govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01844-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
HARRY DUNN, and DANIEL HODGES, 
 
  Plaintiffs, 
 
 v. 
 
ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, et al., 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 No. 25- cv-1844 (DLF) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Harry Dunn and Daniel Hodges, officers who defended the U.S. Capitol from rioters on 
January 6, 2021, bring this action against the Architect of the Capitol, seeking to compel 
compliance with a law that directs the Architect to install a plaque honoring those who served on 
January 6.  See generally Compl., Dkt. 1; Consolidated Appropriations Act 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-
103, § 214, 136 Stat. 49, 527 (2022).  Before the Court is the Architect’s Motion to Dismiss under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  See Def. Mot. to Dismiss,  Dkt. 27.   
Because the plaintiffs lack Article III standing, the Court will grant the defendant’s motion under 
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction.1 
I. BACKGROUND 
 On January 6, 2021,  rioters attacked the United States Capitol to disrupt the certification 
of the presidential election.  Compl. ¶ 11.  Officers from the Metropolitan Police Department and 
Capitol Police, among others, confronted the mob as it breached barricades and forced its way into 
the Capitol.  Id. ¶ 12.  The officers defended the building and the people inside it, even as hundreds 
of officers were assaulted.  Id. ¶ 20.   
 
1 Because the Court will grant the defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, 
it does not address the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments. 
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The plaintiffs, Harry Dunn and Daniel Hodges, were among the officers who defended the 
Capitol on January 6.  Dunn, a former officer of the U.S. Capitol Police , id. ¶ 4, alleges that on 
that day, he “saw rioters attack police” and “protected injured officers” while enduring racial 
epithets, id. ¶ 17.  Hodges, a current officer of the Metropolitan Police Department, id. ¶ 4, alleges 
that he was assaulted several times while defending the Capitol, id. ¶ 18. 
Congress included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, a declaration that “the 
United States owes its deepest gratitude to those officers  . . . who valiantly protected the United 
States Capitol, Members of Congress, and staff on January 6, 2021.”  Pub. L. No. 117-103, 
§ 214(a).  To give that gratitude a permanent expression, the Act directed  the Architect to install, 
within one year, an “honorific plaque listing the names of all of the officers” who responded to the 
violence “at a permanent location on the western front of the United States Capitol.”  Id. § 214(b). 
That deadline came and went.  More than three years later, the Architect installed a plaque 
recognizing the January 6 first responders.  See Pls.’ Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 1.  
But the plaque does not “list[] the names of all of the officers .”  Pub. L. No. 117- 103, § 214(b).  
Instead, it lists law-enforcement agencies and organizations alongside a QR-code that visitors may 
scan to access the officers’ names.  See Pls.’ Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 3.  Nor is the 
plaque installed “at a permanent location on the western front of the Capitol .”  Pub. L. No. 117-
103, § 214(b).  C urrently, it is displayed in the non-public Senate wing until the plaque can be 
placed in its permanent location .  See Pls.’ Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 2–3 (citing 
Megan Mineiro, Senate Agrees to Display a Jan. 6 Plaque Honoring Officers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8, 
2026)).  
The p laintiff officers sue Austin, the Architect of the Capitol, in his official capacity , 
alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Compl. ¶ 3–4.  They 
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seek mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, specifically, an order compelling the Architect to install 
the memorial as mandated.  Id. ¶¶ 38–43.  The Architect has moved to dismiss this action for lack 
of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).  See Def. Mot. to Dismiss.     
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss 
an action or claim when the court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).  A 
motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold challenge to the court’s 
jurisdiction.”  Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  Federal district courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”  
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  Thus, “the plaintiff bears 
the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Moran v. U.S. Capitol 
Police Bd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
561 (1992)).   
“When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must treat the complaint’s factual 
allegations as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the 
facts alleged.”  Han v. Lynch, 223 F. Supp. 3d 95, 103 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Those factual allegations, however, receive “closer scrutiny” than they would if the court 
were considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.  Id.  Unlike in the Rule 12(b)(6) 
context, a court may consider documents outside the pleadings to evaluate whether it has 
jurisdiction, but it still must “accept all of the factual allegations in [the] complaint as true.”  See 
Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  If, at any point, the court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court must 
dismiss the claim or action.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).   
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III. ANALYSIS 
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to “cases” and 
“controversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  There is no “case or controversy unless the plaintiff 
has standing.”  West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  Standing is jurisdictional;  
if a plaintiff lacks standing, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the action.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3). 
The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements” : (1) the 
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”  that is concrete and particularized and actual or 
imminent; (2) there must be “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of”; and (3) it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.”  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) .  “The burden 
of establishing these elements falls on the party invoking federal jurisdiction, and at the pleading 
stage, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating each element.”  Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 
F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
   
Standing is assessed from the time of the complaint.  Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc. v. FAA, 
211 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ; cf. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388, 397 
(1980).  Because the officers lacked standing when they commenced this action,  this Court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. 
  
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A. Injury in Fact 
For standing purposes, an injury in fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest” that 
is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.”  Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).  That requirement is not satisfied by an interest in seeing 
the government comply with the law.  See id.  at 573–74.  Nor does “offense, disagreement, or 
distaste” with government action constitute a concrete injury without more.  Nat’l Park Serv. v. 
Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. in the U.S., 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 3).    
Although the Architect has now installed the plaque, standing turns on whether the officer 
plaintiffs had a cognizable injury when they filed the complaint.  Advanced Mgmt. Tech., 211 F.3d 
at 636.  The relevant question, then, is whether  the officers whom Congress meant to honor 
suffered a cognizable injury from the Architect's failure to install the plaque.  The officer plaintiffs 
insist that they did, alleging several related injuries.  See Compl. ¶ 31, 32.  But none of the injuries 
alleged in the complaint satisfies Article III's requirements. 
First, the officers allege that by failing to offer the recognition Congress promised, the 
Architect has exacerbated “psychic injuries”  that the officers have experienced since January 6.  
Compl. ¶ 31.  According to the officers , the Architect’s failure to install the memorial plaque, as 
Congress directed, “suggests that the officers are not worthy of being recognized.”  Id. ¶ 29.  As a 
result, the Architect’s failure to act has compounded Officer Hodges’s anxiety and depression and 
made it impossible for Officer Dunn to continue working to protect members of Congress .  Id. 
¶ 32.   
Second, the officers allege that the Architect’s continued failure to recognize their service 
has emboldened private parties to harass them and disparage th eir service.  Id.  In particular, the 
officers have been accused “of being ‘ crisis actors ’ and . . . conspiracy agents” and regularly 
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receive death threats.  Id.  Officer Dunn also has been targeted because of his race.  Id.  As a result, 
both officers fear for their personal security.  Id.   
The first theory fails to present an injury in fact.  I njury in fact requires something “other 
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which 
one disagrees.”  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).  D istress resulting from what the officers  perceive as 
the government’s failure adequately to honor or recognize their service is precisely the kind of 
psychological consequence arising from disagreement with government conduct that, standing 
alone, does not constitute  a concrete injury under  Article III.   See Nat’l Trust, 609 U.S. at ___ 
(slip op. at 3).   
Nor does t he officers’ unusually strong interest  in the challenged government action 
transform that interest into a concrete injury .  To be sure, the  officers have a far more personal 
connection to the plaque than the public at large.  They are not “just any person,” Nat’l Trust, 609 
U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 6) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); they are among the very officers 
Congress sought to honor.  That gives them an understandable and deeply personal interest in 
whether the government recognizes their service in the manner Congress prescribed.  But Article 
III standing “is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest.”  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 
486; accord Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563.  It requires an injury in fact.  Here, the asserted 
injury is the psychological harm the officers  attribute to what they view as inadequate 
governmental recognition of their service.  Their especially compelling personal stake in receiving 
that recognition does not render  the harm arising from their objection to government inaction 
concrete for purposes of Article III. 
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The officers’ generalized interest in having the Architect comply with Congress's mandate 
likewise does not constitute an Article III injury.  An asserted right to have the government act in 
accordance with the law, without more, is not judicially cognizable.  See Defenders of Wildlife , 
504 U.S. at 575–76.  Vindicating “the public interest (including the public interest in Government 
observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,” not 
the federal courts .  Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 576.  A nd a s the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held, and recently reinforced, “offense, disagreement, or distaste does not qualify as a 
concrete and particularized injury under Article III.”  Nat’l Trust, 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 
3).  Those limitations prevent the federal courts  from becoming “continuing monitors of the 
wisdom and soundness” of government action or forums for resolving disagreements over public 
policy.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The plaintiff 
officers’ disagreement with the Architect’s failure to carry out Congress's mandate thus does not 
supply the concrete and particularized injury that Article III requires. 
The officers’ second theory of standing rests on actions by third parties.  They allege that 
they have been called “crisis actors” and “left-wing conspiracy agents,” subjected to racial epithets, 
and received death threats.  Compl. ¶ 32.  And they fear for their physical safety as a result.  Id.  
Those allegations may describe concrete harms sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.  
See TransUnion LLC , 594 U.S. at  425 (explaining that concrete injuries can include certain 
intangible harms).   
But a concrete injury, standing alone, is not enough to establish Article III standing.  Those 
alleged injuries stem from the actions of third parties, which, in turn, caused the plaintiff officers 
harm.  Compl. ¶ 32.   The officers still must, and cannot, show that those injuries are fairly traceable 
to the Architect's failure to install the plaque or likely to be redressed by his doing so.  
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Whether and how the officers who defended the Capitol on January 6, 2021 should be 
honored is a matter on which Congress has spoken, and on which it remains free to act .  But 
Congress’s decision to require a particular form of recognition does not itself create the concrete 
injury necessary for Article III standing.  At least as alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff officers 
have not carried their burden of establishing that they have suffered an injury in fact.2   
B. Causation and Redressability 
Even assuming that the alleged mental -health issues and third- party harassment are 
cognizable injuries, the officers have not traced those harms to the Architect's failure to install the 
plaque as mandated .  Article III requires the injury to be “fairly traceable” to the challenged 
conduct and “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision” of the court.  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 
at 471–72.  Causation and redressability thus assure “that proper parties have brought their dispute 
to the proper branch of federal government.”  Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 
(D.C. Cir. 1996).  Causation may be said to focus on whether a particular party is appropriate; 
redressability, on whether the forum is.  Id. at 664.   
 
2 The officers appear to disclaim any distinct aesthetic injury, but they do rely by analogy on cases 
recognizing aesthetic injuries arising from contact with public displays.  See Pls.’ Opp’n at 6 
(arguing that their harms are “far more than aesthetic or generally offensive”).  E ven if the Court 
were to construe the complaint as alleging an aesthetic injury, that theory would also fail.  The 
officers do not allege that the plaque’s location or design impairs their ability to “view[], 
appreciat[e], and study[]” the Capitol, Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 562–63, or otherwise 
diminishes their use and enjoyment of it, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180–183 (2000).   
  The officers also rely on some cases recognizing reputational injuries. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss 
at 8 (citing TransUnion, 594 U.S. 413 (2021)).  But the complaint does not allege that the Architect 
made any false or defamatory statement about the officers  or that the challenged conduct itself 
altered their reputation in a concrete way.  See Transunion, 594 U.S. at 425, 435.  Rather, it alleges 
psychological harm stemming from mistreatment by unidentified third parties in connection with 
the officers' service and advocacy.  See Compl. ¶ 32.  Even assuming those allegations could be 
characterized as reputational injury, the officers still must establish that the injury is fairly traceable 
to the Architect and redressable by an order of this Court.  See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471–72.  
And, as the Court will explain, the plaintiff officers cannot make that showing.  See Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562.   
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Start with the officers’ psychological injuries.  Their theory is that the Architect’s failure 
to provide the recognition Congress prescribed materially exacerbated the anxiety, depression, and 
other psychological harms they suffered after January 6.  Compl. ¶ ¶ 31–32.  That theory is not 
implausible merely because the attack and its aftermath are the more immediate causes of those 
injuries.  Article III “does not require that the defendant be the most immediate cause, or even a 
proximate cause,” only that the injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct .  Attias v. 
Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  The problem here is that the officers have not 
alleged facts showing that the challenged conduct caused or materially exacerbated their mental-
health conditions.   
In the officers’ view, the government  has attempted to “rewrite the history of January 6, 
2021.”  See Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.  And “because people take their cues . . 
. from national political leaders,” id. at 5, the plaintiff officers contend that honoring their service 
by installing the plaque as required by law is integral to alleviating the stress they experience from 
the public's perception of that service.  But that argument reveals the gap in the officers’ causal 
theory.  The y do not argue that the Architect's failure to install the plaque  itself worsened their 
mental health conditions.  See Compl. ¶ 32.  Rather, their theory depends on what the Architect's 
failure to install the plaque communicates to the public, how the public understands that message, 
and how the resulting level of public recognition affects the officers .  See Pl.’s Resp. to Court 
Order at 2. 
  That theory requires several inferential steps between the challenged conduct and the 
alleged injury, including the actions of independent third parties.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int ’l 
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); Murthy v. Missouri , 603 U.S. 43, 70 (2024) .  Although the 
complaint links the failure to install the plaque to public perceptions of January 6 and of the 
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plaintiff officers, it does not allege that the Architect's failure to install the plaque worsened those 
perceptions.  At most, the complaint suggests that the  uninstalled plaque  failed to improve an 
already unfavorable public perception.  The asserted causal chain is therefore too attenuated to 
fairly trace the officers’ mental-health injuries to the Architect's inaction.   
The alleged third -party harassment injury presents an even more attenuated chain.  The 
officers have undoubtedly experienced mistreatment.  But they attribute that behavior to the broad 
governmental “whitewash” of January 6 that they allege , of which the plaque  is only one 
component.  Pl .’s Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Ord er at 2.  Again, their theory requires the 
Court to infer that the Architect's failure to install the plaque conveys disrespect for the officers’ 
sacrifice; that members of the public recognize that disrespect ; that this disrespect alters the 
public’s perception of January 6 or its responding officers; and finally, that those altered 
perceptions cause threats and harassment directed at the officers .  If that sounds attenuated, it is.  
Each causal theory attributes the plaintiff officers ’ injuries not to the plaque itself, but to the 
reactions of third parties to the plaque and the controversy surrounding it. 
Courts are skeptical of causal theories that depend on “unfettered choices made by 
independent actors not before the courts.”  Cierco v. Mnuchin, 857 F.3d 407, 414–15 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562).  Courts are also skeptical of causal theories 
that depend on a “number of speculative links ” in chain.  Bentsen, 94 F.3d at 670.  The officers ’ 
harassment theory depends on both.  Nothing alleged provides a basis to conclude  installing the 
plaque as mandated by law  would itself change  public opinion or alter the behavior of the 
unidentified third parties threatening and harassing the officers.  The officers’ theory of causation 
is too attenuated to satisfy Article III. 
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The same problem defeats redressability.  Even if the Architect's failure to install the plaque 
contributed to the officers’ injuries, the officers would need to show that mandating its installation 
would be “likely” to alleviate those injuries.  Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 561.  Yet the  
officers’ theory, again, d epends on the response of third parties —th at requiring the Architect to 
install the plaque mandated by Congress would alter the public’s perception of the officers which 
would ultimately alleviate the  officers’ psychological injuries or reduce the harassment they 
experience.  Article III does not allow the Court to rely on such a speculative sequence of events . 
See Bentsen, 94 F.3d at 663–64.  
In their prayer for relief t he officers request the plaque that  Congress required.  But t he 
officers must show that the relief they seek is likely to remedy the psychological and third- party 
harms on which their standing depends.  They have not. 
CONCLUSION 
For the  above reasons, this Court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction over this action .  
Accordingly, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 27, is granted.  A separate order consistent 
with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.  
 
________________________ 
DABNEY L
. FRIEDRICH 
United States District Judge 
September 30, 2026 
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