govinfo:USCOURTS-wiwd-3_22-cv-00257-15

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN 
 
HERU SPENCER,           
          
    Plaintiff,       OPINION AND ORDER 
 v. 
                 22-cv-257-wmc 
THE CHURCH OF PRISMATIC 
LIGHT, TIFFANY FAITH WAIT, 
and JERI CLARK,  
 
    Defendants. 
 
Proceeding pro se and without prepayment of the filing fee, plaintiff Heru Spencer  
was granted leave to assert trademark infringement and defamation claims against a now 
defunct, non-profit organization named The Church of Prismatic Light, and two of its 
former board members, Tiffany Faith Wait and Jeri Clark .  (Dkt. #7.)  Spencer then 
retained counsel, who filed an amended complaint naming as a co-plaintiff his own non-
profit organization known as the “Djedi Order, doing business as The Church of Prismatic 
Light.”  In addition to his original claims for defamation and  federal trademark 
infringement, the amended complaint also asserts claims for:   federal unfair competition; 
unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of Wisconsin state law; Wisconsin 
common law and statutory trademark infringement; and federal copyright infringement .  
(Dkt. #49.)  However, counsel for plaintiffs later withdrew, as did counsel for defendants, 
and the Djedi Order was dismissed after plaintiff Spencer failed to comply with several 
orders to retain counsel on its behalf.  (Dkts. ##77, 101, 164.) 
Defendants Wait and Clark have moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff 
Spencer’s claims.  (Dkts. ##205, 211.)  Plaintiff Spencer  subsequently filed his own 
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motion for summary judgment  on his claims against Wait and Clark , which the court 
elected to treat as a cross -motion.  (Dkt s. ##215, 228.)  Because plaintiff has failed to 
identify or come forward with admissible evidence in support of his claims , defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment will be granted and plaintiff’s cross-motion will be denied.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Before turning to the facts in this protracted, contentious dispute, the court begins 
by emphasizing the standard of review and local procedures that apply to motions for 
summary judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine issue of material fact exists when 
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);  see also Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  The fact that the parties have 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter this standard.  Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).   
To survive summary judgment, the nonmovant “must go beyond the pleadings (e.g., 
produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file) to 
demonstrate that there is evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to [reach] a 
verdict in [their] favor.”  Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C., 934 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Further, while the court views the record 
“in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and constru[es] all reasonable inferences 
from the evidence in [their] favor,” Moore v. Western Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 590 (7th 
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Cir. 2023), a nonmovant is only entitled to favorable inferences that are supported by 
admissible evidence, not those based upon mere speculation or conjecture, Grant v. Trustees 
of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017), or upon “[c]onclusory statements, not 
grounded in specific facts,” Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 984, 989 
(7th Cir. 2016). 
As in every case  before this court , the parties were notified of its posted local 
procedures for seeking and opposing summary judgment , which were also provided in 
writing at the pretrial conference.  (Dkt. #39.)   While defendants have substantially 
complied with those procedures by submitting proposed findings of fact with citations to 
evidence in the record , plaintiff has not.  See Proc. to be Followed on Mot. For Summ. 
Judg., § II(C), (E); Hedrich v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 274 F.3d 1174, 1178 
(7th Cir. 2011) (courts are to consider only evidence set forth in proposed finding of fact 
with proper citation); Rivera v. Guevara , 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(disregarding “submissions that make legal arguments and assert legal conclusions”).   
Indeed, plaintiff has submitted no evidence in response to defendants’ motions other than 
his own declaration, which is itself unsupported by citations to the record much less specific 
facts.  (Dkt. #220.)  Instead, he has submitted an “Exhibit Index” of “over 100 supporting 
documents” (dkt. #218) that he claims were disclosed to defendants in discovery  (dkt. 
#230, at 2), but are not cited to in any of his submissions and are nowhere to be found in 
the record.  Nor has plaintiff addressed some of the arguments raised by defendants  in 
their respective summary judgment motions. 
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“[D]istrict judges have discretion to enforce the local rules strictly, even against pro 
se litigants.”  Hatton v. Storms, No. 24-2131, 2025 WL 3562267, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 
2025) (unpublished) (citing Robinson v. Waterman , 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021); 
Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2020)).  Because all of the 
parties are pro se, the court exercises its discretion in attempting to  address plaintiff’s 
claims and arguments, however, unsupported.  See Edgewood Manor Apartment Homes, LLC 
v. RSUI Indem. Co., 733 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that 
the district court has broad discretion to require strict compliance with local rules or to 
relax the rules and excuse noncompliance.”).   The court will not, however, “dig through 
the record to find evidentiary support for a party’s summary judgment arguments.”  MAO-
MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm  Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,  994 F.3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 
2021).  Nor is the court obligated to conduct research or develop arguments on behalf of 
a party.  Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Mahaffey v. Ramos, 
588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir.  2009) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without 
discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.”). 
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the “party opposing a summary judgment 
motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment 
should not be entered.”  Mahran v. Advoc. Christ Med. Ctr ., 12 F.4th 708, 713 (7th Cir. 
2021) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, 
Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 415 (7th Cir. 2019) (reiterating that “it is ‘not the duty of the district 
court to scour the record in search of material factual disputes’”) (citations omitted).  While 
plaintiff’s unrepresented status entitles him to liberal construction of his filings, that “pro 
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se status doesn’t alleviate his burden on summary judgment.”  Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 
742, 760 (7th Cir. 2011).   Accordingly, absent contrary evidence advanced by plaintiff, 
proposed findings of fact supported by defendants ’ persuasive evidence are deemed 
undisputed.  Similarly, to the extent that plaintiff has not addressed argument s advanced 
by defendants as to several of his claims, those claims are deemed waived.  See Crothersville 
Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co ., S.I., 168 F.4th 483, 490-92 (7th 
Cir. 2026); see also Nichols v. Michigan City Plant Plan. Dep ’t, 755 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 
2014) (“The non-moving party waives any arguments that were not raised in its response 
to the moving party’s motion for summary judgment.”). 
UNDISPUTED FACTS1 
Plaintiff Heru Spencer is a citizen of Montana, although he resided in Madison, 
Wisconsin, at the time this suit was filed.  (Dkt. #1, at 5.)  Defendant Wait is a citizen of 
Oklahoma and defendant Clark currently resides in California. 
In April 2022, defendants Wait and Clark co-founded and incorporated as a non -
profit in Oklahoma  “The Church of Prismatic Light ” as a religious organization that 
advocated for “LGBTQ+ rights.”2  Around that same time, t he organization filed for a 
trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office depicted below and described as:  
 
1 As just addressed above, u nless otherwise indicated, the facts in this section are taken from the 
parties’ proposed findings of fact to the extent that they have complied with the court’s summary 
judgment procedures. 
 
2 The term “prismatic” is defined as the spectrum of colors formed by a prism, and “prismatic light” 
is similarly defined as “resembling the colors formed by the refraction of light through a prism.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1084 (1981). 
 
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“[a] multi-colored prismatic heart circled by a bronze banner with ‘the church of’ arched 
above it and the ‘Prismatic Light’ on the banner to form The Church of Prismatic Light.”3   
 
 
The goods and services reportedly provided under this proposed mark included unspecified 
“religious ceremonies” and organization of “religious meetings,” with its first use reportedly 
occurring on April 4, 2022.  Wait also sought and received a registered copyright for The 
Church of Prismatic Light’s tenets of faith, which were posted on the organization’s 
website.  (Dkts. ##29-3, 29-5.) 
Around this same time, Wait also publicly announced the organization’s formation 
on her TikTok account, and invited others to apply for board membership.  Hundreds of 
people responded, including plaintiff Spencer, who introduced himself as the founder of 
the Djedi Order and expressed an interest in applying.  According to Spencer, the Djedi 
Order refers to Jedi tenets that are based on “the popular Star Wars franchise.”  (Pl.’s Am. 
 
3 USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System at https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ (last accessed June 
17, 2026).   
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Comp. (dkt. #49, ¶ 1).)  After Wait and Clark spoke with Spencer, they denied his 
application to join as a board member for their organization. 
Immediately after his rejection, Spencer began posting TikTok videos attacking 
Wait and her family , including her children .  On May 2, 2022, Spencer then filed for a 
registered trademark in Montana for the name “The Church of Prismatic Light.”  On the 
same date, he also applied for a registered trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office for the following monochromatic proposed mark:   
 
The goods and services offered are described as “[r]eligious and spiritual services, namely, 
conducting religious worship, marriage ceremonies, baptismal ceremonies, [and] baby 
dedications.”4  Spencer reported in his trademark application that the mark was first used 
on May 2, 2020.  That trademark was officially registered on September 10, 2024.   
Spencer filed this lawsuit in May 2022, accusing Wait, Clark, and others associated 
with them of trademark infringement, claiming that he started his version of The Church 
of Prismatic Light in Montana, Wisconsin, California, and other states  before defendants 
had formed their organization bearing the same name in Oklahoma, adding that his church 
entity had engaged in “internet meetings” in 2020 and 2021. 5  Subsequently, Spencer 
 
4 USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System at https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ (last accessed June 
17, 2026).  
  
5 Spencer also originally sued Katrina Rose Wolff and Ida Hamilton, but they were dismissed as 
defendants after he failed to serve them.  (Dkt. #123.) 
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applied for a registered copyright for “Djedi Tenets” that were nearly identical to the tenets 
of The Church of Prismatic Light posted by Wait on that entity’s website.  (Dkts. ##29-
1, 29-2.)   
To further complicate matters, b y June 2022, Wait formally left The Church of 
Prismatic Light that she had founded with Clark.  Since then, Wait has had no involvement 
with that organization or its board members .  Further, the trademark that Wait applied 
for was never registered and was deemed abandoned in September 2023. 6  Until 2023, 
however, Clark served as president  of their version of The Church of Prismatic Light , at 
which time  it was re branded as “The Prism Sanctuary .”  In turn , that entity ceased 
operations entirely and became defunct in 2024.       
OPINION 
I. Federal and State Common Law Trademark Infringement 
Plaintiff’s primary claim is that defendants Wait and Clark infringed on his 
trademark for The Church of Prismatic Light by using an “identical mark” in violation of 
the Lanham Act  and state common law .7  (Pl.’s Am. Compl. (d kt. #49, ¶¶ 25-28, 38).)  
 
 
6 USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System at https://tmsearch.uspto.gov/ (last accessed June 
17, 2026).  
  
7 Plaintiff also alleges that defendants infringed on his trade dress in violation of federal and state 
law.  (Pl.’s Am. Compl. (dkt. #49, ¶¶ 25-26, 34-35, 39).)  However, “trade dress” refers to “a 
product design that is so distinctive it identifies the product’s source.”  Republic Tech. (NA), LLC v. 
BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP , 135 F.4th 572, 582 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see also Badger 
Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1151 (7th Cir. 1994) (“‘Trade dress’ refers to the total 
image of a product, including size, shape, color combinations, graphics, packaging and label.” )  
However, plaintiff neither alleges nor offers any evidence that this case involved any actual product 
with a distinct or protectable design.  Because he has made no effort to demonstrate an actionable 
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The Lanham Act governs trademarks, service marks , and unfair competition , 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a), and is generally intended to protect individuals and businesses from unfair 
practices by competing entities.  Specifically, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates a 
federal civil remedy against any person who uses in commerce “any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device” or “any false designation of origin” if it “is likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another person.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).   
To begin, plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendants’ trademark was identical 
to his.  Thus, it appears that he only takes issue with the name chosen by defendants for 
their non-profit organization, arguing that use of “The Church of Prismatic Light ” itself 
constitutes an infringement in violation of trademark law.  Certainly, the names of religious 
institutions are protectable under trademark law.  See, e.g., TE-TA-MA Truth Foundation – 
Family of URI, Inc. v. World of Church Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2002) (“World 
Church of the Creator” was enjoined from use by defendant as an infringement on 
plaintiff’s “Church of the Creator” trademark).   
To prevail on a trademark infringement claim under either the Lanham Act or state 
common law, however, plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could find that:  (1) he owns a protectable trademark, and (2) a likelihood of confusion 
exists between his use and defendants’ use of the mark.  Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian 
 
claim for trade dress infringement under federal or state law, those claims are waived and will not 
be addressed further. 
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Ins. Group , 128 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 1997) ; Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s 
Reprographics, Inc., 203 Wis. 2d 226, 234, 552 N.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing 
First Wis. Nat’l Bank v. Wichman, 85 Wis. 2d 54, 64-66, 270 N.W.2d 168, 173-74 (1978)) 
(“In order to prevail on [a state common law trademark  or trade name infringement] claim, 
the plaintiff must show that a designation meets the definition of trademark or trade name 
and that the defendant ’s use of a similar designation is likely to cause confusion.”).   As 
discussed below, plaintiff satisfies neither element here because he advances no more than 
perfunctory argument in moving for summary judgment and offers no evidence in support 
of his infringement claim.  (Dkt. #216, at 2.)  Similarly, plaintiff does little more in his 
response to defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment on those claims.  (Dkt. 
#222, at 2; Dkt. #223, at 2.)     
A. Ownership 
Defendants point out that plaintiff did not  even seek to register “The Church of 
Prismatic Light” as a trademark until after defendant Wait  had already announced the 
formation of their non -profit organization and registered it in Oklahoma in April 2022.  
Defendants argue, therefore, that plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of his trademark 
infringement claims, having failed to present evidence showing that he owned The Church 
of Prismatic Light as an unregistered trademark before defendants’ actual use of that mark 
for their non-profit organization.8  (Dkt. #206, at 4; Dkt. #212, at 2-3.)  See S.C. Johnson 
 
8 Neither party disputes that plaintiff’s mark is sufficiently distinctive for purposes of protection as 
common law marks under the Lanham Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).  As a result, the court does not address this issue further. 
 
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& Son, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp ., 835 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2016) (it is a “bedrock 
principle of trademark law that trademark ownership is not acquired by federal or state 
registration, but rather from prior appropriation and actual use in the market”) (emphasis 
added) (quotations omitted).   
“The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127.  For services, a mark is “used” in commerce “when it 
is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in 
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and 
a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in 
connection with the services. ”  Id.  While plaintiff alleges that the Djedi Order first used 
The Church of Prismatic Light in March 2020, he offers no details about that use, nor 
more importantly at summary judgment, has he  pointed to any admissible evidence in the 
record to support its alleged use in commerce as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1127.9   
When a party to a trademark infringement suit fails to produce any documentary 
evidence of bona fide, prior use of a mark in commerce, summary judgment is appropriate. 
See Conversive, Inc. v. Conversagent, Inc. , 433 F.  Supp. 2d 1079, 1090 (C.D.  Cal. 2006) 
(“Because of the absence of evidence that the mark was used in commerce, defendant has 
 
9 Defendants note further that plaintiff admitted during discovery that he gave his rights to the 
disputed trademark to the Djedi Order, raising a question about whether he even has standing to 
assert infringement claims since that entity is not a party .  (Dkt. #158, at 6; Ex. B to Wait Decl. 
(dkt. #207-3) at ¶ 13.)  Because plaintiff also represents in a discovery response that the trademark 
is actually “owned by [him] and not the Djedi Order church,” the court does not address 
defendants’ arguments about standing further , except to note that plaintiff was ordered to show 
cause in writing by January 28, 2025, clarifying ownership of the disputed trademark (dkt. #155, 
at 5), but has ignored that order. 
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failed to offer evidence that establishes . . . any trademark rights [in the mark].”). Because 
plaintiff has failed to present any such evidence, his unsupported, conclusory declaration 
is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.  See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA Inc ., 
No. 11-cv-5426, 2015 WL 1543262, at *15 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 2015) (“ Conclusory 
statements about infringement without evidentiary backing are insufficient to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact.”) (citation omitted).   
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, summary judgment is the “put up or shut up 
moment in litigation” where “the non-moving party is required to marshal and present the 
court with the evidence [he] contends will prove [his] case.”  Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) . 
Specifically, “summary judgment requires a non -moving party to respond to the moving 
party’s properly -supported motion by identifying specific, admissible evidence showing 
that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial.”  Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ ., 870 
F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted) .  While the court has generally 
reviewed plaintiff’s submissions and attempted to locate support for his allegations, “judges 
and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”  U.S. ex rel. 
Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).   Because plaintiff has 
not met his burden to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
he owned the disputed trademark based on prior use in commerce, defendants are entitled 
to summary judgment on this issue. 
B. Likelihood of Confusion 
In addition , defendants point out  that plaintiff has presented no evidence 
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establishing the likelihood of consumer confusion based on defendants’ previous use of 
The Church of Prismatic Light.  (Dkt. #206, at 2-3; Dkt. #212, at 2-3.)  “The ‘keystone’ 
of trademark infringement is ‘likelihood of confusion’ as to source, affiliation, connection 
or sponsorship of goods or services among the relevant class of customers and potential 
customers.”  Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 726 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sands, 
Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co ., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992)).  “To decide 
whether there is a likelihood of confusion .  . . a court must ask whether consumers, and 
specifically consumers who would use either product, would be likely to attribute them to 
a single source.”  Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int’l Software, Inc., 653 
F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 2011)).  Possible confusion is not enough; rather, confusion must 
be “probable.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
As the party charging infringement,  plaintiff had the burden of proving likelihood 
of confusion, which “ requires a showing that the defendant ’s actual practice is likely to 
produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or services in 
question.”  KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc ., 543 U.S. 111, 117 -18 
(2004).  To make a determination on likelihood of confusion, courts in the Seventh Circuit 
consider the following seven factors:  “(1) the similarity between the marks; (2) the 
similarity of the [services]; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of 
care consumers are likely to use; (5) the strength of plaintiff ’s mark; (6) actual consumer 
confusion; and (7) the defendant ’s intent to ‘palm off’ its [services] as that of another.”  
Uncommon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc., 926 F.3d 409, 425 (7th Cir. 2019).  None of these factors 
alone are dispositive, but the similarity of the marks, the defendant ’s intent, and actual 
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confusion are usually the most important.  Id.  In this case, all three of those factors favor 
defendants. 
First, as reflected above, the respective trademarks for the parties’ non-profit entities 
are not identical.  While plaintiff is correct that the words are the same, the appearance and 
placement of the words are not such that a consumer of religious services would 
automatically associate one organization with the other.  Indeed, defendants’ now-
abandoned mark, featuring the words “The Church of” and “Prismatic Light” emblazoned 
over and across a multicolored heart with prismatic characteristics, was far more distinctive 
than plaintiff’s comparatively plain mark, which consists solely of the unadorned words 
“The Church of Prismatic Light” in black typeface.   
Second, plaintiff presents no evidence that defendant s adopted The Church of 
Prismatic Light with any intent to pass off their services as those of plaintiff’s.  See Packman 
v. Chicago Tribune Co ., 267 F.3d 628, 644 (7th Cir. 2001).  Because plaintiff’s bare 
assertions to the contrary are unsupported by evidence, they are insufficient to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact on this issue.  Id. at 645. 
Third, plaintiff points to no evidence that consumers were actually confused by 
defendants’ use of The Church of Prismatic Light.  While actual confusion is not required 
to show a likelihood of confusion, Sands, Taylor & Wood Co., 978 F.2d at 960, it is one of 
the more important factors.  Uncommon, LLC , 926 F.3d at 425.  Moreover, evidence 
showing that customers were actually confused is highly probative of the ultimate question 
whether a likelihood of confusion exists .  Epic Sys. Corp. v. YourCareUniverse, Inc ., 244 F. 
Supp. 3d 878, 891 (W.D. Wis. 2017).   
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Finally, plaintiff presents no evidence that defendants’ use of The Church of 
Prismatic Light conflicts with any ongoing use.  The key question relevant to this factor is 
whether plaintiff and defendants are using the disputed mark to compete for the same 
customers.  Epic Sys. Corp ., 244 F. Supp. 3d at 900 (citations omitted).  Here, it is 
undisputed that :  defendant  Wait left the organization in June 2022 ; the entity she 
originally formed with Clark rebranded as The Prism Sanctuary in 2023; and even Prism 
Sanctuary ceased operations entirely in 2024 .  As a result, this factor also favors 
defendants.10 
Because all of the relevant factors favor defendants, and plaintiff has not cited to 
any record evidence showing a likelihood of confusion, plaintiff has failed to establish that 
a reasonable jury could find in his favor  on this element either .  While likelihood of 
confusion is usually a fact question reserved for a jury, summary judgment is appropriate 
when the plaintiff has not met its burden.  See Epic Sys. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“the 
Seventh Circuit has not hesitated to decide likelihood confusion as a matter of law on 
summary judgment when the plaintiff has not met its burden.”) (collecting cases affirming 
dismissal where the plaintiff did not establish likelihood of confusion).   
Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s trademark 
infringement allegations under both the Lanham Act and common law .  For the same 
reason, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this claim will also be denied. 
 
10 Neither defendant raised the affirmative defense of abandonment, nor briefed whether it applies.  
Nevertheless, the non-use for the past several years by defunct entities is prima facie evidence of 
abandonment.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining abandonment as discontinuance, with no intent to 
resume use, which may be inferred from circumstances). 
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II. State Statutory Trademark Infringement 
Plaintiff further claims that defendants violated Wisconsin statutory law by 
engaging in trademark infringement.  (Pl.’s Am. Compl. (dkt. #49, ¶ 39).)  Wisconsin law 
includes a statutory cause of action for infringement of trademarks and trade names.  Wis. 
Stat. ch. 132; Ritter v. Farrow , 2021 WI 14, ¶ 25, 395 Wis.  2d 787, 955 N.W.2d 122.  
Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 132.033 (1) provides a cause of action to “[e]very person, 
association or union adopting or using a mark ” against a party who uses or displays a 
“counterfeit mark identical or substantially identical” to the mark, provided that the mark 
has been registered.  See also Wis. Stat. § 132.001(2) (defining “mark” to require 
registration under Wis. Stat. § 132.01); see also Wis. Stat. § 132.16(6) (prohibiting use of 
an organization’s registered, identifying information without authorization).   
Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed for lack of evidence.  Plaintiff 
has presented n o argument or evidence showing that he ever successfully registered his 
trademark with the State of Wisconsin.  As a result, plaintiff cannot prevail on a trademark 
infringement claim under Wisconsin law.   Regardless, because no reasonable jury would 
conclude that defendants violated Wis. Stat. § 132.033(1), they are entitled to summary 
judgment on this claim.  See Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc., 168 F.4th at 490-
92; Nichols, 755 F.3d at 600. 
III.  Federal and State Law Unfair Competition 
Plaintiff similarly claims that by infringing on his trademark for The Church of 
Prismatic Light, defendants Wait and Clark engaged in unfair competition in violation of 
the Lanham Act , 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) , and Wisconsin state common law.  (Pl.’s Am. 
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Compl. (dkt. #49) ¶¶ 30, 34.)  “The analysis is essentially the same for unfair competition 
under the Lanham Act and under the common law ,” both of which require plaintiff to 
establish a likelihood of confusion.  Children’s Med. Grp., Inc. v. Lake Cnty. Pediatrics, S.C., 
417 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1156 (E.D. Wis. 2019) ; see also CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air En g’g, Inc., 
267 F.3d 660, 673 -74 (7th Cir. 2001 ) (to establish trademark infringement or unfair 
competition, a plaintiff must establish that (1) its mark is protectable and (2) the 
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers ); Echo Travel, 
Inc. v. Travel Assocs., Inc. , 870 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir. 1989)  (Wisconsin common law 
unfair competition claim requires (1) validity of the mark in question and (2) a likelihood 
of consumer confusion). 
Just as with his trademark-infringement claim, plaintiff’s unfair-competition claims 
fail for lack of evidence.  Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence in support of his claim 
of confusion amongst consumers or other members of the public who might be interested 
in his non-profit.  Thus, for the same reasons discussed above, plaintiff fails to show that 
a reasonable jury would conclude that defendants engaged in unfair competition by 
infringing on his trademark.  The court concludes, therefore, that defendants are entitled 
to summary judgment on this claim and that plaintiff’s cross-motion must be denied. 
IV.  State Law Deceptive Trade Practices 
Plaintiff next alleges that defendants’ use of an “identical mark” violates Wisconsin 
state law prohibiting deceptive trade practices.  (Pl.’s Am. Compl. (dkt. #49, ¶ 34).)   
Claims arising under the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ WDTPA”), codified 
at Wis. Stat. § 100.18, “have three required elements: ‘(1) the defendant made a 
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representation to the public with the intent to induce an obligation, (2) the representation 
was untrue, deceptive or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced 
(caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.’”  Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc., 3 F.4th 
927, 934 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, ¶ 44, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 
749 N.W.2d 544).   
 Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to 
produce any evidence during discovery of a pecuniary loss or other damages that are 
attributable to their use of The Church of Prismatic Light.  More specifically, defendant 
Clark argues that plaintiff fails to show she made any representation that was untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading  with the intent to induce an obligation by a consumer  or any 
representation at all that materially induced a consumer’s decision, causing plaintiff to 
suffer a pecuniary loss.  (Dkt. #212, at 6.)  Not only failing to cross -move for summary 
judgment, plaintiff appears to have abandoned his trade practices claim altogether, having 
neither responded to defendants’ arguments , nor identified a specific false statement by 
one of the defendants .  Even more fundamentally in the face of defendants’ summary 
judgment motions, plaintiff produced no evidence that he suffered  any pecuniary loss as 
the result of any such statement.  (Dkts. ##216, 222, 223.)  Accordingly, defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment in their favor on this claim  as well .11  See Crothersville 
Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc., 168 F.4th at 490-92; Nichols, 755 F.3d at 600.   
 
11 Even if not waived, plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim under the WDTPA because his claim, as 
pleaded, is based on representations allegedly made to the public, not to plaintiff.  (Pl.’s Am. Compl. 
(dkt. #49, ¶ 34).)  This court has repeatedly held that the WDTPA does not afford a cause of action 
for one vendor against a competitor for representations made to third parties.  Grice Eng’g, Inc. v. JG 
Innovations, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923-24 (W.D. Wis. 2010); see also Spacesaver Corp. v. Marvel 
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V. Federal Copyright Infringement 
Plaintiff further claims that defendants violated federal copyright law by knowingly 
copying and using copyrighted materials owned by him.  (Pl .’s Am. Compl. (dkt. #49, ¶ 
42).)  To succeed on this claim, plaintiff must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, 
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”  Design Basics, LLC, 
v. Signature Constr., Inc., 994 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co ., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).   Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot 
prevail on this claim because he did not identify in discovery (1) any original, copyrighted 
work owned by him that (2) has been infringed.  (Dkt. #206, at 3; Dkt. #212, at 10-11.)  
To the extent plaintiff identifies the “Djedi Tenets” of his faith,  defendant Clark argues 
further that copyright law only protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves .  
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (barring copyright protection for ideas).  In addition,  Clark offers 
evidence that plaintiff’s claim rests on tenets of faith based on ideas that he actually copied 
from defendants’ public content, which undermines his claim  that defendants copied his 
original work.12  (Dkt. #212, at 10-11.)   
 
Group, Inc ., 621 F.  Supp. 2d 659, 663 -64 (W.D.  Wis. 2009) (“[I]f § 100.18 extends to 
misrepresentations made to nonparties, application of the statute becomes almost nonsensical.”) ; 
Willert v. Andre, No. 17-cv-496-jdp, 2017 WL 5033658, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 31, 2017) (“Here, 
the purpose of the DTPA and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretation of the DTPA . . . are 
persuasive indications that were this issue to come before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it would 
hold that a business cannot state a claim for misrepresentations made by its competitor to a third 
party.”).  For this additional reason, plaintiff’s WDTPA claim fails as a matter of law. 
12 Plaintiff previously presented an exhibit featuring a list of tenets for his Church of Prismatic 
Light, and a copyright for “Djedi Tenets,” which was registered as of June 23, 2022, after the alleged 
use by Wait, who accused plaintiff of copying her Church of Prismatic Light’s Seven Tenets of Faith, 
which were registered as of May 23, 2022 , according to public records from the U.S. Copyright 
Office.  (Dkts. ##29-2, 29-5.) 
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Again, p laintiff did not move for summary judgment on this claim , but more 
importantly, has not responded to any of the defendants’ arguments for entry of summary 
judgment against him .  (Dkt s. ##222, 223.)  Accordingly, he has waived this claim  by 
failing to defend it as well.  See Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church, Inc., 168 F.4th at 
490-92; Nichols, 755 F.3d at 600.  As a result, defendants are  also entitled to summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s federal copyright infringement claim. 
VI.   Defamation 
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendants and other members of The Church of 
Prismatic Light as formed by Wait and Clark in April 2022 have defamed him on social 
media, exposing him to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace in society as 
well as injury to his non -profit[.]”  (Pl.’s Am. Compl. (dkt. #49, ¶ 45).)  Despite being 
asked to do so in discovery,  defendants argue that plaintiff’s defamation claim fails as a 
matter of law because he has still not identified any specific false statement made against 
him.  (Dkt. #206, at 5; Dkt. #212, at 11.)   
In Wisconsin, a defamation claim that does not involve a public figure requires 
proof of the following elements:  
(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, conduct, or in writing to 
a person other than the person defamed; and (3) the communication is 
unprivileged and is defamatory, that is, tends to harm one’s reputation so as 
to lower him or her in the estim ation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him or her. 
Amoroso v. Schuh , 278 F. Supp. 3d 1106 , 1111 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (quoting In re Storms , 
2008 WI 56, ¶ 38, 309 Wis. 2d 704, 750 N.W.2d 739).  Determining whether a statement 
is capable of defamatory meaning requires a court to consider the words and statements in 
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the context of the communication as a whole.  Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 81 Wis. 
2d. 1, 6, 259 N.W.2d 691  (1977); Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis.  2d 271, 276, 140 N.W.2d 
259 (1966).  Thus, to state a defamation claim, “the particular words complained of shall 
be set forth in the complaint.”  Wis. Stat. § 802.03; Schindler v. Seiler, 474 F.3d 1008, 1010 
(7th Cir. 2007).   
 Unfortunately for plaintiff, his amended complaint still does not identify any 
specific false statement about him that was communicated to anyone by the defendants.  
Plaintiff has further provided no evidence of any particular false statement , either in his 
response to defendants’ summary-judgment motions or his cross-motion.  (Dkts. ##216, 
222, 223.)  This is fatal to his claim. 
 Defendants also argue that plaintiff refused to disclose in discovery any evidence of 
reputational harm or calculations of his alleged financial loss to substantiate his claim for 
defamatory damages, despite being ordered to do so.  (Dkt. #155.)  Regardless, at summary 
judgment, plaintiff still has provided no such evidence, nor has he responded to defendants’ 
argument in favor of summary judgment.  (Dkts. ##222, 223.)  For this additional reason, 
plaintiff’s defamation claim cannot survive.  Jones v. Heartland Employment Servs., LLC, 721 
F. App’x 547, 548 (7th Cir. 2018).  Absent evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
find in plaintiff’s favor, the court must grant defendants’ motions for summary judgment 
on his defamation claim and plaintiff’s cross-motion must be denied.   
 Because plaintiff has failed to support any of his claims  in response to defendants’ 
requests for discovery and their respective motions for summary judgment, the proverbial 
“put up or shut up” time in any lawsuit,  this long-running, acrimonious dispute between 
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the plaintiff and the individual defendants must end.13  Therefore, defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment will be granted and plaintiff’s motion will be denied.   
 Moreover, as plaintiff has made no effort to pursue claims against the now-defunct 
non-profit formed by defendants Wait and Clark, despite ample notice that he had to come 
forward with all of his evidence and arguments, the court will dismiss those claims against 
defendant The Church of Prismatic Light for want of prosecution pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 41(b).  See William v. Chicago Bd. of Educ ., 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1998) (district 
courts possess inherent authority to dismiss a case sua sponte for want of prosecution to 
“achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” ); Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 
F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2006) (district courts have the inherent power to remedy dilatory 
conduct by dismissing a case for want of prosecution without a motion from the opposing 
party); Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC , 446 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (district court did 
not abuse its discretion by dismissing lawsuit with prejudice for failure to prosecute without 
giving plaintiff explicit warning).  Since the deadline for dispositive motions expired over 
a year ago, and plaintiff has not pursued any request for default following withdrawal of 
 
13 The record documents the parties’ bitter feud, which has included allegations of cyberbullying 
and online harassment on both sides, requiring multiple orders from this court as well as hearings 
before Magistrate Judges Stephen Crocker and Anita Boor to resolve discovery issues  and other 
pretrial disputes.  (Dkts. ##81-82, 84, 89, 91, 102, 111, 121, 126, 146, 149, 155, 166, 167, 177-
179, 194, 198.)  Despite the effort and expenditure of judicial resources to bring closure to this 
case, both defendants have moved for sanctions against plaintiff for ignoring court orders to compel 
discovery and for engaging in abusive litigation conduct.  (Dkts. ##188-189, 206, 215.)  Plaintiff, 
similarly, accuses both defendants of spoliation of evidence for deleting their Tik Tok accounts, 
Google drives, and other unspecified “Church -related” records.  (Dkt. ##222 -223.)  Because the 
alleged conduct is not alleged to have impaired plaintiff’s ability to respond to defendants’ 
summary-judgment motions or support his claims, the requests for sanctions will be denied as moot. 
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counsel,14 he appears to have abandoned any claim against this non-profit entity, formerly 
operated by the individual defendants as The Church of Prismatic Light. 
Even if plaintiff were entitled to entry of default against the defunct non -profit, 
however, he has not come forward with evidence of injury or damages  attributable to his 
claims against any of the named defendants.  Nor does it appear based on the discussion 
of plaintiff’s claims against Wait and Clark that plaintiff would be entitled to default 
judgment based on a monetary loss .  See 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed. 2019) (“Even after default, however, it remains for the 
court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, 
since a party in default does not admit mere conclusions of law.” ); accord Abdul-Wadood v. 
Bayh, 85 F.3d 631, 1996 WL 219068, at *1 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (“The entry of 
a default order does not automatically mean that a default judgment will be entered. The 
court must first assure itself that the complaint supports the right to relief.”) .  Therefore, 
this case is resolved in its entirety, including any claim for default judgment that plaintiff 
may have, but has not, sought. 
  
 
14 While represented by counsel, defendants Wait and The Church of Prismatic Light filed a joint 
answer to plaintiff’s original and amended complaints.  (Dkts. ##24, 50.)  After defense counsel 
withdrew, these defendants were also told that The Church of Prismatic Light could not represent 
itself and required substitute counsel, which Wait and Clark represented that they could not afford 
to hire.  (Dkt. #164, at 3 n.1.)  Plaintiff has not included defendant The Church of Prismatic Light 
in his motion for summary judgment, which concerned only his claims that defendants Wait and 
Clark (1) misappropriated his trademark, (2) falsely presented themselves as founders of The 
Church of Prismatic Light, and (3) defamed him.  (Dkt. #216.)  Nor did he move or re-urge one of 
his previously filed motions for a default judgment, despite being advised by Magistrate Judge Boor 
at a status conference on December 12, 2024, that entry of default was a potential consequence if 
the defendant non-profit entity remained unrepresented.  (Dkt. #126.)   
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ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
1) The motions for summary judgment filed by defendant Tiffany Faith Wait and 
Jeri Clark (dkts. ## 205, 211) are GRANTED.   
2) The motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff Heru Spencer (dkt. #215) 
is DENIED.   
3) Plaintiff’s claims against The Church of Prismatic Light are DISMISSED. 
4) All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. 
5) The clerk’s office is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close this case. 
Entered this 30th day of September, 2026. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
      /s/ 
      __________________________________ 
      WILLIAM M. CONLEY 
      District Judge 
 
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