govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-1_25-cv-00814-19

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
AHMAD ABU ELREICH,  
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
WAYMO, LLC and UBER 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
 
Defendants. 
Case No. 1:25-cv-00814 JLT SKO 
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING 
MOTION TO FILE EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT 
OF OBJECTIONS; GRANTING 
DEFENDANT UBER’S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT 
WAYMO’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS AS 
MOOT 
(Docs. 33, 36, 37, 73) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ahmad Abu Elreich is the named inventor and owner of U.S. Patent No. 11,577,691 (the 
“’691 Patent”). He brings the instant action alleging that the ride-hailing system utilized by 
Defendants Uber and Waymo infringe the ’691 Patent. Uber filed a motion to dismiss, 
contending, among other things, that all claims of the ’691 Patent are invalid under § 101 for 
patent ineligibility. (Doc. 33 at 7–19.) This motion is joined by Waymo (Doc. 36 at 2.)  
On June 22, 2026, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations 
that Defendant Uber’s motion to dismiss be granted based on patent ineligibility without leave to 
amend. (Doc. 70.) The Court served the findings and recommendations on the parties and notified 
them that any objections were due in 14 days. (Id.) On July 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed timely 
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objections. (Doc. 71.) Defendant responded to those objections. (Doc. 80.) According to 28 
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the case. Having carefully 
reviewed the entire file, including Respondents’ objections, the Court concludes the findings and 
recommendations are supported by the record and proper analysis. Given that Plaintiff is 
proceeding pro se and has filed 22 objections, the Court provides some additional explanations 
herein that are intended to supplement, not supplant, the findings and recommendations.1  
As a threshold matter, on July 13, 2026, approximately one week after Plaintiff filed his 
objections, he filed a 203-page document seeking leave to file attached exhibits in support of his 
objections. (Doc. 73.) The submission is a direct violation of the magistrate judge’s order 
prohibiting the submission of exhibits alongside objections to the findings and recommendations. 
(Doc. 70 at 13.) Regardless, the Court has considerable discretion to consider or reject evidence 
presented for the first time in objections to findings and recommendations. Jones v. Blanas, 393 
F.3d 918, 935 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621–22 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Brown v. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Hartford, No. 1:20-CV-00186-JLT-SAB, 2022 WL 951171, at 
*2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2022) (declining to consider new evidence presented with objections in 
part because plaintiffs made no attempt to explain why the evidence was not presented earlier). 
Here, though Plaintiff offers reasons why he was unable to file the exhibits at the same time as his 
objections, he provides no justification for not presenting the exhibits to the magistrate judge for 
consideration before the findings and recommendations issued. As the Defense points out (Doc. 
78 at 3), the exhibits contain information that “has always been available to Plaintiff.” The 
request is therefore DENIED.  
 
1 The Court takes judicial notice of all patents and patent applications cited in the Federal Circuit’s opinion 
in Rideshare Displays, Inc. Squires, No. 2023-2033, 2025 WL 2751580 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2025), cert. 
denied sub nom. Rideshare Displays, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., No. 25-1132, 2026 WL 1377032 (U.S. May 18, 
2026). The Court does so because they are public records whose accuracies are “not subject to reasonable 
dispute.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); GeoVector Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1016 
n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (explaining that a court may take judicial notice of foreign patents and patent 
applications); Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Foresight Diagnostics Inc., No. 24-cv-03972-EKL, 2025 WL 
1963092, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (taking judicial notice of domestic patent applications). The 
Court also takes judicial notice of all intrinsic evidence of the patent-in-suit. SEMICAPS Pte Ltd. v. 
Hamamatsu Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 802, 806 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (taking judicial notice of prosecution 
history).  
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 101 of Title 35 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 
U.S.C. § 101. Under the Mayo/Alice test, federal courts perform a two-step analysis to determine 
patent eligibility under § 101. 
At step one, “[the Court] ‘look[s] at the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art to 
determine if the claim’s character as a whole is directed to [a patent eligible] subject matter.’” 
Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M GmbH, 942 F.3d 1143, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting 
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). “In the 
software context, Alice step one often turns on whether the claims focus on the specific asserted 
improvement in computer capabilities rather than an abstract idea for which computers are 
invoked merely as a tool.” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Gen Digital Inc., 169 
F.4th 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Although the 
specification is relevant to the construction of the claims, reliance on the specification must 
always yield to the claim language” when determining whether the claims are directed to an 
abstract idea. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, the Court assesses, under step 
two of the Alice inquiry, whether the claims possess an “inventive concept—i.e., an element or 
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (cleaned up). This requires the Court to “consider the elements 
of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the 
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 
217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79–80) (cleaned up). However, the Court is mindful that the 
“additional elements[] . . . must be more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” 
Ollnova Techs. Ltd. v. ecobee Techs. ULC, 177 F.4th 1343, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2026). The Court is 
also mindful that Alice step two “is a question of law that may be informed by underlying factual 
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determinations, such as whether a claim limitation or combination of limitations is well-
understood, routine, and conventional.” Beteiro, LLC v. DraftKings Inc., 104 F.4th 1350, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Alice Step One  
In assessing whether the claims are “directed to” an abstract idea under Alice step one, the 
Federal Circuit has identified the several “well-settled indicators of abstractness.” See Beteiro, 
104 F.4th at 1355; Vineyard Investigations v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, No. 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-
SKO, 2026 WL 1991815, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2026). As relevant here, they include: (a) 
whether the claims recite generic steps for detecting, receiving, processing, managing, sending, or 
displaying information, id. at 1355–56; PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 
1315–18 (Fed. Cir. 2021); (b) whether “the claims are drafted using largely (if not entirely) result-
focused functional language,” “containing no specificity about how the purported invention 
achieves those results[,]” Beteiro, 104 F.4th at 1356; (c) whether the claims focus on a specific 
improvement to computer capabilities or an abstract idea implemented through the use of generic 
technologies, Miller Mendel, Inc. v. City of Anna, Texas, 107 F.4th 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2024); 
Columbia Univ., 169 F.4th at 1329; and (d) whether the claims can be “persuasively 
analogize[d]” to a fundamental human activity, see Beteiro, 104 F.4th at 1356; In re Sturgeon, 
839 F. App’x 517, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining that the abstract idea exception includes 
“mental processes” and “methods of managing human activity”).  
For reasons articulated in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Rideshare Displays, the findings 
and recommendations, and below, the Court concludes that the patent is directed to a patent-
ineligible method of organizing human activity rather than any improvement in computer 
capabilities or technologies. Specifically, as in Rideshare Displays, the patent-in-suit is directed 
to a system for vehicle identification which allows users of rideshare apps (e.g., Uber and Lyft) to 
verify that they are getting into the correct cars, and for drivers to confirm that they are picking up 
the correct riders. 2025 WL 2751580, at *1. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s objections and 
counterarguments but finds them unpersuasive.  
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To begin, Plaintiff argues that the patent “implements cryptographic authentication.” 
(Doc. 42 at 3.) The problem for Plaintiff is that the patent claims do not recite or otherwise 
embody an improved method of authentication, Columbia Univ, 169 F.4th at 1329, as the 
magistrate judge points out, (Doc. 71 at 9), and Defendant reiterates in response (Doc. 77 at 4–
5).2 The use of an “authentication key”—in a generic, non-specific manner3—is not enough to 
distinguish away Rideshare Displays due to the lack of technological improvement, Universal 
Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., 10 F.4th 1342, 1346–48 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“In cases involving 
authentication technology, patent eligibility often turns on whether the claims provide sufficient 
specificity to constitute an improvement to computer functionality itself. (discussing cases)), as 
Defendant points out, (Doc. 46 at 7). Though an authentication key/token must be generated using 
a physical computer, (Doc. 71 at 7), it does not render a claim non-abstract, Beteiro, 104 F.4th at 
1359 (noting “many post-Alice cases holding that the physicality of what is claimed is not by 
itself enough to exempt the claims from being directed to an abstract idea” (citations and 
quotation marks omitted)).  
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s analogy to a taxi fails because rideshare apps are 
 
2 Indeed, one of the cited prior art references, which is deemed intrinsic evidence, explicitly describes the 
use of authentication token for controlling access to an autonomous vehicle. See U.S. Patent Application 
Publication No. 2016/0301698 at ¶ [0050]; dunnhumby USA, LLC v. emnos USA Corp., No. 13-cv-0399, 
2015 WL 1542365, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2015) (“‘References Cited’—constitute intrinsic evidence.” 
(citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2011))). Plaintiff’s argument 
that he invented token-based authentication, (see Doc. 71 at 4), contradicts intrinsic evidence and is not 
entitled to the presumption of truth, see Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 
913 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court need not ‘accept as true allegations that 
contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,’ such as the claims and the patent 
specification.” (quoting Anderson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 570 F. App’x 927, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2014))). 
 
3 Plaintiff misunderstands the magistrate judge’s point that the patent-in-suit does not disclose or specify 
how to generate an authentication key. (See Doc. 71 at 9.) First, because the claims do not require a 
specific approach to generate one, a skilled artisan may do so in a conventional manner; second, claims 
that are not limited to a particular method of generating an authentication key may be viewed as result-
focused functional claiming. See Columbia Univ., 169 F.4th at 1329; Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox 
Corp., 134 F.4th 1205, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 891 (2025); see also In re Bd. of Trs. 
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 989 F.3d 1367, 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (holding that non-specific 
actions like “providing the determined drug in response to a request” from the computer add nothing of 
significance to an ineligible solve-an-algorithm-on-a-computer claim).  
Moreover, Plaintiff’s reference to Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 
2021), confuses two doctrinal principles in patent law: patent eligibility under § 101 and full-scope 
enablement under § 112. (Doc. 71 at 9.) The difference between the two is explained in Am. Axle & Mfg., 
Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  
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fully automated. (Doc. 42 at 3; see also Doc. 71 at 5 (objecting to the taxi analogy).) However, as 
Defendants and the findings and recommendations point out, (Doc. 70 at 11–12; Doc. 46 at 6), 
claims which “focus on [the] ‘mere automation of manual processes’” in a generic manner are 
nonetheless directed to an abstract idea, PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th at 1318 (quoting Credit 
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  
Plaintiff also contends4 that Uber may not argue that the patent-in-suit is abstract when 
Uber filed its “own patents on the same technology.” (Doc. 71 at 2, 12.)5 As Defendant points 
out, (Doc. 55 at 2; Doc. 77 at 8), the Federal Circuit has already rejected a similar argument: 
Appellant additionally argues that, even if the asserted claims are 
result-oriented, Google similarly uses ‘functional claiming ’ in its 
own video conferencing patents and thus necessarily believes this 
approach to claim drafting does not result in subject matter ineligible 
claims. The subject matter eligibility of Google’s patent claims is not 
before us and has no bearing on our analysis of the ’637 patent. 
US Pat. No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC, 164 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (internal 
citations omitted). This or another court may address Defendants’ patents if, and when, they are 
asserted. 
Moreover, Plaintiff faults the magistrate judge for not addressing claim 8, which further 
specifies that a rider may have the option of sending a message to an emergency contact. (Doc. 71 
at 9.) However, this argument was never presented to the magistrate judge. (See Doc. 70 at 8.) In 
any event, sending a message to an emergency contact is also a method of organizing human 
activity (i.e., an abstract idea) rather than an improvement to computer technology.  
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the patent recites technological improvements related to 
network, hardware, and security improvements. (Doc. 42 at 3–4.) However, the findings and 
 
4 As the Defense points out (Doc. 77 at 8), Plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in his objections. 
In an abundance of caution, and because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court addresses this and certain other 
arguably “new” arguments herein, while disregarding those new arguments that are entirely irrelevant.  
 
5 Notably, one of the patents obtained by Uber and discussed by Plaintiff, U.S. Patent No. 12,432,567 (the 
“’567 Patent”), is a “continuation” of a patent filed in 2017; therefore, it is deemed a prior art reference 
over the patent-in-suit. Consequently, Plaintiff’s argument that his patent is same or similar to the ’567 
Patent creates an obviousness problem for him. That said, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court 
will not construe Plaintiff’s argument as a concession of obviousness.  
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recommendations correctly noted that there is no such improvement on the face of the patent-in-
suit. (Doc. 70 at 11.) Instead, Plaintiff merely points to the technological advancements and 
benefits attained by Defendants. (Doc. 42 at 4; Doc. 71 at 10–11.) This, as Defendant points out, 
(Doc. 46 at 7–8), is a wholly different question from whether the patent claims recite or embody 
those improvements; and whether the specification teaches an ordinarily skilled 
computer/software engineer how to achieve them, see WhitServe LLC v. Dropbox, Inc., 854 F. 
App’x 367, 372 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The specification does not, however, explain the technological 
processes underlying the purported technological improvement.”); Interval Licensing LLC v. 
AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that a patent is not directed to a 
technological solution when it does not teach a skilled artisan how to create the improved 
system). “Where, as here, the specification ‘describes the components and features listed in the 
claims generically,’ it ‘support[s] the conclusion that these components and features are 
conventional.’” Beteiro, 104 F.4th at 1358 (quoting Weisner v. Google LLC, 51 F.4th 1073, 
1083–84 (Fed. Cir. 2022)) (alteration in original). 
B. Alice Step Two 
Because the patent claims are directed to an abstract idea, the Court turns to Alice step 
two. The magistrate judge correctly points out that, as in Rideshare Displays, the patent-in-suit 
merely implements an abstract idea using well-known concepts and technologies in computer 
science. (Doc. 70 at 11.) The Court agrees that the patent “claims to ‘an abstract idea 
implemented on generic computer components, without providing a specific technical solution 
beyond simply using generic computer concepts in a conventional way’ do not suffice at step 
two.” Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 50 F.4th 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2022) 
(quoting BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016)); see also Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 113 F.4th 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2024) (requiring technological solution to a technological challenge). To the extent there is any 
improvement that “more easily enables and facilitates human interactions, [] it does not 
fundamentally alter or improve the way the technology itself functions.” Rideshare Displays, 
2025 WL 2751580, at *6. The discussion below regarding Alice step two is limited to issues and 
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arguments not addressed in Rideshare Displays or the findings and recommendations. 
First, Plaintiff’s invocation of non-obviousness, (Doc. 42 at 1), cannot save the patent-in-
suit because the question of obviousness under § 103 is a distinct question of patent eligibility 
under § 101, Constellation Designs, LLC v. LG Elecs. Inc., 174 F.4th 888, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2026); 
see also Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp., No. 2022-1590, 2023 WL 5346043, at *7 (Fed. Cir. 
Aug. 21, 2023) (“Questions of nonobviousness such as secondary considerations, however, are 
irrelevant when considering eligibility.” (citations omitted)).6  
Second, Plaintiff points to Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and 
contends that the magistrate judge erred by deciding the question of conventionality under Alice 
step two without accepting any evidence from Defendants. (Doc. 71 at 14.) However, as the 
magistrate judge noted, it is well established that § 101 eligibility can be determined at the motion 
to dismiss stage. (Doc. 70 at 5; see also Doc. 77 at 12–13.) As alluded to above, there is no 
possible argument that things like an authentication key/token, a personal computer, a server, a 
display device, and others are not well-known. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health 
Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding patent ineligible at motion to 
dismiss stage appropriate because “no proposed construction of any terms or proposed expert 
 
6 Regardless, the patent is almost certainly obvious. The relevant inquiry asks whether an ordinary 
software engineer, after considering the relevant prior art references and after exercising ordinary skill and 
creativity expected of him, would have found the patented method to be non-obvious. See Altoona Publix 
Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 486 (1935) (“An improvement to an apparatus or method, 
to be patentable, must be the result of invention, and not the mere exercise of the skill of the calling or an 
advance plainly indicated by the prior art.” (citing Elec. Cable Joint Co. v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 292 U.S. 
69, 79–80 (1934))); Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1980) (Section 103 “excludes 
adjustments, alterations, and improvements that could be expected to result from the exercise of the skill 
and ingenuity of a[n ordinary artisan] charged with knowledge of all that is disclosed in prior art.”); KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–21 (2007) (discussing the obviousness inquiry; and instructing 
courts to consider the judgment and creativity of an ordinarily skilled artisan); see also ABS Glob., Inc. v. 
Inguran, LLC, 914 F.3d 1054, 1064–65 (7th Cir. 2019) (Wood, C.J., joined by Barrett and Easterbrook, 
J.J.) (explaining that the obviousness inquiry established in 1952 merely codified the constitutional 
standard of invention); Yoder Bros. v. California-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1378 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(similar).  
Here, claim 1, the representative claim, is nearly identical to the substitute claims that the Federal 
Circuit evaluated in Rideshare Displays, except for the use of an authentication token and user accounts. 
See 2025 WL 2751580, at *3–4. And one of the prior art references cited in Rideshare Displays, U.S. 
Patent No. 9,494,938 col. 8 ll. 12–23, col. 13 ll. 31–43, teaches the use of both. The Court struggles to see 
any plausible argument that it would not have been obvious to take the patents in Rideshare Displays and 
somehow incorporate the use of an authentication key, a very basic concept in computer science. See KSR, 
550 U.S. at 417; Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 228–30 (1976). 
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testimony that would change the § 101 analysis”). 
Third, Plaintiff points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr for the proposition that “a 
computer-controlled physical process is patentable.” (Doc. 71 at 11 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175 (1981)). This argument is irrelevant here because the patent-in-suit is directed to a ride-
sharing app, a software program—and it does not control any non-computer-related process 
(displaying information is an inherent part of many computer-based systems). Nor was this 
argument raised before the magistrate judge.  
Fourth, Plaintiff’s argument that the patent-in-suit “solves a real-world safety crisis,” 
(Doc. 71 at 7–8), does not answer the question of whether the patent claims recite a technological 
solution to a technological problem. An abstract idea implemented on a generic computer or 
smartphone remains patent ineligible, even if it has real-world benefits. Intell. Ventures I LLC v. 
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Claims that amount to nothing 
significantly more than an instruction to apply an abstract idea using some unspecified, generic 
computer and in which each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform 
generic computer functions do not make an abstract idea patent-eligible.” (cleaned up)); In re 
Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“[C]laims to ‘an abstract idea implemented on 
generic computer components, without providing a specific technical solution beyond simply 
using generic computer concepts in a conventional way’ do not pass muster at step two.” (quoting 
Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352)). The findings and recommendations correctly point out that “the 
claims here at most improve the convenience and user experience of matching a rider with a 
vehicle in a crowded environment; they do not ‘fundamentally alter or improve the way the 
technology itself functions’ and therefore do not provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo 
step two.” (Doc. 70 at 11 (quoting Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 
1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).  
C. Other Objections 
Plaintiff also made several objections which were not raised in Plaintiff’s brief in 
opposition. (Doc. 42.) First, Plaintiff’s allegation that some person or party fraudulently filed a 
power-of-attorney with the PTO, (Doc. 71 at 12), has no bearing on the technological merits of 
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the system which undergirds the patent-in-suit. Second, Plaintiff’s argument regarding self-
driving cars, (Doc. 71 at 8), is irrelevant because the claims are plainly not limited to self-driving 
cars. Indeed, the specification explicitly states that a vehicle may be operated by a human driver 
or by a computer. ’691 Patent col. 3 ll. 9–10. Third, Plaintiff’s reference to the PTO’s patent 
eligibility memorandum regarding the mental step doctrine, (Doc. 71 at 3), is irrelevant because 
the patent-in-suit is directed to a method of organizing human activity rather than a mental step, 
see Rideshare Displays, 2025 WL 2751580, at *6. Fourth, Plaintiff’s “Seven-Year Fight for 
American innovation” is not connected to any substantive legal issue regarding patent eligibility. 
(Doc. 71 at 14.) Fifth, the eighteenth objection pertains to joint infringement, an issue that was 
not addressed by the assigned magistrate judge. (Doc. 71 at 13; Doc. 70 at 2 n.2.)  
D. Leave to Amend 
“The [C]ourt considers five factors in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad 
faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the 
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 
984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)).7 The 
Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave 
to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 
amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. 
Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).  
The Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile for the following three 
reasons. First, as the findings and recommendations point out, (Doc. 70 at 10), “the claims [here] 
are drafted using largely (if not entirely) result-focused functional language, containing no 
specificity about how the purported invention achieves those results. Claims of this nature are 
almost always found to be ineligible for patenting under Section 101.” Beteiro, 104 F.4th at 1356. 
Second, the magistrate judge correctly points out, (Doc. 70 at 12), that Plaintiff cannot amend 
around the plain text of the claims, Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 706 (Fed. 
 
7 The findings and recommendations merely listed “bad faith” as one of the factors that the Court may consider when 
deciding whether to grant leave to amend. (Doc. 70 at 12.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, (Doc. 71 at 13), the Court 
sees no indication that the assigned magistrate judge found that Plaintiff acted in bad faith.  
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Cir. 2023) (“No amendment to a complaint can alter what a patent itself states. In this case, then, 
our agreement with the district court as to what the patent discloses, and our agreement with the 
court’s application of the Alice test, leads inexorably to the conclusion that amendment of the 
complaint would have been futile.”); Shortridge v. Found. Constr. Payroll Serv., LLC, No. 14-cv-
04850-JCS, 2015 WL 1739256, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (denying leave to amend for a 
pro se plaintiff), aff’d, 655 F. App’x 848 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Third, the fact that the Federal Circuit 
has addressed virtually identical patents in Rideshare Displays effectively compels a conclusion 
by this Court that the patent-in-suit is invalid for want of patentable subject matter under § 101.  
For the above reasons, the Court concludes that the asserted patent is INVALID for want 
of patent eligible subject matter and that amendment would be futile.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:  
(1) The findings and recommendations issued June 22, 2026 (Doc. 70) are ADOPTED IN 
FULL. 
(2) Plaintiff’s request for leave to file exhibits in support of his objections (Doc. 73) is 
DENIED.  
(3) Defendant Uber’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33), joined by Defendant Waymo, (Doc. 
36), is GRANTED. 
(4) Defendant Waymo’s separate motion to dismiss (Doc. 37) is DENIED AS MOOT.  
(5) The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE 
TO AMEND. 
 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:   September 28, 2026_ 
 
Case 1:25-cv-00814-JLT-HBK     Document 84     Filed 09/28/26     Page 11 of 11

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