried to split a transaction to avoid properly authenticating the customer under its 
policy.  
Applying her arguments to the facts of the case, the lack of express policy  
against splitting transactions to avoid an authentication prompt does not suggest 
that her termination was pretextual. See Allen, 545 F.3d at 398 (the lack of a 
specific policy against the infraction does not itself create a genuine issue as to 
pretext). Even so, Ms. Meyer’s claim that JPMC had no policy prohibiting the June 
2021 transaction is incorrect. JPMC’s authentication policy clearly states that 
customers “must be authenticated” in accordance with the policy “before processing 
transactions[.]” (ECF No. 38-1, PAGEID # 616.) Here, JPMC’s policy offers three 
options for authenticating a customer without a debit card for a withdrawal over 
$2,000: the employee may authenticate the customer using a one-time passcode sent 
to the customer’s mobile device, the customer may provide an acceptable primary 
and secondary ID, or the customer can return later with his debit card. 
(Authentication Policy, PAGEID ## 616–18.) Rather than using one of these 
approved methods, Ms. Meyer tried to avoid triggering the requested authentication 
by trying to do three withdrawals under $2,000. In this context, it was reasonable 
for JPMC to consider intentionally evading an authentication prompt to complete a 
transaction outside of policy guidelines as a terminable offense.  
Ms. Meyer attempts to overcome this fact by arguing that she “properly 
authenticated” the customer “via policy appropriate identification[.]” (Resp., 
PAGEID # 3220). But the evidence belies this contention. When asked by GS 
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whether she felt that splitting the transaction to avoid additional authentication 
was acceptable, Ms. Meyer said that “she was only trying to help the customer since 
she was sure” of his identity because he “provided two forms of ID.” (ECF No. 39-1, 
PAGEID # 738.) That the customer had two forms of ID does not mean that she 
authenticated the customer using policy-approved primary and secondary IDs. (See 
Reply, PAGEID # 3256 n.3.) In fact, Ms. Meyer testified that she could only 
remember the customer having a photo ID; she did not remember him having any 
other form of identification that would have been sufficient to authenticate him to 
withdraw $5,000 under the policy. (Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID # 171–72.) And that Ms. 
Meyer tried to do three withdrawals, each under $2,000, suggests that she could not 
properly authenticate him to take out over $2,000. 
More importantly, it is undisputed that JPMC believed that Ms. Meyer tried 
to complete the transaction without properly authenticating the customer. (See 
Courtade Dep., PAGEID ## 708–09, 735; ECF No. 40-1, PAGEID ## 859, 884.) 
Whether Ms. Meyer actually authenticated the customer using policy-approved 
identifications before running the transactions is irrelevant without evidence to 
contradict that JPMC believed that she did not. See Chen, 580 F.3d at 401 (“When 
an employer reasonably and honestly relies on particularized facts in making an 
employment decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on pretext even if its 
conclusion is later shown to be ‘mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.’”) (citation 
omitted). Records from the multiple investigations demonstrate that JPMC thought 
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that Ms. Meyer attempted the transaction without properly authenticating the 
customer. (See ECF No. 39-1, PAGEID ## 738, 745, 757.)  
Ms. Meyer’s arguments regarding a lack of formal policy fail.  
2. Ms. Meyer fails to show that her infraction was 
insufficient to motivate her termination. 
A plaintiff can show pretext by producing evidence that similarly situated 
employees outside the protected class “were not fired even though they were 
engaged in substantially identical conduct to that which the employer contends 
motivated” her termination. Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 286–87 
(6th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). In evaluating whether the individuals with 
whom plaintiff seeks to compare her treatment are similarly situated, courts 
consider whether the employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the 
same standards, and engaged in the same conduct “without such differentiating or 
mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s 
treatment of them for it.” Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (citation omitted). “The 
plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving 
more favorable treatment,” but they must be similar in all relevant aspects. Id.  
a. Jessica Cheeseman 
Ms. Meyer first compares herself to Ms. Cheeseman, arguing that Ms. 
Cheeseman engaged in the same conduct that led to her termination, in addition to 
engaging in other misconduct, without repercussion. (Resp., PAGEID ## 3221–23.) 
Start with Ms. Meyer’s claim that Ms. Cheeseman engaged in the same 
conduct. Ms. Meyer once saw Ms. Cheeseman split a transaction to bypass the TE 
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System’s authentication prompt, but she is not aware of Ms. Cheeseman being 
disciplined for doing so. (See Pl.’s Dep., PAGEID # 206.) But there is no evidence 
that Ms. Muzillo or anyone else knew that Ms. Cheeseman split a transaction for 
this purpose and, without such evidence, Ms. Meyer cannot show that Ms. 
Cheeseman was treated more favorably for engaging in the same conduct. See 
Blount v. Stanley Eng’g Fastening, 55 F.4th 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2022) (other 
employee not similarly situated when there was “no evidence that [the employer] 
knew about any of these alleged additional violations”).  
Ms. Meyer next argues that Ms. Cheeseman forced balanced a vault and 
regularly completed schoolwork in front of customers but was not disciplined. 
(Resp., PAGEID ## 3223–24.) As to the former, evidence that Ms. Cheeseman forced 
balanced a vault offers no probative value without evidence that Ms. Muzillo knew 
about Ms. Cheeseman’s violation but did not discipline her – evidence that Ms. 
Meyer again failed to provide. As to the latter, it is unclear how completing 
schoolwork in front of customers is comparable to intentionally bypassing 
authentication prompts. Ms. Meyer does not argue that these two actions are 
comparably serious and should be viewed similarly. That said, it seems reasonable 
for JPMC to treat conduct that puts the company and customers at risk for fraud 
more severely than completing homework in front of customers. Regardless of 
whether Ms. Meyer’s conduct resulted in any actual harm, she could have exposed 
the bank to loss or liability, while doing homework in front of customers does not 
carry the same obvious risks. 
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b. Sakshi Dave 
Ms. Meyer argues that her replacement, Sakshi Dave, also split a transaction 
but was not terminated. (Resp., PAGEID # 3222.) But Ms. Dave’s conduct is too 
distinguishable from Ms. Meyer’s to create a genuine issue as to pretext. Ms. Dave 
split a transaction because the customer requested two separate transactions, not to 
bypass an authentication prompt. (ECF No. 60-3, PAGEID # 3238.) Thus, Ms. 
Dave’s split transaction is materially distinct from Ms. Meyer’s split transaction. 
“When determining whether employees engaged in similar misconduct, we look to 
the ‘type, circumstances, and respective severity of the misconduct alleged.’” Hieber 
v. Oakland Cnty. Mich., 136 F.4th 308, 330 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). 
Although the conduct need only be “substantially identical,” it must be similar in all 
relevant aspects. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 782 
(6th Cir. 2016) (citing Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352). Ms. Dave’s is not. 
JPMC further distinguishes its treatment of Ms. Dave from Ms. Meyer 
because Ms. Dave had worked at the Delaware Branch for only “a few months 
before that transaction[.]” (Reply, ECF No. 61-1, PAGEID # 3257.) An employee’s 
longer tenure can be a differentiating circumstance that accounts for differential 
treatment. See Cameron v. Ohio, 344 F. App’x 115, 119 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). Indeed, differences “in 
job title, responsibilities, experience, and work record can be used to determine 
whether two employees are similarly situated.” Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 
691 (6th Cir. 2004). In evaluating whether two employees are similarly situated, the 
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“appropriate test is to look at those factors relevant to the factual context,” 
including whether the employees’ “distinctions were in fact relevant” to the 
employer’s decision. Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495, 513 (6th Cir. 2021) 
(citation modified). Here, JPMC believed that Ms. Meyer’s experience made her 
conduct more egregious because she had the experience to know better, while Ms. 
Dave was still learning the job. 
Ms. Meyer has not put forth sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable 
jury to conclude that JPMC’s differing treatment of Ms. Dave’s split transaction was 
a pretext for unlawful discrimination.  
c. Other Comparator Evidence 
Ms. Meyer provides additional examples of younger employees who were not 
disciplined for misconduct. (Resp., PAGEID ## 3224–25.) However, she primarily 
cites to her Complaint as support for her arguments. (Id.) Unverified pleadings are 
not evidence and they cannot be used to create a genuine dispute as to any material 
fact.  
Turning to Ms. Meyer’s only arguments based on specific evidence leaves two 
potential comparators: (1) a 20-year-old employee who was “late for work numerous 
times” during her probationary period and rarely balanced her cash drawer yet 
faced no discipline; and (2) Ms. Muzillo and a 32-year-old employee, who left 
$10,000 out for an hour when conducting an audit without consequence. (See Oliver 
Decl., ECF No. 60-1, ¶¶ 19, 23.) But Ms. Meyer develops no argument as to how 
these actions are comparable to intentionally circumventing authentication 
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prompts. That Delaware Branch employees, including Ms. Meyer, were not 
disciplined for every policy violation only shows that Ms. Muzillo was not quick to 
discipline her subordinates.  
As to her evidence that younger employees were treated more favorably, Ms. 
Meyer points to Ms. Guthrie’s statement that she had seen Ms. Muzillo “not follow 
the rules with some people” and Ms. Oliver’s statement that Ms. Muzillo did not 
discipline or terminate younger employees “for violations known and allowed by 
[her][.]” (See Guthrie Dep., PAGEID # 2405; Oliver Decl. ¶ 17.) Without specific 
facts as to the kind of policy violations Ms. Muzillo tolerated from younger 
employees but not from older employees, these conclusory statements do not raise a 
genuine issue of pretext for trial. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584 (“[R]umors, 
conclusory allegations and subjective beliefs … are wholly insufficient evidence to 
establish a claim of discrimination…[.]”).  
At bottom, Ms. Meyer challenges the wisdom of JPMC’s decision to terminate 
her over one transaction and not terminate others for various misconduct. Whether 
her termination was fair or wise is not for the Court to decide. See Lee v. City of 
Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 256–57 (6th Cir. 2011) (“It is not within the province 
of the courts to … ‘act as super personnel departments to second guess an 
employer’s facially legitimate business decisions.’”) (citation omitted). For the 
purposes of demonstrating pretext, Ms. Meyer has not identified any employee who 
engaged in comparable intentional conduct that JPMC considered unethical but 
whom JPMC did not discipline. 
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3. Ms. Meyer fails to identify other evidence of pretext 
sufficient to undermine JPMC’s proffered reason for her 
termination. 
Ms. Meyer’s final pretext argument is that Ms. Muzillo has a “history” of age 
bias, evidenced by her age-related comments. (Resp., PAGEID # 3227.) 
“An employer’s age-related comments can raise an inference that the 
employer acted on ageist animus.” Smith v. City of Union, Ohio, 144 F.4th 867, 875 
(6th Cir. 2025). Courts “gauge how much weight to place on such statements” 
depending on the speaker’s position in the employer’s hierarchy and her influence 
over the decision, whether the statement was made during the decisionmaking 
process, the purpose and content of the statement, and whether the statement 
buttresses other evidence of pretext. Id.; see also Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 357. 
“Isolated and ambiguous comments are too abstract … to support a finding of age 
discrimination.” Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 355 (citation modified).  
Ms. Meyer identifies three comments that she claims demonstrate Ms. 
Muzillo’s ageist animus: (1) Ms. Muzillo reported that Ms. Meyer had an 
“antiquated” view of the associate banker position; (2) she “bragged about firing an 
older long-term employee” at her previous job; and (3) she told other employees that 
she did not want to hire a job candidate because he was old. (Resp., PAGEID # 
3227.) Although Ms. Muzillo was involved in the decision to terminate Ms. Meyer, 
none of these statements raises a triable issue regarding pretext.  
First, Ms. Muzillo’s statement regarding Ms. Meyer’s “antiquated” view of 
her job (made six months before the June 2021 transaction) has no reasonable 
connection to her age. An employee’s view of her role can be “antiquated” regardless 
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of her age, so this statement offers no probative value regarding Ms. Muzillo’s 
alleged ageist bias. The context of Ms. Muzillo’s statement demonstrates that she 
was referring to Ms. Meyer’s resistance to the evolving nature of the teller position.  
Regarding the second statement, Ms. Guthrie reported overhearing Ms. 
Muzillo brag that she got a 20-year employee at her previous job fired. (Guthrie 
Dep., PAGEID # 2402.) It is not clear when or in what context Ms. Muzillo made 
this statement. The statement’s ambiguity diminishes its probative value, because 
it does not refer to the fired employee’s age, only her tenure. Although correlated, 
the fact that Ms. Muzillo bragged about getting a long-tenured employee fired does 
not equate to her bragging about firing an older employee. Cf. Scott v. Potter, 182 F. 
App’x 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (“‘[Y]ears of service’ is conceptually distinct from 
‘age.’ While both terms apply to many of the same individuals in various contexts, 
the overlap is not perfect.”). 
Regarding the third statement, Ms. Oliver said that Ms. Muzillo expressed to 
her that a man in his “mid-40s or older” was not a “good fit for the vibe” of the 
Delaware Branch because he “was in the military previously, very awkward and 
old[.]” (Oliver Decl. ¶ 18.) It is unclear when Ms. Muzillo made this statement, but 
she was not discussing Ms. Meyer or her employment. Moreover, the comment only 
suggests that age played a role in Ms. Muzillo’s decision not to hire the individual 
and is not the kind of unambiguously ageist comment that courts have found 
probative of age discrimination.  
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Moreover, this third statement cannot, on its own or even taken with her 
other statements, create a genuine issue as to pretext. A manager’s isolated 
comments outside the decisionmaking process, without more, does not create a 
triable issue that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual. See, e.g., Rowan v. 
Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2004) (“stray 
statement” that “the older people should go, bring in some new blood” could not 
support a jury finding of pretext to mask age discrimination); E.E.O.C. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 768 (6th Cir. 2015) (decisionmaker’s “statements or actions 
outside of the decisionmaking process” “cannot alone prove pretext”) (en banc). 
Without any other basis to reasonably question JPMC’s motivation for its decision, 
Ms. Muzillo’s comments are simply too attenuated from Ms. Meyer’s termination to 
allow a reasonable jury to find that age was the but-for cause of her termination.  
*  *  * 
 In sum, Ms. Meyer has not sustained her burden to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether age was the but-for cause of her termination. 
Accordingly, JPMC is entitled to judgment in its favor.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, JPMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 
No. 49) is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison                        
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
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