govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_25-cr-00227-5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EDWIN APONTE 
 
CRIMINAL ACTION 
NO.  # 25-227-1 
                                      
  
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Defendant Edwin Aponte (“Aponte”) is charged with, inter alia, two counts (Counts Two 
and Three) of kidnapping and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 2.  
Aponte has moved to dismiss those counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(b)(3)(B), arguing that the indictment fails to state an offense under the federal kidnapping 
statute and that there is insufficient evidence to proceed with these counts.  For the reasons that 
follow, Aponte’s motion shall be denied.  
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
An “indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of 
the essential facts constituting the offense charged and must be signed by an attorney for the 
government.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).  It “is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the 
offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, 
second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same 
offense.”  Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (citing Hagner v. United States, 
285 U.S. 427 (1932); United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953)).  Although an indictment 
“must allege more than just the essential elements of the offense,” United States v. John-
Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2014), it need not provide greater specificity than the 
statutory language “so long as there is sufficient factual orientation to permit the defendant to 
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prepare his defense and to invoke double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent prosecution,” 
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Rankin, 870 
F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1989)).  “Generally, an indictment will satisfy these requirements where it 
informs the defendant of the statute he is charged with violating, lists the elements of a violation 
under the statute, and specifies the time period during which the violations occurred.”  United 
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012).  
“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes dismissal of an indictment if its 
allegations do not suffice to charge an offense, but such dismissals may not be predicated upon 
the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the indictment’s charges.”  United States v. 
DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 2000).  
II. DISCUSSION  
Counts Two and Three of the indictment allege
1 that “[o]n or about June 3, 2024, in 
Philadelphia, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,” Aponte and his codefendants knowingly 
and willfully: (1) “unlawfully seized, confined, kidnapped, abducted, carried away, and held,” 2 
D.P. and R.G.; (2) did so “for ransom, reward, and otherwise, that is, for the purpose of robbing 
and carjacking” of D.P. and R.G.; and, (3) “in committing the offense, [they] used a means, 
facility, and instrumentality of interstate commerce, that is, cellular telephones and a 2021 Jeep 
Grand Cherokee . . . that had been transported, shipped, and received in interstate commerce.” 
This language hews closely to the language in the federal kidnapping statute which 
provides, in relevant part, that:  
 
1 Count Two alleges that the Defendants, including Aponte, kidnapped, and aided and abetted the kidnapping of 
D.P.  Count Three alleges the same with respect to R.G. 
 
2 Each count also alleges conduct relevant to aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2, namely, that the 
Defendants “aided and abetted the unlawful seizing, confining, kidnapping, abducting, carrying away, and holding 
of” the respective victim. 
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“[w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, . . . kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds 
for ransom or reward or otherwise any person . . . when the person is willfully transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce. . . or the offender travels in interstate or foreign 
commerce or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or 
foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense. . . 
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).  This statute, therefore, provides three possible avenues for establishing 
a federal nexus: (1) the transportation of a victim is in interstate commerce; (2) the travel of an 
offender in interstate commerce in the commission or furtherance of the kidnapping; or, (3) the 
offender uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign 
commerce in committing or furthering the offense.  Id.  It is upon this element of the kidnapping 
statute—the federal jurisdictional hook—that  Aponte bases his challenge.   
Aponte argues that, because the indictment alleges neither that the defendants transported 
the victims across state lines, nor that the defendants themselves traveled outside of Pennsylvania 
in the commission of the offenses, both of those avenues of federal jurisdiction are closed to the 
Government.  With respect to the third option—the use of an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce
3—he acknowledges that “Counts Two and Three state components of the interstate -
commerce element,” but argues that the indictment is defective because it does not go further and 
“provide facts supporting” how the Jeep Grand Cherokee or cellular telephones were used in the 
two kidnappings.    
The question, then, is not whether the indictment alleges the jurisdictional element—it 
does—but whether the indictment must contain the additional facts Aponte contends  are missing.  
Yet, Aponte identifies no case law that would suggest such a requirement.  To the contrary, the 
 
3 “[M]otor vehicles are instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”  United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Although the Third Circuit has not announced a similar rule with respect to cellular telephones, circuits that 
have considered the issue have found that they are per se instrumentalities.  See United States v. Holloway, 2026 
WL 2445539 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2026) (collecting cases).  
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binding rule, as articulated in Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117-18, and applied by the Third Circuit, see, 
e.g., Huet, 665 F.3d at 595; John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 195-96; Rankin, 870 F.2d at 112, is that 
the indictment need only lay out the elements of the offense and provide sufficient factual 
orientation to allow Aponte to prepare his defense and invoke double jeopardy in the event of a 
subsequent prosecution.  See John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 195-96.  “[D]etailed allegations are 
unnecessary.”  United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Measured against this standard, both relevant counts in this indictment identify the statute 
charged, set out the elements of the offense, distinguish the victims for each charge, and specify 
the date—June 3, 2024— on which the alleged kidnappings occurred.  See Huet, 665 F.3d at 595.  
They further identify the basis for federal jurisdiction—the use of cellular telephones  and a 
specific Jeep Grand Cherokee—which  the Government alleges the defendants used “in 
committing the offense.”  This is sufficient to set forth the elements under the federal kidnapping 
statute and provide enough additional information to apprise Aponte of the charges against 
which he must defend or invoke double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent prosecution.  See, 
e.g., John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186 (observing that indictment was “adequate,” even absent the 
names of the victims, where it alleged the statutory elements, the relevant time period, and the 
nature of the charged conduct); Stock, 728 F.3d at 292 (explaining that “detailed allegations” are 
unnecessary where the indictment recites the statutory language and provides “sufficient factual 
orientation”—typically the time period —of the alleged offense) ; Rankin, 870 F.2d at 112  
(holding that an indictment need not specify “the particular manner” in which the charged 
conduct accomplished an element of the offense); see also United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 
U.S. 102, 110 (2007) (“[D]etailed allegations . . . are not contemplated by Rule 7(c)(1).”). 
Therefore, Aponte’s motion shall be denied.  An appropriate order follows. 
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       BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
       S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE 
       _______________________________ 
       WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J. 
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