govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_26-cv-02928-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
WILSON ANTONIO MARTINEZ PINA, 
Petitioner,  
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No. 2:26-cv-02928-SHL-cgc 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK, New Orleans 
Field Office Director of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and 
Removal Operations, 
Respondent. 
 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
 
 
 Before the Court is Petitioner Martinez Pina’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed July 27, 2026.  (ECF No. 1.)  Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who 
challenges his continued immigration-related detention in the West Tennessee Detention Facility 
as violative of his Fifth Amendment due process rights.  (Id. at PageID 1; 6.)  Respondent 
responded in opposition on August 3, 2026.  (ECF No. 7.)  Petitioner replied on August 5, 2026.  
(ECF No. 8.) 
Respondent first contends that, Mr. Martinez Pina’s “detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 
1225 because Petitioner is an arriving alien who actively sought admission in the United States,” 
and is thus subject to mandatory detention.  (ECF No. 7 at PageID 33.)  Petitioner disagrees and 
asserts that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226, particularly because he has remained at 
liberty in the interior United States for more than three years and is not presently subject to 
expedited removal.  (ECF No. 8 at PageID 49; 52.)  Respondent also contends that Petitioner has 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, so the Court should deny his petition.  (ECF No. 7 at 
PageID 32.)   
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As discussed below, because (1) there is no indication that Petitioner is presently in 
expedited-removal proceedings, and thus his immigration detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 
1226 and the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 
2026), and (2) Petitioner is excused for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the 
Petition is GRANTED. 
BACKGROUND 
 Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who “entered [the United States] through the Calexico 
Port of Entry using a CBP One appointment and was charged as an arriving alien,” in June 2023.  
(ECF No. 8 at PageID 52.)  Upon his entry, he was served with a Notice to Appear, ordering him 
to appear at an out-of-custody court date of November 29, 2023, placing him in full removal 
proceedings.  (ECF 7-2 at PageID 40; ECF No. 7 at PageID 33.)  Petitioner was then paroled into 
the interior of the United States .  (ECF No. 8 at PageID 50.)  Petitioner’s removal case has been 
pending for more than three years.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2; 7.)   
In July 2026, ICE arrested Petitioner at the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office, having 
been arrested by local police. (ECF No. 7-1 at PageID 45.)  Respondent subsequently transferred 
him to the West Tennessee Detention Facility, where he has since remained in custody.   
Mr. Martinez Pina filed the instant Petition on July 27, 2026.  (ECF No. 1.)  He 
challenges his mandatory detention without bond at the West Tennessee Detention Facility under 
8 U.S.C. § 1225 as violative of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fifth Amendment 
and seeks immediate release.  (Id. at PageID 2–6.)  The Parties’ arguments are considered in 
more detail below. 
ANALYSIS 
 Petitioner challenges his mandatory detention at the West Tennessee Detention Facility 
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and seeks immediate release from Respondent’s custody, or an individualized bond hearing.  
(ECF No. 8 at PageID 53.)  He argues that Respondent unlawfully purports to detain him under 8 
U.S.C. § 1225, and that he has been denied a bond hearing in violation of his due process right to 
such a hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.  (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) 
 First, Respondent seeks to distinguish this case from Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 
F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026).  (ECF No. 7.)  According to Respondent, Lopez-Campos “does not 
control the outcome in this matter” because Petitioner is subject to 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s 
mandatory detention scheme as an “arriving alien,” not § 1226(a) as a noncitizen.  (Id. at PageID 
37.)  Respondent argues that Petitioner’s case is different from the Lopez-Campos’ petitioners, 
who “spent ‘significant time…within the interior of the United States,’ ‘resided within the 
United States for years,’ and most importantly, were determined to not be seeking admission or 
lawful entry into the United States.”  (Id. at PageID 38.)  Respondent argues that, here, Petitioner 
“applied for entry” in June 2023, “lacked proper documentation” at that time, and “is an arriving 
alien,” “therefore fall[ing] outside of the scope of” Lopez-Campos.  (Id.)  
 However, none of Respondent’s arguments change the fact that Petitioner was released 
and paroled into, and has remained an interior resident of, the United States since the summer of 
2023.  Whether Mr. Martinez Pina’s parole was terminated because of his Rutherford County 
arrest does not change this analysis.  See Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 723.  The question turns 
on whether he was presently “seeking admission.”  See id. at 722–23.  Respondent contends that 
because Petitioner “made application for admission,” he “was thus actively seeking admission.”  
(ECF No. 7 at PageID 38.)  As Petitioner argues, Respondent asks the Court to indefinitely 
freeze his legal status in the summer of 2023 and ignore the last three years.  (ECF No. 8 at 
PageID 52.)  Lopez-Campos explicitly rejected bond eligibility turning on withdrawal of a 
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petitioner’s application for admission because that would “create[] more problems than it 
[would] solve[],” and “‘lead to absurd or futile results.’”  Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 723 
(quoting Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004)). 
 Like the petitioners in Lopez-Campos, Petitioner was detained indefinitely under 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b) without the possibility of a bond hearing, despite having lived for a “significant 
time . . . within the interior of the United States.” Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 734.  The record 
is devoid of evidence that Petitioner was actively seeking admission into the country at the time 
of his 2026 arrest in Tennessee.  As a result, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, 
and the discretionary bond provisions of that statute govern. 
Second, Respondent argues, in the alternative, that the Court should deny the Petition 
because Mr. Martinez Pina “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.”  (ECF No. 7 at 
PageID 32.)  However, as the Court has ruled in recent immigration habeas petitions, e.g., Lopez 
Soza v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-CV-02224, 2026 WL 1104329, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 23, 2026), Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is EXCUSED.  The legal 
questions presented by the Petition are fit for prompt resolution, and exhaustion would be futile 
because Petitioner cannot seek meaningful and timely administrative relief.  McCarthy v. 
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (explaining that where a statute is silent as to exhaustion, 
requiring exhaustion is within a court’s discretion); Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 
216, 225 (BIA 2025) (holding that an immigration judge “lack[s] authority to hear bond requests 
or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission”). 
 Given that § 1226(a) applies, Petitioner “rightfully state[s] that [he has] a liberty interest 
to be free from detention.”  Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 734.  ICE’s decision to detain him 
without providing a bond hearing in accordance with § 1226(a) violated that liberty interest.  
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Thus, he is entitled to immediate release.  See Villafranca Lara v. Ladwig, No. 26-CV-02079, 
2026 WL 401204, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2026) (“Because ICE purported to detain 
[Petitioner] under § 1225(b)(2)(A), which includes no provision for a bond hearing, the Court 
will not now order a bond hearing under § 1226(a).”).  Therefore, consistent with Lopez-Campos 
and this Court’s decision in Villafranca Lara, and after consideration of the record, the Petition is 
GRANTED. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, the Petition is GRANTED.  Respondent is ORDERED to 
release Mr. Martinez Pina immediately.  Respondent is ENJOINED from pursuing Petitioner’s 
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).  Respondent is further 
ORDERED to file a Status Report with this Court within two business days, to certify 
compliance with this Order.   
 IT IS SO ORDERED, this 1st day of October, 2026. 
 s/ Sheryl H. Lipman  
 SHERYL H. LIPMAN 
 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
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